Lewis Claims Research Articles

Dasgupta's Detonation

Dasgupta's Detonation

A Curse upon the Nation: Race, Freedom, and Extermination in America and the Atlantic World by Kay Wright Lewis

Reviewed by: A Curse upon the Nation: Race, Freedom, and Extermination in America and the Atlantic World by Kay Wright Lewis Stephen E. Maizlish A Curse upon the Nation: Race, Freedom, and Extermination in America and the Atlantic World. Kay Wright Lewis. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2017. ISBN 978-0-8203-5127-8, 292 pp., cloth, $64.95. Kay Wright Lewis's goal is to correct past accounts of slavery and its aftermath that have inadequately acknowledged the fear and trauma created by the racialized violence African Americans experienced. In A Curse upon the Nation: Race, Freedom, and Extermination in America and the Atlantic World, Lewis claims that "extermination was part of a racialized ideology used to sustain" slavery (2). For African Americans, the memories of that violence in the antebellum South and in the Jim Crow society that followed "remained significant into the Civil Rights era" (2). Whites in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Lewis argues, believed that emancipation and black equality would lead to a race war and the extinction of both races. It was to avoid this outcome that whites employed exterminating racial violence against blacks. Racial violence in America began with the first European settlements. It was initially directed against native peoples. As the colonies expanded, this culture of exterminating brutality came to dominate race relations generally, eventually extending to the imported African population. Lewis traces this growing determination to eliminate or enslave those whom European settlers considered barbarians through the entire colonial period. White people's fear of what they believed to be the warrior past of the Africans they enslaved drove them with particular force to treat their slaves with harsh and gruesome cruelty. Nevertheless, African slaves resisted their enslavement. That in turn, argues Lewis, led to retaliation and even more widespread exterminating white violence. This bloodletting persisted into the antebellum period and intensified in the aftermath of Nat Turner's rebellion in 1831. The result of this new explosion of terror was a series of lasting traumatic memories that haunted the black community for many years. Fear of a race war continued to consume the antebellum white South following Turner's insurrection and its bloody aftermath. Dread of a race war dominated the Virginia debates over slavery and formed the basis for Southern opposition to the reopening of the Atlantic slave trade. Lewis argues that this dread also explains the panicky Southern white people's reaction to John Brown's raid. The memory of the exterminating horror that came after Turner's upraising led African American slaves to be wary of and ultimately reject participation in Brown's plan for a slave insurrection. They feared a bloodbath, but even though they had not responded positively to Brown, one followed the raid anyway. Lewis follows her analysis of racial violence in antebellum America with the claim that South Carolina left the Union not only in reaction to its perception of Northern hostility to slavery but also from a belief that the Federal government [End Page 299] would no longer protect the South from a slave insurrection, that is, from the very race war Southerners had long dreaded. Slaves saw the war for the Union, unlike John Brown's raid, as an opportunity to at last achieve their dream of freedom, so they willingly participated in the Northern war effort. The white Southern response was predictable. As they had been for centuries, African American civilians, along with captured black soldiers, were slaughtered by white Southerners in another exterminating reign of terror that continued after the war and traumatized the black populations for decades to come. That trauma, Lewis explains, was only reinforced during the years of Jim Crow and by the violence visited upon returning black soldiers following the First and Second World Wars. Civil Rights leaders of the 1950s and 60s had different views of how to counter white violence, but, Lewis reminds us, they all recognized that this violence needed to be confronted. Lewis is correct to focus on the ever-present Southern concern over a mutually destructive war of the races. It is impossible to examine the Southern white past without continuously encountering this obsessive anxiety over racial conflict. Lewis's...

Approaching Job by Andrew Zack Lewis

Reviewed by: Approaching Job by Andrew Zack Lewis David Penchansky andrew zack lewis, Approaching Job (Cascade Companions 33; Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2017). Pp. ix + 145. Paper $16.80. Lewis provides a good survey of both the content of the Book of Job and its major critical issues. Although he claims to take no sides, he usually advocates one interpretation over others. He describes his work as a "companion," not a commentary. He does not cover Job verse by verse or even pericope by pericope. He rather reflects on the book in its various parts. There is, however, a dramatic disconnect in this work between two conflicting interpretations, and L. tries unsuccessfully to maintain them both. First, he claims that God's speeches provide a key to Job's meaning. God's reflections on the natural world indicate that Job's fate pales in importance. In other places, L. emphasizes Job's persistence, honesty, and ultimate submission, which leads to his restoration. God, then, is just and will restore Job. So which is it? Does Job not matter, or is the deity obsessed with his piety? Lewis claims the Book of Job is "tidy" (pp. 45, 53), by which he means tightly structured and organized. He says, "I assume a general integrity of the book" (p. 4). He offers two entirely different ways to structure his interpretation. First, he presents Job as a narrative in which the various main characters move forward and progress to a climax. The friends grow increasingly frustrated and angry. Most importantly, Job moves from ignorance and selfishness to submission and insight. A second structure, a chiastic one, suggests that the beginning and end reflect each other, and the center is most important. These two interpretations (never reconciled) lead L. to claim that the Book of Job (though produced by multiple authors) has a single ruling genius and that the disparate parts work together to make a single statement. For L., Job is univocal (p. 105), yet he points to many untidy features. He claims, though, that Job possesses its own kind of tidiness, one that excuses the rough edges. [End Page 317] This short book, after the introduction, consists of four chapters. In the first, L. provides a sketch of every character in Job, including the minor ones that he identifies as mere plot devices. Chapter 2 (which L. advises the nonprofessional to skip) introduces the major critical problems that face every Job interpretation. In chap. 3, he explores the book's theological implications, and in chapter 4 he applies the whole to the contemporary world of suffering, poverty, and ecological degradation. Ultimately, L. blames Job for selfishness and failure to understand the nature of God's freedom (p. 100), For L., the Book of Job attacks the theological belief that God punishes all transgression and rewards piety. He argues that the book presents a free God who transcends any formula, which he says would "pigeonhole the divine action" (p. 120). At the same time, L. wants to assert that the Book of Job depicts a just God who will restore Job because of his piety, steadfastness, and repentance. L. exonerates God from responsibility for Job's suffering but ultimately gives an unsatisfactory explanation for Job's pain. This resembles God's unsatisfactory answer that he gives to Job from the tempest. David Penchansky University of St. Thomas, Saint Paul, MN 55105 Copyright © 2018 The Catholic Biblical Association of America

Disappearing knowledge

Following the exposition of the basic standpoints of contextualism in relation to invariantistic position, which takes the concept of knowledge in its rigorous and fixed meaning, the text continues to deal with the analysis of the concept of knowledge offered by David Lewis, with a goal to solve common epistemological problems, one of those being the lottery paradox. Accepting fallibilism as the only plausible option regarding the possibility of acquiring knowledge, Lewis claims that, with the postulated rules that allow us to properly eliminate alternative possibilities, it is possible to resolve the previously mentioned paradox. If we want to base knowledge on probability, and not on certainty, and to directly stipulate it with the context in which it is being imposed or expressed, than it is obvious that knowledge will depend on whether the requirements for knowledge are high or low. Thus, in one case it might occur that we have knowledge, and in the other that we do not, even though nothing is changed except the conversational conditions that are already ?in the game?. Such, elusive knowledge, that gets lost, De Rose labels ?now you know it, now you don?t? and considers it to be a direct consequence of Lewis?s analysis. As such, the analysis should not be accepted.

Sensuous Abstraction as Aesthetic Wonder: Reframing Lewis’s Analysis of Studied Perception

In each instance I read — or more aptly put, studied — Tyson Lewis's essay on Studied Perception and a Phenomenon of Bodily Gesturality, I sought a comfort- able environment with an accommodating chair, as well as a table that provided room for me to move about among my books, notepad, and computer. These physical needs were important components in my efforts to maintain a mental state that allowed for clarity of thought and insight. No brown or imaginative abstraction was possible for me without those physical accommodations. While studying Lewis's words, I leaned forward and backward in my seat as my mental processes required. At times my hands supported my chin, while at others my hands were occupied with holding a pen or paper as I underlined key passages and my head nodded along with each of his central points. I would argue alongside Lewis that each of those actions was essential to my thought process as I engaged in abstract thinking. His account of the gesturality that accompanies contemplation reminds me that I operate under the assumption that my students have developed and frequently tap into their own carefully cultivated habits of mind and body as they study even though I do not explicitly discuss or model such processes when we are in class together. This interests me since it means that I have fallen short of creating the kinds of spaces that Lewis calls for, even though I would agree that they are valuable and essential to the learning process. As Lewis notes, the task of the teacher is to: open up a space and a time wherein students can stumble upon/into their gestures, get lost in these gestures, and thus take pleasure in the delay of perceptual completion. He argues that we, as educators, are lacking in our efforts to fulfill this aspect of our responsibilities, and I am inclined to agree. Underlying his claim concerning the important role of bodily gesturality is Lewis's phenomenological analysis of study based on Samuel Todes's work, Body and World. While I found Lewis's analysis of Todes to be sound and thought- provoking, I would like to address an aspect of the discussion of sensuous abstraction that I believe to be present in Lewis's thinking but is not sufficiently acknowledged by him. My argument is that in discussing the characteristics of sensuous abstraction both Todes and Lewis are talking about an aesthetic approach to experiencing and making-meaning of what is being studied and I shall explain why this is an important point to hold in dialogue with the rest of Lewis's claims. To better understand Lewis's analysis of Todes's work, I visited Body and World's Appendix II - Sensuous Abstraction and the Abstract Sense of Reality 1 from which Lewis draws many of his examples of Todes's thinking on this matter. I found it interesting that Todes sets forth as the goal of perception a kind of scientific facticity that is concerned with the 'thisness' of things, 2 which is why,

Madame de Pompadour's Protege: Henri Bertin and the Collapse of Bourbon Absolutism c. 1750-1792

Gwynne Lewis, Emeritus Professor of History at Warwick University, describes the collapse of French absolutism through the distinguished administrative career of Henri Bertin, reformer, sometime économiste, intendant, contrôleur-général des finances (1759–63) and ultimately secretary of state (1763–80). Lewis asserts that Bertin rose to such heights thanks to the patronage of Madame de Pompadour and stayed there because of his vital role in both overseeing and covering up Louis XV’s illicit sex life. Organised in mostly chronological fashion in six substantive chapters and a lengthy conclusion, Lewis takes his readers on a whirlwind tour of a number of important topics. Although Lewis claims that he will ‘record and evaluate Bertin’s significant contribution to the ideological, political and economic reforms that were introduced following the disasters of the Seven Years’ War’, he spends remarkably little time discussing either the content or nature of the reforms themselves or detailing Bertin’s role in them even in the three chapters ostensibly devoted to those subjects (Chapters 4–6). Instead, readers learn about the rise of the Bertin family of Périgueux to become robe nobles, the displacement of the oldest son and heir, the comte de Fratteaux and Henri’s assumption of the mantle of leadership and his simultaneous assimilation to the group surrounding Madame de Pompadour. Lewis goes out on a limb to assert that Pompadour, Bertin and Louis XV formed a ‘royal “triumvirate”’ in 1754 that lasted nearly until Pompadour’s death in 1764 that was based on overseeing and then covering up Louis XV’s extramarital affairs. Lewis frequently over-emphasises the impact of Louis XV’s sex life on the waning authority of Bourbon absolutism. For this reader, these assertions required much more evidence to be convincing. This part of the book also highlights the significance of the Seven Years War in weakening French absolutism as well as making tantalising but vague references to Louis XV’s secret diplomacy. Unfortunately the linkages among these factors are not clarified or explored sufficiently to understand the basis of Lewis’s arguments.

The Garden as Unfinished Narrative of the Good in C.S. Lewis’ Perelandra

In Lewis’ transposition of Milton’s Paradise to a distant world where Adam and Eve do not succumb to Satan, the structure of Eden is radically different from the enclosed garden familiar to most readers. In the novel Perelandra (1944), C.S. Lewis represents the Garden of Eden as an open and ‘shifting’ place. The new Garden of Eden, with Adam and Eve unfallen, is a place of indeterminate future, excitement, growth, and change, very unlike the static, safe, enclosed Garden—the hortus conclusus of traditional iconography—from which humanity is not just expelled but also, in some sense, escapes. The innovation is not in the theological underpinnings that Lewis claims to share with Milton but in the literary devices that make evil in Perelandra seem boring, dead-end, and repetitive, while goodness is the clear source of change and excitement.

TESTIMONY AND SINCERITY

AbstractIs there a justified presumption that a speaker is testifying sincerely? Anti‐reductionism about testimony claims that there is, absent reasons to the contrary. Yet why believe this, given the actuality and prevalence of lies and deception? I examine one argument that may be appropriated to meet this challenge, David Lewis's claim that truthfulness is a convention. I argue that it fails, and that the supposition that there is a presumption of sincerity remains unsupported. The failure of Lewis's argument is instructive, however, for it shows us a better way of approaching language use than the standard anti‐reductionist treatment. As speech is an intentional action, so a presumption of the sincerity or otherwise of others' testimony must be explicable in the terms we normally use to explain action.

Success and truth in the realism/anti-realism debate

I aim to clarify the relationship between the success of a theory and the truth of that theory. This has been a central issue in the debates between realists and anti-realists. Realists assume that success is a reliable indicator of truth, but the details about the respects in which success is a reliable indicator or test of truth have been largely left to our intuitions. Lewis (Synthese 129:371–380, 2001) provides a clear proposal of how success and truth might be connected, comparing a test of success of our theories to medical tests with low rates of false positives and false negatives. But, contrary to what Lewis claims, I argue that it is not enough for the realist to undercut the claim that success is not a reliable indicator of truth. Rather, the realist must show that our current best theories are likely true. Further, I argue that tests in science are unlike medical tests in a number of important ways.

Desire-as-belief revisited

On Hume’s account of motivation, beliefs and desires are very di¤erent kinds of propositional attitudes. Beliefs are cognitive attitudes, desires emotive ones. An agent’s belief in a proposition captures the weight he or she assigns to this proposition in his or her cognitive representation of the world. An agent’s desire for a proposition captures the degree to which he or she prefers its truth, motivating him or her to act accordingly. Although beliefs and desires are sometimes entangled, they play very di¤erent roles in rational agency.1 In two classic papers (Lewis 1988, 1996), David Lewis discusses several challenges to this Humean picture, but ultimately rejects them. We think that his discussion of a central anti-Humean alternative – the desire-as-belief thesis – is in need of re nement. On this thesis, the desire for proposition p is given by the belief that p is desirable. Lewis claims that ‘[e]xcept in trivial cases, [this thesis] collapses into contradiction’(Lewis 1996, p. 308). The problem, he argues, is that the thesis is inconsistent with the purportedly plausible requirement that one’s desire for a proposition should not change upon learning that the proposition is true; call this the invariance requirement. In this paper, we revisit Lewis’s argument. We show that, if one carefully distinguishes between non-evaluative and evaluative propositions, the desire-asbelief thesis can be rendered consistent with the invariance requirement. Lewis’s conclusion holds only under certain conditions: the desire-as-belief thesis con‡icts with the invariance requirement if and only if there are certain correlations between non-evaluative and evaluative propositions. But when there are such correlations, we suggest, the invariance requirement loses its plausibility. Thus Lewis’s argument against the desire-as-belief thesis appears to be valid only in cases in which it is unsound.

An Economic Evaluation of the Moneyball Hypothesis

Michael Lewis's book, Moneyball, describes how an innovative manager working for the Oakland Athletics successfully exploited an inefficiency in baseball's labor market over a prolonged period of time. We evaluate Lewis's claims by applying standard econometric procedures to data on player productivity and compensation from 1999 to 2004. These methods support Lewis's argument that certain baseball skills were valued inefficiently in the early part of this period, and that this inefficiency was profitably exploited by managers with the ability to generate and interpret statistical knowledge. Consistent with Lewis's story and economic reasoning, as knowledge of the inefficiency became increasingly dispersed across baseball teams the market corrected the original mispricing.

The Simple Vs. Reformed Conditional Analysis of Dispositions

Lewis claims that Martin’s cases indeed refute the simple conditional analysis of dispositions and proposes the reformed conditional analysis that is purported to overcome them. In this paper I will first argue that Lewis’s defense of the reformed analysis can be understood to invoke the concepts of disposition-specific stimulus and manifestation. I will go on to argue that advocates of the simple analysis, just like Lewis, can also defend their analysis from alleged counterexamples including Martin’s cases by invoking the concepts of disposition-specific stimulus and manifestation. This means that Lewis’s own necessary defense of the reformed analysis invalidates his motivation of it. Finally, I will argue that we have a good reason to favor the simple analysis over Lewis’s analysis.

Lewis on fallible knowledge

Lewis has offered a contextualist epistemology that he claims is non-fallibilist. The present note aims to show that, while there seems to be a simple argument for Lewis's claim, the argument is fallacious, and Lewis's epistemology is fallibilist after all.

David Lewis's Counterfactual Arrow of Time

David Lewis (1979) has argued that according to his possible worlds analysis of counterfactuals, backtracking counterfactuals of the form If event A were to happen at tA, then event B would happen at where tB precedes tA, are usually false if B does not actually happen at tB. On the other hand, there are plenty of such counterfactuals true with tA preceding tB; for instance it is true that were I to drop the glass now, it would hit the ground at some point in the future, even if in fact it does not do so. Assuming some contingent facts about the arrangement and laws of our universe, this time-reversal asymmetry, Lewis claims, follows from a possible worlds analysis of counterfactuals despite the fact that this analysis of counterfactuals is entirely time symmetric. Lewis argues, further, that this asymmetry gives meaning to the common notion of the future as open and the past as closed, even if determinism both of the future by the past and of the past by the future is true, which for the purposes of the analysis he assumes it to be and in which assumption I will follow him in this paper. With Lewis, and also contrary to my own views, I will assume physicalism. Much of the argument of Lewis's (1979) paper is a reply to an objection that had been raised by Fine and others against his analysis of counterfactuals. I shall argue that Lewis's reply succeeds in some interesting special cases but fails in others to demonstrate the asymmetry he seeks. But even more seriously, I shall show that the asymmetry Lewis finds, if there actually is one to be found there, is grounded in the fact that there is a time-reversal asymmetric preselection in the kinds of events that figure as antecedents of ordinary language counterfactuals. We do not in practice ask: What would happen if p held? for every proposition p, but only for some. I argue that this preselection of some antecedents of counterfactuals but not others in everyday counterfactuals is based in part on the commonsensical notion that generally it is past events that are the causes of future

On staying the same

According to David Lewis, something 'endures iff it persists by being wholly present at more than one time' (1986: 202). Lewis claims that the 'problem of temporary intrinsics' (PTI, henceforth) is a decisive objection against endurance: 'Persisting things change their intrinsic properties. For instance shape: when I sit, I have a bent shape, when I stand, I have a straightened shape.... How is such change possible?' (1986: 203-204). Robin Le Poidevin explicates the difficulty this way: 'Among the set of past facts is Fa; among the set of present facts is Not-Fa. So reality contains two facts, Fa and Not-Fa, which together form a contradiction' (1998: 38). Lewis's alternative is 'Perdurantism': ordinary material things persist by having parts that exist at different times. Temporary intrinsics belong to different temporal parts. Lewis is bent in the derived sense that he has a part that is bent simpliciter; he sits and stands much as a road is both straight and windy because it has a straight part and a windy part. One way to defend Endurantism against PTI is to deny that shapes are intrinsic properties. Lewis, setting out this view, writes:

Seth Forman. Blacks in the Jewish Mind: A Crisis of Liberalism. New York: New York University Press, 1998. x, 274 pp.

This is a welcome corrective to the many recent polemical and scholarly—but tendentious—studies of black-Jewish relations that portray Jews as differing little from other whites. As Seth Forman indicates, many of these studies bear the imprint of the Black Power movement, whose influence mounted in the late 1960s. Seeking to undermine the integrationist civil rights coalition in which Jews occupied a leading role, the writers of these works severely minimized or denied any special Jewish empathy for the African-American cause. David L. Lewis claims that Jewish involvement in the civil rights movement was motivated by self-interest rather than by heightened sensitivity rooted in a memory of antisemitic persecution. Jews allegedly “us[ed] Blacks as surrogates” (p. 12) to eliminate discrimination against Jews, blacks deriving little benefit from the alliance. Harold Cruse similarly portrayed Jews in the civil rights movement as opportunistic, as a privileged group that had not suffered in the United States and therefore had nothing in common with African Americans. According to Forman, Taylor Branch even cites Israel's refusal to grant citizenship to members of Ben-Ami Carter's “Black Hebrew” sect as evidence that Jews have been “perpetrators of racial hate” (p. 14). But Branch ignores the invalidity of the sect's claim to be Jewish as well as its virulently antisemitic and anti-white theology.

Is Connectedness Necessary to What Matters in Survival

The standard version of the psychological criterion or theory of personal identity takes it that psychological connectedness is not necessary for personal identity, or for what matters in survival. That is, a future person can be you, and/or have what matters in survival for you, even though there is no psychological connectedness between you and that future person. David Lewis, however, holds that psychological connectedness is necessary to both identity and what matters (which he takes to coincide). This entails, Lewis acknowledges, that if a human body were to live longer than connectedness lasts, then that body would ‘embody’ or ‘constitute’ a different person later on than it did to begin with. Moreover, Lewis accepts, a body may embody more than one person at any one time. Lewis claims that this can be reconciled to some degree with common sense if we count by person stages rather than by persons. I show, though, that Lewis' view cannot be salvaged in this way, and, moreover, that it leads to further absurdities. I conclude that as an account of identity and of what matters in survival, it is highly implausible, and most unsatisfactory.

The 'Protean' Spirit of Jeff Lewis

In a recent contribution to this journal, Jeff Lewis has criticised the views of both Nigel Blake and myself on spiritual education. In particular he has taken exception to my own claim that concepts of spirituality are indexed to particular religious or other traditions raising difficulties for any common programme of spiritual education. Lewis claims that my own conception of spirituality is mistakenly 'reductionist' and seeks to base a general conception of spiritual education on a more 'holistic' approach. By way of response, I argue (amongst other points): first, that Lewis does not consistently adhere to this 'holistic' conception and that his account of spiritual life is ultimately no less 'reductionist' than mine; second, that his attempt to ground a perspective-neutral conception of spiritual life in the claims of cognitive science is deeply misconceived; third, that his arguments have seriously problematic socio-political implications.

The 'Protean' Spirit of Jeff Lewis

In a recent contribution to this journal, Jeff Lewis has criticised the views of both Nigel Blake and myself on spiritual education. In particular he has taken exception to my own claim that concepts of spirituality are indexed to particular religious or other traditions raising difficulties for any common programme of spiritual education. Lewis claims that my own conception of spirituality is mistakenly 'reductionist' and seeks to base a general conception of spiritual education on a more 'holistic' approach. By way of response, I argue (amongst other points): first, that Lewis does not consistently adhere to this 'holistic' conception and that his account of spiritual life is ultimately no less 'reductionist' than mine; second, that his attempt to ground a perspective-neutral conception of spiritual life in the claims of cognitive science is deeply misconceived; third, that his arguments have seriously problematic socio-political implications.

The Pseudo-Homeric World of Mrs. Dalloway

A big book is big bore. - Callimachus, fragment 465 Never did any book so bore me. - Virginia Woolf, Letters 3:80 The relationship between Mrs. Dalloway and Joyce's Ulysses has been construed by critics as adversarial almost from the beginning, partly because of the vitriolic attack on Mrs. Dalloway by Wyndham Lewis in 1934. But Lewis's cheap shot was merely squib. The ad ignorantiam arguments by which he claimed that the scenes in Woolf's novel are exact and puerile copies of the scenes in [Ulysses] (138) launched line of successors who swallowed his model whole.(1) Lewis's claim that the sound of the smoke-writing airplane boring into the ears of the crowd (MD 29-30; emphasis added) is a pathetic 'crib' of the fireworks display and the rocket that is the culmination of Mr. Bloom's beach ecstasy (138-39) apparently relies on the sky that serves as background in instances. No doubt Lewis's interest in the pseudo-Homeric image of Bloom impersonating Odysseus among the Phaiakians admiring Nausicaa leaves Lewis dazzled; yet he doesn't mention the airplane that appears and reappears like portentous bird in Proust's Remembrance of Things Past, an indebtedness that Woolf explicitly acknowledges (Diary 234, 322). Clearly excluding most contemporary novels, Lewis feels that Ulysses is or ought to be the cynosure of the literate world. As for Mrs. Dalloway, Odysseus, Nausicaa, and her Scherian family (suitably obscure) will appear elsewhere. We need more careful explication.(2) The fact is that Woolf's airplane is writing instrument inscribing Homer's winged words white smoke from quite unlike Joyce's fountain-pen-like fireworks (MD 29, 42). The aerial display follows the backfiring automobile (19), of which are aurally related to Aristophanic crepitation from boredom (Henderson 196), sequence of scatological commentary. Another serious oversight is the statue of canine Gordon with one leg (MD 77). Doubtless those aware of the techniques of and satire, associating the raised leg the smoke from behind, might also associate them (in spite of the chiastic arrangement)(3) Joyce's Ulysses, which as Woolf expressed it includes a dog that p's and a man that forths (Letters 2: 234). Appropriately, Margaret Rose reminds us, discrepancy between the parodied text and its new context is one of the chief sources of the comic (23) and its criticism of society as well (Levin 248). Woolf herself says parodies should be amusing, do the work of the critic greater daring than the critic can usually display. . . . First they make us laugh, and then they make us think . . . [giving] little model of the work in question [with a] sense of the defects of that work by few deft pinches and twists which bring out the absurdity without destroying the likeness. (Essays 89) Rose addresses the problems associated recognizing in literature-which as Jonathan Culler explains requires somewhat different mode of reading (152) - the first concerning the naive reader who is unable to recognize that exists at all. The second, also highly relevant to Lewis's situation, concerns the reader who recognizes the quotation but does not comprehend the intention; this reader may believe that the author is unintentionally misquoting . . . because his sympathy for the parodied text is so strong that his assumptions about it have not been affected by the parody (Rose 27). Lewis and others miss the actual and introduce irrelevancies that inspire accusations of plagiarism. Another reader might feel both the parodied text and its author to be the targets of satire. Finally, Rose offers the ideal reader reaction as one in which the reader of the parodied effect enjoys the recognition of the hidden irony and satire (27). As of Ulysses, device that replaces authorial intrusion (Oettli 68) and that frees us from the demands of poetic seriousness (Culler 152), Mrs. …