Level Of Polarization Research Articles

The Role of Anti-Establishment Orientations During the Trump Presidency

AbstractGrowing levels of polarization and out-group hostility have become fashionable explanations for the caustic politics of the Trump presidency. However, partisan and ideological identities cannot explain popular attraction to Trump’s anti-elite and populist rhetoric, nor can polarization and sorting account for rising levels of mass identification as political independents. In light of these discrepancies, we offer an explanation for the Trump era unrelated to traditional left-right identities and ideologies: anti-establishment orientations. We argue that much of what is interpreted as an expression of partisan and ideological extremism or polarization is actually the product of a deep-seated antagonism toward the broader political establishment. We first exhibit the individual-level correlates of anti-establishment orientations, finding that people holding strong anti-establishment views exhibit relatively high levels of anti-social personality traits and distrust of others. We then show that anti-establishment orientations are more predictive than left-right orientations of beliefs in conspiracy theories regarding COVID-19, QAnon, and voter fraud. Most importantly, we demonstrate that, while anti-establishment orientations are positively related to support for Donald Trump, they are negatively related to support for Joe Biden and both major parties. In short, the toxicity emblematic of the Trump era—support for outsider candidates, belief in conspiracy theories, corrosive rhetoric, and violence—are derivative of antipathy towards the established political order, rather than a strict adherence to partisan and ideological dogma. We conclude that Trump’s most powerful and unique impact on American electoral politics is his activation, inflammation, and manipulation of preexisting anti-establishment orientations for partisan ends.

Virtual network communications and the political polarization of society (on the example of the United States)

The article is devoted to assessing the degree of influence of virtual network communications on the level of ideological polarization of society. The theoretical basis of the research was the works of foreign authors devoted to the problems of the network society and network communication, and the empirical basis was the results of observation of the information and communication processes that accompanied the US presidential campaign in 2020. The use of communication and network approaches allowed to trace the correlation between the mass use of popular Internet services and the political radicalization of citizens. The authors conclude that virtual network communication has a high potential for conflict. It ensures cooperation between groups of like-minded political activists, but exacerbates the political polarization of the society. The algorithms of new media are designed to stimulate ideological confrontation. The principle of maximum personalization of content immerses ordinary users in «information cocoons» (echo chambers), where they are isolated from alternative views of the surrounding reality. By constantly provoking the audience of social networks to emotional reactions, political actors and the media deliberately exacerbate the contradictions existing in society. They fill the virtual environment with resonant statements, mutual insults and fake news.The sense of permissiveness experienced by individuals using social networks contributes to the radicalization of the new media discourse. The key problem is that this state of affairs satisfies IT-corporations and meets the particular interests of the subjects of political struggle. From the point of view of the authors of the article, it is objectively necessary to introduce strict political and managerial mechanisms that can ensure the ordering of communication processes in the virtual environment. There are prerequisites for the ideological polarization of society in modern Russia, as in the United States. There is a great danger that during the fateful election campaigns at the federal level the ideological confrontation in social networks may develop into the violent struggle. To prevent the implementation of this negative scenario, a qualitative modernization of the existing regulatory framework in the field of regulation of network communications is required.

Legislative Capacity & Administrative Power Under Divided Polarization

Abstract Conventional wisdom holds that party polarization leads to legislative gridlock, which in turn disables congressional oversight of agencies and thus erodes their constitutional legitimacy and democratic accountability. At the root of this argument is an empirical claim that higher levels of polarization materially reduce legislative productivity as measured by the number of laws passed or the number of issues on the legislative agenda addressed by those laws, both of which are negatively associated with party polarization. By focusing on the content of statutes passed rather than their number, this essay shows that in the era of party polarization and divided government, Congress has actually 1) enacted an ever growing volume of significant regulatory policy (packaged into fewer laws); 2) increasingly employed implementation designs intended to limit bureaucratic and presidential power; and 3) legislated regulatory policy substance in greater detail (reducing bureaucratic discretion) when relying on litigation and courts as a supplement or alternative to bureaucracy. This essay thereby complicates, both empirically and normatively, the relationship between Congress and administrative power in the era of party polarization and divided government.

Affective blocs: Understanding affective polarization in multiparty systems

Research has suggested that affective polarization (AP)—the extent to which partisans view each other as a disliked out-group—has increased, especially in two-party political systems such as in the US. The understanding of AP in multiparty systems remains limited. We study AP in Finland, characterized by a strong multiparty system and a low level of ideological polarization, between 2007 and 2019. We find that AP has increased, driven mainly by voters evaluating their least favorite party more negatively. We also propose an approach that goes beyond earlier literature, which has mostly used a single aggregate metric to measure AP. Using latent profile analysis, we find that voters are grouped into blocs that view some parties positively and others negatively. This suggests that the complex dynamics of AP in multiparty democracies involve relationships between not just individual parties but between what we call affective blocs that span across party lines.

What News Users Perceive as ‘Alternative Media’ Varies between Countries: How Media Fragmentation and Polarization Matter

Studies have extensively discussed what characterizes news media sources as alternative. However, this study focuses on users and the range of news sources they perceive as alternative media. We expect that these audience perceptions vary between countries, depending on the level of media fragmentation and polarization. We use original survey data from five countries (Denmark = 2,667 respondents; Italy = 2,121; Poland = 2,536; Switzerland = 1,859; United States = 3,493) and investigate (i) what sources are perceived by users as alternative and (ii) whether these perceptions differ among users embedded in more or less fragmented-polarized media environments. Our results reveal that users have distinctive types of media in mind when reporting alternative media consumption, fanning out on a spectrum from traditional mass media outlets to self-proclaimed alternative news media. Interestingly, despite a greater supply of alternative news sources and an overall higher propensity to indicate the use of alternative news sources, citizens in more fragmented-polarized media environments are more likely to indicate using mass media outlets as alternative news media. We conclude from these findings that media fragmentation and polarization in a political information environment contribute to the convergence of the alternative-to-mainstream spectrum in the eyes of their audiences.

Ticking all the boxes? A comparative study of social sorting and affective polarization

This study explores whether, in societies around the world, affective polarization – or animosity between citizens based on their political allegiance – is stronger if political divisions align with non-political ones. Such ‘social sorting’ has earlier been established to foster affective polarization in the United States. In this study, I argue that the underlying mechanism travels across the globe. I then present two complementary studies which confirm this hypothesis. First, I employ CSES data to predict the level of affective polarization by social sorting at 119 elections in 40 countries, showing that greater alignment of partisan divisions with non-political divisions in a society (along the lines of income, education, religion and region) is associated with stronger dislike towards political outgroups. Second, using Dutch panel data, I show that individuals who fit the socio-demographic ‘profile’ of their party better tend to be more affectively polarized. This has important implications for our understanding of affective polarization.

Politics, Markets, and Pandemics: Public Education’s Response to COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic provides a unique opportunity to examine how local governments respond to a public health crisis amid high levels of partisan polarization. As an arena that has historically been relatively insulated from national partisan cleavages, public schools provide a useful window into understanding the growing nationalization of local politics. Leveraging the fact that all school districts had to adopt a reopening plan in fall 2020, we assess the factors that influenced school district reopening decisions. We find that mass partisanship and vested interests best explain the degree to which schools reopened. Republican (Democratic) districts were far more (less) likely to reopen in person, while districts with stronger unions relied more on remote learning. Notably, we find little connection between reopening decisions and indicators measuring the severity of the virus. Finally, public schools were sensitive to the threat of student exit. Districts located in counties with more Catholic schools were somewhat more likely to reopen in person. We assess the implications of these findings for U.S. education policy and the study of local government more generally.

A divided kingdom? Variation in polarization, sorting, and dimensional alignment among the British public, 1986-2018.

Understanding changes in the structure of public opinion is necessary to evaluate both contemporary claims about political divisions in Brexit Britain, as well as to uncover any long-term mapping of public opinion on the depolarization and subsequent polarization of elites from the birth of New Labour to the aftermath of the Great Recession. I assess trends from British Social Attitudes surveys, utilizing recent conceptual and methodological distinctions between different features of public opinion change. I find that the public, on average, moved to the left during the early 1990s, to the right during New Labour, and back to the left from 2010. Such oscillations are even more pronounced for positions along a welfare dimension. In contrast, average positions along a libertarian-authoritarian dimension were constant until around 2010, when the public became more liberal. Polarization of left-right opinion has increased in recent years but does not match that estimated between the mid-1980s and early 1990s, while low and stable levels of polarization are estimated along libertarian-authoritarian and welfare dimensions. Overall trends are dis-aggregated by social class, educational attainment, party identification, strength of partisanship, interest in politics, and position on Europe. Further, the relationships between positions along these three ideological dimensions vary systematically across time and between groups.

Determinants of the Sales Market of Products of Meat Processing Complex in the Innovation and Investment System of Regional Polarized

The article considers the determinants of the sales market development of meat processing complex products that implement the parameters of innovation and investment capacity of local subjects in the innovation and investment system of the regional polarized space. The purpose of this study was to characterize Ukrainian sales market development of meat processing complex products. A comprehensive methodological approach to the systematic diagnosis of the time interval for the sale of meat processing complex products of the region according to the level of spatial polarization of innovation and investment capacity of the subject has been developed. The determinants of the development of the sales market for meat products have been identified. The forecast spatio-temporal interval of sales of meat processing complex products according to the level of innovation and investment capacity of the subjects in the polarized innovation and investment system of the region is interpreted. The analysis of production and marketing activities of agro-clusters of the meat processing complex of Ukraine is carried out. An assessment of the production and marketing activities of agro-clusters of the meat processing complex, taking into account foreign investment is fulfilled. The index of market conditions of sales of products of the subject of meat processing industry on the scale (value) of the net income received at the expense of the introduced innovative technologies in manufacture is calculated. The forecast value of the polyvector change of the general integrated indicator of innovation and investment capacity of agro-clusters in the polarized space-time interval of the regional level is determined. It is concluded that innovations are vital factor of increasing the level of sales of products of meat processing subjects. It is proposed to implement the assessment of potential opportunities for innovation, organization of sales, communication and pricing policies.

The Role of Regulatory Agencies in Agenda-Setting Processes: Insights from the Italian Response to the COVID-19 Infodemic.

International organizations such as the WHO have worked to raise awareness of the massive infodemic that accompanied the COVID‐19 outbreak and made it hard for people to find trustworthy sources of information and reliable guidance for their decisions. Our contribution focuses on the Italian case, where the Communications Regulatory Authority (AGCOM) was able to act as first mover in its field so as to strategically frame the problem of disinformation in the absence of a pre‐existing policy intervention. An emerging body of research shows that the activity of formally independent regulators is not necessarily limited to the implementation of delegated regulatory competencies. We discuss the implications of the activity of independent regulators for the fight against disinformation during the COVID‐19 pandemic. We find that as a political actor in its own right, the Italian media regulator claimed control over sectoral expertise in order to shape the crucial first steps of the response to the infodemic.

Modeling ideological polarization in democratic party systems

There are mounting claims that increasing ideological polarization is reshaping democratic party systems with important effects on the functioning of electoral politics, the correlates of voting choice, turnout, and even the representativeness of government. Yet, our knowledge of what causes party system polarization is still developing. The primary research goal is to systematically combine and test existing theories predicting levels of party system polarization across 21 established democracies. Polarization levels have generally risen since the mid-1990s. A pooled model finds that characteristics of the electoral system and the party system largely determine the continuity of party system polarization. Polarization levels also appear linked to short-term factors such as citizens’ declining confidence in the economy and increasing concerns about immigration. The conclusion discusses the implications for party systems and politics in affluent democracies.

Ginsenoside CK inhibits obese insulin resistance by activating PPARγ to interfere with macrophage activation

Obesity is often accompanied by chronic low-grade inflammation, which aggravates the disorder of lipid metabolism and leads to insulin resistance (IR). Macrophage activation plays an important role in inflammation. Ginsenoside Compound K (CK) is an active metabolite of ginsenoside Rb1, which is adopting to an anti-inflammatory effective substance. In order to clarify the mechanism of ginsenoside CK on the regulation of macrophage activation in adipose tissue, the macrophage model was incubated with the supernatant of hypertrophic adipocytes, and the co-culture models of Raw264.7 and 3T3-L1 were established. The levels of related cytokines, macrophage polarization and protein expression in inflammatory signaling pathway were measured. The results showed that ginsenoside CK significantly inhibited the increase of MCP-1 and TNF-α induced by the supernatant of hypertrophic adipocytes, promoted the expression of IL-10, inhibited the activation of inflammatory macrophages and increased the expression of anti-inflammatory macrophages. Similarly, ginsenoside CK inhibited the migration of Raw264.7, blocked the activation of NF-κB, and up-regulated the expression of PPARγ. In addition, ginsenoside CK also promotes the expression of IRS-1 in insulin signal pathway. The experimental results proved that ginsenoside CK plays a crucial role in alleviating inflammation and insulin resistance in obesity, and inhibits macrophage activation through the key protein PPARγ.

Is divisive politics making Americans sick? Associations of perceived partisan polarization with physical and mental health outcomes among adults in the United States

ObjectivesTo investigate whether changes in perceived partisan polarization since the 2016 US presidential election and current perceptions of polarization are associated with the onset of physical and mental health conditions in adults. MethodsWe surveyed a nationally-representative sample (n = 2752) of US adults between December 2019 and January 2020. We used multivariable logistic regression to estimate associations between perceived polarization and the incidence of hypertension, high cholesterol, obesity, diabetes, and anxiety, depressive, and sleep disorders in or after 2016 and current self-rated health. Our secondary exposure variables measured perceptions of mass and elite polarization at the state and national level. Perceived mass polarization measured perceptions of the partisan gap between Democrat and Republican voters; perceived elite polarization measured perceptions of the partisan gap between Democrat and Republican elected officials. ResultsParticipants reporting an increase in polarization had 52–57% higher odds of developing depressive disorders (OR = 1.52, 95% CI: 1.01, 2.29, P = 0.047) and anxiety disorders (OR = 1.57, 95% CI: 1.07, 2.29, P = 0.02) compared to participants who perceived no change in polarization. Those reporting high (vs. low) levels of perceived state-level mass polarization had a 49% higher odds of incident depressive disorders (P = 0.03). Participants who perceived high levels of state-level elite polarization reported a 71% higher odds of incident depressive disorders (P = 0.004) and a 49% higher odds of incident sleep disorders (P = 0.03). ConclusionsPerceptions of partisan polarization may represent important factors that are linked to the onset of mental health and sleep disorders.

Election commissions and non-democratic outcomes: Thailand’s contentious 2019 election

Responding to a recent call for more in-depth qualitative studies of electoral management bodies (EMBs), this article examines formally independent EMBs by using the example of the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) and the role it played in the recent 2019 election. We argue that in non-democratic regimes with high levels of political polarisation and entrenched elites, formal EMB independence may become part of the problem why elections fail. It creates opportunities for long-term EMB capture by actors who wield power outside of formal politics and are unaccountable to public interest. In case of the ECT, this has led to the decreasing electoral standards culminating in the highly contentious 2019 election where the ECT’s administrative efficiency and effectiveness of voting came secondary to pleasing the entrenched old Thai elite. Its conduct has reduced Thailand’s prospects for a peaceful transition to democratic rule as those who oppose the country’s old elite have increasingly limited opportunities to challenge it through formal means.

Temporal evolution of prompt GRB polarization

ABSTRACT The dominant radiation mechanism that produces the prompt emission in gamma-ray bursts (GRBs) remains a major open question. Spectral information alone has proven insufficient in elucidating its nature. Time-resolved linear polarization has the potential to distinguish between popular emission mechanisms, e.g. synchrotron radiation from electrons with a power-law energy distribution or inverse Compton scattering of soft seed thermal photons, which can yield the typical GRB spectrum but produce different levels of polarization. Furthermore, it can be used to learn about the outflow’s composition (i.e. whether it is kinetic-energy-dominated or Poynting-flux-dominated) and angular structure. For synchrotron emission, it is a powerful probe of the magnetic field geometry. Here, we consider synchrotron emission from a thin ultrarelativistic outflow, with bulk Lorentz factor Γ(R) = Γ0(R/R0)−m/2 ≫ 1, that radiates a Band-function spectrum in a single (multiple) pulse(s) over a range of radii, R0 ≤ R ≤ R0 + ΔR. Pulse profiles and polarization evolution at a given energy are presented for a coasting (m = 0) and accelerating (m = −2/3) thin spherical shell and for different viewing angles for a top-hat jet with sharp as well as smooth edges in emissivity. Four different magnetic field configurations are considered, such as a locally ordered field coherent over angular scales θB ≳ 1/Γ, a tangled field (B⊥) in the plane transverse to the radial direction, an ordered field (B∥) aligned in the radial direction, and a globally ordered toroidal field (Btor). All field configurations produce distinct polarization evolution with single (for B⊥ and B∥) and double (for Btor) 90○ changes in the polarization position angle.

Are Americans polarized on issue dimensions?

ABSTRACT American mass polarization is still a contested subject in political science. One reason why scholars disagree is because polarization has often been studied either using individual issue questions or using an overall measure of ideology (usually ideological constraint). Because these methods are problematic, I use a multidimensional approach to estimating ideology. Since scholars have disagreed on what issue domains are important for Americans, I use exploratory factor analysis to show that there are three major ones: economics, race, and morality. I then use a latent measurement model to construct ideal points on all three beginning in the year 1988 going through to 2016. Then I evaluate polarization both as an increase in dispersion and as a state of how bimodal the distribution is. Although I find increased dispersion on all the dimensions since 1988, the key finding of this study is that the level of polarization is dependent on the dimension–Americans are more polarized on race and morality in 2016 than they are on economics. Still, all the distributions are centrally distributed even in 2016. Hence, polarization could still become a lot worse than it was in 2016.

Thresholds of polarization vision in octopuses.

ABSTRACTPolarization vision is widespread in nature, mainly among invertebrates, and is used for a range of tasks including navigation, habitat localization and communication. In marine environments, some species such as those from the Crustacea and Cephalopoda that are principally monochromatic, have evolved to use this adaptation to discriminate objects across the whole visual field, an ability similar to our own use of colour vision. The performance of these polarization vision systems varies, and the few cephalopod species tested so far have notably acute thresholds of discrimination. However, most studies to date have used artificial sources of polarized light that produce levels of polarization much higher than found in nature. In this study, the ability of octopuses to detect polarization contrasts varying in angle of polarization (AoP) was investigated over a range of different degrees of linear polarization (DoLP) to better judge their visual ability in more ecologically relevant conditions. The ‘just-noticeable-differences’ (JND) of AoP contrasts varied consistently with DoLP. These JND thresholds could be largely explained by their ‘polarization distance’, a neurophysical model that effectively calculates the level of activity in opposing horizontally and vertically oriented polarization channels in the cephalopod visual system. Imaging polarimetry from the animals’ natural environment was then used to illustrate the functional advantage that these polarization thresholds may confer in behaviourally relevant contexts.

Charismatic authority and fractured polities: A cross-national analysis.

Sociological research has overlooked the political consequences of charismatic leadership that arises in existing democratic political bureaucracies. In this article, we theorize the consequences of charismatic leadership in democratic nations by revisiting Max Weber's theory of charismatic authority. Our extension of Weber's theory of charismatic authority helps to address a gap in the political polarization literature concerning the role of charismatic leadership. This article provides a foundational link in the research on charismatic authority-bridging the literatures on charisma and cross-national comparative sociology. This bridging is enabled by advances in data collection that include information on charismatic authority in cross-national context. This article makes use of a Driscoll and Kraay fixed-effects analysis across 76 democracies from 1960 to 2009 to explore the relationship between charismatic leadership and political polarization. Our findings suggest that nations with higher levels of charismatic leadership tend to have higher levels of political polarization. These results contribute to both the literature on political polarization and charisma-as well as support our extension of Weber's theory of charismatic authority.

Interest group lobbying and partisan polarization in the United States: 1999–2016

AbstactThe lobbying activity of interest groups has been overlooked as a contributing factor to legislative party polarization in the United States. Using bill-level data from Congress and three state legislatures, I show floor votes on bills lobbied by more non-profit interest groups are more polarized by party. The state legislative data demonstrate the robustness of the relationship between lobbying and polarization, showing it is not an artifact of party agenda control, salience, or bill content. Increased lobbying from these groups in recent years helps explain high levels of partisan polarization in Congress and an uneven pattern across the state legislatures.

Why do boycotts sometimes increase sales? Consumer activism in the age of political polarization

In this article, we argue that the occurrence, trajectory, and impact of consumer activism are in large part driven by the political environment in which firms operate, particularly by their country’s level of polarization and the political makeup of their core customer base. In environments characterized by low levels of political polarization, companies are embroiled in a relatively small number of political controversies, and as a result are rarely the target of consumer activism. Conversely, in highly polarized environments, people’s political sensibilities are easily offended, which leads to a relatively large number of political controversies. These controversies tend to arise along party lines, meaning they elicit a consumer boycott exclusively from one side of the political spectrum. Such partisan boycotts lead people on the other side of the political spectrum to rally around the company at the center of the controversy and to purchase more of its products. Whether a company’s sales end up decreasing or increasing depends on the nature of the issue at the heart of the controversy as well as on the political beliefs of its core customer base. We conclude by describing how companies can successfully navigate this complex interplay between political polarization, consumer activism, and customers’ political preferences.