Level Of Agricultural Protection Research Articles

The EU enlargements treatment effect on agricultural policy

AbstractThis article exploits the sequences of the European Union (EU) enlargements to investigate their impact on the incoming countries' agricultural policy. We use a quasi‐experimental approach—the Synthetic Control method—to identify changes in the level of agricultural protection of the new members, in comparison with a counterfactual scenario. Our results suggest that earlier 1973 and 1985 EU enlargements show a significant increase in the rate of assistance to agriculture of incoming countries. The opposite holds, however, for the 1995 and 2004 enlargements, where the incomers significantly reduced their level of assistance to agriculture, in comparison with a counterfactual scenario.

Impact of agricultural protection on agricultural growth in Nigeria: political economy perspective (1980-2016).

This study examined the impact of agricultural protection and other macroeconomic variables on agricultural growth in Nigeria from 1980 to 2016. The specific objectives were to (i) estimate the level of agricultural protection in Nigeria; (ii) determine the effects of agricultural protection on agricultural growth, and (iii) analyse the causal relationship between agricultural protection and agricultural growth in Nigeria. The data were obtained from annual time series dataset from Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), World Bank, and Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and were tested using unit root and cointegration tests. Descriptive statistics, Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC) model, multiple regression and Granger causality were analytical test used, while the hypotheses were tested with F-test. Results revealed a significant presence of protection in the agricultural sector but not statistically commensurate with the share of agriculture to Nigeria's gross domestic product, (GDP). All hypotheses were tested at 1% probability level, i.e. p < 0.01. There was a negative significant relationship between agricultural growth and protection in agriculture. A significant and positive relationship exists between agricultural growth and budgetary appropriation to the agricultural sector, while foreign direct investment and farmers' economic welfare had a non-significant and negative relationship with protection level. There was significant causality running from budgetary appropriation (agriculture) to agricultural protection and from protection level to GDP (agriculture). One of the major recommendations is that government should review its policy instruments, programmes, and projects to ensure that targeted policy objectives such as increase in agricultural growth is achieved by increasing its budget and liberalizing the sector.

IMPACT OF AGRICULTURAL PROTECTION ON AGRICULTURAL GROWTH IN NIGERIA: POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE (1980-2016)

This study examined the impact of agricultural protection and other macroeconomic variables on agricultural growth in Nigeria from 1980 to 2016. The specific objectives were to (i) estimate the level of agricultural protection in Nigeria; (ii) determine the effects of agricultural protection on agricultural growth, and (iii) analyse the causal relationship between agricultural protection and agricultural growth in Nigeria. The data were obtained from annual time series dataset from Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), World Bank, and Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and were tested using unit root and cointegration tests. Descriptive statistics, Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC) model, multiple regression and Granger causality were analytical test used, while the hypotheses were tested with F-test. Results revealed a significant presence of protection in the agricultural sector but not statistically commensurate with the share of agriculture to Nigeria's gross domestic product, (GDP). All hypotheses were tested at 1% probability level, i.e. p < 0.01. There was a negative significant relationship between agricultural growth and protection in agriculture. A significant and positive relationship exists between agricultural growth and budgetary appropriation to the agricultural sector, while foreign direct investment and farmers' economic welfare had a non-significant and negative relationship with protection level. There was significant causality running from budgetary appropriation (agriculture) to agricultural protection and from protection level to GDP (agriculture). One of the major recommendations is that government should review its policy instruments, programmes, and projects to ensure that targeted policy objectives such as increase in agricultural growth is achieved by increasing its budget and liberalizing the sector.

Political competition and policy choices: the evidence from agricultural protection

AbstractThis article investigates whether political competition plays an important role in determining the level of agricultural protection. In order to do so, we exploit variation in political and economic data from 74 developing and developed countries for the post‐war period. We use two measures of political competition: one that captures the extent to which political power can be freely contested regardless of election results and one based on vote share at last parliamentary elections. Our results, based on static and dynamic panel estimators, show unambiguously that the higher the level of political competitions is, the higher the agricultural protection.

Political competition and support for agriculture

This paper investigates whether political competition plays an important role in determining the level of agricultural protection. In order to do so, we exploit variation in political and economic data from 74 developing and developed countries for the post-war period. Our results robustly show that the level of agricultural distortions is the higher, the higher is the level of political competition. We show that political competition may importantly complement other institutional aspects in determining policy choices. We investigate the heterogeneous effects of political competition across different electoral rules (majoritarian vs. proportional), forms of government (coalition vs. single-party) and level of incomes.

Die Bestimmungsgründe der Agrarförderung in Industrie- und Schwellenländern

Abstract The main topic of the paper is an explanation of the level of agricultural protection in industrialized countries and middle income countries. Concerning this, empirical regression models are presented in order to identify political and economic determinants of the level of agricultural protection in a country. These models are based on a cross-section of several OECD-countries. In this context, the theory of the political economy of agricultural policy is also considered. Apparently, several exogenous variables have an impact on the amount of support transfers to the agricultural sector, such as structure of exports, level of urbanisation and proportion of agricultural employees in total number of employees

A Game Theoretic Analysis of Turkish Accession to a European Customs Union

The entrance of additional countries into a European customs union, in this case Turkey, and its impact on agriculture are examined. Results from a trade simulation model are used as components of a Political Preference Function and utilized within a game theoretic framework to identify the optimal strategies for Turkey, the EU, and the U.S. Turkey's best interest, from an agricultural perspective, involves adoption of agreements made in the Uruguay round of GATT as a developing country rather than applying EU protection. Although free trade is not the optimal solution, simulations indicate that the solution does involve the reduction of agricultural protection levels.

Political economy determinants of agricultural protection levels in EU member states: An empirical investigation

This study uses a political economy approach to explain differences in agricultural protection levels among EU countries during the period 1975–1989. Panel data regression analysis is conducted for two different measures of agricultural protection. The paper shows that agricultural support increases when market conditions are against agriculture (countercyclicity), and in countries with a comparative disadvantage in agriculture. The number of farms strongly conditions the protection patterns across countries, showing that small countries and small agricultural sectors are more likely to gain CAP transfers. The results support the hypothesis that national agricultural policies have been used by member states as anadditional compensatory mechanism to the CAP. Finally, the use of a protection index that removes the assumption of zero substitutability among inputs and outputs increases the explanatory power of the model.

Benefits and Costs of Agricultural Protection in Korea

By connecting the agricultural sector and other sectors of the economy general equilibrium model simulation calculation, results show that the protection policy in the agricultural sector is not only a burden on household spending, but also can reduce national income. If we lower the level of agricultural protection to the half of current level, the real income of Korea will increase 0.3 percentage points and South Korean household expenditures in the actual consumption will increase by 1 percentage point. Agricultural protection policy makes export-oriented manufacturing shrinking. If we ease or withdraw the policy of suppression farm income we can increase the export point to the type of international competitiveness of the manufacturing sector, thereby increasing the manufacturing sector, production, raise incomes and increase employment opportunities GATP model simulation results show that if Korea abandons agricultural protection, there will not be so much effect on its major trading partner-America and Australia. On the hand it will increase the national income and consumption, that will of course result in the expansion the Korean economy.

INSTITUTIONS AND MARKET DISTORTIONS: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE FOR TOBACCO

The link between institutional factors and agricultural protection levels is investigated using cross‐section time series data on three tobacco types. The analysis includes the presence of monopsonistic marketing agencies, political institutions, and the feasibility of tax revenue collection and diversification. Protection increases with economic development and with well functioning direct taxation systems, but tends to be lower in the most advanced pluralistic democracies. The presence of strong anti‐smoking interest groups seems to galvanise the lobbying effort of tobacco farmers — higher protection is associated with that presence.

Political Institutions and International Patterns of Agricultural Protection

This paper analyzes the influence of political systems and rights in patterns of agricultural protection across commodities, countries, and over time. Four political systems and a qualitative index of political rights account for differences in political institutions. The analysis incorporates the effects of development, of constraints on tax collection feasibility, and of comparative advantages and terms of trade. Pluralistic systems are associated with higher agricultural protection levels, although in a nonlinear fashion. Access to pluralism appears to be important, although further democratization partly dissipates protection. Copyright 1994 by MIT Press.

Political Institutions and International Patterns of Agricultural Protection

This paper analyzes the influence of political systems and rights in patterns of agricultural protection across commodities, countries, and over time. Four political systems and a qualitative index of political rights account for differences in political institutions. The analysis incorporates the effects of development, of constraints on tax collection feasibility, and of comparative advantages and terms of trade. Pluralistic systems are associated with higher agricultural protection levels, although in a nonlinear fashion. Access to pluralism appears to be important, although further democratization partly dissipates protection. Copyright 1994 by MIT Press.

The Political Economy of Agricultural Policy: Discussion

The last decade has seen a surge of interest and literature in political economy by political scientists, economists, sociologists, and in the past several years agricultural economists and others concerned with agricultural and food sector issues. Much of this work has been in response to apparently perverse policy outcomes or public choice failures that have proved difficult to address through conventional economic theory and analysis. Perhaps the question that has received the most attention in this regard has been the paradox of developing countries typically taxing, while industrialized countries commonly subsidize, their agricultural sectors. The titles of both of these invited papers address other questions that are important to U.S. farm policy analysis. To begin, the Paarlberg paper explicitly asks whether there is anything uniquely to American farm policy. Paarlberg addresses this question by introducing the cosmopolitan model of Honma and Hayami and, by extension, related analyses byBalisacan and Roumasset, de Gorter and Tsur, and others. Paarlberg identifies several important limitations of these models. First, the cosmopolitan model has considerably greater difficulty in explaining intertemporal changes in levels of protection than it does in explaining cross-sectional and/or cross-commodity variations in protection levels. Typically, these models seek to explain agricultural protection levels as functions of structural economic and demographic variables (agriculture's proportion of GDP or the labor force, etc.), variables measuring comparative advantage in agriculture (such as input ratios), and binary variables to dummy out unique geographic or political influences. These (and other) factors are commonly shown to explain up to 70% or so of crosssectional variability in protection levels. However, this type of explanatory ability may considerably overstate our ability to understand the determinants of changes in protection levels over time, which are of primary interest from a policy-making perspective. Any number of specific examples could be ci ed in this regard: the recently completed U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, the host of developing country policy reforms instituted in the 1980s, the ongoing GATT negotiations on reducing agricultural protectionism, and so on. At least the first two of these are

Structure of agricultural protection in industrial countries

The nominal rates of agricultural protection in ten industrial countries from 1955 to 1980 are estimated with the same commodity coverage and data definitions. A regression analysis is conducted to explain variations in the measured level of agricultural protection in terms of political as well as economic factors. Nearly 80 percent of the variations is accounted for by differences in agriculture's comparative advantage, agriculture's share in total economy, the international terms of trade between agricultural and manufactured commodities, regionalism (EEC), and food security consideration associated with non-military alliance.

La politique agricole commune et les pays sous-développés : un examen des faits

It is often stated that a reduction lathe level of agricultural protection in the EEC would have favourable effects on LDCs. Specific research attempting to measure those effects of protection through market share analysis or with partial equilibrium models shows diverging results and can be criticized on various grounds. On the whole a reduction in EC protection would have limited positive effects on some LDCs and nil or negative effects on others. (Ed).

Trade Benefits to All: A Design of the Beef Import Liberalization in Japan

Liberalization of trade in agricultural commodities and protection of domestic agriculture are considered two conflicting policy goals. Severe restrictions have been imposed on the imports of agricultural commodities into Japan, resulting in substantial social costs, even though the level of agricultural protection in Japan is not necessarily higher than European Community (EC) countries (Bale and Greenshields, Hayami). The restriction is especially severe for beef where efficiency of domestic production is comparatively low. As a result, the expansion of beef imports has been a major focus in trade negotiations of Japan with Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. In this paper, we argue that the basic premise of the present Japanese beef policy is wrong. As far back as Ricardo, trade liberalization has been shown to result in a net gain to society. Based on this logic, it should be possible to design a policy to achieve the dual goals of trade liberalization and the protection of domestic agriculture by redistributing the gains from trade. Our analysis suggests that a possibility exists for beef imports into Japan to increase several fold, to a level of $1 billion (U.S.) per year; and, at the same time, output and income of domestic producers also could be increased without imposing an additional burden on the government budget.