Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Research Articles

HUMAN DIGNITY, MORAL DAMAGE, AND KILLINGS BY AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS

The present article aims to discuss if the fact that Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) killed or injured a person generates moral damage, and if there is a presumption of moral damage, being unnecessary for the plaintiff to prove the moral suffering to be entitled to reparation from the State. First, the article defines LAWS and provides a brief perspective on moral damage in international law based on the International Law Commission´s Draft Articles on State Responsibility and scholarship. Next, it discusses if LAWS killings or injuries violate the principle of human dignity. Then it highlights international case-law from the international human rights courts on moral damage in re ipsa. The article concludes that LAWS's killings or injuries generate a relative presumption of moral damage.

Front and Back Covers, Volume 40, Number 1. February 2024

Front and back cover caption, volume 40 issue 1EYE IN THE SKY: ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE DRONE ERAA civilian contractor launches a V‐BAT surveillance and reconnaissance drone from the USS Rushmore in the Philippine Sea. Manufactured by the California‐based startup Shield AI, the V‐BAT takes off vertically and operates autonomously without operator guidance or GPS (global positioning system). Its ‘swarming’ capability allows for potential combat use.Drones have had a profound impact in theatres of war for decades, causing lethal outcomes for combatants and non‐combatants alike. The US‐led ‘war on terror’ in regions like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen has seen drone strikes causing tens of thousands of deaths, including many civilians. Beyond the direct, destructive impact, American drone pilots report significant mental health issues like anxiety, depression and PTSD due to the nature of remote‐controlled warfare.Recent conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza have seen an expansion in the types of drones used, ranging from inexpensive commercial drones with explosives to advanced armed drones. While traditionally operated remotely, there is an increasing shift towards autonomous functioning.This escalation in drone warfare technology, particularly the development of lethal autonomous weapon systems, has led to warnings of a global AI arms race involving powers like the US, China and Russia. The concept of ‘sensor‐to‐shooter’ machine learning infrastructures by military planners underscores the ethical, moral and sociopolitical dilemmas in a world increasingly leaning towards algorithmic warfare.In this issue, Roberto González argues that anthropologists need to illuminate how drone warfare impacts societies, the effects on both operators and targeted populations and the broader sociopolitical implications of autonomous weapons. This critical, publicly oriented anthropological perspective is essential to navigating the complex interplay of technology, ethics and human values in modern warfare, offering a deeper understanding of the societal impacts of these rapidly evolving military technologies.UNRAVELLING ‘REAL’ KINSHIPThis thought‐provoking Illustration shows the contrast between the idealized concept of unilineal descent and the intricate realities of kinship in everyday life. The left side of the image displays a simplified, stylized, unilineal family tree. With its clear, vertical lines, this depiction symbolizes kinship as a straightforward, linear progression. It embodies an idealized perspective on lineage, where relationships are traced through a single ancestral line, mirroring classical kinship theory.Conversely, the right side of the image presents a more complex and interwoven family tree. This part challenges the simplistic notions of unilineal descent, revealing kinship's rich, multifaceted nature. Here, the interconnected lines represent a spectrum of relationships extending beyond mere descent, encompassing marriage, adoption, communal ties and other social bonds. These aspects are frequently marginalized in conventional kinship models but, as anthropologists know, they are essential to understanding the full scope of human connections.Sabina Cveček's insightful analysis in this issue shows how archaeologists’ interpretation of unilineal kinship systems tend to be incomplete. Her work underscores the disparity between theoretical models and the nuanced realities of kinship, prompting a call for a more dynamic interpretation of kinship as a socially constructed and evolving network. This illustration invites introspection on the diversity and complexity of kinship and advocates a more inclusive and holistic approach to studying human relationships.Cveček argues that the dichotomy between idealized models and actual kinship dynamics is a recurring theme in anthropological literature. Anthropology remains crucial in understanding the depths and dimensions of kinship systems, even in today's era of scientific advancements like ancient DNA analysis.

Emergent Normativity: Communities of Practice, Technology, and Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems

Abstract Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) are the subject of considerable international debate turning around the extent to which humans remain in control over using force. But what is precisely at stake is less clear as stakeholders have different perspectives on the technologies that animate LAWS. Such differences matter because they shape the substance of the debate, which regulatory options are put on the table, and also normativity on LAWS in the sense of understandings of appropriateness. To understand this process, I draw on practice theories, science and technology studies (STS), and critical norm research. I argue that a constellation of communities of practice (CoPs) shapes the public debate about LAWS and focus on three of these CoPs: diplomats, weapon manufacturers, and journalists. Actors in these CoPs discursively perform practices of boundary-work, in the STS sense, to shape understandings of technologies at the heart of LAWS: automation, autonomy, and AI. I analyze these dynamics empirically in two steps: first, by offering a general-level analysis of practices of boundary-work performed by diplomats at the Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS from 2017 to 2022; and second, through examining such practices performed by weapon manufacturers and journalists in relation to the use of loitering munitions, a particular type of LAWS, in the Second Libyan Civil War (2014–2020).

Killer Robots and Inauthenticity: A Heideggerian Response to the Ethical Challenge Posed by Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems

This paper addresses the ethical challenges raised by the use of lethal autonomous weapons systems. Using aspects of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, the paper demonstrates that lethal autonomous weapons systems create ethical problems because of the lack of moral agency in an autonomous system, and the inauthentic nature of the deaths caused by such a system. The paper considers potential solutions for these issues before arguing that from a Heideggerian standpoint they cannot be overcome, and thus the development and use of lethal autonomous weapons systems should be resisted and prohibited.

POTENTIAL IMPACT OF LETHAL AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS ON STRATEGIC STABILITY AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN SOUTH ASIA

Several trends show that the efforts to alter South Asian strategic landscape have increased, which primarily includes unprecedented proliferation of technology to India. This has exacerbated Pakistan’s security dilemma and is a matter of significant concern for South Asian security environment. Militaries worldwide are preparing for a new warfare trend in emerging technologies that include artificial intelligence and machine learning-based autonomous weapon systems, robotics, hypersonic weapons, and quantum technologies. These technologies are expected to change the character of war besides affecting geopolitical competitions and rivalries. It is pertinent to analyse the impact of these new technologies on regional rivalries to identify and implement effective solutions, thus mitigating potential risks and preventing the occurrence of a catastrophe. As several states are developing AI-based Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, capable of targeting without human supervision, possible exploitation of these technologies by nuclear-armed states may increase the risk of war leading to more aggressive nuclear postures. Such a risk would be higher in South Asia as the ballistic missile flight time would be less than ten minutes, and conventional military interactions of rival states could occur near a long border. The integration of autonomy into conventional weapons and nuclear systems has the potential to undermine strategic stability and will be a quick recipe for accidents and miscalculations. This study explores the region’s threat perceptions and analyses the potential use of LAWS and how it can impact nuclear deterrence and strategic stability of South Asia. This study hypothesizes that LAWS will lower the nuclear threshold in the region and undermine deterrence stability. Bibliography Entry Masood, Maryyum and Muhammad Ali Baig. 2023. "Potential Impact of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia." Margalla Papers 27 (2): 27-43.

Theory of Primary Intelligence (TPI) and Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS)

Umjetna inteligencija (UI) neizbježan je proizvod razvoja tehnologija 21. stoljeća i stoga predstavlja kontinuitet dosadašnjeg tehnološkog napretka. Međutim, UI je ujedno i transformativna tehnologija s neograničenim potencijalom daljnjeg razvoja u različitim područjima znanosti, pa time i u svakodnevnom životu. Upotreba UI-ja u vojne svrhe poput LAWS-a otvara nove dileme, pa se postavljaju ključna pitanja: možemo li proizvesti takvu umjetnu inteligenciju koja s vremenom može postati ne samo replika nas samih kao ljudskih bića već i nešto više, te što to znači za našu sigurnost? Ako je UI u stanju reproducirati kognitivna svojstva čovjeka, nije li samo pitanje bliže budućnosti kada će strojevi donositi odluke umjesto čovjeka? U nekim područjima to i nije novost. Pametna računala i njihove razvijene programske podrške (softveri) već donose odluke, ali još uvijek uz pomoć čovjeka koji ih opskrbljuje neophodnim podatcima, pa govorimo o UI-u 20. stoljeća (UI-20). UI 21. stoljeća (UI-21) treba sve manje ljudskog „uplitanja“. U radu se definira teorija primarne inteligencije (TPI) kao izvorni i do sada neobjavljeni znanstveni koncept o primarnoj poziciji čovjeka u odnosu na umjetnu inteligenciju 21. stoljeća. Teorija polazi od nezaustavljivog tehnološkog razvoja i etičke dimenzije problema upotrebe UI-21.

Regulatory Choices at the Advent of Gig Warfare

Abstract Regulation of military ai may take place in three ways. First, existing rules and principles in ihl is already or could be extended via reinterpretation to apply to military ai; second, new ai regulation may appear via “add-ons” to existing rules, finally, regulation of military ai may appear as a completely new framework, either through new state behavior that results in customary international law or through a new legal act or treaty. By introducing this typology, one may identify possible manners of regulation that are presently under-researched and/or ignored, for example how Rules of Engagement (roe) may be a way to control the use of military ai. Expanding on existing scholarship, the articles discusses how military ai may operate under different forms of military command and control systems, how regulation of military ai is not only a question of “means” but also “methods” of warfare and how the doctrine of supervisory responsibility may go beyond the doctrine of command responsibility. In the case that fully-automated Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (laws) are available and considered for use, it is suggested that their use should be prohibited in densely populated areas following the same logic as incendiary weapons. Further, one could introduce certain export restrictions on fully-automated laws to prevent proliferation to non-state actors and rogue states.

Examining Supply Chain Risks in Autonomous Weapon Systems and Artificial Intelligence

The development of increasingly AI-enabled autonomous systems and other military applications of Artificial Intelligence (AI) have been recognised as emergent major military innovations. In the absence of an effective and enforceable ban on their development and/or usage arising from the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS), it is likely that such systems will continue to be development. Amongst the legal, ethical, practical, and strategic concerns raised by the emergence of such systems, it is important not to lose sight of the risks involved in relying on a high-manufactured system in place of a human. This places additional strains and importance on securing diverse, com�plex, and over cross-jurisdictional supply chains. This article focuses on the vulnerability of and the risks to the integrity and security of the supply chains responsible for producing AI-enabled autonomous military systems.

Laws on LAWS (Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems): The Work of the United Nations and the Swedish Position

Laws on LAWS (Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems): The Work of the United Nations and the Swedish Position

The Evolution of Air Threats in Future Conflicts

Currently, there is an observable trend towards continuous and comprehensive development in both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft design. Furthermore, a dynamic progression has been also witnessed in the evolution of unmanned aerial vehicles, loitering munitions, lethal autonomous weapons systems, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic cruise missiles, lighter-than-air sensor platforms, high altitude pseudo satellites and any others. The development of modern technologies and the acquisition of new materials create opportunities for the modernization of existing air threats as well as the development of novel types. Additionally, the potential of artificial intelligence in unmanned systems is a significant factor that should not be overlooked. The aforementioned circumstances have prompted the author of the article to conduct a thorough examination of contemporary military air threats and to make a forecast regarding the evolution of air threats in future conflicts.

Machine guardians: The Terminator, AI narratives and US regulatory discourse on lethal autonomous weapons systems

References to the Terminator films are central to Western imaginaries of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). The puzzle of whether references to the Terminator franchise have featured in the United States’ international regulatory discourse on these technologies nevertheless remains underexplored. Bringing the growing study of AI narratives into a greater dialogue with the International Relations literature on popular culture and world politics, this article unpacks the repository of different stories told about intelligent machines in the first two Terminator films. Through an interpretivist analysis of this material, we examine whether these AI narratives have featured in the US written contributions to the international regulatory debates on LAWS at the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in the period between 2014 and 2022. Our analysis highlights how hopeful stories about what we coin ‘machine guardians’ have been mirrored in these statements: LAWS development has been presented as a means of protecting humans from physical harm, enacting the commands of human decision makers and using force with superhuman levels of accuracy. This suggests that, contrary to existing interpretations, the various stories told about intelligent machines in the Terminator franchise can be mobilised to both support and oppose the possible regulation of these technologies.

Algorithmic Aversion? Experimental Evidence on the Elasticity of Public Attitudes to “Killer Robots”

Lethal autonomous weapon systems present a prominent yet controversial military innovation. While previous studies have indicated that the deployment of “killer robots” would face considerable public opposition, our understanding of the elasticity of these attitudes, contingent on different factors, remains limited. In this article, we aim to explore the sensitivity of public attitudes to three specific factors: concerns about the accident-prone nature of the technology, concerns about responsibility attribution for adverse outcomes, and concerns about the inherently undignified nature of automated killing. Our survey experiment with a large sample of Americans reveals that public attitudes toward autonomous weapons are significantly contingent on beliefs about their error-proneness relative to human-operated systems. Additionally, we find limited evidence that individuals concerned about human dignity violations are more likely to oppose “killer robots.” These findings hold significance for current policy debates about the international regulation of autonomous weapons.

Controlling lethal autonomous weapons systems: A typology of the position of states

This paper seeks to understand the potential for robust global control of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). The paper seeks to uncover the predominant views and trends in global decision-making about such weapons systems by way of observing the positions and preferences of States inhabiting the international system as a realistic modality of a more probable normative outcome. Through a thorough examination of publicly available positions of United Nations (UN) Member States, it establishes a typology of varying positions maintained by States and reveals the argumentative rationale for the major positions advanced. This typology results to be far from unified and is composed of the following categories: (1) States that support the prohibition of LAWS; (2) States that support the prohibition of LAWS, but do not support calls for an international ban treaty; (3) States that do not support (or oppose) the prohibition of LAWS; (4) States with “flexible” positions over the LAWS: oppose use or use under certain circumstances, but not the development and production; (5) States that expressed support for multilateral talks, but have not expressed a position on the prohibition or not of LAWS; and (6) States that have called for a legally binding instrument (or legal regulation) on LAWS (inclusive of both prohibitions and regulations). Regulation and human control emerge as factors that have significant value in the equation.

The democratic offset: Contestation, deliberation, and participation regarding military applications of AI

Authoritarian regimes’ unrestricted collection of citizens’ data might constitute an advantage regarding the development of some types of AI, and AI might facilitate authoritarian practices. This feedback loop challenges democracies. In a critical continuation of the Pentagon’s Third Offset Strategy, I investigate a possible Democratic Offset regarding military applications of AI focussed on contestation, deliberation, and participation. I apply Landemore’s Open Democracy, Hildebrandt’s Agonistic Machine Learning, and Sharp’s Civilian-Based Defence. Discussing value pluralism in AI ethics, I criticise parts of the literature for leaving the fundamental ethical incompatibility of democracies and authoritarian regimes unaddressed. I am focussing on the duty to disobey illegal orders derived from customary international humanitarian law (IHL) and the standard of ‘meaningful human control’, which is central to the partially outdated debate about lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS). I criticize the standard of ‘meaningful human control’ following two pathways: First, the ethical and legal principles of just war theory and IHL should be implemented in military applications of AI to submit human commands to more control, in the sense of technological disaffordances. Second, the debate should focus on the societal circumstances for personal responsibility and disobedience to be trained and exerted in deliberation and participation related to military applications of AI, in the sense of societal affordances. In a larger picture, this includes multi-level stakeholder involvement, robust documentation to facilitate auditing, civilian-based defence in decentralized smart cities, and open-source intelligence. This multi-layered approach fosters cognitive diversity, which might constitute a strategic advantage for democracies regarding AI.

Practice-based and public-deliberative normativity: retaining human control over the use of force

The debate about lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) characterises them as future problems in need of pre-emptive regulation, for example, through codifying meaningful human control. But autonomous technologies are already part of weapons and have shaped how states think about human control. To understand this normative space, I proceed in two steps: first, I theorise how practices of designing, of training personnel for, and of operating weapon systems integrating autonomous technologies have shaped normativity/normality on human control at sites unseen. Second, I trace how this normativity/normality interacts with public deliberations at the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS by theorising potential dynamics of interaction. I find that the normativity/normality emerging from practices performed in relation to weapon systems integrating autonomous technologies assigns humans a reduced role in specific use of force decisions and understands this diminished decision-making capacity as ‘appropriate’ and ‘normal’. In the public-deliberative process, stakeholders have interacted with this normativity by ignoring it, engaging in distancing or positively acknowledging it – rather than scrutinising it. These arguments move beyond prioritising public deliberation in norm research towards exploring practices performed at sites outside of the public eye as productive of normativity. I theorise this process via international practice theories, critical security studies and Science and Technology scholarship to draw out how practices shape normativity, presenting ideas of oughtness and justice, and normality, making something appear normal via collective, repeated performances.

Regulating lethal autonomous weapon systems: exploring the challenges of explainability and traceability

AbstractWe explore existing political commitments by states regarding the development and use of lethal autonomous weapon systems. We carry out two background reviewing efforts, the first addressing ethical and legal framings and proposals from recent academic literature, the second addressing recent formal policy principles as endorsed by states, with a focus on the principles adopted by the United States Department of Defense and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We then develop two conceptual case studies. The first addresses the interrelated principles of explainability and traceability, leading to proposals for acceptable scope limitations to these principles. The second considers the topic of deception in warfare and how it may be viewed in the context of ethical principles for lethal autonomous weapon systems.

The irresponsibility of not using AI in the military

The ongoing debate on the ethics of using artificial intelligence (AI) in military contexts has been negatively impacted by the predominant focus on the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) in war. However, AI technologies have a considerably broader scope and present opportunities for decision support optimization across the entire spectrum of the military decision-making process (MDMP). These opportunities cannot be ignored. Instead of mainly focusing on the risks of the use of AI in target engagement, the debate about responsible AI should (i) concern each step in the MDMP, and (ii) take ethical considerations and enhanced performance in military operations into account. A characterization of the debate on responsible AI in the military, considering both machine and human weaknesses and strengths, is provided in this paper. We present inroads into the improvement of the MDMP, and thus military operations, through the use of AI for decision support, taking each quadrant of this characterization into account.

Weaponised Artificial Intelligence and Chinese Practices of Human–Machine Interaction

Abstract Weaponised artificial intelligence (AI) and the prospective development of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) are topics that have sparked international debate on retaining human control over the use of force. This article unpacks China’s understanding of human–machine interaction to find that it encompasses many shades of grey. Specifically, despite repeatedly supporting a legal ban on LAWS, China simultaneously promotes a narrow understanding of these systems that intends to exclude such systems from what it deems “beneficial” uses of AI. We offer understandings of this ambivalent position by investigating how it is constituted through Chinese actors’ competing practices in the areas of economy, science and technology, defence, and diplomacy. Such practices produce normative understandings of human control and machine autonomy that pull China’s position on LAWS in different directions. We contribute to the scholarship bounded by norm research and international practice theories in examining how normativity originates in and emerges from diverse domestic contexts within competing practices. We also aim to provide insights into possible approaches whereby to achieve consensus in debates on regulating LAWS, which at the time of writing have reached a stalemate.

The Responsibility Gap and LAWS: a Critical Mapping of the Debate

AI has numerous applications and in various fields, including the military domain. The increase in the degree of autonomy in some decision-making systems leads to discussions on the possible future use of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). A central issue in these discussions is the assignment of moral responsibility for some AI-based outcomes. Several authors claim that the high autonomous capability of such systems leads to a so-called “responsibility gap.” In recent years, there has been a surge in philosophical literature around the concept of responsibility gaps and different solutions have been devised to close or bridge these gaps. In order to move forward in the research around LAWS and the problem of responsibility, it is important to increase our understanding of the different perspectives and discussions in this debate. This paper attempts to do so by disentangling the various arguments and providing a critical overview. After giving a brief outline of the state of the technology of LAWS, I will review the debates over responsibility gaps using three differentiators: those who believe in the existence of responsibility gaps versus those who do not, those who hold that responsibility gaps constitute a new moral problem versus those who argue they do not, and those who claim that solutions can be successful as opposed to those who believe that it is an unsolvable problem.

Smrtonosni autonomni sistemi oružja (LAWS) - ka strožoj regulativi ili neselektivnoj upotrebi?

Modern battlefields around the globe demonstrated the employment of the next generation of weapons which are colloquially designated as "killer robots", or Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS). Although LAWS, for now, are always under the supervision of the human operator, the technological advancements in Artificial Intelligence allow for such weapon systems to achieve a significant degree of autonomy, including the autonomy over the decision-making process of utilizing the lethal force against the human targets. Due to the lack of global regulation for the research, production, and deployment of LAWS, they are seeing more and more employment in contemporary battlefields, from Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Nagorno-Karabakh to Ukraine. The goals of this article are to understand the limitations of the AI that can be employed in LAWS; to present an overview of the current LAWS via the available public data; to assess the state of the regulations of the LAWS, by employing comparative analysis of strategies and positions towards LAWS from the side of the EU, the USA, China, Russia, and India. The results of this research demonstrate that barring the EU which is in the process of adopting a regulation that will enforce a total ban on the LAWS, the other major powers express a balanced approach towards this issue by reserving rights to develop and employ LAWS for the goals of their national security, per the Article 36 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.