Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence Research Articles

Was Clarke a Voluntarist?

The distinction between voluntarism and intellectualism has recently been criticized for inaccurately characterising early modern theories of divine freedom. In response, defenders of the distinction have argued that these labels are needed in order to account for the famous correspondence between Leibniz (intellectualist) and Clarke (voluntarist). In this paper, I argue that the voluntarism/intellectualism distinction is unable to account for the opposition between Leibniz and Clarke. In the first part, I provide an analysis of Clarke’s theory of divine freedom, and show how he employs the distinction between activity and passivity in order to account for the separation between God’s will and intellect, which ultimately safeguards God’s freedom. I also analyse Clarke’s correspondence with Leibniz, and show how Clarke deals with choice among equals, the principle of sufficient reason, and the principle of the best. In the second part, I argue on the basis of this analysis that Clarke is not a voluntarist, but should instead be interpreted as an intellectualist (if one wants to keep the labels). Therefore, the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence cannot be explained as a clash between voluntarism and intellectualism.

Space: A History ed. by Andrew Janiak

Reviewed by: Space: A History ed. by Andrew Janiak Marius Stan Andrew Janiak, editor. Space: A History. Oxford Philosophical Concepts. Series editor, Christia Mercer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xiii + 351. Paper, $24.95. This is a book with a purpose: it aims to chronicle the life of a concept (space) from its birth in ancient Greece to its growth into centrality for early modern metaphysics, and its end with Kant, after whom classical space got displaced to a marginal position. The volume is commendable for its good balance of broad scope, depth of insight, and careful exposition. Its chapters impressively combine analytic sharpness with sensitivity to historical context and philological nuance. Moreover, the gender balance among contributors is admirably even. [End Page 343] Barbara Sattler lucidly teaches us how the Greeks juggled a number of related ideas (roughly corresponding to our notions of place, region, position, and interval) yet without arriving at a concept of space qua global carrier of metric structure. Marije Martijn gives a novel account of Proclus's elusive notions, imagination and intelligible matter. That greatly helps us see his enormous influence on posterity. He anticipated strikingly key parts in the space doctrines of Descartes, Newton, and Kant; and his kinematic foundations for geometry overlap much with the analogous views of Hobbes and Kant, who also thought that geometric figures are generated by the motion of points and lines. Medieval doctrines of place and void span some twelve centuries, and presenting them usefully in one chapter would be hopeless. Edith Dudley Sylla wisely restricts her focus to Nicole Oresme and his milieu, but her account teaches a broader lesson. As they grappled with Aristotle's physics, fourteenth-century figures produced doctrines that anticipate visibly the early moderns' absolutism and relationism; strikingly, medieval distinctions and heuristics formed the background to debates about space and place well into the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. And yet, as Andrew Janiak points out in his chapter, from Plato to Suarez, the concept of space remained marginal; that began to change with Cartesian science. Experiments suggesting that vacua might exist; efforts to rethink the nature of geometry; and a new science of motion that (by the Law of Inertia) appealed to preferred directions in space—all these developments conspired to make space-concepts explanatorily fundamental, and central to theoretical philosophy: "thinkers such as Leibniz and Newton begin to treat space and its structure as worthy of philosophical analysis in a new way" (247). Before Einstein, cognitive access to space was by two channels: geometry and vision. The latter posed serious challenges. It required theorists to reconcile two things: a metaphysics of how material facts (about the size, shape, and distance of things) make cognitive contact with an immaterial mind; and an epistemology of the mysterious inferential processes whereby the mind passes from two-dimensional evidence (patterns on a screen-like retina) to knowledge of three-dimensional spatial relations. Many took these challenges on between Euclid and Berkeley; thus, explaining them well is far from easy. Gary Hatfield does it with admirable skill: he presents the very indispensable elements and key historical junctures in the long quest for a coherent theory of vision. Kant saw himself as the last early modern—the one who moved past difficult dilemmas by a third, better way. Michael Friedman's chapter vindicates that image. He gives a sharp reading of Kant's difficult thought that his doctrine of space fares better than Leibniz's or Newton's, and a quite novel account of God's relation to space (another early modern conundrum). Also difficult, though not for Friedman, was Kant's claim that space does not obtain for the things-in-themselves. This volume will make an excellent companion textbook to a number of courses, especially surveys of the major periods in the history of philosophy, and introductions to the philosophy of space and time. It has two other virtues beyond its pedagogical merits. First, by spanning two millennia of doctrines, it shows nicely how metaphysical reflection feeds off of sources as diverse as basic physics, natural theology, and the physiology of vision—which in turn gave epistemology a chance to reflect on how we reconcile such...

The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence as a Case Study for the Historiography of Physics

This paper examines an important episode in the history of early modern physics – the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence of 1715-16, an exchange that occurred at the intersection of physics, metaphysics and theology – before turning to questions of interpretation in the historiography of physics. Samuel Clarke, a disciple of Isaac Newton, engaged in a dispute over Newton’s commitment to absolute space and absolute time with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, who criticized Newton’s views and advanced a rival account. I clarify the positions at stake in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, define a variety of terms – absolute space, absolute time, substantivalism, and relationalism – endogenous to the exchange, and reconstruct key elements in the philosophical dimension of the dispute. I then use the Leibniz-Clarke exchange as a springboard from which to examine interpretive considerations in the historiography of physics. I argue that the history of physics can benefit from reassessing its historiographical commitments by borrowing or appropriating some of the intellectual resources used by philosophers working in the history of philosophy. This historiographical reassessment, I contend, will not only shed new light on the Leibniz-Clarke exchange but may also reinvigorate the history of physics.

Three Paradoxes Concerning Causality and Time: Parmenides, Leibniz, Einstein/Schrödinger

Parmenides’ Poem on Nature contains a proof that the world could not have come into being in time, because no explanation could be given for why it would do so at a given time. This same proof reappears in the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, where it is directed against Newtonian absolute time. Newtonians, Leibniz explains, believe that time is homogeneous and absolute, but this makes it inexplicable how God could have chosen to create the world on a given day. Similarly, in his correspondence with Schrödinger in the 1930s, Einstein suggests that certain quantum mechanical occurrences, such as the spontaneous decay of a radioactive atom, are absurd, because they cannot be assigned a definite location in time. In Schrödinger’s version on Einstein’s argument, we must say that the cat dies twice: first, inside the box; yet, second, when we open the box. But both accounts cannot be true. Since each of the authors discussed was aware of the approach of his predecessors, they share a structure. In this article, I develop a unified account of all three.

Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, Brain in a Vat, Five-Minute Hypothesis, McTaggart’s Paradox, etc. Are Clarified in Quantum Language

Recently we proposed “quantum language” (or, “the linguistic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics”), which was not only characterized as the metaphysical and linguistic turn of quantum mechanics but also the linguistic turn of Descartes = Kant epistemology. We believe that quantum language is not only the scientific final goal of dualistic idealism but also the language in which science is written. Hence there is a reason to want to clarify, from the quantum linguistic point of view, the following problems: “brain in a vat argument”, “the Cogito proposition”, “five-minute hypothesis”, “only the present exists”, “Copernican revolution”, “McTaggart’s paradox”, and so on. In this paper, these will be discussed in quantum language. And we clarify that these are not propositions in quantum language. That is, these are metaphysical and not scientific. Also, we emphasize that Leibniz’s relationalism in Leibniz-Clarke correspondence should be regarded as one of the most important parts of the linguistic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.

The Relationship between the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles and the Principle of Sufficient Reason in the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence

The aim of this paper is to render a detailed analysis of the correspondence with Clarke in order to shed some light in the relationship between the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Most of the secondary literature takes for granted that Leibniz derives the Principle of Identity of Indiscernible from the Principle of Sufficient Reason in at least some parts of the correspondence. This would render the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles a merely contingent truth and not a necessary principle. I will argue that this interpretation is misleading, and that Leibniz never abandoned the idea that the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessary truth. Although he is continuously using the Principle of Sufficient Reason in his argumentation, he keeps in parallel a strong argumentation that entails the necessity of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. To achieve this goal, it will be necessary to point out first some contextual facts that may determine a correct understanding of the correspondence. It will be also necessary to frame the discussion about the principles into the broader debate on the possibility of Newtonian space. Finally, it will be shown that the mentioned hypothesis is supported by textual evidence throughout the entire correspondence.

Natureza do espaço em Leibniz e a correspondência Leibniz-Clarke

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n2p297We study the Leibnizian conception of space based upon a critical analysis of the arguments developed throughout the Leibniz–Clarke correspondence. This study is done upon the content of the correspondence originally published by Clarke in 1717 and wholly republished by H. G. Alexander in 1956. Our main goal is to show how it is possible to unfold the Leibnizian concept of space in three distinct ontological structures, each one interconnected and strongly based in the principle of preestablished harmony. These three structures anticipate ideas that were partially, at least, retaken inside some modern perspectives in physics and its philosophy. The main points discussed are: (i) the contention against the newtonian atomism and absolute space; (ii) the ontological and physical implications of the Leibnizian metaphysical principles; (iii) the problem of the symmetry; (iv) the identification of a real property of spatial extension; (v) the conception of relative space as ideal structure and (vi) the emergency of a structure of relational space founded in the real structure of spatial extension.

Leibniz and Clarke in Conflict: The Role of “Force” and the Nature of God’s Providence

The intellectual background of the concept of force in the dispute between Leibniz and Clarke has not received enough scholarly attention. Vailati’s monograph, which is the most important study of the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, focuses on a non-theological dimension in terms of the concept of force in this debate. Based on this perspective, Vailati’s conclusion is that Clarke’s understanding of force was totally different from that of Newton. However, the historical context shows that this is not the case. Clarke’s concept of motive force bore a strong resemblance to that of Newton, according to which force was an active principle that had been endowed upon matter at the beginning of God’s creation. Furthermore, the close link between force, matter and God’s providence had a long tradition of debate between Cartesian and Gassendian philosophers since early modern times. The different concepts of force dividing Cartesian and Gassendian philosophers were actually related to, and conditioned by, their underlying fundamental theological differences. The concept of force in the Leibniz-Clarke controversy, accordingly, could be regarded as along the lines of the earlier disputes between Cartesian and Gassendian philosophers.

Perspectives and argumentative structure in the Leibniz-Clarke debate: the hidden perspective


 The paper analyses the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. The corpus consists of two times five letters. I restructure the corpus horizontally and vertically in order to make the text readable from the perspective of debated themes and argumentation as well. Horizontally, I reconstruct the debate through low resolution debate analysis, focusing of the notion of space and related terms (natural law, atom, vacuum, gravitation). Vertically, I investigate different argumentative patterns in the text. Finally, I consider the interpretative value of these new analytical perspectives.

Time and Space, Science and Philosophy in the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence

Time and Space, Science and Philosophy in the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence

The Epistemological Roots of the Dispute over Time and Freedom in the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence

Historians and philosophers of science commonly ignore the epistemological disagreement about the theoretical limits of rationality that underlies the disputes over the absoluteness or relationality of time and the true nature of divine freedom in the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence. Accordingly, I explore both the logical interconnectedness and the deeper philosophical roots of these disputes, with a view to evaluating the contrast in Leibniz's and Clarke's underlying notions of the limits of rationality. In tracing this contrast, I attempt to show first that Clarke's position can be used to demonstrate successfully that Leibniz's concept of divine freedom, and his use of the Principle of Sufficient Reason to justify it, involves a contradiction. Second, I attempt to demonstrate that the concept of the limits of rationality underlying Clarke's conception of divine freedom can be successfully defended against Leibniz's attacks.

Berkeley's Views on Time

Berkeley's views on time are clearly expressed, succinctly stated, and quite untenable. In view of these facts it is strange to find him consistently misunderstood, and often praised. In particular, A.A. Luce, Berkeley's most committed commentator, gets him completely wrong, attributing to him a doctrine which he explicitly rejects.Berkeley's views on time must be garnered from sparse references to the topic in the Philosophical Commentaries, in two sections of the Principles, in the correspondence with Johnson, and in the First Dialogue. Time is not discussed in De Motu, rather surprisingly, though this fact is seldom noticed. Thus, H.G. Alexander, in his introduction to the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, writes:Berkeley's De Motu (1721) contains a discussion of the Newtonian concepts of absolute space and time, which is in some respects more important than that of either Leibniz or Clarke.Like fish with chips, philosophical discussions of space usually consort with discussions of time, and there is a strong tendency to assume that argument patterns employed, and conclusions reached, in the one may be transferred, with minimal changes, to the other.

Hume on Space (and Time)

Hume on Space (and Time) BEN MIJUSKOVIC HUME'S LABYRINTHINE ANALYSES of our ideas of space and time, textually occuring so early in the Treatise, 1clearly testify to his conviction of their central role in the physical sciences, then making such fantastic progress. Furthermore, quite early in the Treatise, Hume indicates his ambition to effect a revolution in the mental sciences comparable to the one Newton had achieved in the physical disciplines, through the latter's conception of the force and effects of gravity. Accordingly, Hume regards the three principles or laws of the association of ideas as a "kind of ATTRACTION, which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural" (T, 12-13). In pursuit of his investigations Hume commences , in the first part of the Treatise, by insisting on the principle that all our simple ideas are derived from simple impressions and that impressions always precede their correspondent ideas (T, 4, 7). This being firmly established, Hume nevertheless immediately proceeds in the very next part of the work to declare, paradoxically enough, that our ideas of space and time are complex ideas that lie beyond the nature of each and all of our simple impressions. Differently put, Hume is insisting that our ideas of space and time, unlike our idea of, say, a shade of blue, are not derived unproblematically from a precedent, simple mental impression (or physiological sensation, ~ la Locke). Thus, according to Hume, our idea of space is not sensationally given; it is not traceable to an antecedent extended impression as our idea of blue is derived from a precedent impression of blue. Hume's insistence that our conception of space is nonsensational has perplexed competent commentators on Hume. Consequently, even so able an interpreteter as Kemp Smith has been puzzled "why it was that [Hume] did not take the more easy line of allowing 'extensity' to the sensations of sight and touch. ''2 Or again, "How is it that [Hume] has not taken what would seem to be for him the easier and more obvious course, at least as regards space--the course usually taken by those who hold a sensationalist theory of knowledge--that extensity is a feature of certain of our sensations (those given through the senses of touch and sight), and in consequence sensibly imaged?" (PDH, 280). Of this simpler solution both Hobbes (Leviathan, Pt. I, 1; De Corpore, Pt. II, 7, 8) and Locke (Essay, II, 8) had availed themselves prior to Hume. Hence, Kemp Smith has found the section to be tough going indeed and has contented himself, to a great extent, in simply offering a number of historical appendices, suggesting lines of influence on Hume, through passages discovered in the works of Pierre Bayle, Nicholas de Malezieu, and Isaac Barrow. Now, without denying that Hume studied and was influenced in part by the ' A Treatise of Hurnan Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1888); hereafter cited as T. 2 The Philosophy of David Hume (New York, 1964), p. 277; hereafter cited as PDH. [3871 388 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY thinking of these authors (as well as by Francis Hutcheson), I wish to take up and develop in this paper a "historical" suggestion first offered by a student of Kemp Smith's, Charles Hendel; and I shall extend Hendel's point and try to argue a "theoretic" one, namely, that Hume's phenomenalism in the section devoted to space and time is derived from, and closely akin to, a form of Leibnizian idealism. In 1925, Hendel argued that Hume was directly influenced by the Leibniz-Clarke debate over the ontological and epistemological status of space and time; and he held that for Hume space and time, as appearances, were ultimately grounded in the associative power of the imagination.' Thirty years later, in a second edition, Hendel disavowed his earlier claim concerning the imagination and avoided discussion of his prior view that Hume was influenced by the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence (1963 edition, pp. 501, 503). In Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature, which first appeared in 1932 (reissued by Archon, 1967; see pp. 64-65, 67, 73, 77), John Laird also intimated that...

Leibniz and the Sensorium Dei

Leibniz and the Sensorium Dei HOWARD R. BERNSTEIN SEVERAL YEARSAGO Koyr6 and Cohen discovered among the Newton manuscripts several drafts and fragments preparatory to a rather famous letter to Leibniz via the mediation of the Abb6 Conti (26 February 1716).1Among the many intriguing excisions that did not survive to the condensed final version, was the frequent reference to an alleged Sensorium Dei, a sensory of God. Now it happens that Leibniz's letter to Conti of November or December, 1715, to which these drafts were to constitute a reply, does not specifically invoke the Sensorium. The assertion that"Sir Isaac Newton says, that space is an organ, which God makes use of to perceive things by,''2 of course, belongs to the opening volley of the famous Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence and not to Leibniz's abortive attempt to engage Newton in his own voice. Strategic concerns no doubt were instrumental in the choice of the alleged Sensorium Dei as a standard under which to fight. But as one strips away the dross, such an entry is seen to have concealed a confluence of assumptions penetrating to the arcanum of Leibniz's philosophia perennis. Leibniz's initial letter to Caroline of Anspach exacerbated tensions already longstanding with the Newtonians. To accuse "Sir Isaac Newton and his followers" of having contributed to an alleged "decay of natural religion" was indeed a bold controversial stroke. 3 Not only did Newton genuinely espouse the so-called eternal verities of natural religion, but others, and Clarke among them, anchored their apologetics in gleanings from his scientific discoveries. If Clarke was vulnerable to Leibniz's innuendoes, so was Sir Isaac Newton, whose "odd opinions concerning the trinity" were less publicized but more extreme than Clarke's? Accordingly, it was with a sense of personal urgency that Clarke's Epistolary Dedication to the letters rings with the necessity to A. Koyr6, I. B. Cohen, "Newton and the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence," Archives International d'Histoire des Sciences, 15 (1962), 63-126. Drafts of letter found in Portsmouth Collection of Newtonian MSS. Letter in P. des Maizeaux, Recueil des diversespieces, sur la philosophy... (Amsterdam, 1720), II, and in J. Raphson, History of Fluxions (London, 1715 [actually 1717]). Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, ed. H. Alexander (Manchester, 1956), II. Hereafter cited as L-C Correspondence. Originally published by Clarke as A collection of Papers which passed between the late Learned Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke in the years 1715 and 1716 relating to the Principles of Natural Philosophy and Religion, with an Appendix (London, 1717). Also of interest, since edition is based on Hanover MSS, is Correspondence Leibnitz-Clarke, ed. A. Robinet (Paris, 1957). 3L-C Correspondence, II. Letters to Princess Caroline available in extenso in Die Werke yon Leibniz, ed. O. Klopp, 11 vols. (Hanover, 1864-1884), XI; selections trans, by Alexander, Appendix B, 189-198. F. Priesdey brings out controversial aspects in "The Clarke-Leibniz controversy," in The Methodological Heritage of Newton, ed. R. Butts and J. Davis (Toronto, 1970), 34-56. 4For Clarke see J. Rodney, "Samuel Clarke," Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Vol. III (New York, 1971); "Samuel Clarke and the Acceptance of Newtonian Thought," Research Studies 36 (1968), 351-360; H. Metzgar, A ttraction Universelle et Religion Naturelle chez quelques commenta teurs anglais de Newton (Paris, 1938), esp. 115-124. Most famous apolegetic, Boyle lectures, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God (London, 1706), went to ten editions by 1749; controversy with Anthony Collins, "freethinker," "Remarks upon a Book entitled Philosophical Enquiry concerning Human Liberty," A Collection of Papers... . (London, 1717), 3-46. Note: this was Clarke's edition of his exchange with Leibniz; [1711 172 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY confirm, establish, and vindicate against all objectors.., those great and fundamental truths of natural religion.., that from the earliest antiquity to this day.., had never been so deeply and so firmly laid, as in the mathematical and experimental philosophy of that great man. And Your Royal Highness could not permit those suspicions, which had been suggested by a gentleman of such eminent note in a learned world as Mr. Leibnitz to remain unanswered? Pressures on the adversaries conspired almost to dictate that battle be joined under...

The Leibnizian-Newtonian Debates: Natural Philosophy and Social Psychology

By the time of the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence of 1716 the Newtonian and Leibnizian systems of natural philosophy had reached maturity. Each system consisted of different physical as well as metaphysical principles which, taken together, formed a world view. At the time of their famous debates, Leibniz at 70 and Newton at 74, the founders of two highly developed scientific philosophies, were struggling to establish and defend the ontological and mechanical bases of differing bodies of organized knowledge.

Geometry and Convention: A Critical Discussion

GEOMETRY AND CONVENTION: A CRITICAL DISCUSSION A COLLECTION of essays/ together with the essays of George Schlesinger and the essay of Hilary Putman, replies to which are contained in this collection, provide contemporary philosophers of nature with a twentieth-century counterpart of the famous Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. Griinbaum levels an all-out attack on that form of spatial and temporal absolutism which holds that distances and durations are intrinsic features of space and time. He upholds a form of relativism according to which space and time have distances and durations only relative to physical devices such as rods and clocks and according to which a significant conventional element is involved in specifying how such devices determine distances and durations. Schlesinger claims that hypothetical empirical facts-the lengthening of the day as measured by a pendulum, the increase of the velocity of light as measured by rods and pendulum clocks-could force us to accept the view that everything has doubled in size overnight. But how can one be forced to accept nocturnal doubling if one is free to account for the hypothetical facts by supposing that the laws of nature have changed their dependence on lengths and hence that things have not doubled in size at all? By rejecting this alternative Schlesinger is made by Griinbaum to appear as a spatial absolutist who holds that space has an intrinsic metric and that this metric can change. Putnam's long criticism of the first essay in Griinbaum's collection is an attempt to show that Griinbaum has exaggerated the role of convention in regard to spatial and temporal measures. One should consider geometrical and chronological matters in the context of an 1 Adolf Griinbaum, Geometry and Ch1·onometry in Philosophical Perspective, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1968. Pp. 386. $3.45. 343 344 MILTON FISK entire physical theory, and then, according to Putnam, it will be apparent there is little room left for convention. From this point of view, one can say that intervals in space and time have, in an objective way, magnitudes. In his 175 page reply to Putnam, Griinbaum denies he has been unaware of important theoretical and empirical constraints in the choice of a metric. But, granting the constraints, there is still an important element of convention since, he points out, space and time as mere sets of points and instants lack metrical properties. Such, then, in barest outline are the issues in this lengthy debate over the status of spatial and temporal magnitudes. It is with considerable misgivings that I add to this already voluminous discussion. Griinbaum's 196~ essay in the third volume of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Sciencethe substance of which appears again as Chapters 1-4 of his Philosophical Problems of Space and Time and is Chapter 1 of the present collection-sparked the discussion. This essay developed Reichenbach's emphasis, particularly in The Philosophy of Space and Time, on definitional or conventional elements in geometry and chronometry. Griinbaum finds the justification for the conventionalism Reichenbach advocates in the idea of Riemann that continuous manifolds have no intrinsic metric. In Chapter~. Griinbaum joins together replies to two of Schlesinger's papers, the first of Schlesinger's papers appearing in Philosophical Studies (15, 1964) and the second in The Australasian Journal of Philosophy (.~5, 1967). Griinbaum 's replies originally appeared along with these papers. The third and final chapter, published in the fifth volume of Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science, is the reply to Putnam's critique in the second volume of The Delaware Seminar. The thoroughness of Griinbaum's exposition and of his replies is accompanied by an undesirable amount of repetitiveness . And the polemical bombast, especially of the reply to Putnam, has interferred with the possibility of a clear statement of the fundamental issue between the two. The elaborate attempts to show how " Putnam flies in the face of my writings, is unmindful of an important caveat of mme, GEOMETRY AND CONVENTION 345 and saddles me with" so-and-so's error could, without loss, have been saved for private correspondence with Putnam. Despite such attempts, the reply contains many valuable elaborations of points Griinbaurn made in the 1962...

The Leibniz-Clarke Controversy: Absolute versus Relative Space and Time

There is an increasing current interest in the philosophy and history of physics. This paper discusses an interesting and important (but relatively little known among physicists) controversy in the history of theories of space and time, the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. Leibniz represents the relativist view of space and time. Clarke, a disciple of Newton, upholds the absolute space and time of Newtonian mechanics.

The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence . Together with extracts from Newton's Principia and Opticks , edited with introduction and notes by H. G. Alexander. Philosophical Library, New York, 1956. 200 pp. $4.75.

<i>The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence</i> . Together with extracts from Newton's <i>Principia</i> and <i>Opticks</i> , edited with introduction and notes by H. G. Alexander. Philosophical Library, New York, 1956. 200 pp. $4.75.

The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence . Together with extracts from Newton's Principia and Opticks , edited with introduction and notes by H. G. Alexander. Philosophical Library, New York, 1956. 200 pp. $4.75.

<i>The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence</i> . Together with extracts from Newton's <i>Principia</i> and <i>Opticks</i> , edited with introduction and notes by H. G. Alexander. Philosophical Library, New York, 1956. 200 pp. $4.75.

The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence. Together with Extracts from Newton's Principia and Opticks. Edited with Introduction and Notes by H. G. Alexander. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. lvi+200 pp. $4.75.

The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence. Together with Extracts from Newton's Principia and Opticks. Edited with Introduction and Notes by H. G. Alexander. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. lvi+200 pp. $4.75. - Volume 10 Issue 2