Legitimacy Of Criminal Law Research Articles

Legitimacy of Criminal Law in Lieu of Fines in Corruption

This study aims to analyze the criminal regulation of confinement in lieu of fines in criminal law in Indonesia, as well as to examine whether the application of imprisonment is a substitute for fines in corruption by law enforcement in Indonesia. This type of research in writing this proposal is a normative juridical research method. The approach used in this study is statutory. The results show that law enforcement refers to the provisions of criminal confinement, which are contained in Article 10 of the Criminal Code, which then substitutes for imprisonment in Article 30 and Article 31 of the Criminal Code.

Odpowiedzialność karna a brak zagrożenia dla dobra prawnego przy przestępstwach abstrakcyjnego narażenia na niebezpieczeństwo

Na niniejszy tekst składają się rozważania o zakresie odpowiedzialności karnej w ramach przestępstw abstrakcyjnego narażenia na niebezpieczeństwo. Celem przeprowadzonej analizy jest próba zarysowania możliwości uzasadnienia ograniczenia odpowiedzialności karnej za wskazany typ przestępstw przez uwzględnienie tzw. przeciwdowodu braku zagrożenia. Rozważania skupiły się na relacji przeciwdowodu z konstrukcją normy prawnej, a także na problemie legitymacji prawnokarnej, definicji abstrakcyjnego narażenia i przedmiotu ochrony w odniesieniu do reguł wykładni prawa karnego.

Mutual Trust in European Criminal Law

This paper aims to go through the main steps in the evolution of the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decision in criminal matters in order to identify the main features and flaws of the newly born European criminal law. What is the purpose of this branch of law? Is it right to talk about it and where does it draw its legitimacy from? It is suggested that one of the main issues that need to be dealt with is that of trust. An attempt is made to define the latter in non-legal terms and to view it as a prerequisite of cooperation. Understanding its implications as well as the consequences of non-trust can be helpful to better clarify what the direction of European criminal law can be. In particular, it is essential to link trust to legitimacy of criminal law, because the more legitimate authorities are or appear to be, the more they are willing to trust each other.

Political Legitimacy and Democracy

The term ‘political legitimacy’ is unfortunately ambiguous. One serious source of confusion is the failure to distinguish clearly between political legitimacy and political authority and to conflate political authority with authoritativeness. I will distinguish between (1) political legitimacy, (2) political authority, and (3) authoritativeness. I will also articulate two importantly different variants of the notion of political authority. Having drawn these distinctions, I will argue first that political legitimacy, rather than political authority, is the more central notion for a theory of the morality of political power. My second main conclusion will be that where democratic authorization of the exercise of political power is possible, only a democratic government can be legitimate. Another ambiguity is also a source of confusion. Sometimes it is unclear whether ‘legitimacy’ is being used in a descriptive or a normative sense. In this article I am concerned exclusively with legitimacy in the normative sense, not with the conditions under which an entity is believed to be legitimate. However, a normative account of legitimacy is essential for a descriptive account. Unless one distinguishes carefully between political legitimacy, political authority, and authoritativeness, one will not be clear about what beliefs in legitimacy are beliefs about.

Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law

Traditional criminal law theories provide little account of third-party interests injured from punishment of offenders. We define offenses, and the necessity for prosecution, by the culpability and harm caused by criminal conduct, and set the overarching goals of criminal law - deterrence, retribution, or some mixture of the two - as guides for when and how much to punish. Despite that commitment, the practice of criminal law sometimes explicitly accommodates concerns for punishment?s collateral consequences to third parties. Third-party interests now appear in both prosecutorial charging guidelines and judicial sentencing decisions as rationales for leniency. This intermittent concern for collateral harms poses practical problems of defining which third-party interests. It also leads to treating like cases differently. We accommodate third-party interests by moderating prosecution and punishment, but we do so haphazardly and unevenly across the spectrum of criminal practice. Conceptually, mitigation of collateral consequences calls into question both the descriptive accuracy and the prescriptive utility of dominant theories of criminal law, deontological retributivism and deterrence-oriented utilitarianism. Our practical concern for third-party interests signals the necessity of criminal law paying attention to its broader social consequences. Mitigating third-party interests is likely necessary at times to maintain the legitimacy of criminal law, even as conflicting commitments to distributive fairness, retributive justice and crime prevention sometimes necessitate punishment. This essay explores the problems of third-party interests and describes some implications for criminal justice of downgrading the primacy of retributivism and deterrence in order to view criminal law more as a pragmatic, administrative process that accommodates multiple, conflicting policy interests.