“Delegated regulation,” “delegated legislation,” “administrative rulemaking,” or “regulatory implementation” are well-known phenomena in modern democracies. Given the complexity of contemporary societies and the broad range of issues (often of a technical nature) in which the state intervenes, regulation cannot entirely be assured by normal legislative procedure, as this is too cumbersome, not flexible enough to adapt to rapidly changing conditions, and often not able to integrate the necessary technical expertise. Legislation will, therefore, delegate part of the regulatory process to less cumbersome bodies. Yet while delegated regulation is a general practice, and while its necessity is generally acknowledged, it has not been an easy task to make it fit with the dominant understanding of democracy in which parliament would adopt all measures of a generally binding nature, whereas a “neutral bureaucracy” would ensure the application of the general rule to the specific case. There are considerable differences in the way the United States and the European Union (EU) deal with delegated regulation and how they conceptualize the legitimacy of such regulatory procedures beyond the normal legislative road. In the United States, delegated regulation is the resort of independent regulatory agencies, and the legitimacy of such administrative rulemaking has been thought of mainly in terms of legislative mandate, due process, and participatory rights guaranteed by judicial review. In the EU, delegated regulation is mainly adopted through the so-called comitology procedures, where regulatory powers are not delegated to independent agencies, but are exercised by the European Commis-