Legislative Polarization Research Articles

Government formation in presidentialism: Disentangling the combined effects of pre-electoral coalitions and legislative polarization

Abstract Recent research has shed light on the impact of pre-electoral coalitions on government formation in presidential democracies. However, the fact that pre-electoral coalitions are not automatically transformed into coalition cabinets has often gone under the radar. In this article, I argue that the importance of pre-electoral pacts for government formation depends on the degree of legislative polarization. When parties are distant from one another in the ideological spectrum, presidents face more difficulties in breaking away from the pre-electoral pact and rearranging their multiparty alliances. Conversely, when polarization is not pervasive, presidents have more leeway to build coalition cabinets different from the ones prescribed by pre-electoral coalitions. Drawing on a dataset of 13 Latin American countries, the results support my claim and suggest that the relationship between government formation and the concession of office benefits for pre-electoral coalition members is more nuanced than previously assumed.

Polarization and Place‐Based Representation in US State Legislatures

Recent scholarship has shown that legislators with deeper local roots and other preexisting place‐based attachments to their districts enjoy far‐reaching electoral advantages over their more “carpetbagging” colleagues. In this article, we consider how local roots, and its intersection with legislative polarization, influences legislative behavior, using a dataset of nearly 5,000 state legislators and novel measures of their local roots. We hypothesize that state legislators with deep local roots in their districts should be less ideologically polarized than their less‐rooted colleagues. This is precisely what we find. Using Shor‐McCarty ideology measures, we show that the most locally rooted legislators are 16% less ideologically extreme than their unrooted counterparts. These effects are comparable to or exceed those of district partisanship, chamber seniority, or other legislator characteristics. Collectively, these findings show that legislators’ local roots not only affect their electoral fortunes, but also have major implications for legislative activity and party polarization.

Institutional Challenges of Economic Reforms: Tunisia during Democratic Transition

This paper focuses on the challenges of economic reform in post-revolution Tunisia. It underlines the importance of a mixed approach between political economy (positive) and normative economic analysis to implement an effective public policy reform agenda. The post-revolution situation underlines the need for a progressive consensual reform strategy to preserve the interests of different groups and overcome political and legislative polarization. Building an effective reform system in Tunisia will mean improving institutional public administration capacities, enhancing government leadership, and building an effective system of coordination, evaluation, and follow up.

Interest group lobbying and partisan polarization in the United States: 1999–2016

AbstactThe lobbying activity of interest groups has been overlooked as a contributing factor to legislative party polarization in the United States. Using bill-level data from Congress and three state legislatures, I show floor votes on bills lobbied by more non-profit interest groups are more polarized by party. The state legislative data demonstrate the robustness of the relationship between lobbying and polarization, showing it is not an artifact of party agenda control, salience, or bill content. Increased lobbying from these groups in recent years helps explain high levels of partisan polarization in Congress and an uneven pattern across the state legislatures.

Political Consequences of Economic Hardship: State Economic Activity and Polarization in American Legislatures

Abstract Previous literature has explored the effects of economic conditions on voting behavior. In this article, I analyze how the economy affects legislative polarization. Using recently available state legislator ideal point estimates, I find a strong negative relationship between state economic activity and political polarization. States that fared worse economically have experienced greater increases in legislative polarization. I show this relationship is causal by employing an instrumental variables strategy. The instrument isolates exogenous variation in state economic activity by exploiting time-series variation in oil prices, which differentially affects individual states according to their economic dependence on oil production. The estimated polarization effects are stronger for Republicans. The findings have implications for understanding the interaction between the economy and political outcomes. (JEL H7, H83).

The polarization dynamics of electoral reforms

AbstractElectoral reforms affect legislative outcomes by influencing incumbent legislators’ behavior, new entrants’ behavior, and the probability that incumbents are replaced with new entrants. Empirical work on electoral reforms and polarization has focused on new entrants’ behavior. We employ a simple decision theoretic framework with partial incumbent policy persistence and spatial voting to examine the three channels jointly. We show that a reform designed to encourage ideological moderation produces larger effects on polarization when the reform is implemented than when it is removed. The key insight is that implementing a moderation-inducing reform generates a set of challengers who are more likely to defeat incumbents while the incumbents are more likely to win reelection when the reform is removed. We then empirically examine how elections and legislative polarization respond to unlimited PAC contributions in state legislatures. Examining incumbents’ decisions to stand for reelection, the electoral performance of incumbents who do run, and partisan polarization, we find empirical support for our predictions.

When the local is national – A new high-water mark for nationalization in the 2018 United States state legislative elections

ABSTRACT The November 2018 state legislative elections continued the recent trend towards increased (dynamic) nationalization. Control of 87 state legislative chambers and many governor’s offices was determined by elections that took place in a highly nationalized environment in which voter choices were strongly shaped by support for or opposition to the national parties in general and President Donald Trump in particular. Nationalization reached a new peak in its influence on state legislative elections in 2018, while cross-state variation in the extent of nationalization was associated with legislative polarization and the quality of the state-legislative-information environment.

Interest Group Activists and the Polarization of State Legislatures

Theories in campaign finance research suggest that interest group contributions moderate, and individual contributions polarize, state legislators. However, interest groups are comprised of individuals, and public opinion data suggest that group‐affiliated individual donors are more politically active and have especially extreme attitudes. This article investigates the relationship between group‐affiliated donors and legislative polarization in the U.S. states. In recent elections, individual contributors have grown more closely affiliated with activist organizations, such as environmental and anti‐abortion groups. Contributions from these group‐affiliated contributors predict legislative extremism at least as well as overall contributions from interest groups, individual donors, party committees, and party‐affiliated individuals. Using a novel data set of state legislative primary dates, results suggest that this relationship may be concentrated in the nomination process. Although the potential for endogeneity merits caution, the findings complicate theoretical firewalls between organizations and individuals in research on parties, interest groups, and campaign finance.

Geography, Uncertainty, and Polarization

Using new data on roll-call voting of US state legislators and public opinion in their districts, we explain how ideological polarization of voters within districts can lead to legislative polarization. In so-called “moderate” districts that switch hands between parties, legislative behavior is shaped by the fact that voters are often quite heterogeneous: the ideological distance between Democrats and Republicans within these districts is often greater than the distance between liberal cities and conservative rural areas. We root this intuition in a formal model that associates intradistrict ideological heterogeneity with uncertainty about the ideological location of the median voter. We then demonstrate that among districts with similar median voter ideologies, the difference in legislative behavior between Democratic and Republican state legislators is greater in more ideologically heterogeneous districts. Our findings suggest that accounting for the subtleties of political geography can help explain the coexistence of polarized legislators and a mass public that appears to contain many moderates.

Introduction: The Place of Agencies in Polarized Government

This is one of two complementary essays for a symposium honoring the work of Peter L. Strauss. Also included is the joint introduction. (The second essay is Gillian Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States.) These essays engage one of Strauss’s most germinal writings, “The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch” to consider whether contemporary polarized politics spells the end of the intricate system of multi-branch control and accountability which, Strauss argued, legitimates administrative agencies. Political polarization has become a major focus in contemporary discussions on congressional activity and governance. The tone of these discussions has grown increasingly grim, as many political scientists, argue that a constitutional system of divided and shared powers hardens current levels of partisan warfare into legislative gridlock. Proposals for reform abound. Scholars and political commentators have called for modifications to the electoral process and to party structure, for additional oversight of the culture among members of Congress, and for increased attention to demographics and economic inequality within the electorate. These proposals sometimes conflict, and usually face daunting legal or political obstacles to adoption. In an effort to better assess the likelihood that congressional dysfunction will be the norm going forward, this Essay reviews and synthesizes recent political science literature with the goal of sorting out what we know — and, perhaps more important, do not know — about the nature, extent, and causes of congressional polarization. The Essay begins by discussing standard metrics of congressional polarization and describing alternative approaches that challenge the standard account as overly simplistic. It then looks at historical trends to consider whether the contemporary situation is truly anomalous. Next, it considers the many theories put forth to explain the phenomenon, focusing initially on whether congressional polarization can be explained by polarization in the electorate and then moving to proposals around the electoral process, party structure and culture, and demographics. Finding little support in the literature for the notion that the challenged structures and practices are actually driving legislative polarization, the Essay concludes by suggesting that the rhetoric around congressional polarization — particularly around the likely continuation of partisan warfare and legislative gridlock — is far more negative than the existing evidence can justify.

Giving the People What They Want? Legislative Polarization and Public Approval of State Legislatures

The relationship between approval of the state legislature and political polarization in the legislature is investigated by matching responses from a large national survey to Shor and McCarty’s ideological scores for state parties. In contrast to popular wisdom, citizens do not have a negative view of more polarized legislatures or more extreme majority parties, all else constant. Instead, legislative approval is filtered primarily through a partisan lens; partisans are more approving when their party is in control and more extreme (and less approving when the opposing party is in control and more extreme).

Public Confidence in the Redistricting Process

This study examines the determinants of public confidence in the honesty and integrity of state redistricting processes by analyzing responses to the 2011 and 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies. Individual opinions about the redistricting process are matched to several state characteristics, including the presence of independent redistricting commissions, state legislative polarization, and legislative professionalism. Contrary to popular wisdom, the analysis reveals that neither partisan redistricting procedures nor political polarization reduce confidence in the redistricting process. Rather, public attitudes are determined more so by distaste for legislative professionalism and affinity for the party in control of state government.

Culture war counter-mobilization: Gay rights and religious right groups in the states

The counter-mobilization hypothesis long ago fell on hard times. Despite its inherent plausibility, the notion has suffered from the lack of solid empirical testing and use in a wide variety of contexts. Nevertheless, counter-mobilization merits attention since it remains at the heart of pluralist theory. Without a clear response to competing interests, organizational representation of interests is a problematic concept. In this paper, we revisit the counter-mobilization hypothesis in the context of two groups often said to be key players in the culture wars – religious right and LGBT organizations – in a time period, 2001–2010, where we expect there to be responses to the other’s actions. Examining group counts in the states, we find evidence of counter-mobilization in the classic sense Truman intended. Moreover, we find a link between legislative polarization and the mutual presence of these groups that reinforces the relevance of this concept.

Polarization, Inequality, and the State Legislatures

While legislative polarization at the national level has been carefully examined and largely explained, the causes of polarization in state legislatures have been more elusive. Studies examining factors such as gerrymandering and party primaries as possible explanations have found largely undetectable or at best very modest relationships between these variables and levels of polarization. This paper provides an explanation of state legislative polarization based on socio-economic and demographic factors within the states. Economics and demographics have long played a significant role in understanding party choice, vote choice, the decision to abstain or vote, and support for various policies. Because of this we explore if these factors also influence polarization of state legislatures. Utilizing the Shorr-McCarty polarization data for state legislatures, which provides the differences between the mean Democratic and Republican legislator scores, and controlling for important economic and demographic factors, we explain a significant amount of the polarization existing in state legislatures. These findings present a fascinating look into not only the root causes of polarization in state legislatures, but also point to some fundamental differences in politics and ideology at the state and national levels.

Do Campaign Donors Influence Polarization? Evidence from Public Financing in the American States

Does the source of campaign funds influence legislative polarization? We develop competing theoretical expectations regarding the effects of publicly financed elections on legislative voting behavior. To test these expectations, we leverage a natural experiment in the New Jersey Assembly in which public financing was made available to a subset of members. We find that public financing exerts substantively negligible effects on roll-call voting. We then find a similar result in an examination of state legislatures. We conclude that, counter to the logic of the US Supreme Court, pundits, and reformers, the source of campaign funds exerts minimal influence on polarization.

Partisan Polarization in the United States: Diagnoses and Avenues for Reform

Over the several decades, observers of American politics have noted the sharp increase in partisanship and ideological polarization among members of Congress. While better ideological differentiation may provide voters clearer choices and increase accountability, the results of recent partisan and ideological battles have raised questions about the impact pf polarization on good governance.While much scholarly effort has gone into studying the root causes on congressional polarization, such research has been hampered by its sole reliance on the US House and Senate for data on legislative polarization. But new data on polarization of state legislatures provided by Shor and McCarty (2011) and updated with the generous support of the John and Laura Arnold Foundation expands our capacity to uncover the political, economic, and social factors that underlie our increasingly polarized system.In this report, we review the evidence concerning the polarization of the US Congress and supplement it with analyses based on the experience of polarization in the US states. We show that while there is variation in polarization across states, in aggregate the patterns are very similar to the national experience. Moreover, analyses of the causes of polarization at the national level are generally confirmed by the data on the states. The richer data from the sates, however, allows us to address new sets of questions which suggest some limited opportunities for reforms targeted at reducing polarization.

When are Majority-Party Leaders Powerful? Legislative Theories Revised.

Foundational theories of the legislature disagree about why, or even whether, legislative leaders are powerful, but issues of measurement and causal inference have prevented empirical work from addressing these debates effectively. To make progress, we offer a new dataset on the identities of legislative leaders in all U.S. state legislatures over the past 20 years. Using a difference-in-differences design, we show that, on average, becoming a majority-party leader causes a large increase in contributions from strategic interest groups — an indication that leaders are indeed powerful. Contrary to major theoretical predictions, however, we show that leaders are no more powerful, and possibly less powerful, when legislative polarization increases. Moreover, neither the size of the majority party nor the professionalization of the legislature are associated with how powerful majority-party leaders are. In contrast, we find that majority- party leaders are more powerful in bigger legislatures, which we argue suggests that a key role for leaders is solving issues of complexity and coordination. The paper thus offers new data and evidence that revises and improves our understanding of legislative politics both in the U.S. and in democratic settings more generally.

Geography, Uncertainty, and Polarization

Using new data on roll-call voting of U.S. state legislators and public opinion in their districts, we explain how ideological polarization of voters within districts can lead to legislative polarization. So-called moderate'' districts that switch hands between parties are often internally polarized: the ideological distance between Democrats and Republicans within these districts is often greater than the distance between liberal cities and conservative rural districts. We present a theoretical model in which intra-district ideological polarization makes candidates uncertain about the ideological location of the median voter, thereby reducing their incentives to offer moderate policy positions. We then demonstrate that among districts with similar median voter ideologies, the difference in legislative behavior between Democratic and Republican state legislators is greater in more ideologically heterogeneous districts. Our findings suggest that accounting for the subtleties of political geography can help explain the coexistence of a polarized legislature and a moderate mass public.

Ideological Heterogeneity and Legislative Polarization in the United States

The responsiveness of individual legislators to their constituents creates an indirect electoral connection between the aggregate preferences of citizens and the behavior of legislative parties. In this research, I argue that legislators from moderate districts are the least likely to support their parties and most likely to vote moderately during roll call votes. I also argue that states with low ideological variance among citizens are the most likely to have moderate districts. Thus, states with ideologically heterogeneous populations are more likely to have homogeneous, extreme legislative parties. Using ideal point estimates and measures of party cohesion from state legislative parties, empirical evidence largely supports my expectations.

Rules of Procedure as a Cause of Legislative Paralysis: The Case of Costa Rica, 2002–2012

AbstractResearch on executive-legislative relations in Latin America has focused on the impact of minority presidents and multiparty legislatures on legislative productivity. But an additional deadlock scenario, the blocking of a majority president by a minority through filibustering, has been understudied. This article analyzes filibustering in Costa Rica and explains the legislative paralysis in the wake of the nation's transition to a multiparty system in 2002. Legislative paralysis is seen as a product of the interaction between increased legislative fragmentation and polarization and the legislature's preexisting rules of procedure, which enable legislators easily to block bills they oppose, even when those bills are supported by supermajorities. This argument is tested through a comparison of major economic reforms in the 2000s to the reforms tackled in the 1990s. The role of filibustering, well acknowledged in U.S. politics, should also be studied in comparative politics.