Leadership Game Research Articles

Should Bank Provide Insurance for Horticultural Crop Damage? (A Stackelberg Game Approach)

Abstract This study provides insight for a bank to insure farmers with the possibility of having horticultural crops damaged. Specifically, a Stackelberg leadership game is formulated with the bank as the leader and the farmer as the follower. The bank declares its insurance fee first to anticipate the horticulture prices and maximize its profit. Then, the farmer decides the horticulture price sequentially given the insurance fee and the crop condition. The game is solved under the with and without insurance scenarios. The farmer decides its horticulture price with no banking insurance fee in without insurance scenario. The bank decision-making is only included in with insurance scenario. From the analytical comparison result, it is better for the farmer to have insurance from the bank when the probability of damage to a horticultural crop exists. However, the bank should give an insurance fee to the farmer with a high probability of having good horticultural crops and less customer sensitivity to damaged crops.

A Stackelberg–Nash equilibrium with investment and reinsurance in mixed leadership game

In this paper, we investigate the optimal reinsurance and investment problem from joint interests of the insurer and the reinsurer in the framework of the mixed leadership game, where both of them can invest their wealth in the financial market, and the liabilities are correlated with the risky asset. More specifically, we assume that the insurer is the leader to determine the amount he/she invests into the risky asset but acts as the follower to decide the optimal reinsurance retention level, while the reinsurer is the leader to set the reinsurance premium price and acts as a follower to determine his/her investment strategy. Both the insurer and the reinsurer aim to maximize the expected utility of their terminal wealth, and the explicit Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium is derived by solving the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations. In order to better understand the effect of the mixed leadership game on the optimal reinsurance and investment problem, we also consider the optimization problem within the framework of the stochastic Stackelberg differential game shown in [Bai, Y., Zhou, Z., Xiao, H., Gao, R. & Zhong, F. (2021). A Stackelberg reinsurance-investment game with asymmetric information and delay. Optimization 70(10), 2131–2168.], where the reinsurer is the leader while the insurer acts as the follower for both the reinsurance and investment strategies. Some theoretical analyses and numerical examples are provided to show the economic intuition and insights of the results.

The values of leadership in badminton game

The values in sport settings have long been discussed in the literature, including the ones in the context of badminton. Despite there have been many leadership values in the literature, there is no explicit leadership value coming from research in badminton. Therefore, the purpose of the current study was to investigate the values of leadership being learned from the badminton game and develop value products through Research and Development. The research method used was a mixed method. Participants of the study included 7 former badminton players having leadership positions and 122 students in physical education teacher education program. Data were collected through in-depth interviews and survey. The results of these interviews were then interpreted, reduced, and given codes so that the values of leadership in badminton were obtained converging. The results of the research on leadership values in badminton games included (1) knowing the boundaries of territory (2) realizing the limits of authority (3) working together (4) obeying rules (5) keeping secrets (6) depth of knowledge (7) elegant decisions (8) obeying superiors (9) act with heart. The value products have been implemented and measured their effectiveness. It concludes that badminton provides opportunities to learn and develop leadership competencies. The value products are effective as a model for teaching leadership through badminton.

Private provision of price excludable public goods by rivals

We uniquely study the private provision of price excludable public goods in a duopoly. Simultaneous price competition generates only a mixed strategy equilibrium. Price leadership generates a pure strategy equilibrium with the leader setting a lower price and serving most consumers. This leadership game is the endogenous timing choice and improves welfare relative to monopoly provision. We re-examine these results under production in advance. The leadership game no longer remains a unique timing choice but the profit under production in advance is strictly larger.

Multiple parameter optimization methodology by integrating a game theory principle into priority-based decision making

Mathematical model development for multivariate decision-making problems (i.e., multiple parameter and response optimization problems) has received significant attention and has been investigated by many researchers and practitioners. Although many different optimization models and methods, including priority and weight allocation problems, have been proposed in the literature, there is significant room for improvement. The majority of existing optimization methods may have difficulties in determining reliable priorities and weights for practical industrial situations. In addition, because they often focus on tradeoffs only among multiple output responses, these methods may not incorporate the multiple priority and/or weight effects directly from input factors to output responses (i.e., quality characteristics). To address these problems, the primary objective of this research is to propose a new multi-objective optimization approach by integrating a game theory principle (i.e., the Stackelberg leadership game) into a robust parameter design model to determine the optimal factor settings. First, a multi-response robust design optimization (RDO) problem was formulated using a mean squared error model and response surface methodology. A Stackelberg leadership game is then integrated into this RDO problem, where multiple responses play the role of game participants. Second, the integrated RDO model using the Stackelberg game-based multi-response (SGMR) formulation approach is analyzed by decomposition into various sequential optimization models in terms of different leader–follower relationships. Finally, non-dominated solutions are obtained from the proposed model by evaluating the overall quality loss (OQL). A pharmaceutical numerical example was performed to demonstrate the proposed integrated model and to examine whether this model can determine the most efficient solutions when the relative importance among multiple responses is unidentified. In addition, a comparative study associated with the conventional multi-objective optimization methods and the newly proposed RDO model is presented, and the proposed RDO model provided significantly better solutions than the conventional methods in the relevant comparative study.

Building Trust: A Dynamic Game of Collusive Price Leadership

Building Trust: A Dynamic Game of Collusive Price Leadership

Book Review: Leadership in Game of Thrones

Book Review: Leadership in Game of Thrones

Getting your leadership game on in virtual environments.

This chapter explores strategies for using virtual games in leadership education. Pedagogical practices, examples, and connections to leadership learning frameworks, learning goals, and competencies are also included. Implications for practice such as intentional design, pairing with other instructional strategies, and debriefing are also discussed with an emphasis on purposeful utilization.

Using games in the college curricular setting to engage leadership learners.

Active learning experiences, such as games, have been found to increase the holistic learning experience for students in college curricular settings. However, barriers exist to using games as a leadership pedagogy in the curriculum. This article reviews the benefits and challenges of using games in college leadership curricular settings and provides an overview of select leadership games including instructions, leadership competencies addressed, and processing questions for each game.

Introduction: Leadership in an Infinite Game

Introduction: Leadership in an Infinite Game

Oligopolistic Price Leadership and Mergers: The United States Beer Industry

We study a repeated game of price leadership in which a firm proposes supermarkups over Bertrand prices to a coalition of rivals. Supermarkups and marginal costs are recoverable from data on prices and quantities using the model’s structure. In an application to the beer industry, we find that price leadership increases profit relative to Bertrand competition by 17 percent in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, and by 22 percent in 2010 and 2011, with the change mostly due to consolidation. We simulate two mergers, which relax binding incentive compatibility constraints and increase supermarkups. These coordinated effects arise even with efficiencies that offset price increases under Bertrand competition. (JEL G34, K21, L13, L14, L41, L66)

Solution of a pollution sensitive EOQ model under fuzzy lock leadership game approach

Solution of a pollution sensitive EOQ model under fuzzy lock leadership game approach

Dynamics and Stability Analysis of a Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Game with Price Competition in Insurance Market

This paper investigates the dynamical behaviors of a Stackelberg mixed duopoly game with price competition in the insurance market, involving one state-owned public insurance company and one private insurance company. We study and compare the stability conditions for the Nash equilibrium points of two sequential-move games, public leadership, and private leadership games. Numerical simulations present complicated dynamic behaviors. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium becomes unstable as the price adjustment speed increases, and the system eventually becomes chaotic via flip bifurcation. Moreover, the time-delayed feedback control is used to force the system back to stability.

Bryant and Sharer: seven challenges most likely to make-or-break leaders

PurposeThis interview with Adam Bryant and Kevin Sharer, the authors of “The CEO Test: Mastering the Challenges that Make or Break All Leaders,” examines the relationship between the leaders and followers and the key challenges that tend to determine leadership success or failure.Design/methodology/approachThe authors told S&L’s interviewer Brian Leavy: “We focus specifically on leading others - illuminating seven of the most common make-or-break challenges, and then showing how to navigate them effectively.”FindingsThe authors' research found that “It’s the leader’s job to capture the essence of what matters and then be able to boil down the strategy to just a handful of memorable ideas so that everyone understands, remembers and knows how to contribute to its success.”Practical implicationsLeaders have to learn that listening is a multidimensional practice that requires commitment and constant attention, and the aim is to get a true sense of the nature of their organization and its dynamics.Originality/valueMuch of the on-going outpouring of leadership literature tends to focus on the personal qualities and characteristics of the individual leader. Less studied are the dynamics of the relationship between the leader and the led, or the nature and content of the role itself and the key tasks associated with it. One exception is "The CEO Test: Mastering the Challenges that Make or Break All Leaders" by Adam Bryant and Kevin Sharer. Their "overarching framework to mastering the inner game of leadership is to embrace it as a series of paradoxes,” is an original perspective.

The Role of the Teacher to Construct Teaching and Learning Activities Creating a Freedom to Learn (Action Research Study)

One obstacle that occurs in schools in South Nias Regency is the limited learning resources for students and the limitations of teacher handbooks in the delivery of information and other teaching materials. Learning is the object of this study in economic and science subjects. This study concern about how educators construct learning in situations of limited learning resources. This research was carried out at Toma Public Junior High School on 2018 using the school action approach. The instrument was in the form of an observation sheet of teacher and student activities, an interview sheet, documentation of students’ learning experience process activities. Research findings show that teachers need training to improve the ability to construct learning. The learning tools in the form of syllabus and lesson plans have been partially prepared but only limited to administrative requirements. Developing the teacher’s ability to construct this learning the KBN team conducted activities using several learning methods including domino effects, leadership games and collaborative approaches, as well as using learning tools and media around the school contextually, only the principal was actively involved during the activity process. It was concluded that through collaboration and contextual methods were able to increase students ‘understanding of the material being taught, able to spur student seriousness, train students’ perspectives on the material being taught, be able to implement through thought processes and build new narratives about the material being taught, using learning media contained in school environment, and occur interactively between teachers and students.

Clientelism and identity

Electoral clientelism or vote buying has been regarded as undermining democratic institutions and weakening the accountability of the state towards its citizens, especially the poor. Social identity as a form of political mobilisation may contribute to this, enabling support to be won with clientelist transfers. This paper reports data from a novel laboratory experiment designed to examine whether clientelism can be sustained as a political strategy, and whether identity impacts the nature or efficacy of clientelism. Specifically, we design a voting and leadership game in order to examine whether individuals vote for clientelist allocations by a leader even at the expense of more efficient and egalitarian allocations. We find group identity does not significantly impact the prevalence of clientelist plans. Leaders are more likely, however, to choose allocations that provide fewer benefits (lower rents) to themselves when they are part of the majority in-group than when they are in the minority.

Solution of an imperfect‐quality EOQ model with backorder under fuzzy lock leadership game approach

Solution of an imperfect‐quality EOQ model with backorder under fuzzy lock leadership game approach

Fostering Student-Leadership in a Tanzanian Rural Primary School

Many rural Tanzanian students face challenges that hinder their academic preparation which can lead to school dropout. Knowing this, a needs assessment in a rural primary school (grades 1-7) identified that high teacher-student ratio, hierarchical structures, and tribalism contributed to poor academic performance. A solution to mitigate these obstacles was found in the promotion of student-leaders who could support teachers and peers. Therefore, a leadership program was developed and implemented for eighteen students (ages 10–13 years) who participated in four workshops across two weeks aiming at enhancing their leadership knowledge and skills through leadership activities and games reflections, transfer, and action planning.

Foresight in a Game of Leadership

Leadership can be effective in promoting cooperation within a group, but as the saying goes “heavy is the head that wears the crown”. A lot of debate still surrounds exactly what motivates individuals to expend the effort necessary to lead their groupmates. Evolutionary game theoretic models represent individual’s thought processes by strategy update protocols. The most common of these are random mutation, individual learning, selective imitation, and myopic optimization. Recently we introduced a new strategy update protocol - foresight - which takes into account future payoffs, and how groupmates respond to one’s own strategies. Here we apply our approach to a new 2 × 2 game, where one player, a leader, ensures via inspection and punishment that the other player, a subordinate, produces collective good. We compare the levels of inspection and production predicted by Nash Equilibrium, Quantal Response Equilibrium, level-k cognition, fictitious play, reinforcement learning, selective payoff-biased imitation, and foresight. We show that only foresight and selective imitation are effective at promoting contribution by the subordinate and inspection and punishment by the leader. The role of selective imitation in cultural and social evolution is well appreciated. In line with our prior findings, foresight is a viable alternative route to cooperation.

Pass-through of commodity price shocks in distribution channels with risk-averse agents

We apply variance analysis for studying the risk sharing mechanism in distribution channels, in which the risk-averse buyer and supplier are suffered from commodity price shocks. We obtain the closed-form optimal pass-through rate that minimizes the total channel price/cost risk and maximizes the channel throughput for a Stackelberg leadership game and a Nash bargaining solution. Using the commodity price data in the steel industry, we demonstrate that the pass-through rate should be set between 40 and 80% for major metal alloys.