Lawyers In Private Practice Research Articles

The economic burden of posttraumatic stress disorder among Canadian lawyers: an exploratory study

ABSTRACT Witnessing traumatic material is common for lawyers and can trigger symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This exploratory study aimed to assess the economic burden associated with probable PTSD (determined by a cut-off score on the PCL-5), among a convenience sample of Canadian lawyers. A group of 159 lawyers completed a longitudinal online survey. Participants were also classified as having incident, persistent, remitted, or no probable PTSD. Societal costs included direct, indirect, and patient costs. Past year health services use, physician fees, prescription medications, loss of productivity at work, medical leave, time lost due to medical visits, and fees paid to mental health and other professionals not covered by the universal health care plan in Canada were considered. Lawyers with probable PTSD incurred significantly higher costs than those without PTSD for loss of productivity at work ($62,105 vs $15,847) and, specifically among lawyers in private practice, for billable hours lost ($39,375 vs $7,127). The societal costs associated with probable PTSD were mainly driven by those related to loss of productivity due to absenteeism and presenteeism. How those results mirror the values and behaviors that are promoted in the field of law is discussed.

Research and Resources for Private Equity Lawyers

AbstractIn this article John Franssen, Head of Research at Travers Smith LLP, gives an overview of what private equity is (including a brief glossary of some key terms), how private equity invests, the type of work lawyers in private practice are involved in and some of the key resources that they need and that are available. This article will also highlight the growing importance of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) and sustainability investment for private equity managers.

C. Jones and L. Weinert (eds), EU Competition Law Volume II: Mergers and Acquisitions* (3rd edition)

Merger notifications to the European Commission (Commission) under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR)1 form a central part of the workload of most competition lawyers in private practice, in particular those working in the large commercial firms in Brussels and elsewhere in the European Union. Pre-Brexit, this would have been the case for their colleagues working in London and other legal centres in the UK, although many cross-border transactions that they work on will still be reviewed by the Commission, as well as by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA).2 Following a slight drop in notifications in 2020

The Government Deference Dimension of Judicial Decision Making: Evidence from the Supreme Court of Norway

Past research has revealed conflicting findings regarding the degree to which judges on European apex courts enact their policy preferences or instead disagree on the basis of divergent legal views. We investigate disagreement between judges on the Norwegian Supreme Court between 1996 and 2016. During this period, the court dealt with a greater volume of policy‐relevant cases than previously. The method of appointment to the court was also changed to a judicial appointments commission. We analyse non‐unanimous cases using item response theory models. We find that judges are not divided along left–right lines but instead disagree about the appropriate degree of deference to give to public authorities. There is no significant association between the appointing government and judges' ideal points either before or after the reform to appointments. Judges who were formerly academics are however much less deferential than career judges or judges who were previously lawyers in private practice.

Law Society Policy For Access to Justice Failure

Law Society Policy For Access to Justice Failure

Legal Information Access of Lawyers in Private Practice: A Case Study of the Kingdom of Eswatini

Legal Information Access of Lawyers in Private Practice: A Case Study of the Kingdom of Eswatini

Agricultural Investments: A Primer for Host Government Lawyers and Local Lawyers in Private Practice

Agricultural Investments: A Primer for Host Government Lawyers and Local Lawyers in Private Practice

Law Society Accountability for the Access to Justice Problem

Law Society Accountability for the Access to Justice Problem

Be Careful What You Wish For: Ronald Reagan, Donald Trump, The Assault on Civil Rights, and The Surprising Story of How Title VII Got Its Private Right of Action

This essay reviews the impact of President Ronald Reagan’s policies on civil rights enforcement in the 1980s, as he tried to turn back the clock on civil rights. Reagan devastated the civil rights enforcement agencies, as he pandered to the white nationalists who helped him win election. But Reagan’s attempts ultimately failed, and leave behind an important lesson for President Donald Trump. Reagan’s appointments to and policies at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division, and the Department of Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) seriously damaged civil rights enforcement. But employment discrimination law has survived and continues to be an often-effective tool against racism, misogyny, homophobia, religious hatred, and other forms of discrimination. Title VII cases (and claims under parallel statutes) continue to be a major part of the caseload in federal courts. Why? Because the Civil Rights Act is largely enforced by private civil rights groups and lawyers in private practice who bring cases before independent judges pursuant to a private right of action. Did a progressive Congress have the foresight to recognize that a private right of action would protect the victims of discrimination from future administrations hostile to civil rights, and thus include it in the statute as a check against enforcement agencies captured by civil rights opponents? Hardly. Rather, moderate and conservative Senate Republicans, resigned to the fact that an employment discrimination law was inevitable, and fearful of a powerful federal agency that would restrict business autonomy in the manner of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), substituted a private right of action for agency adjudication in an attempt to sabotage the effectiveness of Title VII. In 1964, the adoption of a private right of action was widely seen as a great loss for civil rights advocates, turning Title VII from an enforceable law to an ineffectual call for voluntary compliance with anti-discrimination policies. Almost no one foresaw the development of a private bar of plaintiffs’ employment discrimination lawyers. Those who tried to sabotage the enforcement of civil rights through a private right of action should be turning in their graves, having inadvertently given civil rights advocates a powerful tool to resist assaults on civil rights.

Recent Developments in the Provision of Pro Bono Legal Services by Attorneys in South Africa

This paper focuses on legal service delivery for the indigent by attorneys in private practice acting pro bono in civil rather than criminal matters. In this regard there have been and continue to be considerable gaps between the proper access to civil justice imperatives of constitutional South Africa and the status quo which has existed from the advent of a democratic South Africa until the present. Law as a vehicle for necessary positive change in the daily lives of South African residents is pertinently considered within the country’s woefully unequal socio-economic climate. This paper considers the role which pro bono work by private attorneys is playing and should play in promoting a more just and equitable society through proper access to justice. It explores the current position in South Africa as well as the position in selected foreign jurisdictions regarding pro bono services by attorneys in private practice in civil matters. Part of the discussion focuses on the question of whether pro bono work should be voluntary or mandatory. The merits of introducing a pro bono obligation are critically analysed by looking at the effect on both legal practitioners as well as those receiving the pro bono services. Having defined pro bono work, the practical need for pro bono work by lawyers in private practice is highlighted due to the dearth of legal aid in civil matters for indigent South Africans. Possible constitutional imperatives for the provision of free legal services in civil matters are highlighted. An important part of the paper is a reflection on some of the pro bono work being conducted by private firms of attorneys. The paper concludes with suggestions on means for establishing a more effective pro bono system in South Africa.

Regulators at the Margins: The Impact of Malpractice Insurers on Solo and Small Firm Lawyers

Solo and small firm lawyers comprise more than three-fifths of all lawyers in private practice and are disproportionately subject to discipline sanctions. Sociolegal scholars have long sought to identify the factors that influence the behavior of these lawyers. Research suggests that lawyer professional liability (“LPL”) insurers regulate the behavior of large firm lawyers through the underwriting process, premium pricing, contract design, and risk management practices in order to reduce the risk of loss. This article explores whether LPL insurers also regulate the behavior of solo and small firm lawyers in ways that encourage responsible conduct. The articles draws on interviews of insurance industry executives, risk management counsel, and insured lawyers, as well as surveys of lawyers and insurer documents, to explore the impact of LPL insurers on the work lives of solo and small firm lawyers. The research reveals that unlike LPL insurers of large law firms, LPL insurers appear to regulate the behavior of solo and small firm lawyers in limited ways. The article explores the reasons why this is the case. It also discusses solo and small firm lawyers’ attitudes about malpractice actions, which shed additional light on the likely efficacy of insurers’ efforts to regulate the behavior of these lawyers. The article identifies a much more effective regulator of lawyer conduct — title insurers — and explains how this regulation occurs and the conditions that make effective regulation possible. It suggests some steps that LPL insurers could take to further encourage solo and small firm lawyers to engage in more responsible behavior.

A2J: Preventing the Abolition of Law Societies by Curing the Defects in their Management Structure: A Solution to the Unaffordable Legal Services Problem

The root cause of the unaffordable legal services problem (“the problem”) in Canada is the obsolescence of the management structure of its law societies (10 major defects listed). A 19th century management structure cannot cope with the need for legal services of a 21st century society based upon democracy and the rule of law. Law societies should either be abolished or their management structure changed. A Canadian version of the Clementi Report (U.K., 2004) could effect such abolition.The re-structured management solution recommended is a combination of: (1) a national institute, providing law societies with the continuing and permanently developing expertise for such difficult problems, as does a civil service provide for an elected government, which is missing from current law society management, being management by “part-time amateurs” (benchers) providing their labor as charity; and, (2) a centralized legal research support service providing at cost to all lawyers and judges in Canada, legal opinions and other online materials. Since July 1979, such a service has been provided by Legal Aid Ontario to Ontario lawyers in private practice who service legal aid cases. The Appendix describes a national version of such a service. That service would be the beginning of a much needed national conversion of the provision of legal services from the “handcraftsman’s” method to a support services method. All areas of the production of goods and services have made that transition, where there has been sufficient pressure to make it happen, such as the pressure upon all medical services, and that imposed by a highly competitive commercial market. As a result, no doctor’s office provides all treatments and remedies for all patients, as does each law office for each client.The law societies’ response to the problem is to promote various alternative legal services, based upon a strategy of, “cutting costs by cutting competence” — the competence of the person providing the service, or the service itself; for example: targeted, unbundled legal services; assisting self-represented litigants programs; student and paralegal programs; pro bono for simple, short cases; family mediation services; and, self-help phone-in and online services. Thus, law society benchers do only the easy things because their motivations for becoming benchers, and the need to serve their clients and legal department employers first, conflict with tackling difficult problems, otherwise, they are at risk of being “spread to thin” for time, troubles, and temper.

The Technology of Centralized Legal Research Can Solve the Unaffordable Legal Services Problem

The technology of centralized legal research (CLR) creates a support service that can provide legal opinion and related services far more cost-efficiently than can any law firm. CLR technology maximizes the re-use of all work-product by means of three kinds of specialization of: (1) research staff; (2) materials used; and, (3) database management. By its ninth year of development (1988), LAO LAW, the centralized legal research unit at Legal Aid Ontario (LAO), was producing 5,000 legal opinions per year for Ontario lawyers in private practice to service legal aid clients (the judicare model of providing legal services to poor people). Now in 2014, it has a successful history of 35 years of innovation, popularity, and saving LAO millions of dollars that would otherwise have been paid-out on lawyers accounts for legal research hours claimed. This article explains how this service could be made a national service, available to all lawyers for all of their clients at cost. Greater cost-savings would be obtained because “nothing is as effective at reducing costs as scaling-up,” i.e., “bigger is better.” This same technology can create several other support services, which together, would solve “the unaffordable legal services problem”: the majority of population cannot obtain legal services at reasonable cost.

The Failure of Law Societies to Accept Their Duty in Law to Solve the Unaffordable Legal Services Problem

Canada’s law societies have a duty in law to solve the “unaffordable legal services problem,” i.e., that the majority of the population cannot obtain legal services at reasonable cost. The problem has been developing over decades during which years the law societies have failed to act. The problem has caused severe damage to: (1) the population for lack of legal services; (2) the courts by the “clogging” caused by self-represented litigants; (3) the legal profession which is contracting when it could be expanding, in spite of very negative forecasts for its future; and (4) to the funding of legal aid organizations because it is not “politically wise” to provide adequate or increased funding for free legal services for poor people while the majority of taxpayers have no affordable legal services. The theme of this article is that the law societies have not acted because they do not accept the proposition that it is their duty in law to solve the problem, as are the problems created by incompetent and unethical lawyers.The problem is inevitable because of the method used to deliver legal services. The legal profession uses a “handcraftman’s method” instead of a “support services method.” The former has been abandoned everywhere else in the large-scale production of goods and services in favour of the latter, because of its much greater cost-efficiency. The handcraftsman’s method means that, instead of using highly specialized support services, law firms do all of the work themselves to service all of each client’s legal problems. As a result, no law firm has a sufficient degree of specialization, combined with the necessary scaled-up volume of production to prevent the problem from happening. The difference in the two methods is exemplified by the cost-efficiency of a centralized legal research unit servicing lawyers in private practice who provide free legal services to legal aid clients (poor people). Its technology of centralized legal research has enabled it to produce close to 5,000 complete legal opinions per year, thus saving its government-financed legal aid organization millions of dollars that would otherwise have had to be paid out on lawyers’ accounts for legal research services rendered.

Work-Family Conflict and Job- Demand Control in Psychological Adjustment of Lawyers in Private Practice

Despite the continuous interest in psychological adjustment of entrepreneurs as important factor in wellbeing and business outcomes, lawyers in private practice especially in Nigeria have not been covered and largely documented in the body of literature that exist. Hence this study that examined the roles played by work-family conflict and job demand control on psychological adjustment among lawyers as entrepreneurs in private practice. It involved a sample of 156 male and female lawyers in Ibadan metropolis. Three hypotheses were tested by using pearson ‘r’ and multiple regression statistics. It was found that work-family conflict was negatively related to psychological adjustment (r = -0.412, P<.01) while job demand control positively correlated with psychological adjustment (r = -0.185, P<.01). Also, work-family conflict and job demand control jointly predicted psychological adjustment (F (2,153) = 20.55, P <.01). Independently, predictions were found for work-family conflict (B=-0.640, t = 5.86, P<.05) and job demand- control (B=-O.077, t=-2.85, P<.05). It was concluded that work-family conflict and job demand-control are important factors in the psychological adjustment of lawyers in private practice. It implies that the variables are deserving of attention in personal development for lawyers as entrepreneurs. More so, attempt at improving their adjustment capacity need to focus on preparing them with coping skills to balance work-family demands and exercise control over their job related activities.

Recent Developments in the Provision of <i>Pro Bono</i> Legal Services by Attorneys in South Africa

This paper focuses on legal service delivery for the indigent by attorneys in private practice acting pro bono in civil rather than criminal matters. In this regard there have been and continue to be considerable gaps between the proper access to civil justice imperatives of constitutional South Africa and the status quo which has existed from the advent of a democratic South Africa until the present. Law as a vehicle for necessary positive change in the daily lives of South African residents is pertinently considered within the country’s woefully unequal socio-economic climate. This paper considers the role which pro bono work by private attorneys is playing and should play in promoting a more just and equitable society through proper access to justice. It explores the current position in South Africa as well as the position in selected foreign jurisdictions regarding pro bono services by attorneys in private practice in civil matters. Part of the discussion focuses on the question of whether pro bono work should be voluntary or mandatory. The merits of introducing a pro bono obligation are critically analysed by looking at the effect on both legal practitioners as well as those receiving the pro bono services. Having defined pro bono work, the practical need for pro bono work by lawyers in private practice is highlighted due to the dearth of legal aid in civil matters for indigent South Africans. Possible constitutional imperatives for the provision of free legal services in civil matters are highlighted. An important part of the paper is a reflection on some of the pro bono work being conducted by private firms of attorneys. The paper concludes with suggestions on means for establishing a more effective pro bono system in South Africa.KEYWORDS: legal service delivery; indigent; attorneys; pro bono; civil matters; private practice; constitutional; South Africa; socio-economic; access to justice; foreign jurisdictions; voluntary; mandatory; legal aid; free legal services

Regulating Law Firms in Canada

In Canada, the regulatory focus of law societies has always focused on the people who provide legal services rather than on the vehicles through which legal services may be provided. The traditional model of the delivery of legal services then was the sole lawyer in private practice. This model has survived for over two centuries. However, law firms of all sizes are now omnipresent in the Canadian legal profession. While law firms are ever present in the practice of law, they are peripheral in the regulation of lawyers in Canada. At the very least, this discrepancy presents a question that should be addressed: should law firms be regulated? Law Societies should regulate law firms. They should do so primarily on the basis of ensuring public confidence in self-regulation and respect for the Rule of Law and only secondarily out of concerns regarding public protection. The proper question is not why should law firms be regulated but why do they largely escape Law Society regulation? It is widely recognized that law firms have their own culture. It is contested whether this culture strengthens or weakens ethical conduct of the firm’s constituent lawyers. Resolution of this issue is not necessary for the purposes of my argument. Once it is acknowledged that the law firm is an independent actor exerting significant influence on the practice of law, the burden of justifying why it should be regulated necessarily shifts. The absence of law firm regulation creates a problem of legitimacy for Law Societies mandated to regulate the practice of law in the public interest. This regulatory gap also raises Rule of Law concerns and may threaten public confidence if the public believes that the most powerful groups of lawyers escape regulation. Bar leaders in Canada have ratcheted up the expectations of self-regulation through the strength of their rhetoric and their actions against perceived incursions of self-regulation. As a result, lawyers in Canada have set the bar for what self-regulation is supposed to accomplish at a very high level. Consequently, the failure to regulate law firms may threaten self-regulation of the legal profession in Canada. This paper presents an argument and a blueprint for law firm regulation. It has five parts in addition to this introduction. In Part I, I detail why Canadian law societies should regulate law firms. Part II undertakes a “regulatory audit” of how Law Societies in Canada currently regulate law firms. In this section and in this paper I focus on the Law Society of Upper Canada as the regulator of the largest number of lawyers in Canada as well as the jurisdiction with which I am most familiar. Then I turn to comparative experience in Part III by examining how law firms are regulated in three comparable jurisdictions: the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom. Then in Part IV, I present a suggested template for law firm regulation. Finally, Part V provides a brief conclusion.

Custom as a Source of Law (review)

Reviewed by: Custom as a Source of Law Sean O. Sheridan T.O.R. Custom as a Source of Law by David J. Bederman. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Canons 23 through 28 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law provide the ius vigens on the issue of custom as a source of law in the Church. Specifically, canon 23 states: "Only that custom introduced by a community of the faithful and approved by the legislator according to the norm of the following canons has the force of law." The use of custom as a basis for law has a long standing tradition in the Church, but also in the laws of civil society. In his book entitled Custom as a Source of Law, Bederman traces the historical development and the significance of custom as a source of law in an effort to identify its role in the modern legal system. Bederman's book, based on a series of lectures that he presented in a course for law students at Emory University School of Law, is divided into three major parts. Part One, "Customary Law in Perspective," focuses on the historical development of custom as a source of law from an anthropological perspective (3-1), a cultural perspective (16-26), an historical perspective (27-41), and an economic, sociobiological and psychological perspective (42-53). Part Two, "Custom in Domestic Legal Systems," addresses the use of custom as a source of law in specific areas: family law (57-67), property (68-79), contracts (80-90), torts (91-100) and constitutional law (101-113). Lastly, Part Three, "Custom in International Law," considers the issue from the perspectives of private international law (117-134) and public international law (135-167). Although Bederman does not address the Church's current understanding of custom as a source of law, he does consider briefly the role of custom in the ius commune (22-25), which would be of particular interest to medieval historians. He recognizes the development of custom from Roman law through its consideration by the medieval canonist Gratian. He suggests that, in some respect for Gratian, custom as a source of law was an attempt "to suppress dangerous or irrational customs" (23-24) but also an extension and enrichment of the classical Roman Law treatment of the question (24). For the most part, although the other topics in the book appear to be well researched and well written, they would in all likelihood be most interesting to historians or civil law academicians, rather than to canonists or even civil law practitioners. Certainly, analogies to the principles of canon law might be drawn from Bederman's treatment of issues such as family [End Page 284] law (57-67), which could, for example, be incorporated into a decision on the question of the nullity of a marriage. Similar consideration might be made for questions on temporal goods with regard to Bederman's treatment of custom as a source of law for property issues (68-79) or the interpretation of contracts (80-90). The same could also be said for civil lawyers in private practice who might make use of this information. Perhaps Bederman himself best acknowledges the challenge presented by the issue of custom as a source of law through his conclusion that "as tempting as it would be to propose here a unified theory for custom's formation, such, alas, is impossible." (171). Nonetheless, Bederman should be commended for his contribution to the discussion. Sean O. Sheridan T.O.R. The Catholic University of America School of Canon Law Washington DC Copyright © 2012 The Catholic University of America Press

When Must EPA Set Ambient Air Quality Standards - Looking Back at NRDC v. Train

I. THE ORIGINS OF NRDC v. TRAIN II. THE NRDC LITIGATION AND OPINION III. THE AFTERMATH A. Setting the Ambient Standard for Lead B. Implementation of the Ambient Air Quality Standards C. Did the Standard Accomplish the Goals of NRDC? IV. CONCLUSION At our conference at UCLA on the Clean Air Act and climate change in April 2011, Kassie Siegel of the Center for Biological Diversity described what she thought could be accomplished if the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) were to set national ambient air quality standards for greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act (Act). (1) These standards, she explained, would establish a target concentration of greenhouse gases in the outside atmosphere we breathe (e.g., 350 parts of carbon dioxide per cubic meter of air). (2) States would then prepare State Implementation Plans (SIPs) that would detail the steps they would take to meet those standards, such as establishing controls on major sources like power plants or altering land use laws and management to decrease reliance on the single-occupancy motor vehicle. (3) As I have explained elsewhere, there are many disadvantages to setting ambient air quality standards for greenhouse gases. (4) For example, the ambient standard system would take a long time--roughly ten years--to be put into place. There would be controversy and room for litigation about the exact level at which the standard should be set, a question over which there is already a great deal of debate. Once set, the standard would doubtless be challenged in court, further delaying implementation. SIPs would likewise be subject to administrative and legal challenges. One nationally-known expert on the Act, now a lawyer in private practice, has told me that if he were being paid to hinder regulation of greenhouse gases, he would want EPA to go down the ambient standard path. (5) The difficulties of setting ambient air quality standards for greenhouse gases would be justifiable--just as ambient standards are for other important air pollutants--if the standards could be effectively implemented. But this is not the case. Ironically, both the Act's stringency and laxity play a role. Presumably, EPA would set both health-based and welfare-based ambient air quality standards (primary and secondary standards, respectively) because it has found that greenhouse gases endanger both health and welfare. (6) Under the Act, states must demonstrate that nonattainment areas meet health-based standards within ten years after being designated as nonattainment. (7) But decreasing concentrations of greenhouse gases takes much longer because some greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, stay in the atmosphere for prolonged periods and even centuries. (8) The consequence is that EPA would either have to approve plans that it knows will not meet the standard or demand plans with draconian measures that still might not be effective. In addition, the ten-year period for attainment would focus direction on short-term steps, such as energy efficiency initiatives, and not on long-term measures, such as altering land use policies, which might prove more effective over time. The environmental community could possibly agree to ignore the ten-year deadline, although maintaining such an agreement among the large number of potential challengers to EPA would not be easy. But there is little that the community can do to cope with the other obstacle: section 179B of the Act. (9) This provision--inserted at the behest of Texas Senator Phil Gramm in 1990 as solace to El Paso, which is near the Mexican city of Juarez (10)--requires EPA to approve a state plan if it would show attainment but for emissions emanating from outside of the United States. Thus, because foreign nations emit three-quarters of all greenhouse gases, a state could gain approval of a plan that would not do much to reduce emissions. (11) Therefore, setting and enforcing ambient air quality standards is likely to be a tail-chasing process that would gain little. …

Compromise or capitulation? US Food and Drug Administration jurisdiction over tobacco products.

The authors do not consider these competing interests, but in the interest of full transparency declare the following: Dr. Glantz holds two research grants related to tobacco from the National Cancer Institute, an endowed chair as American Legacy Distinguished Professor in Tobacco Control, and a grant from the Robert Wood Johns Foundation to assist Ms. Eubanks, who led the US Department of Justice in its successful RICO case against the tobacco industry (United States v. Philip Morris USA, et al.) in writing a book about the case. Dr. Glantz also administers an endowment from the American Legacy Foundation, which supports the UCSF Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education, which Dr. Glantz directs, and the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library. He also has the William Cahan Endowment provided by the Flight Attendant Medical Research Institute. Mr. Barnes is an attorney in Dr. Glantz' research group, who is supported in part by Dr. Glantz' National Cancer Institute grants. Ms. Eubanks retired from the Department of Justice on December 1, 2005 and is now a lawyer in private practice in Washington, D. C. None of these organizations played any role in the preparation of this paper or the decision to submit it for publication. This paper was not prepared as part of any extramurally funded project. Provenance: Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed