Laws Of Formal Logic Research Articles

EVALUATION OF THE CLINICAL AND EPIDEMIOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ROAD TRAFFIC INJURIES IN CHILDREN AS A MEDICAL AND SANITARY CONSEQUENCE OF A MAN-MADE EMERGENCY

EVALUATION OF THE CLINICAL AND EPIDEMIOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ROAD TRAFFIC INJURIES IN CHILDREN AS A MEDICAL AND SANITARY CONSEQUENCE OF A MAN-MADE EMERGENCY

Modern combat injuries of the extremities. The first report: clinical and anatomical structure and structure of injury combinations

Objective. To determine and verify the clinical and anatomical structure and structure of combinations of combat injuries of the extremities.
 Materials and methods. A retrospective analysis of 2138 observations of combat limb injuries was carried out using the laws of formal logic, parametric and non–parametric statistics. 
 Results. It has been established that head and neck injuries are most often combined with injuries to the upper (53.08%) and lower (46.92%) limbs. Combined injuries to the chest and upper limb occurred in 50.01 per cent of victims, and to the chest and lower limb in 49.99 per cent. The combination of injuries to the abdomen, spine, and pelvis with injuries to the lower extremities was observed in 62.40, 57.15, and 76.18 per cent of victims, respectively.
 Conclusions. Limb injury as a result of modern warfare is a rather complex clinical and anatomical trauma, the main feature of which is multicomponent (damage to different segments of the limbs) and combination with damage to other organs and systems.

Когнитивная интерпретация феномена «фейк» как жанра медиадискурса

The article is dedicated to the description of the cognitive mechanism of fake messages implementation in the media discourse. The controversial nature of this phenomenon is due to a number of linguistic and extralinguistic features, which determines a comprehensive cognitive-discursive analysis of the fake phenomenon in order to identify the sources of its destructiveness, the mechanisms that ensure the successful manifestation of the fake. The crucial violations of the basic laws of formal logic which function as a source of fake conflictogenity are examined in the paper, their productivity is revealed in this aspect, and several recommendations for verifying fake information are provided. The analyzed material is taken from the Internet pages of print and online media of various levels and formats, blogs functioning in the course of the media discourse. It is established that fake is a complex multi-stage cognitive-communicative action. The deliberate unreliability of a fake message determines the mandatory application of various kinds of violations of the norms of communication, first of all – the laws of formal logic. Violations of the laws of identity and sufficient reason are most often used, less often – the law of contradiction; the law of the excluded third, due to its specificity, is not used at all. Violation of the latter law inevitably leads to disavowal of falsification. Structural violations taking place in the cognitive model of a fake message contribute to the successful masking of fake information, as well as blocking the recipient’s critical thinking and, as a result, the intensification of speech effects on the addressee. In addition, the communicative perspective of a fake is associated with causing damage to the addressee. All these aspects make it possible to qualify fake as a destructive type of communicative actions involving the spreading of obviously unreliable socially significant information and aimed at the realization of speech influence on the addressee.

Logos as a Source of Communicative Pressure Confrontation in Various Types of Discourse

The paper dwells upon the study of logos as one of the sources of communicative pressure destructiveness. The paper considers peculiarities of realizing logos conflictogenes in various types of discourse: legal, socio-political and artistic. The material for the study is represented by transcripts of the lawyers’ speeches in the courtroom, transcripts of the politicians’ speeches in the parliament and socio-political talk shows, interviews, as well as excerpts from the works of art. With the language norm adopted as a speech standard, it is proposed to single out argumentation as an individual non-rhetorical type of persuasion. Rhetorical types of persuasion distinguish between speech persuasion as a cooperative type and communicative pressure as a confrontational type. Introduction of conflictogenes into one or more components of the speech model qualifies the speech persuasion as communicative pressure. A logos conflictogene is represented by an illogical statement caused by violation of the laws of formal logic. It is concluded that conflictogenes can perform their primary and secondary functions on the basis of which their possible combinations in the communicative pressure speech model are presented. The paper establishes the primary nature of logos conflictogenes. Moreover, their implementation in the speech model leads to the formation of secondary conflictogenes in the ethos. Although logos conflictogenes can realize the primary source of communicative pressure confrontation, most often they are accompanied by primary conflictogenes of the other components in the speech model. As a rule, it is stipulated by the lack of valid arguments which makes the addresser intensify speech persuasion by appealing to the emotional sphere of the addressee’s consciousness. Logos conflictogenes realizing communicative pressure should be distinguished from communicative errors, which are of an accidental unintentional nature and do not serve the pragmatic goal of the statement.

Цифровая форма объекта интеллектуальной собственности как способ повышения его конкурентоспособности

Relevance. To analyze the problems of legal status’ determination of intellectual property objects’ in digital form in the framework of valid civil legislation. The study tested the admission of different basis for regulation of the intellectual property objects’ possession and use in the digital and analog form. Methodology: the methodological basis of the article is formal-logical law research method. Results. The author concludes that intellectual property objects in digital form exist only in Internet that give for its possessors more opportunities for digital contact distribution. Moreover digital form of the intellectual property object influences on the marketability of digital product in respect of broad list of methods’ use of this product and reduction of its cost in comparative with the analog object. The research provided digital and analog forms of the intellectual property objects are not the same as a whole in spite of its content unity. The author makes a conclusion that such categories as «original work» and «sample of work» can’t be used to the digital form of the intellectual property objects, because the objects in digital form are only the copies of the original work. Therefore legal regulation of the intellectual property objects depends on its forms. The author suggests considering license agreement made on form of click-wrap-agreement as application of the intellectual property objects in digital form. Discussion. The conclusions of the study can be used as a basis for further researches and lawmaking.

Violation of the laws of formal logic as a source of game effect in confrontational media discourse

Violation of the laws of formal logic as a source of game effect in confrontational media discourse

Definition of Derivative Function: Logical Error in Mathematics

The critical analysis of the foundations of the differential calculus is proposed. Methodological basis of the analysis is the unity of formal logic and of rational dialectics. It is shown that differential calculus is fictitious mathematical theory because the concept of the limiting process is the starting point for definition of the derivative function. The passage to the limit “zero” in the definition of the derivative function signifies that the variable quantity takes the only essential value “zero”. This fact leads to the following errors. (1) The definition of the derivative function is based on the violation of the necessary and sufficient condition for the validity of the relationship between the increment of the function argument and the increment of the function because the increment of the function is divided by the zero increment of the argument in the case of the limiting process. (2) The definition of the derivative function is based on the contradiction which is that the increment of the argument is both zero and not zero in the same relationship. This contradiction represents a violation of the formal-logical law of identity and of the formal-logical law of the lack of contradiction. (3) The definition of the differential of function is based on two contradictory (mutually exclusive) features: the differential of the argument is not zero while the increment of the argument in the definition of the derivative function is zero.

Dialectical Logic and Boolean Algebra

Dialectical logic was founded by German famous philosopher F. Hegel, but it has not been laid on mathematics for a long time. In this paper author explains the dialectical logic pure mathematically, and shows that the classic formal logic, its mathematical expression is Boolean algebra(includes multiple value system), is a special case from dialectical logic, and the true-valued function for dialectical logic is a continuous function valued on closed interval  and defined on time-space axes system. The Aristotle three laws of formal logic are expanded into expression of dialectical logic, and Russell paradox is expanded into the case of multiple order. Some new theorems for Boolean operators and the matrix expression for De Morgan’s theorem of multiple variables dialectical logic are given. At the end of the paper, linear or nonlinear dialectical logic are defined and analysis properties of dialectical logic true-valued function are pointed. 

The Priority of Object over Method in Early Greek Mathematics

In modern mathematics, whose origins date back to the 17th c., method takes priority over the object, as the generality of method (which relies on a set of axioms and the laws of formal logic, applicable to any kind of objects whatsoever) implies the generality of the studied object. This epistemological attitude was alien to Greek mathematics, in which the generality of method did not necessarily mean the general character of its object. This is manifest, e.g., in Euclid's Elements, where the axiomatic-deductive method does not eradicate the particularity of the studied objects: numbers, lengths, plane figures, and solids. The aim of this paper consists in showing that in the early stages of Greek mathematics, when axiomatic-deductive way of argumentation was still unknown, object took priority over method in the sense that an investigation was not accomplished according to a definite method, fixed in advance, but rather relied upon methods that were suggested, in each particular case, by the structure of the appropriate objects. I will examine such a state of affairs by proposing reconstructions of archaic demonstrations of theorems taken from early geometry, arithmetic, and the theory of ratios and proportions.

“Unerschütterlich”: Kafka's Proceß, Wittgenstein's Tractatus, and the Law of Logic

This paper offers an “analytic analysis” (that is, one that uses both the sources and methodology of the early analytic tradition in philosophy) of Kafka's Der Proceß. Specifically, the author uses the formal logic Ludwig Wittgenstein charted out in the Tractatus logico‐philosophicus to show that while Josef K.'s arrest, trial and “execution” may seem unjust or even invalid when we refuse to consider pre‐existing or self‐determined guilt, Kafka's portrayal of logical contradiction actually reveals the proceedings to be entirely logically valid. The author accomplishes this through an identification of several key contradictions in Kafka's text combined with an exploration of Wittgenstein's proof (using truth‐tables) that contradictions, though senseless (sinnlos), still belong to logical symbolism. Thus, while the Law (das Gesetz) of the novel's enigmatic and terrifying Court (das Gericht) remains as inscrutable as ever, Der Proceß does indeed heed another sort of law‐the laws of formal logic.

A Realist Analysis of the Relationship between Logic and Experience

I undertake to explain how the well known laws of formal logic – Barbara Syllogism, modus ponens, etc. – relate to experience by developing Edmund Husserl's critique ofFormalism and Psychologism in logical theory and then briefly explaining his positive views of the laws of logic. His view rests upon his understanding of the proposition as a complex, intentional property. The laws of formal logic are, on his view (and mine), statements about the truth values of propositions as determined by their formal character and relationships alone. The laws thus understood explain how algorithms set up to mirror them can accomplish what they do to advance knowledge, even though they operate purely mechanically. Further, they explain the proper sense in which formal laws "govern," and may guide, processes of actual thinking. Husserl's theory is a realist theory in the sense that, on his interpretation, the laws of pure or formal logic hold true regardless of what any individual, culture or species may or may not think, or even if no thinking ever occurs.

The nature of legal reasoning: a commentary with special reference to Professor MacCormick's theory

‘Legal reasoning’ and its character have been under discussion for some time: the character, that is, of the reasoning which judges, advocates, solicitors, and others engaged in matters of legal practice and decision must pursue if their conclusions are to claim validity. Do they – or should they – reason on lines dictated by the laws of formal logic, i.e. deductively in the strict sense of that term? Or must we say that judges, and lawyers in general, cannot reach or justify conclusions on deductive lines, and that in fact – and quite legitimately – they use, in establishing and justifying conclusions, a mode of reasoning which is not deductive but has a quite different determinate character of its own? If so, what is that determinate character? Does it provide criteria whereby we may appriase legal argumentation in particular instances as valid or invalid or, at least, as rational or failing in rationality?

On "Can the Law of Contradiction be Contravened?"

A special supplement [of Kuang-ming Daily] published an article by Comrade Chu-ko Yin-t'ung entitled Can the Law of Contradiction Be Contravened?; in it he maintains that the law of contradiction, as well as the other laws of formal logic, must be observed in every situation. When thinking dialectically, the laws of formal logic must always be observed. His chief argument is that we have still not found an example in which the law of contradiction has been contravened. In addition to explaining the three generally accepted judgments resulting from dialectical thinking on the definitions, etc., of mechanical motion, he asserts that they actually contain no logical contradictions. There are, however, other arguments; and since, after the article was published, there were some who opposed it and some who agreed with it, I thought I would contribute to the discussion.

Is It Possible to Make a Non-Contradictory Statement of the Contradictoriness of Motion?

Zeno's famous paradox of the flying arrow, and the statements made in efforts to solve it by Hegel and Engels to the effect that a moving body is, at a given instant, both in and not in a given place, reveal, on the one hand, the objective contradictoriness of motion and, on the other, the difficulty of explaining it within the framework and method of formal logic. The elevation of the laws of formal logic to an absolute, and the exaggeration of its role have led certain writers to deny the truth of Hegel's and Engels' statement. It was shown that no body can simultaneously be and not be in a given place, and that, in describing motion, one should, instead of employing this mode of expression, merely say that the body is shifting, and successively passes one point after another. This passage is motion as an objectively non-contradictory process.

Ritschl's Criterion of Religious Truth

Ritschl's conception of the criterion of truth. And yet a man's criterion of truth is the key to the understanding of all his thought. If we know that a man will view as true only the laws of formal logic and what can be cogently deduced by these laws from rational principles, then we know all we need to know about the type of religious construction of which that man will be capable. Again, if we know that he will believe nothing that he cannot verify in sense experience, we are already in possession of the main outline of his thought, beyond which he cannot wander and remain coherent. We know too that a theologian who approaches the Scriptures with the assumption of their infallibility, or with any other dogmatic presupposition, has a criterion that will drive him to certain conclusions and effectually bar him from certain others. Some criterion predetermines all thought-construction that is not merely haphazard. It was the great merit of Ritschl to have been aware of the need for clearness on this fundamental matter. It may be that he did not succeed in attaining it to our satisfaction or his own; but it has been his misfortune that what he has said has not been adequately evaluated. The objective study of this side of Ritschl's thought is rendered unusually difficult by two more or less current presuppositions: first, the very term Ritschlianism suggests that our theologian's system was a rather closely knit, logical unity, a system in the strict sense; secondly, the center of Ritschl's thought on the criterion of truth is commonly supposed to be the value-judgment. As a matter of fact, each of these presuppositions is misleading. It is far from accurate to think that Ritschl had one consistent and unified theological view. We are indebted for a detailed