Law In Cyberspace Research Articles

Use of Objective Tests in Examining Law Courses at Daystar University

The use of multiple-choice questions (MCQs) in law schools has not gained widespread acceptance, unlike in medical schools where they enjoy global usage. Law Schools traditionally use essay-type/problem-solving questions to assess students. The efficacy of this form of assessment is increasingly being attacked due to increasing numbers of students and advancements in technology that enable students to generate answers. Bloom’s Taxonomy provides for a hierarchy of learning processes, which include ‘remember’, ‘understand’, ‘apply’, ‘analysis’, ‘evaluate’, and ‘create’. Studies on whether MCQs can test higher-order learning processes required in law courses have been inconclusive. We did a retrospective study to investigate whether MCQs are an efficient and effective way of assessing law courses. Underlying this study was the desire to find an alternative mode of assessment to overcome the threats facing the essay type. Results from selected law courses were analyzed in which students’ performance on MCQ tests, oral tests, and final examinations were compared. MCQs were analyzed on a two-dimensional Bloom’s table to establish the extent to which they tested higher-order learning processes. We compared the results of scores on the MCQs with those of oral tests and final essay-type examinations using correlational analysis and one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). This was for the courses Constitutional Law (n = 22, MCQs = 75), Intellectual Property Rights (n = 113, MCQs = 100), Broadcast & TV Law (n = 11, MCQs = 76), Administrative Law (n = 65, MCQs = 91), and Cyberspace Law (n = 28, MCQs = 101). In general, students performed best on the MCQ test compared to orals and final exams. A two-tailed correlation analysis comparing all five courses showed a strong correlation between MCQs and Orals (r = 0.699, p = 0.189) and a weak correlation between MCQ test and final exam (r = 0.196, p = 0.752). Sixty-eight percent of 75 MCQs in Constitutional Law tested higher-order processes. The mean scores for MCQ (+ = 39.45 + 4.83), orals (+ = 7.64+18.72), and final exam (+ 28.5 + 8.88) showed a best performance for MCGs. ANOVA comparing test scores for MCQs, Orals and Final examination showed a very significant difference (F (2, 63, 0.05) = 38.11, p < 0.0001). Fifty-four out of 100 MCQs for intellectual property Law tested higher-order learning processes. The mean scores for MCQ (+ = 39.78 + 5.22), orals (+ = 18.88+14.66), and final exam (+ 29.0442 + 7.71) showed a best performance for MCQs. ANOVA results were highly significant (F (2,342,0.05) = 125.565, p < 0.0001). In Broadcast & TV Law, 44.7% of 76 MCQs tested higher-order learning processes. The mean scores for MCQ (+ = 43.27+6.89), orals (+ = 31.09+12.53), and final exam (+ 32.09 + 6.69) were different. ANOVA results were very significant (F (2,30,0.05) = 6.057, p < 0.01). There were 91 MCQs in Administrative Law of which 74% tested higher-order processes. The mean scores for the three tests were MCQ (+ = 33.05 + 4.76), orals (+ = 22.89 + 16.08), and final exam (+ 32.58 + 5.58). ANOVA results were very significant with F (2,191,0.05) = 20.388, p < 0.0001. Cyberspace Law had 101 MCQs of which 38.6% tested higher-order learning processes. The mean scores for MCQ (+ = 43.50 + 4.51), orals (+ = 36.43 + 2.27), and final exam (+ 35.04 + 7.71) were different. ANOVA results were very significant (F (2,81,0.05) = 20.375, p < 0.0001). We concluded that MCQs are efficacious and efficient in testing higher-order learning processes. MCQs can be used to assess learning of law courses. We recommend that law schools should embrace MCQs for assessing law courses.

Practices and Implications of Regional Organizations for the Consensus on the Principle of Due Diligence under International Law in Cyberspace

Practices and Implications of Regional Organizations for the Consensus on the Principle of Due Diligence under International Law in Cyberspace

Stuxnet vs WannaCry and Albania: Cyber-attribution on trial

The cyber-attribution problem poses a significant challenge to the effective application of international law in cyberspace. Rooted in unclear standards of proof, evidence disclosure requirements, and deficiencies within the legal framework of the attribution procedure, this issue reflects the limitations of some traditional legal concepts in addressing the unique nature of cyberspace. Notably, the effective control test, introduced by the ICJ in 1986 and reaffirmed in 2007 to attribute the actions of non-state actors, does not adequately account for the distinctive dynamics of cyberspace, allowing states to use proxies to evade responsibility.The legal impracticality and insufficiency of the attribution procedure not only give rise to the cyber-attribution problem but also compel states to develop new attribution tactics. This article explores the evolution of these cyber-attribution techniques to assess whether contemporary state practices align with the customary rules of attribution identified by the ICJ and codified by the ILC within ARSIWA, or whether new, cyber-specific rules might emerge. By analyzing two datasets on cyber incidents and three distinct cases – Stuxnet, WannaCry, and the 2022 cyberattacks against Albania – this article concludes that the effective control test cannot be conclusively identified as part of customary rules within cyberspace due to the insufficient support in state practice. Furthermore, it is apparent that the rules of attribution in the cyber-specific context are in a disarray, lacking consistent, widespread and representative practice to support a general custom. However, emerging state practice shows some degree of unification and development, suggesting the potential for the future establishment of cyber-specific rules of attribution.

Control of Personal Data and Cyber ​​Space by Global Digital Platforms in Relation to Indonesia's Digital Sovereignty

The dominance of foreign digital platforms in the application ecosystem within Indonesia poses significant implications for the sovereignty of the Indonesian state; the utilization of such foreign digital technologies results in the inadvertent surrender and delegation of citizen data to foreign entities for monitoring and processing purposes. This phenomenon has elicited concern among legal scholars, as the usage of foreign applications signifies the applicability of the legal frameworks from the countries of origin of these applications. This raises critical questions regarding the sovereignty of the Indonesian state, particularly concerning its ability to exert control over data and cyberspace in the context of global platforms. The methodological approach employed in this investigation is grounded in normative legal research, utilizing a conceptual framework that examines relevant legal statutes. The aggregation and distribution of personal data constitutes an infringement upon individual privacy rights, as the right to privacy inherently encompasses the prerogative to determine the provision of personal information. The strategic policies and initiatives undertaken by the Indonesian government to bolster national digital sovereignty can be realized through several measures: the implementation of comprehensive personal data protection standards to enhance national digital sovereignty, the establishment of an independent authority for personal data protection, the fortification of cybersecurity measures to mitigate data security risks, and the jurisdictional enforcement of cyberspace law towards achieving digital economic sovereignty. There exists a pressing need for extensive regulatory frameworks to safeguard personal data as an integral component of human rights. A balance must be struck in the management of personal data processing, ensuring the protection of rights and fostering awareness among data subjects, thereby facilitating the development of a secure digital economic ecosystem that offers legal certainty for enterprises and enhances consumer confidence. Furthermore, the establishment of equitable international personal data protection regulations is essential to support the advancement of the digital economy through arrangements governing cross-border data flow.

Implementation of the ITE Law and Democracy in Civil Space

The implementation of the ITE Law in general has not been implemented optimally , because the general public's understanding of the ITE Law is still imperfect, including community activities in cyberspace . Activities in cyberspace cannot be separated from human factors and their legal consequences also intersect with humans in society who are in the physical world, therefore the idea emerged about the need for legal rules to regulate activities in cyberspace. The word "Democracy" comes from two words, namely demos which means people, and kratos/cratein which means government, so it can be interpreted as people's government, or what we know better as government of the people, by the people and for the people. This research uses an explanatory type , namely research that explains the implementation of the ITE Law and democracy in cyberspace. From the results of the research that has been carried out, through the process of filling out questionnaires and interview results, it can be concluded that the implementation of the ITE Law in Indonesia is related to democracy in the moderate category

Online Trials in China: Legal and Institutional Approaches During Different Stages of the Pandemic

Abstract China has set off a wave of legal and institutional approaches to meet the need of access to justice and rule of law in cyberspace. Online trials and Internet courts as the approaches have not been developed so rapidly until the outbreak of COVID-19. This article will divide the development of online trials in China into three stages and discuss their functions and orientations during different times of the pandemic.

Cyber Operations in Peace and War: A Framework for Persistent Engagement

During 1990s, the concept of information warfare (IW) and information operations (including cyber operations, psychological operations, and electronic warfare) could be conducted with varying intensity across all stages of peace and conflict. At that time, many of the concepts related to cyber operations were still hypothetical. Subsequently, conflicts and competition between states have demonstrated the capabilities and limitations of cyber operations. Research emerging in 2022 by multiple authors demonstrate the limitations and usage of offensive cyber operations and maintaining a sustainable military cyber capability, as well as proposing alternative models for conflict in cyberspace. Alongside this, there has been increased attention on the impact of ICTs on international security and the responsible behaviour of nation-states in cyberspace. There is still ambiguity and different perspectives on the application of international law in cyberspace. This uncertainty disrupts the original models of IW and warfare, which assumed clear distinctions amongst the conflict stages. Both the discourse of ICTs in international security and recent conflict necessitate a reconsideration of the decades-old view of IW in times of peace, war and the grey zone in between. This paper proposes a framework for the roles of cyber operations across the stages of conflict based on contemporary perspectives on the utility of cyber operations as well as practical examples. In rethinking the IW model, a multidisciplinary view is required, considering the technical, legal, social and international security perspectives.

Gentlemen, you can't fight in here. Or can you?: How cyberspace operations impact international security

AbstractThe military now views cyberspace as a new warfare domain, with constant cyber operations potentially causing significant consequences. Internationally, countries are heavily involved in cyberspace, but international law lags behind this evolution, raising questions about its application and retaliation measures. This article investigates international law in cyberspace and cyber operations in warfare and terrorism, exploring recent calls for increased legislation. The impact of cyberspace nonregulation on international security is examined from both positive and negative perspectives. It argues that solving anonymity and attribution issues requires state collaboration, with an initial step of cooperation against cyber‐terrorism. The conclusion emphasizes the necessity of cyberspace regulation and legislation for international and national security, offering a starting point for discussion.

Comments on Speech by the Attorney General of UK on International Law in Cyberspace

In a significant address delivered at the Chatham House, the Attorney General, the Rt Hon Suella Braverman QC MP outlined the United Kingdom’s position on international law’s application in cyberspace. This speech marks a pivotal statement on a crucial topic, following a similar speech by her predecessor in 2018. The speech comprises six sections, with a focus on the core non-intervention principle, its application to key sectors, and avenues for response. Braverman’s stance on this principle is heavily intertwined with the UK’s denial of sovereignty’s obligatory nature in cyberspace, which distinguishes it from the majority of countries advocating for sovereignty-based obligations. While emphasizing the importance of the non-intervention principle, the UK offers a broader interpretation of the “coercion” element, which may inadvertently complicate the distinction between sovereignty and non-intervention principles. Braverman provides illustrative examples of potential non-intervention principle violations in critical sectors, facilitating discussions for more specific guidance. Notably, the speech suggests a leaning toward collective countermeasures without explicitly endorsing their legality, further adding to the international discourse’s complexity. Collective countermeasures remain a contentious topic, with various nations holding contrasting positions. In conclusion, the UK’s proactive approach to shaping international norms in cyberspace offers valuable insights for other nations. While the UK’s stance warrants careful consideration, nations like China must actively engage in research, promote their positions, foster international cooperation, and navigate the evolving landscape of international law in cyberspace. This evolving discourse is crucial for establishing an equitable and secure global digital environment.

Untangling the Jurisdictional Web in Cyberspace

The ambiguous theme of cyberspace and its broad widespread inflict a major effect on the legal procedures of litigations. Since litigation might include several nationalities, because of the cosmopolitan nature of cyberspace, determining the competent court is not as direct as traditional litigations. Cyber litigations complicate this procedural threshold as the traditional application of jurisdiction determinants might not suit cyber disputes. Furthermore, jurisdiction conflicts in cyberspace frustrate settling the dispute as courts avoid giving their judgments due to invalidity. Therefore, these conflicts introduce a modern issue to private international law theorists. It is indisputable that drafting obvious jurisdictional rules enhances the rule of law in cyberspace. Thus, the research analyses this issue and establishes a comparison to determine the state of the art regarding it. The article reviews the relevant academic contributions and legislation to point out how they crystallize the aspects of the research question. Besides, it studies relevant case laws from the UK and US judiciaries to conclude the legal principle they adopt to settle these conflicts and to enhance the validity of their judgments. Eventually, it introduces a comprehensive theory on settling jurisdiction conflicts regarding cyber litigation, which enhances the rule of law in cyberspace. 

International Law Protection in Cyberspace Against Ransomware and Experience of Vietnam

Abstract Amongst various cyberattacks, ransomware adversely affects the business operation as the malware locks the computer or data, and menaces to keep it locked unless a ransom is transferred. In a young tech market like Vietnam, cyberattacks, including ransomware, cause serious concerns for State and non-State actors. They can take place anywhere since cyberspace has no physical border to hold them back. This raises a query about the application of international law in cyberspace, especially when the ransomware hits non-State actors. In such cases, the sovereignty principle, having a significant relation with the jurisdiction, underpins the intervention of national authorities and regulation of ransomware. Vietnam’s government has intensified their efforts to stop the cyberattacks by cooperating with other countries and establishing a legal framework based on the international law principle.

When Can Cyberattack Constitute Use of Force: A Case Study of Cyberattack in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

In todays international community, cyberattacks occur frequently, and cyberspace has become an important battlefield for political games among major powers. Under the push of cyberattacks, the tension between Russia and Ukraine has further escalated. However, due to the unique nature of cyberspace, the rules under the existing international law are difficult to directly apply to the field of cyberspace. This has allowed states and non-state actors to willfully disrupt the network systems and other infrastructure of other countries, causing damage to people or property. One major issue is when can a cyberattack constitute use of force under international law. Only by clarifying this issue can we further discuss the issues of cyber warfare and the exercise of self-defense right. This article will start with a cyberattack that occurred in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, explore the essence of use of force, discuss the three mainstream theories about when can cyberattack constitute use of force, and use the framework of the Tallinn Manual to analyze whether the aforementioned cyberattack falls under the use of force in cyberspace. Through this series of analysis, we can further clarify the meaning of use of force in cyberspace and promote the construction of a legal framework for international law in cyberspace.

Between Freedom And Protection: A Critical Review Of Indonesia’S Cyberspace Law

Following the COVID-19 pandemic, dependency on the internet—notably, the utilization of cyberspace—has increased, amplifying the virtual domain to a prominent role in everyone’s everyday life. As a country with one of the highest number of internet users in Asia, Indonesia faces challenges of unequal access, limits on content, data privacy, data security, and digital literacy. Given that cyberspace infrastructure is shared between governments, corporations, individuals, and telecommunication providers while individual countries govern the networks, the Indonesian government is under its own exclusive authority to legislate and create policies governing Indonesia’s cyberspace. There has been significant progress toward a legal framework of Indonesia’s cyberspace law, such as the enactment of the Personal Data Protection Law. Unfortunately, such progress is far from being effective. It is evident from Indonesia’s fragmented laws, response-driven policies, and the numerous cyber incidents that have occurred only within the past years. This article investigates Indonesia’s legal-philosophical position in governing the cyberspace. By using a normative methodology, this research crystallizes Indonesia’s position between the freedom or the protectionist approach through analyzing the existing cyberspace regulations. The result of this study shows that Indonesia is somewhere in the middle of liberalizing its cyberspace and protecting it for its national interest. This position could bring both advantages and disadvantages to Indonesia’s cyberspace development.

Plenary round table: The international law of cyberspace: State of the situation and required developments

Plenary round table: The international law of cyberspace: State of the situation and required developments

International Law and the Regulation of Cyberoperations Below the Jus Ad Bellum Threshold. An Irish Cybersecurity Perspective

Josep Borrell, Vice President of the European Commission, set out his fears that the EU was at risk of being “always principled but seldom relevant” (2021, p. 2). International law could be said to be similarly threatened, particularly in relation to cyberoperations, in respect of which its application has been strongly challenged. While states now broadly agree that international law applies in cyberspace, how it applies remains uncertain and contested. This paper analyses why the application of international law to cyberspace has been so fraught with difficulties and considers whether international law can provide the Irish State with a means of enhancing its cybersecurity and deterring state-led cyberoperations below the threshold of armed conflict. The paper finds that the application of international law in cyberspace is problematic due to the manifestation of cyberoperations below the jus ad bellum threshold, and the challenging geopolitical environment that inhibits agreement on the principles of the international law of cyberoperations. International law is an object of dispute (Delerue, Douzet, & Gery, 2020, p. 15) and arguments on the application of international law in cyberspace represent states’ strategic positions in the evolving geopolitical power struggle. The paper finds that, as cyberoperations are transnational, unilateral responses cannot be effective, and that small states have an interest in promoting international law and norms to create a more favourable international environment. The paper concludes that, as international law continues to exert a normative force on state behaviour, it has the potential to regulate sub-threshold cyberoperations as part of the comprehensive approach to cybersecurity.

The concept of cyberspace in international law

The subject. The article is devoted to the analysis of approaches in the development of the concept of cyberspace in international law.The purpose of this article is to try to highlight the attributes of cyberspace, which will allow to resolve existing gaps in the field of universal cyber regulation in international law. The research presented in this article was conducted by combining various disciplinary approaches, including comparative law, comparative politics and international relations, political theory, and sociology. In addition, the study includes methods of dialectical logic, analysis and synthesis, as well as a formal-legal analysis of UN international legal acts.The main results and scope of their application. As states pay increasing attention to cyberspace management as the technical architecture that powers the global Internet and governance in cyberspace, in terms of how states, corporations and users can use this technology, the role of international law in cyberspace is increasing, becoming more prominent, becoming more important. At the same time, note that international law has no specific rules for regulating cyberspace. Moreover, the technology is both new and dynamic. Thus, for several years there have been open questions as to whether existing international law applies at all to cyberspace. Cyberspace is now the backbone of global commerce, communication and defense systems, and is a key aspect of the critical infrastructure that sustains our modern civilization. Technology and information spread almost instantaneously, and the global economy and supply chains are integrated to a degree unprecedented in history. Nevertheless, there is still no developed universal concept of cyberspace in international law, only approaches at the level of the UN, international organizations, including the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament and International Security, the G20, the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Organization of American States and doctrinal approaches are singled out.Conclusions. The competition for strategic technology and the competition for advantage in the "information space" is growing, so far without the standard international rules of the road. Moreover, the future is likely to prove even more transformational. The potential threats are also extraordinary: autonomous weapons, cyber warfare, sophisticated disinformation campaigns and geopolitical instability. In such circumstances, it is crucial to develop a universal notion of cyberspace because of the persistent significant vulnerabilities and number of threats in global communications.

Cyber Operations against Critical Financial Infrastructure: a Non-Destructive Armed Attack?

Summary The article is devoted to the issue of the use of force in self-defense against cyber operations aimed at financial and banking infrastructure that cause only economic (non-material) damage. The article deals with the relationship between the described type of cyber operation and economic coercion, presenting the conclusion that these are different acts, which are subject to a different regime of international law regulation. Attention is also paid to the analytical approaches that can be used to bring cyber operations under the regime of the regulation of the use of force. The main contribution of the article is to capture the evolution of the scholarly debate and state practice in relation to non-destructive cyber operations in the period after the publication of Tallinn Manual 2.0 (post-2017), concluding that even non-destructive cyber operations (including cyber operations against critical financial infrastructure) can fulfil the characteristics of both use of force and armed attack, based on newly available sources, in particular official national positions on the application of international law in cyberspace published by states.

Protection of the rights and legitimate interests of the individual in a hybrid war

The objective of the article was to reveal r the main topics related to the definition of «hybrid warfare» and «legal policy of the state in a hybrid war», «legal policy of the state in the field of cybersecurity». The need to finalize legislation on the Internet taking into account international human rights standards was emphasized. Given the categorical uncertainty and unwillingness of Ukraine’s current legal framework to resist new threats in a hybrid war, it is advisable to terminologize and standardize the conceptual apparatus in the legal system of cybersecurity, harmonize national legislation with international acts, as well as promoteflexibility in relevant areas of activity. It is alsonecessary to legally regulate the use of the Internet to help increase the liability of providers and site owners for the location of inaccurate and deliberately harmful information, as well as to establish a mechanism to influence unscrupulous subjects of information law in cyberspace. It is concluded that a separate area in criminology should be the protection of information sources and information security issues in a hybrid war.

EU Common Position on International Law and Cyberspace

The discussion on international law applicable to cyber operations has shifted from asking whether international law applies to cyberspace to how it applies. Recently the European Union declared in its renewed cybersecurity strategy the ambition to develop common EU position on the application of international law in cyberspace. As part of a broader vision in striving for leadership on standards, norms and regulatory frameworks in cyberspace, the joint communication underlined the need for taking a more proactive stance in the discussions at the United Nations and other relevant international fora. However, less than half of the European Union Member States have issued a public statementon the interpretation of international law in cyberspace and hence, reaching a consensus on the interpretation of relevant concepts of international law appears a challenge. This article provides an overview of the current status of EuropeanUnion Member States’ public statements on international law applicable to cyber operations, identifies the domains of international law where convergence of views can be observed and highlights the areas with notable differences.

EU Common Position on International Law and Cyberspace

The discussion on international law applicable to cyber operations has shifted from asking whether international law applies to cyberspace to how it applies. Recently the European Union declared in its renewed cybersecurity strategy the ambition to develop common EU position on the application of international law in cyberspace. As part of a broader vision in striving for leadership on standards, norms and regulatory frameworks in cyberspace, the joint communication underlined the need for taking a more proactive stance in the discussions at the United Nations and other relevant international fora. However, less than half of the European Union Member States have issued a public statementon the interpretation of international law in cyberspace and hence, reaching a consensus on the interpretation of relevant concepts of international law appears a challenge. This article provides an overview of the current status of EuropeanUnion Member States’ public statements on international law applicable to cyber operations, identifies the domains of international law where convergence of views can be observed and highlights the areas with notable differences.