Launch Service Providers Research Articles

Autonomous flight termination system: The need for an international regulatory frame

Among the unmanned launch service providers, the autonomous flight termination concept is no longer an unknown actor around the table. The goal of these systems is to limit the consequences of the potential feared events caused by a launch vehicle malfunction by automatically terminating the flight of the vehicle in a safe manner, replacing the human component on the traditional flight termination decision in case of failure.Although some public and private players have already designed (and even flown) an autonomous flight termination system, the problem arises when looking into the safety standards that need to be to be applied to launch from different locations, which are highly dependent on the respective safety authorities.This paper aims at analysing the gap in the current launch safety policies and proposing the guidelines to be followed to widen the range of spaceports capable of hosting a launch vehicle with such a feature.

To infinity and beyond: A teaching case on Rocket Lab and the emergence of New Zealand's space ecosystem

This teaching case focuses on the relationship between entrepreneurs, their ventures and the broader context—the innovation and entrepreneurship ecosystem (I&EE)—in which entrepreneurial activity occurs. Building on secondary data and informal conversations with industry experts, the case recounts the story of Rocket Lab, an aerospace manufacturer and launch service provider founded in 2006 in New Zealand. The case elaborates on how unique contextual conditions in combination with the founder's vision and skills enabled Rocket Lab to become a dominant force in the space sector, even though the firm was founded in a country with virtually no history in spacefaring and highlights that Rocket Lab's emergence constituted the foundation of a burgeoning space industry in New Zealand. In doing so, the case sensitises students to the importance of self-reinforcing and mutually interdependent relationships in well-functioning I&EEs and the role policymakers play in this context. At the same time, it allows a critical discussion of I&EEs, particularly if they are dominated by a small number of anchor firms.

The in-space rescue capability gap

The United States government and commercial spaceflight providers have no plans in place to conduct a timely rescue of a crew from a distressed spacecraft in low Earth orbit, or anywhere else in space. Without rescue plans and dedicated resources, today's space travelers will journey at their own risk. U.S. rules and regulations governing commercial spaceflight simply require launch service and space travel providers to inform the crew and passengers that there are risks. The United States, however, as the world's greatest space faring nation, has the wherewithal to develop and employ effective in-space rescue capabilities if it chooses to do so. This paper seeks to raise awareness of the need to revisit space rescue policies and close capability gaps through historical analogs such as the ancient maritime explorers that embarked upon epic journeys with multiple ships, effective submarine rescue operations, and the rich history of human spaceflight. Potential solutions to improve safety during space travel are identified and policy options are discussed.

Detecting Ships in the New Zealand Exclusive Economic Zone: Requirements for a Dedicated SmallSat SAR Mission

The performance tradeoffs of a smallsat synthetic aperture radar (SAR) system for maritime surveillance in the coastal waters of New Zealand are investigated. The lower costs of smallsat platforms allow for a constellation of SAR satellites that can be launched from New Zealand using an existing local launch service provider. The minimum SAR image quality necessary for a smallsat system to achieve a desired detection performance is determined using existing X-band satellite data. The image quality is specified in terms of noise-equivalent sigma zero (NESZ) and resolution. It was found that for a resolution cell of 4 m <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">2</sup> a system NESZ of -1.7 dB is sufficient to detect small fishing vessels with a probability of detection of 0.5, while maintaining the probability of false alarm below 10 <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">-10</sup> . These requirements are translated into a preliminary SAR system design.

Cost estimating of commercial smallsat launch vehicles

Commercial launch service providers’ low-priced offerings have been a hotly debated topic. However, the strategies with which these firms reduce costs have seen little incorporation into the hardware Cost Estimating Methods (CEMs) and tools prevalent in the aerospace industry. This research changes this, by providing adaptations to agency-focused CEMs that befit a new commercial paradigm, with an emphasis on smallsat launch vehicles.A parametric model for estimating costs in an early phase of development was synthesized, with which it is possible to approximate the full life-cycle costs of small commercial liquid and solid propellant rockets, as well as their cost-based price per flight. Key elements included were reductions in cost achieved by commercial launch operators, by modeling reduced subcontractor management effort and profit retention experienced at lower subcontracting rates.Prices per flight of small commercial launch vehicles were approximated by combining a parametric cost estimating methodology used frequently in the context of space agencies such as ESA and NASA, called the T1 Equivalents method, with another parametric three-part estimate developed by Koelle for development, manufacture and operations phase costs. The first two phases were estimated through the T1 method, while the operations costs were modeled with TRANSCOST.Along with the newly developed methodologies, novel insights such as required launch rates have shone a light on small commercial launch systems’ cost feasibility in the age of public-private spaceflight partnerships.The model developed was able to approximate costs of development, manufacture and price per flight of three commercial rockets to within 20% of actual reported costs or prices. However, it is recommended the model is refined as more reference cost data, especially on a subsystem level, as well as pricing for these smaller rockets becomes available in the coming years.

The SpaceX Effect

Abstract Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) had demonstrated its reusable launch vehicle technology by recovering and reusing the core stage of its Falcon 9 launch vehicles. SpaceX believes reusable launch vehicles will enable its vision of colonizing Mars. This had unleashed pricing competition as SpaceX had begun offering low-cost access to space. Rival launch service providers, although contentious of SpaceX business model, are planning to introduce reusable launch systems into their product mix. This article offers a survey of such launch service providers from 4 distinct geographical regions with varying degrees of public-to-private ownership and catering to different requirements. The study conveys that regardless of these variables, reusability is fast becoming the norm of the launch vehicle industry. Interestingly, managers of these programs do not shy from admitting that Elon Musk and SpaceX are influential factors in their decision-making. The article argues that the space indus...

Space debris — an insurance perspective

The current article forms an introduction for the engineering community to space insurance and the way insurers view the space debris hazard. Insurance for space missions has developed and matured over the decades and is nowroutinely available for most missions, though only some are insured. Policies that cover accidental damage in the pre-launch phases; launch and a period in-orbit; and follow-on in-orbit insurance are taken out by those wanting to transfer their risk exposures to the insurance community. These include spacecraft manufacturers, spacecraft owner-operators, users of spacecraft payloads, and launch service providers. Liabilities to third parties can also be covered by insurance. National and international law (e.g. UN Treaties) determine such matters. Under the UN Liability Convention, the Launching State is ultimately liable. Through licensing and contracts the Launching State transfers its liabilities to the launch service providers and spacecraft owner-operators. In turn, these insure their own liabilities. The risk of space debris damage is included as one of many environmental hazards. In an insurance context, space debris includes man-made objects/fragments, and naturally occurring objects, both in-orbit and entering/re-entering to earth. It also includes debris from launchers and stages that explode or otherwise do not reach orbit. All objects of whatever origin can cause damage or injury as they return through air-space to land or sea. While there have been instances of debris impact on spacecraft in-orbit, so far, none has resulted in an insured loss. Insurance is a reactive enterprise, and if a total loss claim attributed to debris impact were to arrive in the market, it would adversely affect the cost and availability of insurance. Tracing the cause (debris impact) to a particular man-made space object is difficult, but not impossible. If done successfully, this could result in a claim against the Launching State of that object. Insurers always stay aware of the extent and the orbital distribution of space debris, as well as the possibility that debris damage may be traceable to an identifiable man-made object. Their stance is to keep an informed watching brief on the subject.

Space debris mitigation strategies and practices in geosynchronous transfer orbits

Missions to geosynchronous orbits remain one of the most important elements of space launch traffic, accounting for 40% of all missions to Earth orbit and beyond during the four-year period 2000–2003. The vast majority of these missions leave one or more objects in geosynchronous transfer orbits (GTOs), contributing on a short-term or long-term basis to the space debris population. National and international space debris mitigation guidelines seek to curtail the accumulation of debris in orbits which penetrate the regions of low Earth orbit and of geosynchronous orbit. The orbital lifetime of objects in GTO can be greatly influenced by the initial values of perigee, inclination, and right ascension of the orbital plane, leading to orbital lifetimes of from less than one month to more than 100 years. An examination of the characteristic GTOs employed by launch vehicles from around the world has been conducted. The consequences of using perigees above 300 km and super-synchronous apogees, typically above 40,000 km, have been identified. In addition, the differences in orbital behavior of launch vehicle stages and mission-related debris in GTOs have been investigated. Greater coordination and cooperation between space launch service providers and spacecraft designers and owners could significantly improve overall compliance with guidelines to mitigate the accumulation of debris in Earth orbit.

The commercial challenge to Arianespace: the TCI affair

The question of how far rockets used for commercial launch services are subsidised by their respective governments remains highly topical. This article traces the history of the first legal challenge to be made on this basis by a US launch service provider against Arianespace, a case which also called into question the pricing of the Space Shuttle. The perceptions, deliberations and negotiations of both sides are traced and it is noted that their most important outcome was not settlement of the case itself but agreement to start serious consultations on defining ‘rules of the road’ regarding government support to the commercial launch industry.