Signals, Deterrence, and the Quad Ketian Zhang (bio) The United States and its allies have the capability to deter China, and have successfully done so, from their worst-case scenario—a major militarized conflict. However, three factors reduce the effectiveness of their deterrence: the lack of clear signals, excessive media exposure, and divergent interests among Quad members. The Quad can be useful, but only if the United States maintains well-defined signals of commitment while clarifying the stakes. As it currently stands, the Quad does not successfully deter Chinese actions in territorial disputes. China has not shied away from using military coercion in its land border disputes with India. In June 2020, for instance, Chinese and Indian troops clashed violently along the disputed land border in the Galwan Valley, resulting in casualties on both sides.1 Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi told India to "stop transgressions into China-controlled territories" and to "refrain from actions changing the status quo along the border," representing a clear indication of coercive intent.2 Moreover, although China prefers to utilize nonmilitary—or so-called gray-zone—coercion in maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas, such coercive measures can themselves be destabilizing.3 This essay assesses factors influencing the likelihood of successful deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region by using China's land and maritime territorial disputes as examples. It addresses two questions: what signals of resolve are necessary for effective deterrence, and does the Quad enhance [End Page 43] deterrence? Finally, it uses the Sino-Indian border and South China Sea disputes to illustrate the conditions under which deterrence can be effective. The Need for Clearer Signals The United States and its allies have the capability to potentially deter China's territorial challenges. However, clearer signals of resolve and reassurance are necessary to achieve successful deterrence. First and foremost, the United States should set clearer red lines; otherwise, the signals sent to China are mixed and ineffective. For example, during its first term, the Obama administration was not sufficiently clear in signaling red lines to China regarding Chinese behavior in the South China Sea. A 2013 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences report on China's regional security environment stated that the implementation of U.S. rebalancing "had a problem of divergence between willingness and capability," citing the lack of U.S. commitment during the Scarborough Shoal incident of April 2012.4 This lack of clear U.S. red lines led Beijing to proceed with large-scale land reclamation activities in late 2013 and 2014. One Chinese scholar this author interviewed who was often in conversation with the then South China Sea section of China's State Oceanic Administration noted that "China first started reclamation at the Johnson South Reef and was watching the reaction from the international society carefully; it proceeded with large-scale reclamation after realizing that there was not much of a reaction internationally."5 By "international," this interviewee meant the United States. The U.S. response in 2014 was relatively muted: Washington did not call out China's land reclamation from the outset. Instead, the White House and, importantly, President Barack Obama himself remained silent. Obama's second term, however, saw the drawing of clearer red lines. During the November 2015 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Manila, Obama called on China to halt its land reclamation activities in the South China Sea.6 He subsequently warned Beijing in March 2016 that there would be "serious consequences if China reclaimed land [End Page 44] at the Scarborough Shoal."7 Local Chinese government documents from 2013 noted explicitly that China would implement land reclamation on the Scarborough Shoal.8 Yet following Obama's 2015–16 warnings, subsequent government documents cease to mention reclamation on the Scarborough Shoal. This suggests that without the clear red line from the United States, it is quite plausible that China would have proceeded to reclaim the Scarborough Shoal, making this episode a successful case of U.S. deterrence. The Trump administration pressed Beijing to halt militarization of the South China Sea, but Trump himself did not issue a clearly stated red line. This lack of clarity could have had adverse effects. Chinese analyst...