Large Member States Research Articles

Intergovernmentalism in a supranational field: France, Germany, and EU competition policy reform

Competition policy is one of the few truly integrated policy fields of the European Union (EU), with supranational actors like the European Commission having extensive competences. Scholars consider it to be a relatively stable policy domain, characterised by strong path dependencies, a solid anchoring in European primary law, and the pre-eminence of epistemic authority. However, in recent years, EU competition policy has undergone remarkable changes including merger control, projects of common European interest, and state aid. This article argues that France and Germany, the EU’s two largest member states with most financial resources, have been decisive in promoting and realising these changes. Competition policy is an unlikely case for Franco-German European-level political work, primarily because of the supranational character of the policy field and the two countries’ oftentimes opposing positions on aspects related to the European single market. Building on policy document analysis and expert interviews, the article shows how and why France and Germany, partly in confrontation and partly in alignment with the Commission, have re-shaped EU competition policy.

Forced exit from the joint-decision trap: US power and the harmonisation of company taxation in the EU

ABSTRACT EU member states have traditionally opposed the harmonisation of company taxation to preserve national sovereignty over a core state power. Accordingly, legislation and case law were marked by negative integration enforcing the free circulation of capital. Tax avoidance and competition intensified, entrenching interest heterogeneity among small low-tax and large normal-tax member states. In December 2022, however, the Council of the EU introduced an effective minimum tax and harmonised the calculation of taxable corporate profits. Why did member states exit the joint-decision trap in company taxation? I show that external pressure from the US government was decisive. Whereas previous proposals for harmonisation failed in the Council despite impeccable orchestration by the Commission and historically high levels of politicisation, the Directive on effective minimum taxation passed despite declining politicisation and little Commission involvement. Instead, the Biden administration clinched a deal on global minimum taxation with large member states and helped enforce it at EU level through bilateral pressure on opponents. By facilitating EU implementation of global minimum taxation, the Biden administration hoped to foster Congressional adoption of corresponding reforms. Hence, exits from the joint-decision trap can result from external pressure, whereas governments may enforce international agreements to exploit policy feedback.

Some differences, many similarities: comparing Europe’s responses to the 1973 oil crisis and the 2022 gas crisis

AbstractScholars of European integration are primarily interested in explaining change and variation over time. Indeed, given that integration has progressed over 50 years and competences have been transferred to the European level in policy fields, including energy, fast and coordinated action in the face of a major external threat might have been anticipated. Yet, as this article documents, member states struggled to establish a cohesive and solidary European response to the 2022 gas crisis, just as they had failed to cooperate effectively during the 1973 oil crisis. Building on recent literature on European polity development and integration through crises, this article argues that differences in national crisis affectedness and energy structures hampered cooperation. Such asymmetries became particularly visible on the part of France and Germany, the Union’s two largest member states, who could have provided regional political leadership. Consequently, both the 1973 and 2022 energy crises led to very limited steps in European integration and collectively suboptimal policy outcomes, such as high energy prices and uneven access to energy resources.

Government bond rates and interest expenditure of large euro area member states: A scenario analysis

AbstractThis paper assesses the possible development of government interest expenditures for Germany, France, Italy and Spain. Until 2021, governments could anticipate a substantial further reduction in interest expenditure. This outlook has changed drastically with the surge in inflation and government bond rates. Assuming that bond rates remain at the levels implied by yield curves from December 2022, interest expenditure rises substantially. We also examined scenarios with a further upward shift in yield curves by one or two percentage points. They indicate major medium‐term risks for highly indebted member states with interest expenditure approaching or exceeding levels last observed on the eve of the euro area debt crisis. Governments should take action to achieve a decline in debt‐to‐GDP ratios towards safe levels. They need to make sure public debt remains sustainable at the higher interest rates that are required to achieve price stability in the euro area.

Leadership in European crisis politics: France, Germany, and the difficult quest for regional stabilization and integration

ABSTRACT Over the past decade, the European Union (EU) has faced a number of severe crises threatening its core policy regimes and the future of its polity. Potentially existential crises, such as the Eurozone, migration, and Covid-19 crises, require political leaders who are able and willing to give orientation and provide stability. This article argues that France and Germany, as the Union’s two largest member states, have been key for EU stabilization and (further) integration, especially in times of crisis. Thanks to their ‘embedded bilateralism’, France and Germany have available important resources that other member states and the EU’s supranational institutions are lacking. Yet, the emergence of Franco-German leadership and its impact on EU stabilization and integration depend on the demand for leadership, reflecting the status quo costs across the EU and the supply of leadership as the result of relevant Franco-German capacities. Demand and supply factors explain the varying record of Franco-German leadership and stabilization in the three EU crises under consideration.

Bilateral leadership in critical moments: France, Germany, and the management of major European integration crises

Not least in view of the past decade, crises in the European Union (EU) have attracted much scholarly attention. At the same time, difficult decision-making situations and turning points have always been parts of the European integration process. Moreover, as founding and the two largest member states, France and Germany have been key drivers in the development of today’s EU polity. Strikingly, a systematic analysis of major crises covering the entire integration process and the comparative role that France–Germany have played, so far is lacking. Scholars tend to focus on instances of ‘successful’ crisis resolution or, more recently, on a presumably hegemonic Germany. This article, by contrast, argues and demonstrates why and how France and Germany, together, have been essential for the management and resolution of European-level political controversies and deadlock. To do so, the article considers nine major integration crises. It highlights different ways and means of bilateral leadership and their resulting impact on European integration. Case selection includes both successful crisis management and instances of failed or absent leadership.

Conflict Management inside EAEU to Preserve Its Forum

Eurasian Economic Union members: The Eurasian Economic Union consists of five member states: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia.
 What is the Eurasian Economic Union?
 The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU or EAEU is a project for the economic integration of the former Soviet region. Its formal objectives are to create a common market much like the European Union (EU). There are four targets of this forum, i.e:1) coordinating economic policy, 2.) eliminating non-tariff trade barriers,3) harmonizing regulations, and 4).modernizing the economies of its five member states. While the whole population of EEU member states is estimated 180 million people.
 The EEU has some institutions inside it, i.e: the Eurasian Economic Commission in Moscow as its regulatory body, and a Court of the Eurasian Economic Union based in Minsk. The Commission's power is limited. Member states disagreeing with its judgments can appeal to other bodies, and the Commission has no power to bring a member state before the Court in a case of non-compliance. Disputes are often resolved bilaterally rather than via EAEU institutions.
 Bureaucratic forms of the EU have not been fully copied by the EAEU, which seems a slow phase of its development so far. This is might be caused by EAEU GDP in 2019 being the majority Russian economy (87%). Russia is by far the largest member state and dominates the Union. This domination means that Russia is easily able to act unilaterally within the union [1].

Attitudes of national decision-makers towards differentiated integration in the European Union

Differentiated integration (DI) in the European Union (EU) has mainly been understood as variation in participation in common policies. But DI also has implications for the nature and functioning of the EU as a polity. While temporary DI may facilitate deeper integration, permanent DI is liable to increase transaction costs and fragmentation. However, little is known about how such alternatives are assessed by decision-makers in the member states. This article uses novel quantitative and qualitative data to shed light on this question. It looks at the explanatory role of various types of opt-outs and at member states’ dependence, capacity, and identity. We find that temporary and permanent differentiation are assessed differently in the member states but neither alternative is clearly preferred. Long-term involuntary opt-outs are related to negative assessments of both forms of DI. Surprisingly, voluntary opt-outs do not seem to lead to more positive assessments of DI. We also find that the temporary DI is preferred in smaller member states, while support for permanent DI is higher in larger member states. Finally, we find differences in the effects of dependency, capacity, and identity between older and newer member states.

Next Generation EU and its constitutional ramifications: A critical assessment

Following the early turmoil of the COVID-19 pandemic on societies in Europe, the foundations of financing the European Union have been overturned. In this article, we demonstrate the magnitude of change that Next Generation EU (NGEU) creates. While explained as exceptional and justified with reference to the pandemic, in substance, the NGEU is not a crisis measure. It will change the reading of EU law permanently by establishing a new type of instrument for redistribution between the Member States and funding this through debt. This article argues that consensus among large Member States and key institutional stakeholders is insufficient for disregarding key Treaty principles. We scrutinize the regulating capacity of EU constitutional law in relation to that consent and discuss the control of constitutionality by the Court of Justice, the role of national constitutional bodies, and the effect of the package on institutional balance. Finally, the role of EU scholarship is considered in relation to such a profound shift in the EU’s constitutional fabric. COVID-19 pandemic, finance, Next Generation EU, NGEU, crisis measures, debt funding, Treaty principles, constitutionality, role of national constitutional bodies, EU scholarship

Trwały system podziału mandatów w Parlamencie Europejskim – uwarunkowania prawne i polityczne

The article analyses the issue of introducing a permanent system of distribution of seats in the European Parliament, taking into account the existing legal and political conditions. It points out that as a result of the entry into force of the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, and then Brexit, the indirect voting power of citizens of the largest Member States, especially Germany, France and Italy, in the decision-making process in the EU, has increased. At the same time, most of the proposed methods of distribution of seats in this institution lead to a significant increase in the number of parliamentary seats for the Member States with the largest populations. The paper presents the original concept of a permanent system of distribution of seats in the European Parliament, which ensures that when it is first applied, no Member State will have a smaller number of seats than it resulted from European Council Decision of 28 June 2013 establishing the composition of the European Parliament. It, therefore, meets the important political requirement that the introduction of the new method of distribution of parliamentary seats does not result in a reduction in the number of seats for any Member State.

Council Checks of the Commission under the European Semester: Does Member State Power and Euroscepticism Still Matter?*

AbstractThe European Commission recommends evaluations of the economic plans of member states. The Council then provides final text. Previous research suggests that the Council selectively edits the Commission's recommendations. Both large member states and those with eurosceptic populations are likely to have the Council weaken what the Commission writes about them. We examine the determinants of the Council's editing of these texts after the introduction of the European Semester in the period 2011–18. We also account for different varieties of euroscepticism as the literature has become more differentiated. Using metrics of textual changes based on automated and hand‐coding, we find little evidence of a systematic relationship between euroscepticism and textual editing. We do, however, find evidence that member state's voting power and euro status matters. Our findings suggest that eurosceptic no longer affects textual editing of such documents under the European Semester.

Don't Mention the War! Second World War Remembrance and Support for European Cooperation

AbstractThe notion that through increased state cooperation and dependency, national divisions can be overcome and peace can be secured, is at the core of European integration. Political elites often refer to the devastations of the Second World War (WWII) as a way to convey the added value of European cooperation today. Do references to the devastations of WWII enhance public support for European cooperation today? By presenting evidence from survey experiments conducted in the six largest member states (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the Great Britain) in July 2017, this study suggest that they do, albeit only when it comes to financial assistance for other member states in dire economic need. References to the devastations of WWII do not make respondents more willing to support free movement of people or the establishment of a European army. These findings suggest that reminding people of the devastations of WWII triggers a largely transactional response among the public: a willingness to provide financial support, but nothing more. This evidence suggests that securing public support for free movement of people or European security cooperation through historical rhetoric might be difficult to achieve.

Revealing forecaster's preferences: A Bayesian multivariate loss function approach

AbstractRevealing the underlying preferences of a forecaster has always been at the core of much controversy. Herein, we build on the multivariate loss function concept and propose a flexible and multivariate family of likelihoods. This allows examining whether a vector of forecast errors, along with control variables, shapes a forecaster's preferences and, therefore, the underlying multivariate, nonseparable, loss function. We estimate the likelihood function using Bayesian exponentially tilted empirical likelihood, which reveals the shape of the parameter and the power of the multivariate loss function. In the empirical section, the reported evidence reveals that the EU Commission forecasts are predominantly asymmetric, leaning towards optimism in the year ahead, while a correction towards pessimism occurs in the current year forecast. There is some variability of this asymmetry across member states, with forecasts, i.e. gross domestic product growth, for large Member States exhibiting more optimism

The European Commission facing crisis: social, neo-mercantilist and market-oriented approaches (1967–85)

ABSTRACT The European Commission of the European Economic Community (EEC) has occupied a major role in the organization of European economic cooperation, but it has often been overlooked by historians. Drawing on recent literature as well as on an exploration of the Commission’s archives (and the national archives of the three largest member-states), this contribution aims to examine the three visions developed by this institution to tackle the crisis of capitalism between 1967 and 1985. Some commissioners, such as the Dutchman Hendrikus (Henk) Vredeling, fostered a social agenda, aimed at favouring the redistribution of wealth in Europe, and the protection of the weakest. Others, such as the Belgian Etienne Davignon, defended a neo-mercantilist approach in order to maximize European industrial output. And still others, such as the Frenchman Raymond Barre, defended market-based solutions. In 1985, Delors became President of the Commission and put forward a new synthesis of those three approaches. With this threefold structure (social, neo-mercantilist and market-oriented), this article advances three claims. First, it will demonstrate that the Commission was not a monolithic actor, but rather divided along many competing lines. Second, it will show that some prominent commissioners developed their own economic agenda, which was sometimes separate from that of their country’s governments. Third, this article will circumvent the current dominant teleological narrative, which ascribes a neoliberal streak to the entire history of European integration, and accomplish this by showing that the Treaty of Rome may be interpreted in varied ways. The neo-mercantilist category is useful to show that many actors were unconvinced by market-based regulations, without being socialists or social democrats. In sum, this contribution aims to explore the full range of economic solutions envisioned to overcome economic crises.

Don’t Mention the War! Second World War Remembrance and Support for European Cooperation

At the core of the European project is the idea that through increased state cooperation and dependency, national divisions can be overcome and peace can be secured on the European continent. National and European elites often make reference to past devastations of the Second World War (WWII) in order to convey the added value of European cooperation among the public. Does WWII remembrance enhance public support for European cooperation? By presenting evidence from a set of novel survey experiments conducted in the six largest member states (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom) in July 2017, this contribution shows that reminding people of the devastations of WWII, increases support for their country’s cooperation within the European Union (EU) today. Yet, only when it comes to providing assistance for other member states in dire economic need. Reminding people of the devastations of WWII does not make people more willing to extend the rights to EU migrants or contribute to the establishment of an European army. These findings are important as they suggest that WWII remembrance triggers a largely transactional response among the public, a willingness to provide financial support combined with an unwillingness to embrace intra-EU migration or security cooperation. This evidence suggests that securing public support for further deepening of free movement of people and European security cooperation through historical rhetoric might be difficult to achieve.

Cervical Cancer in the Commonwealth: Collective Action

Background and context: Fifty-three countries are members of the Commonwealth. These countries span Africa, Asia, the Americas, Europe and the Pacific and are diverse - they are among the world's largest, smallest, richest and poorest countries. Thirty-one of these members are classified as small states - countries with a population size of 1.5 million people or less and larger member states that share similar characteristics with them. The Commonwealth Secretariat is planning to tackle the problem of cervical cancer in their low and middle member states (LMIC) through the project “Cervical Cancer in the Commonwealth: Collective Action”. There are 209,100 cervical cancer cases diagnosed per year in the Commonwealth, and in 167,300 cases radiotherapy treatment is indicated. Aim: To analyze the problem of cervical cancer in low and middle-income countries of the Commonwealth and to propose the first step for a collective action. Strategy/Tactics: The treatment of locally advanced cervical cancer includes radiotherapy (teletherapy and brachytherapy) plus concomitant chemotherapy. Cervical cancer has a high rate of curability if brachytherapy is added to teletherapy. We identified radiotherapy departments in Commonwealth LMIC with teletherapy but no brachytherapy and proposed the upgrade of these services to include brachytherapy as a first step. Program/Policy process: The evidence-based treatment of locally advanced cervical cancer is a combination of external beam radiotherapy with chemotherapy and brachytherapy. Brachytherapy has played a major role during many decades in the treatment of gynecologic cancer with good clinical results. EBRT combined with BT leads to superior survival for patients with cervix cancer as compared with EBRT alone, and additionally, MR image-guided BT further improves local control and survival. Countries with no access to BT may only offer palliative treatment to women diagnosed with locally advanced cervical cancer. Any curative attempt for these patients should include brachytherapy. The addition of brachytherapy to external beam radiotherapy in the treatment of cervical cancer is associated with a 12% increase in the 4-y overall survival rates and 13% increase in cause-specify survival. Brachytherapy can save at least 12% more cervical cancer lives than radiotherapy alone. These differences would be much bigger in LMIC because of the limited technology used for external beam radiotherapy. Outcomes: Each high dose rate (HDR) brachytherapy afterloader can treat up to 666 patients per year, of which 466 (70%) could be potentially cured. The capital costs for installing an HDR afterloader is around US$ 1 million, including equipment and building, the annual operating costs are US$ 473,000, and the costs of brachytherapy are US$ 710 per patient. In the lifetime of an HDR afterloader (10 years), 4660 patients could be cured per afterloader installed. What was learned: Brachytherapy saves lives!

Power through Collaboration: Stakeholder Influence in EU Climate and Energy Negotiations

Abstract Who gets what in high-level European Union (EU) negotiations and how? This study draws on data concerning stakeholder preferences during heated negotiations leading to the EU’s 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework. It tests the explanatory values of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI), the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), and Historical Institutionalism (HI). Large member states were key (LI). However, coordinated groups of member states, bound by specific common interests, also played crucial roles. ACF explains the 2030 Framework only if: a) the decisive coalitions consisted of the EU’s supranational institutions, the coordinated groups of member states and long-term advocacy coalitions in the interest group community; b) coalition members held comparatively similar views; and c) coalition members adjusted their strategies mutually and/or shared information. The European Commission set the agenda (HI). The analysis demonstrates that LI, HI and ACF may be used as complementary analytical tools, filling several of each other’s gaps.

REGIONAL EXPANSION, IDENTITY CRISIS AND THE PARADOX OF HUMAN RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The EU is very concerned with the implementation of Human Rights, so it has become the basic value and the main terms in its membership1. The EU's desire toexpand the territorial prompts efforts to discipline the implementation of Human Rights is intensified in order to increase the number of members. However, individual identity, how one defines itself as a nation, and freedom of expression are also major points in Human Rights. This is clearly a major obstacle that unknowingly appears in the territorial expansion efforts being undertaken by the European Union. The most obvious and most recent example is the occurrence of Brexit through the EU referendum in June 2016 which resulted in the United Kingdom having to quit the EU membership. This is a major blow to the EU, because in the course of territorial expansion, the EU would have to lose one of its larger member states. This paper discusses the paradox of the virtue of Human Rights as a value that is upheld within the EU and the freedom of individuals and nations in defining themselves, as well as an identity crisis which is beginning to undermine the comfort of life in society.

Escape from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice: A good reason to quit the European Union?

One of the principal objectives of Brexit is to end the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (EU) over the UK. It raises the question whether the UK has ‘suffered’ more than other Member States from judicial action. To answer this question, this paper examines statistics on judicial action and finds that i) the UK has not been embroiled in more proceedings before the Court of Justice than other large Member States; ii) fewer proceedings have been initiated against it by the Commission than other larger or medium-size Member State; and iii) the UK has won relatively more cases than other large Member States. The paper also argues that in principle judicial bias towards integration is not necessarily harmful to the interests of a relatively open economy like that of the UK. This is because such an integrationist tendency would pry open other markets which would be beneficial to UK firms. In addition, the distortion-preventing powers of other EU institutions such as the European Commission also tend to favour pro-market countries like the UK. Lastly, the paper considers alternative dispute resolution arrangements identified by the UK and suggests that they are more likely to reduce legal certainty and delay effective enforcement than the present system based on the Court of Justice.

Influence in the EU: Measuring Mutual Support

AbstractWe assess a country's influence on decision‐making in the Council not merely on the basis of the number of its votes, but based on a novel measure that also takes into account the voting behaviour of other countries. A country that is likely to receive support from other countries will be more influential than a country with more votes, but which tends to be isolated in its policy preferences. We apply the methodology to a novel dataset and use it to assess whether changes in voting weights in the Lisbon Treaty influence the odds of whether countries get what they want when decisions are taken in the Council. We show that large Member States are less successful in getting support from others for their positions, while the changes in voting weights increase large Member States' influence, but statistically significant decrease it only for a subgroup of small Member States.