Lao People's Revolutionary Party Research Articles

The Role of “Resources” in Regime Durability in Laos

This article argues the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, or Laos, draws upon three key types of “resources” in consolidating regime durability. Intentionally broad, our conception of resources encompasses not just natural resources managed by the state on behalf of the national community, but also the ideological and institutional resources that underpin the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) program of industrial resourcification and modernization. Our argument focuses on the mutual constitution and coproduction of natural, ideological, and institutional regime resources using a triptychal model to understand their integrative contribution to regime durability in Laos. This approach illuminates an evolving and pragmatic form of “statist market socialism” that contrasts with the common view of Laos as an aspiring if imperfect market-based developing economy. After defining statist market socialism and the regime’s three key resources, the article presents a case study from Laos’ strategic hydropower sector, to demonstrate how the triptych of regime resources combine in practice to support and sustain LPRP rule.

EXPLOITING RESEARCH RESULTS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ETHNIC POLICIES IN THE LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, SERVING THE COMPILATION OF TRAINING MATERIALS TO FOSTER ETHNIC KNOWLEDGE FOR LAO CADRES AT THE VIETNAM ACADEMY OF ETHNIC MINORITIES

The Lao People's Democratic Republic is a multi-ethnic country. Therefore, during the process of revolutionary leadership, the Lao People's Revolutionary Party always considered ethnic issues and implementing ethnic policies as one of the important tasks in order to improve the material and spiritual life of ethnic minorities, consolidate and promote national unity bloc; striving to build the Lao People's Democratic Republic with economic development and political stability. To implement that policy, Laos has implemented many national guidelines and policies. The article focuses on clarifying the achievements and limitations in the implementation of ethnic policy in the Lao People's Democratic Republic. At the same time, exploit research results to serve the work of compiling documents and training according to Resolution 16/2018-ND/CP at the Vietnam Academy for Ethnic Minorities today. Keywords: Ethnic policy; Lao People's Democratic Republic; Ethnicity; Document compilation; Training program.

Bomb Children: Life in the Former Battlefields of Laos by Leah Zani

Reviewed by: Bomb Children: Life in the Former Battlefields of Laos by Leah Zani Davorn Sisavath Leah Zani, Bomb Children: Life in the Former Battlefields of Laos. Durham: Duke University Press, 2019. 184 pp. Bomb Children: Life in the Former Battlefields of Laos is a reflexive account on the hazards of conducting fieldwork in the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR or Laos). In this lucid and well-written ethnography, Leah Zani strategically and selectively guides the reader through hazards of her fieldwork—conditions of war remains, military waste, police harassment, paranoia, self-censorship, surveillance—and develops a practice for researching and writing about lingering violence that confronts the sociality of war in contemporary Laos. Conducting fieldwork over a span of 17 months between 2012–2015, Zani brings parallels (such as the remains/revivals parallel) to the reader's attention. Bomb Children's conceptual, ethical, and methodological frame of parallelism presents the inherent challenges of hazardous research and contributes to the anthropological study of military waste. As the central organizing frame of Bomb Children, parallelism is derived from the Lao practice of creative style or poetic form, and has its roots in the spoken Lao language. Zani writes, parallels develop in which "statements are juxtaposed, often through the repetition of similar sounds, grammars, structures, or themes" (38). Engaging the parallel process of remains/revivals in Laos, Zani argues parallelism functions as an important research tool to analyze the sociocultural after-effects of war. The book focuses on the contemporary Lao period of Renovation reforms beginning in the 1990s: a period marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the acceleration of and dependence on Western humanitarian, developmental intervention, and financial aid, and a shift towards a market-oriented economy. Today, the country's strategic position at the [End Page 541] "crossroads" of Southeast Asia and rapid economic expansion has garnered attention from scholars conducting research on topics ranging from global integration to patterns of development, land acquisitions, and environmental issues. Until the early 2000s, the country was virtually closed to foreign researchers, and the Lao People's Revolutionary Party's (LPRP) suspicion towards Western researchers remains institutionalized, particularly on discussions of state politics. Despite this, scholars from disciplines such as geography, environmental and agricultural science, development studies, and anthropology continue to contribute scholarship toward the growing body of knowledge on contemporary Laos. Zani's Bomb Children adds to this growing scholarship, particularly data from fieldwork in Laos and the anthropological study of military waste. In Laos, the consequences of US secret bombing campaign from 1964–1973, where over 2 million tons of bombs were dropped during 580,000 bombing missions, resulted in the massive accumulation of military waste. The bombings destroyed villages along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and displaced civilians during the nine-year period. Today, Laos remains the most heavily bombed country per capita. The lingering violence is embedded in a material environment scarred by thousands of bomb craters and littered with tons of military materials such as unexploded ordnance and scrap metals. How does a country rebuild from a history destroyed by bombings, and what remains after war? Turning to an anthropology of military waste to write against terror and the layering contamination of violence, Zani incorporates the parallel of remains/revivals to analyze military waste as "active, corrosive elements of the present and future" (21). "Remains" refer to the military waste left over from the US Secret War, including the material and social relations produced by war and its aftermath. "Revivals" references the ongoing transformation of military waste, and the interweaving processes of "socioeconomic liberalization, religious awakening, and authoritarian renovation," in postwar Laos (22). The study of military waste also involves attending to political and ethical principals of anthropological engagement in a post-socialist authoritarian country where state terror, fear, surveillance, and paranoia shaped Zani's fieldwork. An insightful aspect of Bomb Children is Zani's methodology of parallel violence that requires flexibility in the field. This methodological approach of parallelism stems from her fieldwork data rooted in realities of hazards [End Page 542] by learning to perceive the remains of war in statements, sites, and experiences. Attending to how researchers should protect themselves and...

Legitimation of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party: Socialism, Chintanakan Mai (New Thinking) and Reform

ABSTRACTTo date, scholars of authoritarianism have paid much attention to the use of democratic institutions in dictatorships to mitigate threats from both internal and external ruling elites, to co-opt and divide opposition and to solve commitment problems among the ruling elite. However, there have been no in-depth studies of legitimacy in an authoritarian regime. In communist states, opposition and dissent are addressed not through co-optation but exclusion. By contrast, communist parties attach great value for their survival to obtaining legitimacy from the masses. This article argues that the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) has endeavoured to acquire legitimacy since the foundation of the regime through a dialogical configuration of economic reform and socialist ideology. Economic reform and ideological legitimisation always go together, interacting with each other: economic reform requires ideological modification, and ideology defines the framework of reform. In Laos, this paradoxical configuration is necessary for the LPRP to maintain legitimacy while concurrently pursuing an ideal of socialism and reality of economic reform. In making this argument, this article reassesses the nature and significance of chintanakan mai (new thinking), which was not a formal reform policy, as often assumed, but a temporary slogan for promoting economic reforms.

Regime Renewal in Laos: The Tenth Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party

Regime Renewal in Laos: The Tenth Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party

Laos in 2013: International Controversies, Economic Concerns and the Post-Socialist Rhetoric of Rule

In 2013, after several years of basking in the glow of strong economic growth and prominent international events, the ruling Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) faced an International Monetary Fund (IMF)-prescribed “overheating economy” and a number of international controversies. Under the glare of uncharacteristic scrutiny, the regime was unable or unwilling to explain how a prominent community leader could disappear in the company of police. Then, in order to circumvent regulatory processes, it insisted that a planned hydroelectric project damming part of the Mekong River was not a “mainstream” dam (i.e. on the main stem of the river). In some ways, these responses recalled an earlier period of LPRP rule when the regime would routinely deny, obfuscate and stonewall in the face of external criticism. But as the leaders’ more sophisticated response to its budgetary woes indicated, Laos has changed profoundly in the past two decades, including in the ways the LPRP utilizes language, rhetoric and other forms of communication in reinforcing state power. In surveying the events of the past year in Laos, this article considers the rhetoric of rule in contemporary post-socialist Laos. Political language and rhetoric are critical in any political setting but play an especially important role in revolutionary regimes, which use language to produce new cosmologies of rule, and in one-party systems, where in the absence of open democratic elections, state rhetoric plays a key role in mobilizing legitimacy. In Laos, although the most turgid expressions of revolutionary socialist rhetoric have long been forgotten, many of its keywords — solidarity, progress, discipline, patience, consensus and so on — continue to structure state pronouncements, political actions and public grievances. These have been coupled with the pervasive rhetoric of international development, with its alluring argot of projects, growth, sustainability and good governance, together with promissory slogans like those that guide state development policies around the world. None is more ubiquitous in Laos than “graduating from least developed country status by 2020”. Although this hybrid language has emerged over a period of two decades or more, the Lao government has become more adroit at deploying it. While state- and donorfunded projects disseminate much of the hegemonic rhetoric, keystones of the socialist era such as meetings and mobilization campaigns remain crucial tools of propagation. Despite the pervasively political nature of this rhetoric, it continues to depoliticize public political space by defining acceptable limits of discourse.

From revolutionary heroism to cultural heritage: museums, memory and representation in Laos

ABSTRACT. Museum exhibitions in Laos represent two main strands of Lao national identity discourse. First, they glorify the ‘liberation struggle’ of the so-called ‘Lao multiethnic people’ under the leadership of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, and therefore serve as important ideological tools for the current regime's self-legitimisation. Second, they display the history and cultural heritage of the Lao nation, providing the postcolonial state with a narrative of historical continuity and civilisation that is focused mostly on the dominant ethnic Lao culture. This article explores the contradictions within official images of the Lao nation-state and how these opposing strands of national identity compete or interact. Museums as key arenas of ideological tensions constitute illuminating fields of research on discourses of national identity in Laos.

Laos: The Chinese Connection

The title of my first contribution to Southeast Asian Affairs in 1980 was “Laos: The Vietnamese Connection”. A great deal has happened in the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) over the past three decades, both internally, and in its relations with its neighbours. The Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) is still in power, but it is a party riven by ambition and greed. The country is wealthier than it was thirty years ago; but the urban-rural divide is more marked than ever. Wealth is concentrated in the cities, most of it in the hands of Party members and their families. The resources of the country, which the French had glimpsed a century before, most of which are located in rural areas, are now being rapidly exploited, but not for the benefit of the rural majority. Neighbouring states have hungrily eyed these resources, and seized their opportunities to obtain a share — none more so than China. So just as what was interesting about Laos in 1980 was the Vietnamese connection, so in 2009 what is interesting is the developing Chinese connection, and what this means for Lao politics and policies. To focus on the Chinese connection is not to suggest that the Vietnamese connection no longer matters. It certainly does. Rather it is to focus on economic and political changes that are now taking place. What I want to do in this article is to examine the changes that were becoming apparent in 2008 in three areas: in politics; in economic development; and in international relations. But I shall deal with these in the reverse order, for Lao politics are all but opaque in the absence of any media reporting or discussion, and it is only by examining the shifting influence of neighbouring states, and popular responses to the impact of development policies, that some light can be cast on Lao politics.

Laos: At the Crossroads

There was no diversion in 2007 from the policy directions set down by the Eighth Congress of the ruling Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) in March 2006. The Lao People's Democratic Republic will remain a one-party state with old-style, Soviet-era political institutions, while encouraging free enterprise and foreign investment. The outcome has been a remarkable political stability, and an impressive economic performance. The economy has been booming at over 7 per cent growth for the past two years, due largely to massive foreign investment in the development of hydroelectric power and gold and copper mining as well as a rapidly expanding tourism industry. According to the government's poverty reduction plans, the country, which now has a gross national income (GNI) per capita of approximately US$500, should by 2020 exit Least Developed Country (LDC) status ? or countries with a per capita income of a three-year average of less than US$750, and some other criteria ? and join the ranks of middle-income countries. So far, only two of the nearly fifty LDCs worldwide have managed to pass the threshold by leaving LDC status and moving on to a level whose lower limit of having a GNI per capita exceeding US$900 is required for obtaining the middle-income status: Botswana in 1994 and Cape Verde in 2007. For Laos to graduate in a similar manner, it would have to achieve a more even distribution of wealth, improve education, and, perhaps above all, take stern measures against corruption. With more money in circulation and more goods available in the markets ? combined with abysmally low salaries for civil servants ? it is hardly surprising that the World Bank and other international

Laos: Politics in a Single-party State

In the nominally Marxist-Leninist Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR), whose political institutions are modelled on those of the former Soviet Union, the most important events of the political calendar are the congresses of the ruling Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP). These congresses take place only every five years, and 2006 was such a year. Party congresses provide opportunities both for the nomination of a new political leadership, and for setting out new policy directions. Thus it was the Fourth Party Congress in 1986 that endorsed the so-called “new economic mechanism”, which introduced a market economy and opened the way for private foreign investment. The Fourth Congress was delayed for nine months while the ideological struggle over policy was waged, with great secrecy, within the Party. That subsequent congresses have been held on schedule (some time in March) suggests a degree of ideological consensus. The 2006 Eighth Party Congress was held on schedule. What party congresses do determine is the leadership of the country for the next five years, so they are preceded by a period of intense political activity. And because of the excessive secrecy that surrounds all intra-party politics in Laos, the lead-up to a party congress is a time of swirling rumour. For a good two years prior to the 2006 congress rumours abounded about the likely composition of the new Political Bureau, and who would get what position in the new government that is formed after each congress. In the lead-up to the Eighth Party Congress there was little serious debate over policy. Some observers claimed to discern differences between “reformers” and “conservatives”, or between “pro-Vietnamese” and “pro-Chinese” groupings within the Party, but there was widespread agreement over key policy issues. These were, broadly, that the country should continue to pursue an open market economy and to attract foreign direct investment to develop industry and resources; that it should continue to accept foreign aid from all willing donors;

LAOS: The State of the State

The year 2005 marked the 35th anniversary of the People's Revolutionary Party's takeover of the Laotian government. Throughout this period, journalists and scholars have used various labels to describe the Laotian state. Some referred to it as a communist or socialist authoritarian state while others have described it as a weak state that could not even pay the salaries of many of its employees regularly. It is true that Laos is one of the five remaining communist countries in the world. It is also true that the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) does not tolerate any form of political opposition that directly or indirectly challenges its rule. Laos remains one of the most underdeveloped and poorest countries in the world. Even in 2005, about 38 per cent of the population reportedly lived below the poverty line and the salary of senior government officials was not enough for a family of four to live decently. Furthermore, a large majority of the working people, especially those from minority areas, do not have any formal education.

Laos: Mired in Economic Stagnation?

Introduction By most accounts, 2002 was a politically quiet year for Laos. Unlike previous years, there were no student protests or bomb explosions in capital, Vientiane, and no reported rebel raids against army and police outposts. President Khamtay Siphandone's government grip on power appeared absolute with no open dissent in ranks. Elections to National Assembly were held on 24 February, and government claimed, 2.5 million eligible voters nationwide used their right to vote.1 There were few surprises when a total of 166 candidates competed for 109 seats in Assembly, which in effect is little more than a rubber-stamp body controlled by ruling Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP). Khamtay is also president of Central Committee of party, which controls all aspects of life and society in country. The lack of political debate and initiative was seen by most foreign observers as main reason why Laos' troubled economy showed few signs of real improvement during year. A Western embassy in Laos stated in an internal memo dated 10 October that: the trend is disturbing. The currency, kip, continued to slide, inflation rose, foreign investment declined, not enough revenue was being collected, and government did not even have enough money to pay state employees, such as teachers. In foreign-policy field, there were problems in relationship with Thailand over border demarcation. Laos also continued to demand extradition from Thailand of seventeen Lao rebels who had been involved in an attack on a border post in 2000, and then taken refuge across frontier. Despite promises from Thailand, issue remain unresolved as 2002 drew to a close. On other hand, Laos moved closer to its old allies, Vietnam and Cambodia. In January, prime ministers of Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia met in Ho Chi Minh City to discuss creation of a triangle development2 spanning three countries. In July, a delegation from Politburo of

Laos: Sedately Seguing into the Twenty‑First Century

Introduction After a relatively torrid couple of years, beset with substantial economic difficulties, 2001 was more sedate for the Lao People's Democratic Republic. The signs of political unrest and sporadic acts of terrorism that Laos witnessed throughout 2000 also appeared to fully abate in early 2001. Spiralling inflation has largely been brought under control, as has the foreign exchange rate for the Lao kip. The Seventh Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) was held in March 2001, and some changes to the senior leadership were enacted, but government policy did not appear to alter in any significant way. The resumption of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending in 2001 to Laos was a welcome development, although a general frustration still persists among foreign donors that the country's economic reform process is much too slow and unfocused. Vientiane also faced increased criticism from the United States and Europe over its human rights record.

Unrest in Laos

Mysterious bombings in the capital Vientiane and other cities, increased attacks by ethnic hill-tribe insurgents in the north and factionalism in the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) have turned Laos into the region’s latest potential trouble spot. Both Vietnam and Thailand have publicly expressed concern. Behind the unrest are a shaky economy and increasingly bitter factional disputes among LPRP leaders. International donors are pressuring Laos to carry out reforms, but Vientiane is compounding its problems by refusing to change its rigid political system.

Laos: A Million Elephants, A Million Tourists?

Domestic Political Affairs As in China and Vietnam, reforms in the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) have hardly touched the political arena. Laos still has a one-party system of government, which is officially legalized and guaranteed under the consti tution. Even if terms like socialist and are no longer in official usage and do not appear in the constitution, the leadership holds fast to the Laotian way, in which traditional communist elements exist alongside reforms and an open-door policy. The Sixth Party Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP), held in March 1996, continued on its course to wards a market economy even if the reforms are to be implemented slowly, placing emphasis on wholesome social conditions.1 The tolerance of Theravada Buddhism and its clergy has advanced further, and the domestic political situation is relatively stable. In the past, there had been occasional guerrilla attacks, which, though no grave threat to the government, did make it neces sary for people to obtain special permits (until 1994) for travel outside the area around Vientiane. However, in general, today there are no risks for tourists going to the promoted and permitted tourist destinations. In the second week of January 1998 the National Assembly (NA) announced its new composition after the general election. The Assembly consists of 99 members, 21 of whom are women. Only 7 of the 28 women candidates were not elected. Out of the 99 members, 68 are from local authorities, and 31 from the central government. Lao Loum members, especially ethnic Lao, make up 56.6 per cent. One of the selected candidates is independent.2 The Standing Committee of the new NA consists of seven members. There is a president of the Assembly and three vice-presidents, one more than in the last legislative assembly. In 1998, President Nouhak Phoumsavanh resigned his position as President of the Lao PDR. The new National Assembly elected a new President, a new

Laos: The Sixth Party Congress, and After?

Introduction Laos in 1996 was uneasy about accepting all the consequences of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM). This was the main message of the Sixth Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party. At first sight, the political forces that oppose rapid economic transformation seem to have reinforced their position. It remains to be seen, however, whether this change will be strong enough to stop ? or at least to significantly slow down ? the reform process and the integration of the Lao economy in the Southeast Asian region. On the other hand, the Sixth Party Congress seems to have strengthened the position of representatives of ethnic minorities in the political ?lite. It is an open question, however, whether this second change will increase the attention paid to remote areas and correct the pro-urban bias of the economic and foreign aid policies, thereby improving the prospects for a more balanced growth in Laos.

Laos 1991: On the Defensive

In 1991, two political events of particular significance took place in the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR): 15 years after the formation of the LPDR a new constitution was finally promulgated; and the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) held its Fifth Party Congress. The first laid the legal foundation, the second the political basis for defence of the one party state in Laos, a defence for which the LPRP has sought support through a significant shift in international patronage. In response to the crumbling of Communism in the Soviet Union, the Party ten aciously maintained its monopoly of power, while continuing to adopt a flexible approach to the economy. Contacts with capitalist states, particularly with Thailand, continued to be cultivated, but for political support the LPDR turned increasingly to China. By these means an appearance of decisive forward-looking government was maintained, even though uncertainties remained ? most notably in areas of leadership, where the succession and role of the army remained crucial, and minority and regional affairs, where the Party's attempts to re-centralize political decision making seem likely to run into opposition.

Laos in 1991: Year of the Constitution

The Lao People's Democratic Republic in 1991 was buffeted by the shock waves resulting from the great crisis in the international communist movement. Nevertheless, its basic strategy of the last six years remained unaltered: embrace liberal market economics but preserve the Lao People's Revolutionary Party's (LPRP) monopoly of political power. Laos made it plain in pursuing this course that although it still made obeisance to Marxism-Leninism, building socialism had become only a remote and theoretical goal. The LPRP, which held its Fifth Congress in March, also moved to renovate its own and the Laos state structures to make both more efficient and reduce their drag on economic growth. Laos expanded its relations with the countries of the world, but its poverty, remoteness, and the increasing anomalousness of its regime make it difficult to attract the level of foreign assistance and investment necessary for sustained economic growth.

Laos in 1990: Winds of Change

Laos in 1990 saw winds of change blowing but not all in the direction willed by the ruling Lao People's Revolutionary Party. Overall, the momentum of economic reform and restructuring was abetted by further infusions of Western aid. However, looming prospects of a cutoff in Soviet bloc aid and disillusion stemming from the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe saw Laos once again bidding up ties with Thailand and China. Otherwise, Laos retains its client status vis-a-vis Vietnam and, as with Vietnam, has sought to keep the lid on pressures for political opening. Thus, while 1990 saw Laos drafting its first post-1975 Constitution, the surface calm of the country was beset with stirrings on the part of both ethnic minorities and urban elements that suggested an impatience with the regime's failure to entertain political reform.

The Constitution of the Lao People's Democratic Republic

On 14 August 1991 the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) of the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) unanimously endorsed the first Constitution to be promulgated since the formation of the LPDR on 2 December 1975. For the intervening fifteen years, while Laos was without any constitutionally grounded system of laws, all legislative and executive powers had effectively been exercised by the ruling Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP). This paper briefly examines the background to the new Constitution. It then goes on to discuss the document itself in comparison to earlier drafts and to the constitutions of neighbouring socialist states, namely the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV).