Knowledge Of Virtue Research Articles

Prudence, Rules, and Regulative Epistemology

Following Ballantyne, we can distinguish between descriptive and regulative epistemology. Whereas descriptive epistemology analyzes epistemic categories such as knowledge, justified belief, or evidence, regulative epistemology attempts to guide our thinking. In this paper, we argue that regulative epistemologists should focus their attention on what we call epistemic prudence. Our argument proceeds as follows: First, we lay out an objection to virtue-based regulative epistemology that is analogous to the no-guidance objection to virtue ethics. According to this objection, virtue-based regulative epistemology cannot offer us useful guidance in our deliberations, because an abstract knowledge of virtue does not tell us what we should do here and now, especially in hard cases. We respond to this objection by showing that our making good epistemic decisions cannot simply be a matter of our following the right epistemic rules. In order to reliably inquire and deliberate well, we need epistemic prudence. Thus, while virtue-based regulative epistemology fails to determine how we should inquire and resolve deliberation here and now, this is also true of norm-based regulative epistemology. The upshot of this argument is that regulative epistemologists should focus their attention on understanding the nature of epistemic prudence and on understanding how we can promote its development in ourselves and others.

STRATEGY FOR INTERNALIZATION OF THE VALUES OF THE BOOK OF ALALA IN DEVELOPING STUDENTS MORALS IN MADRASAH DINIYAH NURUL UMMAH PUTRI ISLAMIC BOARDING SCHOOL YOGYAKARTA

Learning methods in teaching carried out by teachers are sometimes still not directed. Many students violate rules and norms, such as not respecting teachers and even considering teachers to be their own friends. Therefore, the study of the previous references solved this problem. The focus of this research is what values are contained in the Alala book. What is the strategy for internalizing the values of the Alala book in fostering the morals of students. This research uses a qualitative descriptive research type. Collecting data using the method of observation, interviews, and documentation. The data analysis methods are data collection, data reduction, data presentation, and drawing conclusions. This results of this study indicate that the values contained in the Alala book are applied by students, namely, Knowledge Requirements, Virtue Knowledge, Maintaining Knowledge, Reaching Ideals, Exalting Teachers, Controlling Passions, Utilizing Time Well, Commands to Seek Knowledge. Meanwhile, the strategies for internalizing the values of the Alala book in fostering the morals of students are exemplary strategies, habituation strategies, advice strategies, story strategies and punishment strategies.

Virtues in Sangam Literature

Virtue is derived conceptually and is changeable according to the change of time. Moral values are different for man who lived as an ethnic group and for an individualistic society. This article shows up how the virtues mentioned in Sangam literary songs new shape for the sake of necessity. A materialistic society constructs virtue according to the occupation, materials, eligibility etc. A man accepts and reject a thing based on his knowledge of virtue. In the struggle for life, the commonality has been distorted based on the ideas of labor and surplus. This article describes the virtues of war, which are intended to destroy the generality and about the government virtues that emphasize power.

Inculcating curiosity: pilot results of an online module to enhance undergraduate intellectual virtue

There has recently been a great deal of theoretical interest in the relevance of the intellectual virtues for education, including undergraduate education. This study introduces a novel online module, as part of a larger university-wide initiative, to introduce and potentially inculcate intellectual virtue in students. Using a non-experimental pretest/posttest design, we report pilot results on student satisfaction with the module and gains across several learning outcomes. Using a Bayesian approach, results suggest that the module increases scores on student curiosity, knowledge of virtues, and understanding of their importance to education. Moreover, the data suggest that minority and historically underprivileged subgroups do not experience differential satisfaction with the module. This study thus provides preliminary statistical evidence for scaling up this educational resource. Recommendations for future research are also discussed, with implications for measuring and assessing intellectual virtue, as well as other learning outcomes relevant to higher education. Supplemental data for this article is available online at https://doi.org/10.1080/02602938.2021.1919988 .

McGrath, Sarah. Moral Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. 240. $65.00 (cloth).

McGrath, Sarah. <i>Moral Knowledge</i>. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. 240. $65.00 (cloth).

Is there such a thing as literary cognition?

AbstractI question whether the case for ‘literary cognitivism’ has generally been successfully made. As it is usually construed, the thesis is easy to satisfy illegitimately because dependence on fictionality is not built in as a requirement. The thesis of literary cognitivism should say: ‘literary fiction can be a source of knowledge in a way that depends crucially on its being fictional’ (Green's phrasing). After questioning whether nonpropositional cognitivist views (e.g., Nussbaum's) meet this neglected standard, I argue that if fictional narratives can impart propositional knowledge in virtue of their fictionality, it would be largely via a suppositional framework. Yet in many cases, such as Huxley's Brave New World, the key literary supposition could simply be an epistemic possibility (‘suppose X, which for all we know, occurs sometime’), not counterfactual supposition, that is, distinctively fictional supposition. The best general case for literary cognitivism may be the limited one that literary fiction can alert us to nonactual metaphysical possibilities that may be important for understanding actuality. Yet even here, seemingly possible fictions are often impossible.

The Role of Women in Advocacy and Community Reform

In advocacy, women need to be identified so that we can attribute a role to their level. The judgment of the thing is part of his conception, which makes the knowledge of women's reality a priority. When we follow the evolution of women's life long ago to this day, we find that it is doomed. The role of women in advocacy: First and before I go on the subject must understand what is the area of advocacy that we want women to do it? Yes, it is the whole society, because this role can only be achieved if the society is included, whose life revives the nation and dies. When he says: Believers and believers, some parents of some enjoin the good and end the evil and believe in God, he means what he says, because the knowledge of Virtue and Prevention of Vice can not be achieved only in the open society, which makes women contribute to the role of men. And the role of women in the reform of society, which is called the Holy Quran, which sees good and forbidding evil is no doubt and can not be denied only Makbar. The gift of the Holy Prophet in social life is conclusive evidence that Muslim women were present alongside men and at all levels. Here I am compelled to shorten some of the evidence that shows the constant and continuous presence in the life of the Prophet and after him in the open ages, which represented the finest era throughout Islamic history. Keywords: Women, Advocacy, Islam

Grunnþættir menntunar, myndlist og mannkostamenntun

Innleiðingu nýrra aðalnámskráa 2011 fylgdu auknar almennar siðferðilegar áherslur þvert á námsgreinar með tilkomu hæfniviðmiða og grunnþátta menntunar sem eiga ýmislegt sameiginlegt með mannkostamenntun. Engu að síður virðist þörf á því að siðferðileg markmið aðalnámskrárinnar verði dregin betur fram og þeim fundinn traustur farvegur. Mannkostamenntun er reist á samtímakenningum um aristótelíska dygðasiðfræði þar sem vitsmunaleg ígrundun, geðshræringar og virkur vilji skipta höfuðmáli. Að þroska með sér dygðir og mannkosti er ævilangt verkefni en hlutverk skólanna getur verið það að efla svokallað dygðalæsi nemenda, sem felst í að þekkja og skilja dygðir og geta hugsað á gagnrýninn hátt um siðferðileg álitamál. List- og verkgreinar snerta mikilvæg svið í hugmyndum Aristótelesar um fullkomna dygð, einkum vegna þess að listaverk geta vakið geðshræringar. Listir hafa frá örófi alda fylgt manninum og þær eru nátengdar vitsmunum okkar, sjálfsvitund og tilfinningalífi. Listirnar búa yfir eiginleikum sem felast í eftirlíkingunni og hjálpa okkur að skilja aðrar manneskjur og öðlast þannig dýpri skilning á hlutskipti annarra. Þannig geta fjölbreytt listaverk frá ýmsum tímaskeiðum og af ýmsum toga veitt okkur siðferðilega þekkingu og þau geta verið vettvangur samræðna og skoðanaskipta um margvísleg siðferðileg álitamál sem ýmist eiga rætur sínar í samfélagslegum málefnum eða persónulegu innra lífi. Sum listaverk byggjast á persónulegri tjáningu listamannsins, önnur eru pólitískari og snerta mannréttindi í víðum skilningi og enn önnur eru tilvistarlegs eðlis og veita okkur innsýn í tilraun manneskjunnar til að skilja sjálfa sig andspænis samfélaginu og hinni víðu veröld. Þessir eiginleikar listanna sýna fram á að listgreinakennsla gegnir mikilvægu hlutverki í almennri menntun.

Socrates’ Search for Laches’ Knowledge of Courage

In Plato’sLaches, Socrates ascribes knowledge of courage to his eponymous interlocutor and makes an attempt to reconstruct it in speech. His attribution of knowledge to Laches controls his discursive behaviour in the dialogue, requiring him to withhold judgements of error, construe apparent error as a failure of speech rather than knowledge, and search for the deeper truth underlying the overt content of Laches’ utterances. Socrates’ method in this elenchus can be described as a kind of ‘epistemic exegesis,’ which aims to draw out and give discursive shape to knowledge of virtue that it assumes that the interlocutor already possesses.

Why Knowledge is Special

AbstractI argue against Greco's account of the value of knowledge, according to which knowledge is distinctively valuablevis-à-visthat which falls short of knowledge in virtue of its status as an achievement and achievements being finally valuable. Instead, I make the case that virtuous belief is also an achievement. I argue that the nature of knowledge is such that knowledge is finally valuable in a way that virtuous belief is not, precisely because knowledge is not simply a success from ability. The value of knowledge lies in the positive responsiveness of the world to an agent's epistemic virtuousness.

Group virtue epistemology

According to Sosa (A virtue epistemology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007; Reflective knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009; Knowing full well, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011), knowledge is apt belief, where a belief is apt when accurate because adroit (competent). Sosa (Philos Perspect 24(1):465–475, 2010; Judgment and agency, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) adds to his triple-A analysis of knowledge, a triple-S analysis of competence, where a complete competence combines its seat, shape and situation. Much of Sosa’s influential work assumes that epistemic agents are individuals who acquire knowledge when they hit the truth through exercising their own individual skills in appropriate shapes and situations. This paper explores an extension of Sosa’s framework to a social setting in which groups constitute epistemic agents over and above their individual members. The claim is that groups can be ascribed knowledge in virtue of hitting the truth through exercising their competences in appropriate shapes and situations. While knowledge at the collective level may diverge from knowledge at the individual level, the competences of groups are nothing over and above the combined competences of their members. The ensuing view thus has implications for the debate over reduction and supervenience in collective epistemology.

Poetry as a Form of Knowledge

AbstractIs poetry a topic for philosophical reflection? This paper seeks to argue that it is by exhibiting poetry as a form of knowledge. What the claim that poetry is a form of knowledge amounts to is that something can be knowledge in virtue of being poetical and poetical in virtue of being the (kind of) knowledge it is. Various kinds of skeptical doubt about this claim are considered. It is argued that such doubts are based on distorting pictures of poetry. Two strategies to justify the claim that poetry is a form of knowledge shall be explored. The first strategy is a broadly Wittgensteinian one, relying on grammatical reminders. The second strategy is a broadly Hegelian one, exhibiting poetry as a form of knowledge by showing that the concepts of two other forms of knowledge – practical and second-person knowledge – due to internal incoherences, point beyond themselves towards the concept of poetry.

Narrative Representation and Phenomenological Knowledge

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that narrative representations can provide knowledge in virtue of their narrativity, regardless of their truth value. I set out the question in section 1, distinguishing narrative cognitivism from aesthetic cognitivism and narrative representations from non-narrative representations. Sections 2 and 3 argue that exemplary narratives can provide lucid phenomenological knowledge, which appears to meet both the epistemic and narrativity criteria for the narrative cognitivist thesis. In section 4, I turn to non-narrative representation, focusing on lyric poetry as presenting a disjunctive objection: either lucid phenomenological knowledge can be reduced to identification and fails to meet the epistemic criterion, or lucid phenomenological knowledge is provided in virtue of aesthetic properties and fails to meet the narrativity criterion. I address both of these problems in sections 5 and 6, and I close with a tentative suggestion as to how my argument for narrative cognitivism could be employed as an argument for aesthetic cognitivism.

Against Kornblith Against Reflective Knowledge

Against Kornblith Against Reflective Knowledge

On Irony Interpretation: Socratic Method in Plato's Euthyphro

Socratic Method in the Euthyphro can be fruitfully analysed as a method of irony interpretation. Socrates' method – the irony of irony interpretation – is to pretend that Euthyphro is an ironist in order to transform him into a self-ironist. To be a self-ironist is to ironize one's knowledge of virtue in order to bring an intuitive and unarticulated awareness of virtue to mind. The exercise of the capacity for self-irony is then a mode of striving for the good.

The ironic defense of Socrates: Plato's Apology

Introduction 1. Title and preliminary considerations 2. Prooemium 3. Prothesis 4. Defense against the charges of the first accusers 5. Defense against the present accusers 6. Digression on nobility and death 7. Epilogue 8. Penalty section 9. Final speech 10. Conclusion: Socrates' human wisdom and knowledge of virtue.

Aristotle's Science of the Best Regime

In this Controversy, Mary Nichols and Robert Bartlett both enlist Aristotle in support of a liberal politics. Nichols finds that the Aristotle analyzed by Bartlett in his remarks in this Review in 1994 leads us away from politics into a life of perfect contemplation. The real Aristotle, she avers, by calling attention to the “limits of reason,” leaves room for the gods, personal freedom, and shared power. Bartlett responds that the life of contemplative reflection that Aristotle praises is the foundation of knowledge of virtue, without which freedom is license, democracy, dangerous.

Ancient and Medieval Memories (review)

u96 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 32:2 APRIL t994 will prove the existence of derivative entities from their definitions and the existence claims. As McKirahan realizes, this entails that Aristotle recognized a modernsounding distinction between basic and derived entities analogous to that between basic and derived truths. It also requires some fancy logical footwork. If the definition of a derived entity is used to prove its existence, then the definition is logically prior to the existence claim: thus, we would be able to know something's definition without knowing that it exists, a view Aristotle often seems to deny. McKirahan's response is not one I think Aristotle could easily accept: before the demonstration, the definition of the derived entity merely says what a word signifies, but afterwards "the significance of the word becomes the essence of the thing" (194) . Chapter XVII tries to determine in exactly what sense the premises of a demonstration can give the cause or explanation of its conclusion. McKirahan argues that the principles must be both ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi: to have scientific knowledge that p, I must know the reason why p is true, and I must have this knowledge in virtue of knowing the reason why. Grasping a demonstration in the way that an "expert" grasps it is just what constitutes scientific knowledge. All this is, in my opinion, exactly right, as is McKirahan's discussion of the ways in which an Aristotelian ettCgctdiffers from a Humean cause or a covering-law explanation. These lead him to various complaints (some old and some new) against 'cause' and 'explanation' as translations of ctt~ct. But McKirahan's alternative translation 'grounds' is hardly an improvement: by my lights, 'grounds' in ordinary English can only be used of decisions or actions of an agent. The final chapter (XVIII) develops an account of the cognition of indemonstrable principles, drawing primarily on the notoriously intractable An. Post. II. 19- McKirahan takes a moderate "empiricist" line and develops a credible account of how perception and induction might lead us to comprehend first principles (though I found the absence of any discussion of Modrak's views disappointing). His suggestions about the role dialectic might play in finding the principles are intriguing but stand in need of further development. On the whole, this excellent chapter is one of the most sensible discussions of II. ]9 in existence. The book is excellently produced and virtually free of errors--astonishingly so, by recent standards (though the order of terms in diagrams of demonstrations is sometimes reversed, e.g., 21o, 299 n. i3). But shame on publishers who, in this day of computers, print footnotes at the back of the book, and on editors who allow footnotes containing nothing but a three-word citation! ROBIN SMITH Kansas State University Janet Coleman. Ancient and Medieval Memories. New York: Cambridge University Press. 199~. Pp. xx + 646. Cloth, $85.oo. Memory is mostly an afterthought for philosophers today. Its primordial status for the major tradition traced in the present volume is clearest in Augustine, whose construal BOOK REVIEWS 297 of the human mind as the image of God links memory with the Creator/first person of the Christian Trinity, with understanding and will completing the model as analogues of eternal Word and Spirit. The "spacious palaces" of Augustinian memory house both images from one's own life and intelligible realities not derivable from mundane sources. This Christian Platonic view of memory occupies much of the "series of interrelated studies" in which Janet Coleman attempts "to give an account of the range of views on memory and its uses during the Middle Ages." The main contrasting view comes from Aristotle, who places memory on a level with sensation and attributes it to some of the other animals besides us. Aristotelians do, however, make reminiscence--logical searching for memories--a distinctively human capacity, and, as Coleman makes especially clear in her exposition of Aquinas, in this tradition our understanding of what we sense or remember can be sharply differentiated from the sensing or remembering. So far, then, there is no understanding of the past aspast in either tradition. For the Platonists there is understanding of the...

Descriptive analysis and the sceptic

Abstract On the basis of Professor Ayer's The Problem of Knowledge, Mr. Stigen criticizes Ayer for defending a position which the sceptic does not attack. Ayer's “descriptive analysis”, which is his answer to the sceptic, consists in an analysis of statements about, e.g. material objects or other minds into verifiable propositions. In other words, Ayer points to the fact that our statements are shown to be true by verification. However, according to Stigen, this analysis does not remove the sceptic's doubts, for the sceptic does not doubt that our statements are true; his attack is directed against the validity of those of my present beliefs for which I claim knowledge‐status. The sceptic asks me to justify my claim that the statement is not only true, but that I have also good grounds now for being sure of it, i.e. that my present belief amounts to knowledge in virtue of its credibility. On this point, according to Stigen, Ayer offers no satisfactory solution.

Inner Laws of Sociology. A New Sociology by Luigi Sturzo

BOOK REVIKWS Inner Laws of Sociology. A New Sociology. By LuiGI STURZO. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1944. Pp. xxxvi +314. In this review we shall confine ourselves to the consideration of several main topics that seem particularly relevant for readers of a theological and philosophical magazine. To cover the book in any wider detail would be of interest primarily to those directly engaged in the study of sociology. We urge those concerned to read the book fully and carefully, for it has a profundity of observation and wealth of material notably lacking in the books usually written on sociology. We shall, accordingly, divide this review into three parts. The first will concern a very broad outline of the book as a whole, commenting only on certain parts which require special consideration; this will serve also to sketch the extent of Don Sturzo's system of sociology. The second part will take up a crucial question, namely, the relation of society and the individual. The third part will consider, though inadequately, sociology as a science and its relation to other knowledge. I. The first pages of the Introduction set out the scope and method of Don Sturzo as a sociologist. Taking sociology as the " study of social life in its complexity and in its synthesizing factors," Don Sturzo assigns two possible methods to it: the experimental, an "analytic study of social facts, to bring out their constant elements and from these to derive their nature and laws "; and the historical, which is " studying the social syntheses and their factors in their concreteness and in the dialectic of human process." He chooses the hitter method while not ignoring the advantages to be gained in the former. He rejects the school of positivist sociologists who have attempted to create a social biology with emphasis upon an organistic or mechanical conception of society. He likewise rejects those who have a " metaphysical " conception of society wherein society is variously conceived as principle, will, idea, or spirit. For Don Sturzo, " the basis of society is simply the human individual taken in his concreteness and complexity as an original and irresolvable principle." Society is not an entity or an organism outside and above the individual, nor is the individual a reality outside and above society. Either taken in itself, as distinct and opposed to the other, is a logical abstraction. 520 BOOK REVIEWS 521 Hence society is the " sum total of individuals." In an attempt to avoid the conclusion that society would " thus be reduced to a mere movement of individual actions and reactions," Don Sturzo maintains that he gives " to the associate instinct its full value as an ever-developing exigency and social impulse, and by this very fact we resolve the individual into society." This, however, is not an evident conclusion of the author's analysis of the relation of society and the individual in the main body of the book. This initial view of sociology and its use of the historical method is the basic presupposition of Don Sturzo as a sociologist. His. understanding of historicism is contained in the following definition: " Historicism is the systematic conception of history as human process, realized by immanent forces, unified in rationality, yet moving from a transcendental and absolute principle towards a transcendental and absolute end." This concerns, rather, the philosophy of history, which is not the same thing as history conceived as philosophy. The latter position is taken by Don Sturzo: " ... history, thus conceived, presents itself with all the characteristics of philosophy. . . . Basically, philosophy and history might be said to be convertible, since both in different ways have as object the rationality that finds realization in human events according to the general laws governing reality." The full explanation sought in history requires philosophical knowledge, but this means that a historian, to the extent necessary , should also be a philosopher; he is not equipped to give such knowledge in virtue of his ability as a historian (though in fact many historians write as though history were the universal science). To insist upon the distinction between philosophy and history being kept clear is not by way of opposing them but rather of relating them in such a...