In the early days of our Republic, many constitutional questions divided Alexander Hamilton on one side from Thomas Jefferson and James Madison on the other. Could Congress charter a bank? Hamilton said yes, and Jefferson said no. Must the Senate consent to the removal of principal officers? Madison said no, and Hamilton (according to most accounts) said yes. Could the President declare neutrality unilaterally? In a series of pseudonymous essays, Hamilton said yes, while Madison said no. In each case, the ultimate decision was made by President George Washington. Through their public and private debates, these three Presidents and Hamilton, another prominent Founder, played central roles in the resolution of critical constitutional questions. For over two centuries, courts have turned to their considered judgment when resolving disputes about the Constitution — even where they disagreed amongst themselves. These Founders, however, did not dispute the issue before this Court. Plaintiffs’ claim that the Presidential Emoluments Clause and Foreign Emoluments Clause prohibit the President from receiving “anything of value,” whether “monetary or nonmonetary,” from domestic or foreign governments. The words and deeds of Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Hamilton teach a different lesson. First, Plaintiffs’ understanding of the Presidential Emoluments Clause cannot be squared with the practices of George Washington, whose conduct helped to define the presidency. In 1793, our first President purchased several plots of government-owned land in the nation’s new capital at a public auction. The auction was managed by federal officers, widely publicized, and these valuable plots were acquired in broad daylight. If Plaintiffs are correct, then Washington openly committed impeachable offenses under the watchful eyes of prominent members of the Founding generation, political opponents, and commercial rivals. This Court should reject Plaintiffs’ novel construction, and instead adopt one consistent with this formative history: the prohibition on the President’s receipt of “emoluments” from domestic governments is limited to “compensation or pecuniary profit derived from a discharge of the duties of the office.” Financial gain arising from private business transactions are not emoluments. Second, Plaintiffs’ reading of the Foreign Emoluments Clause cannot account for the fact that our Founding-era presidents openly received diplomatic gifts from foreign governments. President Washington received a portrait of King Louis XVI from the French Ambassador to the United States. President Jefferson received a bust of Czar Alexander I. President Madison received two pistols from a revolutionary South American government. Congress’s consent was not sought for any of these gifts. If Plaintiffs are correct, three Presidents central to the American Founding openly committed impeachable offenses, or worse, were ignorant of the Constitution they helped draft and define. This Court should reject Plaintiffs’ argument, and instead follow the example set by these Presidents, as well as that illustrated by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton’s 1792 report to the Senate. His report lists all who hold office under the United States, but not the President, implying the latter is not subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Plaintiffs counter this body of evidence with statements from George Mason and Edmund Randolph, who argued during Virginia’s ratification convention that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to the President. This evidence is problematic, however, because under their view — that everyone in the federal government is an “officer” — members of Congress could be impeached. These idiosyncratic views were rejected by the Senate in 1799 following an impeachment trial, and that rejection was ratified by the Supreme Court a century later. Mason and Randolph’s office-related intentions ought not prevail over the understandings and public practices established by Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Hamilton, particularly where, as here, the views of the former have been considered and actively rejected. Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ recent publications also cite examples of antebellum Presidents who asked Congress to dispose of diplomatic gifts. This evidence is not persuasive. First, unlike the Washington-era evidence, which was contemporaneous with the Constitution’s ratification, Plaintiffs’ evidence occurred many decades after the Framing. Second, there is no evidence Presidents Jackson, Van Buren, and Tyler were aware of the practices of Washington, Jefferson, and Madison. Third, voluntary surrender by Jackson of disputed presidential powers to Congress is far less probative than Washington’s public refusal to seek consent and Congress’s acquiescence. When considering competing streams of historical precedent in the separation of powers context, courts favor precedents established via open defiance over mere surrender, even if willful. The most weighty historical evidence demonstrates that the Presidential Emoluments Clause only concerns compensation that is authorized by Congress or authorized by the states in regard to state positions, and that the Foreign Emoluments Clause is inapplicable to the President, because the President does not hold an office...under the United States. For these reasons, this Court should reject Plaintiffs’ attempt to redefine long-standing constitutional meaning to meet the purported demands of the moment.
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Dec 15, 2023
Matthieu Mensch 
Open Access
