Kind Of Mental Representation Research Articles

Stimulus-elicited involuntary autobiographical memories

The reflexive imagery task (RIT) has been used to investigate stimulus-elicited involuntary mental processes. The task has been successful in eliciting involuntary perceptual experiences, urges, and even higher-order cognitions, but it has never been used to elicit autobiographical memories, even though in everyday life these memories are often activated involuntarily by external stimuli. These memories are different in interesting ways from the kinds of mental representations that have been activated involuntarily in the RIT. The memories have properties which might make them insusceptible to such a form of external influence. Perhaps substantive effects will not arise because the mental representations associated with autobiographical memories are complex, poly-sensory, and rich in terms of content. To investigate this matter, we developed a variant of the RIT in which participants were presented with external stimuli (line drawings of everyday objects) and instructed not to recall any autobiographical memories. We investigated whether the nature of the involuntary memories was influenced by the nature of the stimulus. In two experiments, the involuntary memories were associated to the stimulus on a majority of the trials (∼80%). We discuss theoretical implications of this finding and of identifying the conditions in which such involuntary effects will not arise. The boundary conditions of the RIT effect illuminate the limits of unconscious processing and also the role of conscious processing in nervous function.

Values as the Essence of Culture

Recent findings of low societal consensus in cultural values suggest that our field’s dominant paradigm—culture as shared values—is a fallacy. The perennial persistence of this illusion may come from that it appeals to the human brain’s hardwired capacity for essentialism. Evidence against value consensus, however, does not doom all shared-meaning models of culture (pace Schwartz, 2013). I describe evidence for other kinds of mental representations (i.e., concepts, beliefs, norms) that are shared (in the sense of consensus, contagion, or conjoint control) and underlie culturally patterned behavior. Also I consider and probe Schwartz’s (2013) proposed definition of culture as a society-level value system, raising questions about its ontology, functionalism and explanatory power, particularly with regard to understanding cultural change. While acknowledging the utility of aggregated value scores for many research programs, I conclude that psychology needs to study individual-level cultural representations and within-society variation in order to understand the dynamics of cultural influence and change.

Eye Movements in the Processing of Visual Mental Imagery

Visual mental imagery is one kind of mental imagery.Whether mental imagery can be one special kind of mental representation and has its mental process or not is not only focal in imagery research but also is important in the cognitive psychology.The aim of the present study was to investigate the mental processing of mental rotation and visual imagery scanning through eye movements.Two experiments were conducted in the present study.There were 22 participants(11 males and 11 females)volunteered to take part in Experiment 1 and another 20 participants(10 males and 10 females)took part in Experiment 2.The Experiment 1 investigated whether mental rotation was based on mental image or abstract proposition with a 2(picture type:ichnography and mirror image)×8(rotation angle:0,45,90,135,180,225,270 and 315)within-subject design.In the Experiment 2,a 3(scanning distance:0cm,7cm,10.5cm)× 2(cognitive type:perception and imagery)within-subject design was conducted to examine whether imagery could also be scanned and whether the oculomotor behavior during imagery reenacted that which occurred when perceiving the object.In the Experiment 1,the results indicated that mental rotation time to recognize rotated pictures increased linearly with different angles of rotation,and the RT was the largest when the pictures rotated 180.Besides,the oculomotor measures had also similar mental rotation effects during the processing.Subjects need to spend more saccade duration,fixation time and more numbers of saccade as well as more numbers of fixation to identify objects when the pictures were rotated from 0 to 180.The results of Experiment 2 showed that imagery could also be scanned and eye scanpaths during imagery were similar to those during visual perception.That is,the time of scanning increased linearly with increases in distance during the imagery and perception phase.Moreover,regression analysis of the time and number of scanning supported the notion that the oculomotor behavior during imagery reenacted that which occurred when perceiving the object.The present study demonstrated that mental imagery could be one special kind of mental representation and had its mental process.The mental representation of imagery was mental image but not abstract proposition in some special conditions.

Spatial memory in the grey mouse lemur (Microcebus murinus).

Wild animals face the challenge of locating feeding sites distributed across broad spatial and temporal scales. Spatial memory allows animals to find a goal, such as a productive feeding patch, even when there are no goal-specific sensory cues available. Because there is little experimental information on learning and memory capabilities in free-ranging primates, the aim of this study was to test whether grey mouse lemurs (Microcebus murinus), as short-term dietary specialists, rely on spatial memory in relocating productive feeding sites. In addition, we asked what kind of spatial representation might underlie their orientation in their natural environment. Using an experimental approach, we set eight radio-collared grey mouse lemurs a memory task by confronting them with two different spatial patterns of baited and non-baited artificial feeding stations under exclusion of sensory cues. Positional data were recorded by focal animal observations within a grid system of small foot trails. A change in the baiting pattern revealed that grey mouse lemurs primarily used spatial cues to relocate baited feeding stations and that they were able to rapidly learn a new spatial arrangement. Spatially concentrated, non-random movements revealed preliminary evidence for a route-based restriction in mouse lemur space; during a subsequent release experiment, however, we found high travel efficiency in directed movements. We therefore propose that mouse lemur spatial memory is based on some kind of mental representation that is more detailed than a route-based network map.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s10071-009-0219-y) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Explaining frequency of verb morphology in early L2 speech

In speech, early L2 learners of English have been observed to supply forms of copula be more frequently than auxiliary be, and both more frequently than affixal regular past –ed and 3rd person singular present tense –s in contexts where morphological marking is required for native speakers. Early learners also use a construction not found in input: be + bare V (e.g. I’m read), allow constructions involving be to have a range of meanings not found in target English, and rarely overgeneralise –ed and –s to inappropriate contexts. The present study considers the kind of mental representation that L2 learners must have that would lead to the observed performance. A ‘nativist’ account is proposed. It is argued that the mental grammars of early L2 learners are organised in the same way as the grammars of native speakers, this following necessarily from the architecture of the language faculty. They differ minimally in the nature of their Vocabulary entries for verb morphology. This difference correlates with an early under-determination of syntactic representations where ‘uninterpretable’ syntactic features are absent from syntactic expressions. Evidence from a sentence completion task conducted with low proficiency speakers whose L1s are Chinese and Spanish is used to test this claim.

The acquired language of thought hypothesis

I present the symbol grounding problem in the larger context of a materialist theory of content and then present two problems for causal, teleo-functional accounts of content. This leads to a distinction between two kinds of mental representations: presentations and symbols; only the latter are cognitive. Based on Milner and Goodale’s dual route model of vision, I posit the existence of precise interfaces between cognitive systems that are activated during object recognition. Interfaces are constructed as a child learns, and is taught, how to interact with its environment; hence, interface structure has a social determinant essential for symbol grounding. Symbols are encoded in the brain to exploit these interfaces, by having projections to the interfaces that are activated by what they symbolise. I conclude by situating my proposal in the context of Harnad’s (1990) solution to the symbol grounding problem and responding to three standard objections.

Research in clinical reasoning: past history and current trends

Research in clinical reasoning has been conducted for over 30 years. Throughout this time there have been a number of identifiable trends in methodology and theory. This paper identifies three broad research traditions, ordered chronologically, are: (a) attempts to understand reasoning as a general skill--the "clinical reasoning" process; (b) research based on probes of memory--reasoning related to the amount of knowledge and memory; and (c) research related to different kinds of mental representations--semantic qualifiers, scripts, schemas and exemplars. Several broad themes emerge from this review. First, there is little evidence that reasoning can be characterised in terms of general process variables. Secondly, it is evident that expertise is associated, not with a single basic representation but with multiple coordinated representations in memory, from causal mechanisms to prior examples. Different representations may be utilised in different circumstances, but little is known about the characteristics of a particular situation that led to a change in strategy. It becomes evident that expertise lies in the availability of multiple representations of knowledge. Perhaps the most critical aspect of learning is not the acquisition of a particular strategy or skill, nor is it the availability of a particular kind of knowledge. Rather, the critical element may be deliberate practice with multiple examples which, on the hand, facilitates the availability of concepts and conceptual knowledge (i.e. transfer) and, on the other hand, adds to a storehouse of already solved problems.

Naming and Believing: Practices of the Proper Name in Narrative Fiction

1.1 The power of discourse to construct realities is widely asserted in contemporary literary theory. But what exactly is this power? Surely it is only the divine word which can call into existence a mind-independent, external reality which we can all experience in our common life world! The constructive power of discourse in purely human circumstances is much more modest, and could be characterized as the ability to give rise to mental (cognitive) representations, discourse domains, or belief worlds in the minds of individuals, or to belief worlds shared by members of a group. Such discourse domains may be construed as worlds of the mind, which may or may not correspond to any external, intersubjective reality. Semiotic means of some kind (sounds, letters, words, phrases, sketches, etc.) serve in all such cases as both initiators and underpinnings of the resultant mental representation. One particular kind of mental representation or discourse domain consists of spatio-temporal frameworks containing both individual entities with their properties and relations and dynamic situations, that is, changing configurations of the relations between these entities. Such dynamic frameworks are the cognitive correlate of the narrative discourse type, be it factual or fictional. For it is not the semiotic or cognitive dimension as such that distinguishes the factual from the fictional, but rather the correspondence, or lack thereof, between a mental representation and an external situation. The power of discourse to give rise to a cognitive domain is most evident when we have access to the mental operations through which this domain gets established and subsequently modified, and when these operations occur in a well-defined and well-circumscribed [End Page 107] setting. This power is enhanced if the given discourse is the only currently available source of information for the corresponding cognitive domain construction, and it is maximal when the discourse is the only possible source of information about a given domain—namely, when we are dealing with a pure verbal invention, with a world whose very (mental) existence depends crucially and exclusively on a specific semiotic object (discourse, picture, film, etc.). This dependency is of the same nature whether the pragmatic status of the discourse is that of a lie or of a creative artistic invention. The difference between the two will manifest itself rather in the different behavioral disposition the cognitive frame evokes in the individual in whose mind it exists, once she has assigned, at least pro tempore, a pragmatic status to the corresponding discourse.

Mental models – reaching in the dark?

Exploring the nature of our mental representations has been an important theme in cognitive science. Within developmental psychology, there is an ongoing debate about when infants develop the ability to create proper mental representations. McCall and Clifton1xInfants’ means-end search for hidden objects in the absence of visual feedback. McCall, D.D. and Clifton, R.K. Infant Behav. Dev. 1999; 22: 179–195Crossref | Scopus (13)See all References1 investigated this issue using a reaching-in-the-dark procedure based on previous work from their laboratory. In this experiment, eight-month-old infants saw (with the room lights on) an object placed behind a door. Then the lights went out and the infants’ behavior was monitored with an infra-red camera. The babies could still localize the object in the dark from a sound cue, as it made a rattling sound. Behavior on these dark trials was compared with the infants’ behavior when the lights stayed on. The important questions were, would infants reach for the object in the dark, and if so, how would their reaching behavior differ from reaching in the light? Formally, the task was a rather difficult one: infants had to engage in ‘means-end planning’ (i.e. opening the door to get the object) from memory. In the dark trials, infants could not use their visual perception of the world to achieve the end – they had to use some kind of mental representation to complete the task. Results showed an overall decrement in task performance from light to dark trials, although infants made a substantial amount of reaching in the dark. Moreover, the dark reaching was qualitatively the same as the light reaching in terms of accuracy of reach, number of reaches, and the latency of reaches. These data support the idea that infants as young as eight months are capable of creating mental representations substantial enough to support a reasoning chain without the benefit of visual feedback. Further research of this sort should provide more detail about the development of mental models in infancy.

The kinds of mental representations‐‐models, propositions and images‐‐used by college physics students regarding the concept of field

Our objective was to investigate at what level of mental representation college students operate regarding the physical concept of field, particularly in the domain of electromagnetism, when solving problems and questions. Our theoretical basis lies in Johnson‐Laird's theory of mental representations, according to which there are at least three major kinds of such representations: mental models, propositions and images. Some 50 sophomore engineering students were observed during two semesters regarding the level of mental representations they used when solving problems and questions proposed as instructional tasks. Research findings suggest that students work mostly with propositions not related or interpreted with respect to mental models.

Task-dependent construction of mental models as a basis for conceptual change

Learning can be seen as a task-oriented process which often requires the reorganization of existing knowledge, usually referred to as conceptual change. This paper describes a theoretical framework for the analysis of conceptual change that considers conceptual knowledge as a generative cognitive tool for the creation of more specific mental representations — propositional symbolic structures and analog mental models. According to this view, conceptual change is based on a task-oriented interaction between these different kinds of mental representations. The assumption is made that it is possible to foster conceptual change by presenting to students well-defined tasks that stimulate the construction of elaborated mental models as well as an intensive interaction between these models and the corresponding propositional representations. In order to test this assumption an empirical study was conducted, in which subjects had to express their prior knowledge about a complex subject matter from the field of geography (time differences on the earth), which contained various conceptual deficits. The subjects were then randomly assigned to different groups who received the same learning material but had to solve different learning tasks requiring differently structured mental models. Afterwards, the subjects were asked to express their knowledge about the subject matter again and were tested for understanding with a comprehension test. The results support the view that a task-oriented interaction between propositional structures and mental models can help learners to evaluate the consistency of their conceptual knowledge. Accordingly, conceptual deficits result in the formation of mental models with an inadequate structure. Such deficits can be detected if the respective model is used in a sufficiently variable way, whereas they can remain unnoticed if it is used in a limited manner.

Thoughts and Belief Ascriptions*

Mind & LanguageVolume 2, Issue 4 p. 301-325 Thoughts and Belief Ascriptions* PIERRE JACOB, PIERRE JACOB Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UA1484, Séminaire d'épistemologie comparative, Institut de Philosophie, Université de Provence, 29 Avenue Robert Schumann, 13100 Aix-en-Provence, FranceSearch for more papers by this author PIERRE JACOB, PIERRE JACOB Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UA1484, Séminaire d'épistemologie comparative, Institut de Philosophie, Université de Provence, 29 Avenue Robert Schumann, 13100 Aix-en-Provence, FranceSearch for more papers by this author First published: December 1987 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1987.tb00124.xCitations: 7 * I am grateful to Dick Carter, Bo Dahlbom, François Recanati and Dan Sperber who commented on earlier drafts of this paper. I am grateful to Pascal Engel, Dag Prawitz, Radu Bogdan and Paul Horwich for giving me an opportunity to present to audiences at the Séminaire de philosophie de l'esprit in Paris, in the Philosophy Departments of the University of Stockholm, of Tulane University, and the Philosophy of Psychology group at MIT, an ancestor of this paper. I learnt a lot from the numerous reactions. AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume2, Issue4December 1987Pages 301-325 RelatedInformation