Kind Of Explanation Research Articles

(Conceptual) explanations in logic

Abstract To explain phenomena in the world is a central human activity and one of the main goals of rational inquiry. There are several types of explanation: one can explain by drawing an analogy, as one can explain by dwelling on the causes (see e.g. see [Woodward (2004, Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford University Press, Oxford)]. Amongst these different kinds of explanation, in the last decade, philosophers have become receptive to those explanations that explain by providing the reasons (or the grounds) why a statement is true; these explanations are often called conceptual explanations (e.g. see [Betti (2010, Explanation in metaphysics and Bolzano's theory of ground and consequence. Logique et analyse, 211:281316)]). The main aim of the paper is to propose a logical account of conceptual explanations. We will do so by using the resources of proof theory, in particular sequent rules analogous to deep inferences ([e.g. see Brunnler (2004, Deep Inference and Symmetry in Classical Proofs. Logoc Verlag)]). The results we provide not only shed light on conceptual explanations themselves, but also on the role that logic and logical tools might play in the burgeoning field of inquiry concerning explanations. Indeed, we conclude the paper by underlining interesting links between the present research and some other existing works on explanations and logic that have arise in recent years, e.g. see [Arieli et al. (2022, Explainable logic-based argumentation. Computational Models of Argument, 353:3243); Darwiche and Hirth (2023, On the (complete) reasons behind decisions. Journal of Logic Language and Information, 32:6388); Piazza, Pulcini, and Sabatini (2023, Abduction as deductive saturation: a proof-theoretic inquiry. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 52:15751602)]. For here it is for the empirical scientist to know the fact and for the mathematical to know the reason why (our emphasis) [Aristotle (1993, Posterior Analytics. Oxford University Press, Oxford)].

Two faces of control for moral responsibility

Control is typically accepted as a necessary condition for moral responsibility. Thus, humans are morally responsible for their actions only if we can realise the right kind of control. Are there good reasons to think that humans can psychologically realise control? This paper is an attempt to address this question by establishing choice and agenthood as separate but interconnected aspects of control. I consider two challenges to the claim that humans can realise the kind of control required for moral responsibility. First, an empirical challenge from cognitive neuroscience provides a familiar way to argue against the realisation of the choice aspect by human psychology. Second, a more formidable conceptual challenge to the aspect of agenthood presents us with scepticism about the kind of explanations that psychology can provide. The second challenge suggests that, in psychological accounts of choice, the agent disappears. Drawing on recent empirical models of cognitive control and philosophical accounts of agency, I conclude that the psychological explanation of choice is consistent with the aspect of agenthood being realised by human psychology.

Philosophical strategies for nature of science based on worldviews: The quantum interference of single electron

This study aims to present a strategy to transform the worldviews of students, especially college science classrooms, into desirable current worldviews (Darwin, Quantum mechanics, Einstein, refer to Fig 1). Above all, the worldviews, that is metaphysical belief, needs to be changed. This is because metaphysical belief is the basis for the whole framework of conception. Since the previous study emphasized epistemological belief only, an emphasis was placed on metaphysical belief on which epistemological belief is based. Therefore, the two beliefs should be used to elucidate in the education of Nature of Science. Metaphysical belief in the science of cosmic order, symmetry, or disorder is often important in scientific research and can lead to an epistemological view that can select or reject a certain kind of explanation. Specially, the two-slit experiment with single electrons is a radical illustration of another paradigm shift, from classical (mechanistic materialism) to quantum physics (desirable dialectical materialism). The double slit electron experiment creates sensuous images that can be grasped at once. Because quantum mechanics is inherently abstract, it is difficult to accept its meaning.

Biology, Society, or Choice: How Do Non-Experts Interpret Explanations of Behaviour?

Explanations for human behaviour can be framed in many different ways, from the social-structural context to the individual motivation down to the neurobiological implementation. We know comparatively little about how people interpret these explanatory framings, and what they infer when one kind of explanation rather than another is made salient. In four experiments, UK general-population volunteers read vignettes describing the same behaviour, but providing explanations framed in different ways. In Study 1, we found that participants grouped explanations into 'biological', 'psychological' and 'sociocultural' clusters. Explanations with different framings were often seen as incompatible with one another, especially when one belonged to the 'biological' cluster and the other did not. In Study 2, we found that exposure to a particular explanatory framing triggered inferences beyond the information given. Specifically, psychological explanations led participants to assume the behaviour was malleable, and biological framings led them to assume it was not. In Studies 3A and 3B, we found that the choice of explanatory framing can affect people's assumptions about effective interventions. For example, presenting a biological explanation increased people's conviction that interventions like drugs would be effective, and decreased their conviction that psychological or socio-political interventions would be effective. These results illuminate the intuitive psychology of explanations, and also potential pitfalls in scientific communication. Framing an explanation in a particular way will often generate inferences in the audience-about what other factors are not causally important, how easy it is to change the behaviour, and what kinds of remedies are worth considering-that the communicator may not have anticipated and might not intend.

A victory (of what sort) for strict purist invariantism? Some reflections on Gerken’s On folk epistemology: how we think and talk about knowledge

ABSTRACT Gerken's On Folk Epistemology: How we think and talk about knowledge develops and defends strict purist invariantism about knowledge. Along the way, Gerken argues that less-orthodox competitors to strict purist invariantism are plagued by certain heretofore unrecognized or underappreciated difficulties. Given Gerken's own explicit methodological commitments, this defensive component of the book's project is dialectically crucial. By Gerken's own lights, we ought to be persuaded to embrace strict purist invariantism only if it turns out that the strict purist invariantist is better positioned than their competitors to explain the folk epistemological “inputs” to epistemic theorizing. My own goal here is to articulate some reasons to worry that Gerken's defensive efforts are less-than-fully successful. In particular, I argue that we ought to adopt a more expansive and more nuanced conception of the relevant folk epistemological “inputs.” Moreover, I suggest that, at least insofar as we have reason to embrace a kind of qualified methodological preference for theoretical explanations that vindicate our ordinary epistemic practice, we might well have good reason for favoring (certain of) the alternate theoretical explanations of these inputs that less-orthodox views of knowledge supply over the kind of explanations that Gerken convincingly argues strict purist invariantism can offer.

The Will to Nothingness: An Essay on Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality

<i>The Will to Nothingness: An Essay on Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality</i>

Multidimensionalism, Resistance, and The Demographic Problem

Linda Martín Alcoff and others have emphasised that the discipline of philosophy suffers from a ‘demographic problem’. The persistence of this problem is partly the consequence of various forms of resistance to efforts to address the demographic problem. Such resistance is complex and takes many forms and could be responded to in different ways. In this paper, I argue that our attempts to explain and understand the phenomenon of resistance should use a kind of explanatory pluralism that, following Quassim Cassam, I call multidimensionalism. I describe four general kinds of resistance and consider varying explanations, focusing on those focused on vices and social structures. I argue that vice-explanations and structural- explanations are both mutually consistent and mutually entailing. If so, there is no need to choose between vice explanations and structural explanations or any other kinds of explanation. We can and should be multidimensionalists: using many together is better.

A need to be recognised: On the importance of shared semantics for young adults while not in education or employment

Young adults who are not in education or work are often depicted as deviating from the norm of gainful employment that is still widely shared across the Nordic countries. While it has been argued that young adults feel that they are being blamed for their NEET situation, this article seeks to identify the variety of interpretations they have of their situation and what kind of explanations can be proposed for the differences. Theoretically, perspectives from Axel Honneth's recognition theory are combined with Thomas Scheff's sociological work on shame to discuss the variations in the sentiments of young adults. Based on this framework, the article illuminates how young adults use the shared semantics available within their immediate circles to enable them to feel worthy of recognition despite their depicted deviation from the norm of gainful employment. Additionally, the article contributes to sociological debates on Honneth's recognition theory – especially its ambiguous concept of shared semantics – by making sense of the role of communities and institutions as providers of shared semantics. The findings are based on an abductive analysis of 35 in-depth interviews with young Finnish adults aged 18–29 who have been or are currently outside of education or employment.

Modeling and Analysis of Explanation for Secure Industrial Control Systems

Many self-adaptive systems benefit from human involvement and oversight, where a human operator can provide expertise not available to the system and detect problems that the system is unaware of. One way of achieving this synergy is by placing the human operator on the loop —i.e., providing supervisory oversight and intervening in the case of questionable adaptation decisions. To make such interaction effective, an explanation can play an important role in allowing the human operator to understand why the system is making certain decisions and improve the level of knowledge that the operator has about the system. This, in turn, may improve the operator’s capability to intervene and, if necessary, override the decisions being made by the system. However, explanations may incur costs, in terms of delay in actions and the possibility that a human may make a bad judgment. Hence, it is not always obvious whether an explanation will improve overall utility and, if so, then what kind of explanation should be provided to the operator. In this work, we define a formal framework for reasoning about explanations of adaptive system behaviors and the conditions under which they are warranted. Specifically, we characterize explanations in terms of explanation content , effect , and cost . We then present a dynamic system adaptation approach that leverages a probabilistic reasoning technique to determine when an explanation should be used to improve overall system utility. We evaluate our explanation framework in the context of a realistic industrial control system with adaptive behaviors.

When Self-Driving Fails: Evaluating Social Media Posts Regarding Problems and Misconceptions about Tesla’s FSD Mode

With the recent deployment of the latest generation of Tesla’s Full Self-Driving (FSD) mode, consumers are using semi-autonomous vehicles in both highway and residential driving for the first time. As a result, drivers are facing complex and unanticipated situations with an unproven technology, which is a central challenge for cooperative cognition. One way to support cooperative cognition in such situations is to inform and educate the user about potential limitations. Because these limitations are not always easily discovered, users have turned to the internet and social media to document their experiences, seek answers to questions they have, provide advice on features to others, and assist other drivers with less FSD experience. In this paper, we explore a novel approach to supporting cooperative cognition: Using social media posts can help characterize the limitations of the automation in order to get information about the limitations of the system and explanations and workarounds for how to deal with these limitations. Ultimately, our goal is to determine the kinds of problems being reported via social media that might be useful in helping users anticipate and develop a better mental model of an AI system that they rely on. To do so, we examine a corpus of social media posts about FSD problems to identify (1) the typical problems reported, (2) the kinds of explanations or answers provided by users, and (3) the feasibility of using such user-generated information to provide training and assistance for new drivers. The results reveal a number of limitations of the FSD system (e.g., lane-keeping and phantom braking) that may be anticipated by drivers, enabling them to predict and avoid the problems, thus allowing better mental models of the system and supporting cooperative cognition of the human-AI system in more situations.

"You can be a behaviorist and still talk about the mind - as long as you don't put it into a person's head": An interview with Howard Rachlin1.

"You can be a behaviorist and still talk about the mind - as long as you don't put it into a person's head": An interview with Howard Rachlin1.

Renormalization group methods: Which kind of explanation?

Renormalization and Renormalization Group (RG) have proven to be very powerful tools in contemporary physics, with a decisive influence on how to conceive of key physical aspects, including theories themselves. While they can be tackled from a variety of standpoints, this paper focuses on a specific philosophical issue, that is, which kind of explanation can be provided by means of RG methods. After a short, historical overview to set out the physical context, we scrutinize recent debates on the topic, with a particular focus on Morrison's seminal work. With respect to her account, where RG explanation is portrayed as mathematical, non-reductive, and non-causal, our focus is on the first aspect. Our claim is that RG theory's explanatory role cannot reside exclusively in its mathematical character, independently from a physical interpretation: mathematical and physical features intersect in a highly non-trivial way to provide an explanation of physical phenomena.

Lower Class People as Shown by Naladiyar

People are living in a society where they are not getting any of the basic necessities of life and are struggling to fulfil those basic needs every day. So the economy is the biggest problem in their lives. And in terms of the economy, such people have to depend on the people at the top of society. The above reasons push such people to the status of base people. And even though economically backward people are called lower class people, such people can definitely recover from it and make efforts to raise their economy. But the question arises whether it is possible to live dependent on those at the top based on the economy, listen to the rhetoric of inferiority, and then acquire the rhetoric of superiority. It is also worth noting that people in such a situation have been recorded in association with their caste from early to modern literature. Although the so-called lower class people are said to go to the lowest level due to many factors, efforts can be made to recover from them and move to the top. But if we push them to the bottom with the rhetoric of cashless caste, we should also think about how they can rise above. As a result of thinking like that, this research has been carried out in order to find answers to questions like: what kind of explanation does the book Naladiyar give to the sayings of lower class people, and what is the basis of the distinction between superior and inferior?

Exploiting auto-encoders for explaining black-box classifiers

Recent years have witnessed the rise of accurate but obscure classification models that hide the logic of their internal decision processes. In this paper, we present a framework to locally explain any type of black-box classifiers working on any data type through a rule-based model. In the literature already exists local explanation approaches able to accomplish this task. However, they suffer from a significant limitation that implies representing data as a binary vectors and constraining the local surrogate model to be trained on synthetic instances that are not representative of the real world. We overcome these deficiencies by using autoencoder-based approaches. The proposed framework first allows to generate synthetic instances in the latent feature space and learn a latent decision tree classifier. After that, it selects and decodes the synthetic instances respecting local decision rules. Independently from the data type under analysis, such synthetic instances belonging to different classes can unveil the reasons for the classification. Also, depending on the data type, they can be exploited to provide the most useful kind of explanation. Experiments show that the proposed framework advances the state-of-the-art towards a comprehensive and widely usable approach that is able to successfully guarantee various properties besides interpretability.

Tractable Explanations for d-DNNF Classifiers

Compilation into propositional languages finds a growing number of practical uses, including in constraint programming, diagnosis and machine learning (ML), among others. One concrete example is the use of propositional languages as classifiers, and one natural question is how to explain the predictions made. This paper shows that for classifiers represented with some of the best-known propositional languages, different kinds of explanations can be computed in polynomial time. These languages include deterministic decomposable negation normal form (d-DNNF), and so any propositional language that is strictly less succinct than d-DNNF. Furthermore, the paper describes optimizations, specific to Sentential Decision Diagrams (SDDs), which are shown to yield more efficient algorithms in practice.

Micro-level model explanation and counterfactual constraint

Relationships of counterfactual dependence have played a major role in recent debates of explanation and understanding in the philosophy of science. Usually, counterfactual dependencies have been viewed as the explanantia of explanation, i.e., the things providing explanation and understanding. Sometimes, however, counterfactual dependencies are themselves the targets of explanations in science. These kinds of explanations are the focus of this paper. I argue that “micro-level model explanations” explain the particular form of the empirical regularity underlying a counterfactual dependency by representing it as a physical necessity on the basis of postulated microscopic entities. By doing so, micro-level models rule out possible forms the regularity (and the associated counterfactual) could have taken. Micro-model explanations, in other words, constrain empirical regularities and their associated counterfactual dependencies. I introduce and illustrate micro-level model explanations in detail, contrast them to other accounts of explanation, and consider potential problems.

Two kinds of historical explanation in Evolutionary Biology

Historical explanations in evolutionary biology are commonly characterized as narrative explanations. Examples include explanations of the evolution of particular traits and explanations of macroevolutionary transitions. In this paper I present two case studies of explanations in accounts of pathogen evolution and host-pathogen coevolution, respectively, and argue that one of them is captured well by established accounts of time-sequenced narrative explanation. The other one differs from narrative explanations in important respects, even though it shares some characteristics with them as it is also a population-level historical explanation. I thus argue that the second case represents a different kind of explanation that I call historical explanation of type phenomena. The main difference between the two kinds of explanation is the conceptualization of the explanandum phenomena as particulars or type phenomena, respectively. Narrative explanations explain particulars but also deal with generalization, regularities and type phenomena. Historical explanations of type phenomena, on the other hand, explain multiply realizable phenomena but also deal with particulars. The two kinds of explanation complement each other because they explain different aspects of evolution.

The Philosophical Advantages of Whitehead's Physics: Explanation as Primary

Abstract A. N. Whitehead's approach to physical theorizing contrasts with that of mainstream or official (modern) physics in being centrally concerned with articulating a background explanation of physical facts and phenomena in general that would take the place of the “ether” of classical physics, a project otherwise unpursued by the science in its modern period (though luminaries in the field have occasionally hinted at reviving this kind of explanation under certain constraints). Unlike Einstein's, Whitehead's approach to relativity primarily seeks explanation rather than utility (in formulating laws); also, it avoids the philosophical problems with Einstein's theory alleged by Whitehead and a range of other philosophers. This stops short of a finding as to the comparative worth of Whitehead's alternative basis for quantitative formulations.

What Explains the Electoral Crisis of Social Democracy? A Systematic Review of the Literature

AbstractWhile there are some signs of revitalization, social democracy has witnessed a deep electoral crisis over the last decades. The causes for the decline of social democratic parties are highly contested among researchers. This article provides a systematic review of the literature which spans several fields such as party politics, political sociology and political economy. Four kinds of explanations (sociological, materialist, ideational and institutional) are distinguished and scrutinized on the basis of empirical studies published since 2010. The findings indicate that there is not one explanation that stands out but that the electoral crisis of social democracy is a complex phenomenon with multiple causes, such as socio-structural changes, fiscal austerity and neoliberal depolarization. In addition, the findings suggest that a liberal turn on sociocultural issues does not necessarily lead to vote losses. Further research should explore more deeply how short-term and long-term factors have worked together in the process of social democratic decline.

Values of the managers within their environments

Values are the base for understanding attitudes, perception, personality and motivation of individuals affecting their behavior. The system of values determines individual’s priority in accordance with their relative importance.&#x0D; We should consider that the individual tends through his/her life to keep and to preserve the values acquired from his/her early age. It is about attitudes to values of what is right and what isn’t, what is moral and what isn’t. The attitudes of values are tightly related to the age, or to the period of individual’s growing and his/her creation as a person.&#x0D; This could be a kind of explanation why older generations of employees have different attitude to proper working than the younger generations. All of this could be of help for the managers to be able to predict the attitudes of values according to the age, and these attitudes shall be mainly focused to the way of working. They should also be able to direct these attitudes to more general issues related to the company’s working acquiring support from their employees. Unless the managers fail to implement this in their daily work, the undertaken activities will not be favorable.&#x0D; The system of values for managers is comprised by their personal values, some of them acquired and some of them could be from birth and he tends to obey them. Personal values determine the person himself, his/her capacity, characteristics, moral and authority. The values, throughout the system of values, could describe anything that the mangers are trying to achieve through their work and their attitude of behavior at work.