March/April 2008 Historically Speaking 41 not kindness. (One might point out that surrender was not an option to Europe'sJews when facing the Nazis, yet anodier factor putting their plight in a separate category.) Nor did Allied airpower intentionally target the helpless (although the idea was considered by the 9th Air Force in 1945 in Europe.) We can mock the concept of "collateral damage," but it was taken most seriously at the time as a byproduct of the destruction of industrial areas in cities. Allied governments accepted the killing of civilians for military purposes because their leaders believed that the lives of their citizens were worth more than those of their enemies. From Washington 's point of view, did it really matter if the invasion of Kyushuwould have cost "only" 20,000 American lives if these same lives possibly could be saved by killing 120,000Japanese at Hiroshima and Nagasaki? The answer was quite the contrary. Indeed, the Western Allied military apparatus was designed to generate huge amounts of firepower at every level to kill the enemy. There was no moral quandary if fewer of "us" died relative to "them." Had Bess wanted to get aggressive, he might have inquiredwhether Western air forces were justified in killing diousands of French and Italian civilians. It is very possible that more of them died from Allied bombs than British perished from German bombs. De Gaulle knew this, and never raised a protest. I find it almost incomprehensible that anyone would claim to discover moral ambiguity in World War II. As Herodotus reminds us, war is unnatural because fathers bury their sons. World War II was an obscene bloodbath that poisoned the hearts of everyone involved. The degradation of civilized life was all too obvious from one end of the northern hemisphere to the other. And it is a credit to die civilized nations of the Earth that many grew to regret both the pain inflicted on the vanquished and die means used to inflict that pain. This was particularly true as time began to blur the moral calamity that overcame the world during die war. In Samson's famous article in 1946 explaining the use of the atomic bomb, it is very clear that the wise old man knew, above all, that some of his countrymen would forget what the world looked like in 1945 and how people acted in 1945. I wish more historians of today understood Stimson's point. The general public in the West, however, does not seem to suffer any major ethical quandary concerning the war. The gut-wrenching argument that Bess sees inside the West concerning the conduct of World War II exists, in my view, between a small number of people in academics against the vast bulk of the population who may regret the violence of the war but do not question for a minute its necessity . Machiavelli, criticized by Bess, was quite right when describing a necessary war as a just war. If World War II was not necessary, no war has been. Eric Bergerudisprofessorof history atLincoln University . He is the authorof Fire in the Sky: The Air War in the South Pacific (Westview Press, 1999) andseveralother books about World WarII and the Vietnam War. Comments on Choices Under Fire Michael Kort In Choices UnderFire Michael Bess critiques key Allied decisions during World War II, offering assessments of what he sees as their moral complexities. The book has received extensive attention and favorable commentary because Bess is scrupulously fair-minded and judicious in examining the complicated evidence and conflicting arguments pertaining to these issues. He will make almost anyone who reads his book with an open mind consider at least a few of the choices he discusses in a new light, regardless of whether one ultimately agrees with him or not. It is appropriate that the longest chapter in Choices Under Fire concerns the most controversial American act of the war, the use of the atomic bomb against Japan in August 1945. Bess is convincingwhen he adheres to two standards that he accepts as essential in judging the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The first is the need to keep in mind that the...
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