Khan Network Research Articles

Antagonistic recursivities and successive cover-ups: the case of private nuclear proliferation.

"Legal recursivity" is a concept introduced by socio-legal scholars to capture the progressive elaboration of transnational rules through policy linkages at the international and domestic levels, and the associated jurisdictional expansion of international institutions to new policy areas. Recursivity can take many forms, and this article introduces the concept of "antagonistic recursivity" to capture a dual process of recursive legal innovation and antagonistic obstruction by the same policy actors. The article shows how such antagonistic recursivity worked in the case of the global fight against private nuclear proliferators after the 2003 revelations about the reach of the A. Q. Khan network. In the case under study, antagonistic recursivities took the form of executive-driven innovation in rule-making and simultaneous subversion of the same rules by the executive most implicated in the new cycle of policy innovation: the United States government. This paradox can be explained in the following manner. Antagonistic recursivity, the article demonstrates, is likely to emerge when legal rules of global governance have already been previously defined in an opaque manner, so as to help hegemons follow multiple foreign policy goals: the subversion of the most recent policy innovations is then the unfortunate result of attempts to hide prior cover-ups rather than a purposeful violation of new rules.

A.Q. Khan Nuclear Smuggling Network

Abdul Qadeer Khan, widely viewed as the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, was arrested on January 31, 2004 for his key role in the black market sale of nuclear technology and equipment to Iran, North Korea, Libya, and possibly others. A.Q. Khan’s nuclear smuggling network prospered throughout the 1980s and 1990s and was linked to middlemen and businesses in over 20 countries. The network offered buyers a menu of both technical expertise and materials with prices ranging from millions to hundreds of millions of dollars. The Khan network was ultimately exposed largely due to years of intelligence gathering by the United States and the United Kingdom. However, very few of the network’s members have been successfully prosecuted and the demand for nuclear material by both state and non-state actors continues. The exposure of Khan’s network confirmed that a non-state actor could procure and sell a turnkey nuclear weapons program to willing buyers.

Sourcing the Mail Order Bomb: The Evolution of the A. Q. Khan Network and Its Implications

The Khan network provided nuclear technology and assistance to at least four state nuclear programs over the course of three decades. This network was neither static nor a singular entity. Rather, it was a loose collection of actors whose methods evolved in response to a changing world. By the late 1990s, the Khan network was relying on ever increasing levels of subterfuge to procure machine tools from the West while cultivating new locales for the manufacture of centrifuge parts. The trajectory of the network's procurement methods suggests that current supply-side controls are not adequate to block a determined state proliferator.

Intelligence and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Programs: The Achilles Heel

Intelligence is a critical component for all counter-proliferation activities. It allows us to assess and determine what makes up the current threat environment in terms of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. When informed with an accurate assessment of the situation, policy-makers are better suited to counter the proliferation threat. However, success and failure hinge upon how well information is managed during the intelligence process. The intelligence process as it relates to estimating nuclear capabilities or intentions is wrought with many challenges and complications. The denial and deception techniques employed by states running covert weapons programs and the dual-use nature of many weapons components create many difficulties for intelligence organizations. Additionally, illicit transnational networks obscure the situation further by serving as a source, for both nation states and non-state actors, for acquiring dual-use commodities and technologies. These challenges can lead to the miscalculation of a state's capabilities or intentions, as witnessed with the case of Iraq in 2003 when western intelligence services grossly overestimated the capabilities of Saddam's regime. This paper presents a comparative analysis of three cases of nuclear proliferation: India's 1998 nuclear tests, the exposure of the A. Q. Khan network and Iran's nuclear program. Drawing from the analysis, the authors examine the lessons learned and propose recommendations for future counter proliferation policy and strategy.

New paradigms, old hierarchies? Problems and possibilities of US supremacy in a networked world

As Obama took office at the beginning of 2009, several new figures attained important advisory positions in his administration. Anne-Marie Slaughter, former Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, and now Director of Policy Planning in the State Department, is a prime example of the ‘change’ that has come to Washington. In recent years she has been part of a growing academic circle that views networks at the centre of international relations. At the same time, she has promoted the idea that the United States can be ‘the most connected country’ in such a world. By taking a closer look into the discourse of US supremacy and the current state-of-the-art in the theory of transnational networks, this article reveals the divergence between wishful thinking and reality in Slaughter’s position. By analysing her position and introducing three case studies, we conclude that the complexity of power relations in a world of networks makes any assumption of US supremacy highly problematic. Some might ‘mirror’ the beliefs and values of America (Open Society Institute); some might only be a ‘prism’ of various different voices (Al-Jazeera); and some might fall totally outside state control to form ‘shadow networks’ (Khan Network). Ultimately, it is the belief in US exceptionalism that perpetuates the claim that the United States has ‘an edge’ in such a world, with potentially problematic consequences.

The Danger of Nuclear Terrorism: The Indian Case

The concept of nuclear terrorism is possibly the least understood of all dangers emanating from nuclear weapons. However, certain drivers like the nuclear black market (the AQ Khan Network), proliferation of nuclear technology, and the increasing demand for nuclear energy can make it easier for terrorist organizations like Al Qaida to acquire fissile material. The threat of nuclear terrorism cannot be ignored any longer. Nuclear terrorism is a plausible phenomenon that deserves adequate consideration, substantial countermeasures, expertise, and competence to combat it.

Khan Networks: Eyes Wide Shut

Corera Gordon. Shopping for Bombs. Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network. Oxford University Press, 2006, 288 p. Reviewed by Vladimir Orlov

Where is the justice?

“We busted the A. Q. Khan network,” President George W. Bush declared in 2004. Yet, two years later, most of Khan's accomplices remain free. And Henk Slebos, one of Khan's key European operatives, ...

ANTICIPATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Good intelligence is critical to support U.S. policy efforts to counter nuclear proliferation, but the historical record is mixed. This article reviews several past cases of nonproliferation success and failure, including the Soviet Union, China, India, Libya, Iraq, and the A. Q. Khan network. Intelligence frequently provides warning, and in some cases concrete and timely information has enabled nonproliferation successes. On the other hand, failures often result from a lack of detailed and specific information adequate to overturn erroneous assumptions or preconceptions. Improvements in intelligence are needed, but correct assessments of foreign programs cannot be guaranteed. A close and healthy relationship between intelligence analysts and policymakers is also a key factor in making the most of insights that are developed.

Closure of the Pakistan-Based A. Q. Khan Network Case: A Hasty Burial?

North Korea's and Iran's showdown with the US and the West on the nuclear proliferation issue are closely related to their dubious proliferation connections with the Pakistan-based A Q Khan network. Yet, Pakistan has announced that the case against Khan and his proliferation cohorts is closed. To comprehensively understand the non-proliferation challenges, it is crucial that the details about the network's operations as also about Khan's associates as well as their benefactors are publicly revealed. Islamabad's recent decision to bury Khan's linkages leaves under wraps the disturbing dimensions of the scope of complicity of Pakistan's state agencies in Khan-led illegal transfers. In addition, many questions remain unanswered about the involvement of non-state actors in the Khan network internationally, including those in Europe and elsewhere.

Chapter four: Dismantlement

For over three decades, driven by the core motive of deterring external threats to its security, Libya sought to acquire nuclear weapons. Having attempted but failed to procure them ‘off the shelf’ from several states during the 1970s, by late 2003 it had succeeded in assembling much of the technology required to manufacture them. Nevertheless, following secret negotiations with the UK and US governments, in December 2003 Colonel Muammar Gadhafi resolved to abandon the pursuit of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This decision reflected the regime's radically altered security perceptions during the 1990s and early twenty-first century. The pursuit of nuclear weapons had come to be viewed as a strategic liability. This Adelphi Paper examines the motives for Libya's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi's rise to power in 1969 through to late 2003. It assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance and, subsequently, its reliance on the A.Q. Khan network. It examines the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the regime's calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage with the international community and the United States in particular. The process of dismantling the nuclear programme is also addressed, as is the question of whether Libya constitutes a ‘model’ for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.

Introduction

For over three decades, driven by the core motive of deterring external threats to its security, Libya sought to acquire nuclear weapons. Having attempted but failed to procure them ‘off the shelf’ from several states during the 1970s, by late 2003 it had succeeded in assembling much of the technology required to manufacture them. Nevertheless, following secret negotiations with the UK and US governments, in December 2003 Colonel Muammar Gadhafi resolved to abandon the pursuit of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This decision reflected the regime's radically altered security perceptions during the 1990s and early twenty-first century. The pursuit of nuclear weapons had come to be viewed as a strategic liability. This Adelphi Paper examines the motives for Libya's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi's rise to power in 1969 through to late 2003. It assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance and, subsequently, its reliance on the A.Q. Khan network. It examines the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the regime's calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage with the international community and the United States in particular. The process of dismantling the nuclear programme is also addressed, as is the question of whether Libya constitutes a ‘model’ for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.

Chapter one: Nuclear ‘drivers’

For over three decades, driven by the core motive of deterring external threats to its security, Libya sought to acquire nuclear weapons. Having attempted but failed to procure them ‘off the shelf’ from several states during the 1970s, by late 2003 it had succeeded in assembling much of the technology required to manufacture them. Nevertheless, following secret negotiations with the UK and US governments, in December 2003 Colonel Muammar Gadhafi resolved to abandon the pursuit of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This decision reflected the regime's radically altered security perceptions during the 1990s and early twenty-first century. The pursuit of nuclear weapons had come to be viewed as a strategic liability. This Adelphi Paper examines the motives for Libya's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi's rise to power in 1969 through to late 2003. It assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance and, subsequently, its reliance on the A.Q. Khan network. It examines the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the regime's calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage with the international community and the United States in particular. The process of dismantling the nuclear programme is also addressed, as is the question of whether Libya constitutes a ‘model’ for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.

Conclusion

For over three decades, driven by the core motive of deterring external threats to its security, Libya sought to acquire nuclear weapons. Having attempted but failed to procure them ‘off the shelf’ from several states during the 1970s, by late 2003 it had succeeded in assembling much of the technology required to manufacture them. Nevertheless, following secret negotiations with the UK and US governments, in December 2003 Colonel Muammar Gadhafi resolved to abandon the pursuit of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This decision reflected the regime's radically altered security perceptions during the 1990s and early twenty-first century. The pursuit of nuclear weapons had come to be viewed as a strategic liability. This Adelphi Paper examines the motives for Libya's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi's rise to power in 1969 through to late 2003. It assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance and, subsequently, its reliance on the A.Q. Khan network. It examines the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the regime's calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage with the international community and the United States in particular. The process of dismantling the nuclear programme is also addressed, as is the question of whether Libya constitutes a ‘model’ for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.

Chapter two: Proliferation pathways

For over three decades, driven by the core motive of deterring external threats to its security, Libya sought to acquire nuclear weapons. Having attempted but failed to procure them ‘off the shelf’ from several states during the 1970s, by late 2003 it had succeeded in assembling much of the technology required to manufacture them. Nevertheless, following secret negotiations with the UK and US governments, in December 2003 Colonel Muammar Gadhafi resolved to abandon the pursuit of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This decision reflected the regime's radically altered security perceptions during the 1990s and early twenty-first century. The pursuit of nuclear weapons had come to be viewed as a strategic liability. This Adelphi Paper examines the motives for Libya's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi's rise to power in 1969 through to late 2003. It assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance and, subsequently, its reliance on the A.Q. Khan network. It examines the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the regime's calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage with the international community and the United States in particular. The process of dismantling the nuclear programme is also addressed, as is the question of whether Libya constitutes a ‘model’ for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.

Chapter three: The decision

For over three decades, driven by the core motive of deterring external threats to its security, Libya sought to acquire nuclear weapons. Having attempted but failed to procure them ‘off the shelf’ from several states during the 1970s, by late 2003 it had succeeded in assembling much of the technology required to manufacture them. Nevertheless, following secret negotiations with the UK and US governments, in December 2003 Colonel Muammar Gadhafi resolved to abandon the pursuit of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This decision reflected the regime's radically altered security perceptions during the 1990s and early twenty-first century. The pursuit of nuclear weapons had come to be viewed as a strategic liability. This Adelphi Paper examines the motives for Libya's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi's rise to power in 1969 through to late 2003. It assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance and, subsequently, its reliance on the A.Q. Khan network. It examines the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the regime's calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage with the international community and the United States in particular. The process of dismantling the nuclear programme is also addressed, as is the question of whether Libya constitutes a ‘model’ for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.

Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and future proliferation networks

The Khan network has caused enormous damage to U.S. national security and international stability. Yet, the response has been insufficient, producing little confidence that other networks do not or will not exist or that elements of the Khan network will not reconstitute themselves.