Key Substitution Attack Research Articles

Edwards curve digital signature algorithm for video integrity verification on blockchain framework

Within the field of forensic science, video integrity is an essential component that ensures the validity and dependability of visual evidence that is essential for court cases. Maintaining the integrity of justice in a time when digital modification tools are easily accessible requires making sure that video recordings are unaltered. Video footage is carefully inspected by forensic analysts who use advanced tools to look for indications of manipulation or change. This paper presents a novel, lightweight approach for verifying the integrity of video data. The proposed method utilizes the blockchain and the Edwards Curve Digital Signature Algorithm, coupled with the BLAKE2b hash function. Signatures are generated for video clips with a predetermined size called video segments and stored in blocks chronologically. The signature of the previous block is stored in the current block to add another layer of security. At the time of validation, these signatures are verified. Experimental results show that the proposed method outperforms state-of-the-art methods in both speed and security. Our method is capable of identifying any type of forgery on any video file, by anyone, at any given moment, with insignificant additional storage requirements. Furthermore, our security analysis shows that our method is resilient against various types of attacks, including collision attacks, key substitution attacks, side-channel attacks, and chosen message attacks. The proposed lightweight video integrity verification method is better suited for use in resource constrained devices.

On the equivalence of authentication codes and robust (2, 2)-threshold schemes

Abstract In this paper, we show a “direct” equivalence between certain authentication codes and robust threshold schemes. It was previously known that authentication codes and robust threshold schemes are closely related to similar types of designs, but direct equivalences had not been considered in the literature. Our new equivalences motivate the consideration of a certain “key-substitution attack.” We study this attack and analyze it in the setting of “dual authentication codes.” We also show how this viewpoint provides a nice way to prove properties and generalizations of some known constructions.

Key Substitution Attacks on Lattice Signature Schemes Based on SIS Problem

The notion of key substitution security on digital signatures in the multiuser setting has been proposed by Menezes and Smart in 2004. Along with the unforgeability of signature, the key substitution security is very important since it is a critical requirement for the nonrepudiation and the authentication of the signature. Lattice-based signature is a promising candidate for post-quantum cryptography, and the unforgeability of each scheme has been relatively well studied. In this paper, we present key substitution attacks on BLISS, Lyubashevsky’s signature scheme, and GPV and thus show that these signature schemes do not provide nonrepudiation. We also suggest how to avoid key substitution attack on these schemes.

On the security of the Courtois-Finiasz-Sendrier signature

Abstract We prove that a variant of the Courtois-Finiasz-Sendrier signature is strongly existentially unforgeable under chosen message attack in the random oracle model, assuming hardness of the Permuted Goppa Syndrome Decoding Problem (also known as the Niederreiter problem). In addition, we explicitly show that security against key substitution attacks can be arranged by a standard technique of Menezes and Smart, hashing the public key.

Generalized Key Substitution Attacks on Message Recovery Signatures

Abstract The generalized key substitution attacks were proposed as a generalization of the key substitution attacks to examine the security of the signature schemes adopted in ISO/IEC (1st CD) 14888-3, which standardizes appendix- -type signature schemes based on the discrete logarithm problem. This paper examines the message recovery signature schemes based on the discrete logarithm problem, adopted in ISO/IEC 9796-3:2006, and shows that all but one scheme are vulnerable to the generalized key substitution attacks.

Equivalent public keys and a key substitution attack on the schemes from vector decomposition

ABSTRACTThe vector decomposition problem has been considered as a hard problem, which is applicable to cryptography. Okamoto and Takashima proposed various types of public key cryptographic schemes based on the VDP. In this paper, we study the cryptographic implications of Okamoto‐Takashima schemes with respect to the properties of public keys. In the public key cryptography, one public key is associated to a unique private key, and an action using the public key implicitly assumes that the corresponding private action can be done only with the corresponding private key. We formalize this security issue by introducing the notion of equivalent public keys. We show that equivalent public keys exist in the Okamoto‐Takashima basic signature scheme and the homomorphic encryption scheme. We present a strong key substitution attack to their basic signature. We suggest how to prevent equivalent public keys and strong key substitution attack in their signature scheme. We point out that there are cases with no efficient methods to prevent equivalent public keys in their encryption scheme. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Message and Key Substitution Attacks on Verifiably Encrypted Signature Schemes

Message and Key Substitution Attacks on Verifiably Encrypted Signature Schemes

Another Attack on Tso's Short Signature Scheme Based on Bilinear Pairings

In 2009, R. Tso et al. proposed an efficient pairing-based short signature scheme which is provably secure in the Random Oracle Model. In this paper, we propose a new key substitution attack on Raylin Tso et al.’s short signature scheme. For a given message and the corresponding valid signature, the malicious attacker can generate a substituted public key. Everyone verifies the signature successfully with the malicious attacker’s substituted public key. Therefore, Raylin Tso et al.’s short signature scheme has a security flaw in the multi-user setting.

Key Substitution Attack and Malleability of a Short Signature Scheme with Batch Verification

At IWSEC 2008, F. Guo et al. proposed an efficient short signature scheme with batch verification based on C. Gentry’s scheme. In this paper, we firstly propose the key substitution attack on F. Guo et al.’s digital signature scheme and show that the malicious adversary can forge a valid signature, which can be verified with a substituted public key. Secondly, we prove that F. Guo et al.’s scheme is malleable and the attacker can produce a new valid signature on the message if he/she has known some valid signatures on the same message.

On the Security of Status Certificate-Based Encryption Scheme

In this paper, we will show that the status certificate-based encryption scheme proposed by Yum and Lee is insecure against key substitution attacks by two types of attackers.

On Waters' Signature Scheme

Recently, Waters proposed a provably secure signature schemes in the standard model. In this letter, we analyse the security of this signature scheme. We found that the signature scheme is subjected to key substitution attack and is malleable.

Signature Scheme in Multi-User Setting

Recently, Boneh and Boyen proposed a new provably secure short signature scheme under the q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption without random oracles. This scheme is based on bilinear map which is different from Cramer-Shoup signature scheme (which is based on the strong RSA assumption). However, Tan TC[17] showed that Boneh- Boyen scheme is subjected to key substitution attacks in the multi-user setting. In this paper, we propose a new signature scheme. We prove that the proposed scheme is provably secured against existential forgery under adaptive chosen message attack in the standard model and also secure against key substitution attacks.

Comment on the Public Key Substitution Attacks

In this paper we present a comment on some previous works about the Public Key Substitution Attacks (PKSA in brief). Though there exist some security flaws for the schemes being attacked, we point out that these attacks on them are either trivial or avoidable after a little modification.

Key substitution attacks revisited: Taking into account malicious signers

Given a signature sfor some message malong with a corresponding public verification key yin a key substitution attack an attacker derives another verification key $$\overline{y}$$ ≠ y—possibly along with a matching secret key—such that sis also a valid signature of mfor the verification key $$\overline{y}$$. Menezes and Smart have shown that with suitable parameter restrictions DSA and EC-DSA are immune to such attacks. Here, we show that in the presence of a malicious signer key substitution attacks against several signature schemes that are secure in the sense introduced by Menezes and Smart can be mounted. While for EC-DSA such an attack is feasible, other established signature schemes, including EC-KCDSA, can be shown to be secure in this sense.

Key Substitution Attacks on Provably Secure Short Signature Schemes

Recently, Boneh et al. proposed provably secure short signature schemes in the standard model and in the random oracle model respectively. In this letter, we propose strong-key substitution attacks on these signature schemes. In one of the attacks, we show that an adversary can generate a new public key satisfying all legitimate signatures created by the legitimate signer.

A key substitution attack on SFLASH v3

A practical key substitution attack on SFLASHv3 is described: Given a valid (message, signature) pair (m, σ) for some public key v 0, one can derive another public key v 1 (along with matching secret data) such that (m, σ) is also valid for v 1. The computational effort needed for finding such a ‘duplicate’ key is comparable to the effort needed for ordinary key generation.

A new proxy signature scheme with message recovery using self-certified public key

A proxy signature scheme with message recovery using self-certified public key is proposed, which withstands public key substitution attacks, active attacks, and forgery attacks. The proposed scheme accomplishes the tasks of public key verification, proxy signature verification, and message recovery in a logically single step. In addition, the proposed scheme satisfies all properties of strong proxy signature and does not use secure channel in the communication between the original signer and the proxy signature signer.

On the security of Wu-Lin’s robust key authentication scheme

In 2004, Wu-Lin pointed out that Lee et al.’s key authentication scheme is vulnerable to public key substitution attacks. For enhancing the security, Wu-Lin proposed a simply improved key authentication scheme with better efficiency and a robust key authentication scheme resistant to public key substitution attacks. However, in this paper, we will show that Wu-Lin’s robust key authentication scheme is still vulnerable to public key substitution attack. Also, we will show that Lee et al.’s scheme and Wu-Lin’s efficiency improved key authentication scheme are vulnerable to simple public key substitution attack than Wu-Lin’s attack method.

Cryptanalysis and further improvement of Peinado’s improved LHL-key authentication scheme

In 2004, Peinado pointed out that LHL-key authentication scheme is not secure as the intruder can obtain the private key of the users. For enhancing the security, Peinado proposed an improved LHL-key authentication scheme. However, in this paper, we will show that Peinado’s improved LHL-key authentication scheme is still vulnerable to public key substitution attack, i.e., an intruder can substitute a fake public key for the genuine one. And then, we propose a further improved LHL-key authentication scheme resistant to public key substitution attack.

Robust key authentication scheme resistant to public key substitution attacks

In the public key cryptosystem, each user owns a private key and a corresponding public key. When two parties want to communicate with each other, the message is encrypted with recipient's public key such that only the recipient can decrypt the ciphertext with his private key. For obtaining the public key, one can either directly request it from the recipient or retrieve it from the public key directory. For both approaches, it might be possible that some malicious attacker substitutes a fake public key for the genuine one. To withstand such potential attack, we can perform a public key authentication procedure before encrypting the message, such that the ciphertext only can be decrypted by the destined recipient. Recently, Lee et al. proposed a key authentication scheme based on discrete logarithms. The authentication procedure of their scheme is rather simple. However, their scheme is vulnerable to public key substitution attacks. In this paper, we first simply improve the efficiency of their scheme and then propose a robust key authentication scheme resistant to public key substitution attacks.