Kennedy White House Research Articles

If Then: How the Simulmatics Corporation Invented the Future

The scientists of the Simulmatics Corporation acted on the proposition that if they could collect enough data about enough people and feed it into a machine, everything, one day, might be predictable, and everyone, every human mind, simulated, each act anticipated, automatically, and even driven and directed, by targeted messages as unerring as missiles. (pp. 3–4) That the Simulmatics Corporation failed at this mission is the story recounted by Jill Lepore. In 1959, Simulmatics Corporation approached Democratic party leadership with a computer program that could simulate the electorate. The program could be queried about how voters would react if a campaign followed a particular strategy. In this case, the program was asked what would happen if John F. Kennedy directly confronted anti-Catholicism and religious prejudice. Simulmatics predicted that such a strategy would gain Catholics, minorities, and other voters who resented overt prejudice, in numbers sufficient to tip the election. Indeed, Kennedy won that close election, and Simulmatics claimed to have delivered the result, even hiring a public relations expert to promote this claim. The Kennedy team was enraged at this tactic—part of the campaign was waged over the issue of automation—and would have nothing to do with Simulmatics. The inability to secure a place in the Kennedy White House, as an “automated adviser,” would be the start of a series of problems for the company. Much of its history is its search for contract work—including with the New York Times, the Pentagon in Saigon, and with Daniel Patrick Moynihan on anticipating urban riots—and its inability to deliver results. Simulmatics' failures might be explained as the inherent folly of prediction, but a more plausible explanation includes the company's incompetence, methodological sloppiness, and inability to execute. After reading of its repeated failures, I wonder why Simulmatics continued to receive contracts until its bankruptcy in 1970.

The Diaries of Judith Malina, 1958–1971 (Excerpt)

The Diaries of Judith Malina, 1958–1971 (Excerpt)

Explaining the First Contested Senate Confirmation of a Director of Central Intelligence: John McCone, the Kennedy White House, the CIA and the Senate, 1962

This article explores the first nomination for Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) that was seriously contested in the US Senate. Unlike three previous DCIs who headed the Central Intelligence Agency, John A. McCone faced harsh criticism from some in the news media and 12 negative votes in the US Senate after he was nominated for the position by President John F. Kennedy. The article considers factors, including McCone's personal attributes and recent years' controversies about the CIA, as reasons that provoked some opposition to his confirmation as DCI.

Camelot's court: inside the Kennedy White House

Camelot's court: inside the Kennedy White House

President Kennedy's White House Tan

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the Kennedy assassination. Many of us will never forget that Friday, November 22, 1963, when we heard the tragic news that President John F. Kennedy (1917-1963) had been shot in Dallas, Texas. President Kennedy was a charismatic leader, full of wit and humor. He seemed to be the image of youth and vigor, always tanned and seemingly ready to pass a football.

An Evening at the Kennedy White House: Fredric March Performs Hemingway’s Islands in the Stream

On Sunday night, 29 April 1962, President John F. Kennedy hosted a remarkable White House evening for a crowd of luminaries featuring forty-nine Nobel Prize winners from the Western Hemisphere. After remarks by the President and a dinner of beef Wellington, veteran actor Fredric March honored deceased Nobel Prize winners by reading excerpts of their work, including—at the suggestion of Hemingway’s widow Mary—an excerpt from the manuscript that would be published eight years later as Islands in the Stream . The event gave the literary world perhaps its first indication of how Hemingway’s unpublished output would be managed.

Jacqueline Kennedy: first lady of the New Frontier

In a mere one thousand days, Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy created an entrancing public persona that has remained intact for nearly forty years. Even now, a decade after her death, she remains a figure of enduring - and endearing - interest. Yet, while innumerable books have focused on the legends and gossip surrounding this charismatic figure, Barbara Perry's is the first to focus largely on Kennedy's White House years, portraying a First Lady far more complex and enigmatic than previously perceived. Noting how Jackie's celebrity and devotion to privacy have for years precluded a more serious treatment, Perry's engaging and well-crafted story illuminates Kennedy's immeasurable impact on the institution of the First Lady. Perry vividly illustrates the complexities of Jacqueline Bouvier's marriage to John F. Kennedy, and shows how she transformed herself from a reluctant political wife to an effective, confident presidential partner. Perry is especially illuminating in tracing the First Lady's mastery of political symbolism and imagery, along with her use of television and state entertainment to disseminate her work to a global audience. By offering the White House as a stage for the arts, Jackie also bolstered the president's Cold War efforts to portray the United States as the epitome of a free society. From redecorating the White House to championing Lafayette Square's preservation to lending her name to fund-raising for the National Cultural Center, she had a profound impact on the nation's psyche and cultural life. Meanwhile, her fashionable clothes and glamorous hairdos stood in stark contrast to the dowdiness of her predecessors and the drab appearances of Communist leaders' spouses. Never before or since has a First Lady (and her husband) sparkled with so much hope and vigor on the stage of American public life. Perry's deft narrative captures all of that and more, even as it also insightfully depicts Jackie's struggles to preserve her own identity amid the pressures of an institution she changed forever. Grounded on the author's painstaking research into previously overlooked or unavailable archives, at the Kennedy Library and elsewhere, as well as interviews with Jacqueline Kennedy's close associates, Perry's work expands and enriches our understanding of a remarkable American woman.

Richard E. Neustadt as Teacher and Mentor: A Personal Reflection

first encountered Dick Neustadt when walked into his graduate class on the presidency at Columbia University in the fall of 1962. A small but intense man, at least as judged by his chain smoking, he conducted a rather large class in a very informal manner. He had the aura of a person who had been there--wise, reflective, and full of great stories. His lectures were not awe-inspiring; they were a down-to-earth, inside perspective on how government really functioned. Yet, despite the applied quality of his presentation, Neustadt never lost sight of the theoretical perspective from which he framed much of his thinking and writing--although suspect most of the students enjoyed the anecdotes more than the general, strategic points that he was making. certainly did. During this period, we knew that he was in frequent contact with the Kennedy White House, which added a compelling quality to his lectures and illustrations. Of all my professors, he was the one who most successfully bridged the gulf between the academic and the outside world, between theory and practice. His was applied theory. The course had a paper requirement. do not remember the specific assignment, but certainly remember my paper, a comparison of The Prince and Presidential Power. On approving the topic, he stated simply, I have been waiting for this, which took to mean, you're the first but unfortunately won't be the last. Most of my substantive comparison was pretty straightforward, as recall, but when got to the methodology, made some comment to the effect that was surprised that Science Editions published the paperback, because there was nothing scientific about the analysis. Dick readily agreed, despite the behavioral focus of his work. When picked up the paper, he said, almost out of the blue, You know had no choice--Science Editions is Wiley's paperback outlet. took this to mean that he, too, was a little embarrassed by the connotation of the imprint. He also told me that the original manuscript had been rejected by several publishers who were dubious of its marketability. So much for the judgment of commercial publishers! As a teacher, Dick was approachable and friendly. He was also very considerate of his students and kind to them. Despite his growing reputation as an innovative presidential scholar, he never was pretentious nor ton busy for students. suspect he liked the give and take of an undergraduate classroom more than the graduate lecture course. Whenever saw him, he seemed to be always surrounded by undergraduates. Although he had resigned from the Columbia faculty (which understand was a painful decision because he liked Columbia, especially its students) to start the Kennedy School at Harvard, he maintained his Columbia ties. …

Death of a generation: how the assassinations of Diem and JFK prolonged the Vietnam War

When John F. Kennedy was shot, millions were left to wonder how America, and the world, would have been different had he lived to fulfill the enormous promise of his presidency. For many historians and political observers, what Kennedy would and would not have done in has been a source of enduring controversy. Now, based on convincing new evidence-including a startling revelation about the Kennedy administration's involvement in the assassination of Premier Diem-Howard Jones argues that Kennedy intended to withdraw the great bulk of American soldiers and pursue a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Vietnam. Drawing upon recently declassified hearings by the Church Committee on the U.S. role in assassinations, newly released tapes of Kennedy White House discussions, and interviews with John Kenneth Galbraith, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, and others from the president's inner circle, Jones shows that Kennedy firmly believed that the outcome of the war depended on the South Vietnamese. In the spring of 1962, he instructed Secretary of Defense McNamara to draft a withdrawal plan aimed at having all special military forces home by the end of 1965. The Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam was ready for approval in early May 1963, but then the Buddhist revolt erupted and postponed the program. Convinced that the war was not winnable under Diem's leadership, President Kennedy made his most critical mistake-promoting a coup as a means for facilitating a U.S. withdrawal. In the cruelest of ironies, the coup resulted in Diem's death followed by a state of turmoil in that further obstructed disengagement. Still, these events only confirmed Kennedy's view about South Vietnam's inability to win the war and therefore did not lessen his resolve to reduce the U.S. commitment. By the end of November, however, the president was dead and Lyndon Johnson began his campaign of escalation. Jones argues forcefully that if Kennedy had not been assassinated, his withdrawal plan would have spared the lives of 58,000 Americans and countless Vietnamese. Written with vivid immediacy, supported with authoritative research, Death of a Generation answers one of the most profoundly important questions left hanging in the aftermath of John F. Kennedy's death.

Feminist international relations: an unfinished journey

Part I. Introductions: Part II. Sightings: 1. Handmaids' tales of Washington power: the abject and the real Kennedy White House 2. Reginas in international relations: occlusions, cooperations, and Zimbabwean cooperatives 3. The white paper trailing 4. Picturing the Cold War an eyegraft/art graft 5. Four international Dianas: Andy's tribute Part III. Sitings: 6. The emperors theories and transformations looking at the field through feminist lenses 7. Feminists and realists view autonomy and obligation in international relations 8. Some dangers in merging feminist and peace projects 9. Gendered development imaginaries: shall we dance Pygmalion? 10. Emphatic cooperation: a feminist method for IR Part IV. Citings: 11. Feminist arts of international relations 12. Internations of feminism and international relations.

Ambassadorial Roles and Foreign Policy: Elbridge Durbrow, Frederick Nolting, and the U.S. Commitment to Diem's Vietnam, 1957-61

Soon after assuming the presidency, John F. Kennedy adopted a program to achieve a in South Vietnam even as he harbored doubts about the ability of the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem to defeat the growing communist insurgency. As part of this effort, Kennedy replaced Elbridge Durbrow, the U.S. ambassador in Saigon from early 1957, with Frederick Nolting. Durbrow had spent the better part of three years pressing Diem to adopt political and economic reforms, primarily to broaden his government's base of support. Durbrow's approach included threats to withhold U.S. foreign aid if Diem did not adopt the reforms that the embassy recommended. Consistent with the approach adopted by the Kennedy administration, Nolting abandoned Durbrow's tactics, backing Diem unconditionally regardless of the latter's behavior. Durbrow, an ardent cold warrior, was sent to Saigon to manage the U.S. relationship with the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem in the interest of building South Vietnam into a bulwark against the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. Durbrow fully accepted the premises of containment and the domino theory on which the Eisenhower administration based its foreign policy. He soon learned, however, that Diem's regime was failing to provide the bulwark (or even the anticommunist regime) in which the Eisenhower administration was interested (Kaiser 2000, 58-59). Durbrow and other embassy officials in Saigon saw serious flaws in the Diem regime, and their convictions increased with time. With the Eisenhower White House exerting little control over affairs in Saigon at a time when Vietnam was a less important issue than it would become a few years later, Durbrow and the embassy pressured Diem to reform. Ultimately, they needed Washington's support to achieve their goals, the timing was such that the Eisenhower administration did not have to make critical decisions regarding the U.S. commitment to Diem and was able to hand off Vietnam to the Kennedy administration. The institutional record compiled by the embassy raised doubts among key officials of the incoming Kennedy administration, including the president himself, regarding the extent to which U.S. aid was achieving the goal of a stable, anticommunist government in South Vietnam. Nonetheless, for reasons of domestic and international politics, officials in the Kennedy White House and in the Pentagon did not act on the basis of Durbrow's views either. Rather, they pushed forward, adhering to the strategic policy of the Eisenhower (and Truman) administration, but with new vigor added at the tactical level, as Nolting (1966, 2) recalled, in order to buy time for Diem. The appointment of Nolting was one element of the new approach. The administration sent Nolting to Vietnam under the assumption that gaining Diem's confidence was the key to the breakthrough it sought. Given a narrower and more explicit brief than Durbrow, Nolting discarded the latter's carrot-and-stick approach, opting for carrots alone. He believed that a winning spirit among U.S. officials in Washington and Saigon was the best way to help Diem battle the growing communist insurgency. Backing Diem unconditionally and providing sufficient military and security personnel, Nolting surmised, would enable the Saigon regime to gain broad political support and increase its effectiveness. In the process, Washington would also increase its ability to reform Diem, in his view. In carrying out his instructions, however, Nolting conceded much of the leverage that the Kennedy administration hoped to assert over Diem. This study shows how successive presidential administrations redefined ambassadorial roles and how two ambassadors responded, given their instructions. It pays close attention to actions of Durbrow and Nolting at a pivotal moment when Washington opted not to exercise some of the leverage it might have wielded over Diem. …

Handmaids' Tales of Washington Power: The Abject and the Real Kennedy White House

A considerable amount of academic attention has been paid to John Kennedy and to his group of advisors during the Cuban missile crisis. Next to no attention has been accorded other bodies of the Kennedy White House that had daily access to a President's most private moments and possibly to his important deliberations. Drawing on Richard Reeves' account of President Kennedy: Profile of Power, I revisit the early 1960s looking for bodies of power that are culturally sexed female by others and compelled into being as workaday secretaries and confidants, and para-Everythings for Kennedy. In doing so, I draw on the feminist body theorizing of Judith Butler, Rosi Braidotti and Elizabeth Grosz, as well as the evocations of bodies in important but abjected places featured in Margaret Atwood's Handmaid's Tale. After constructing the historically broad category of the handmaid to Washington power, I reread constructions of decision-making in the Cuban missile crisis offered by Graham Allison and conclude that the feint of mancentred Washington masks bodies given the locations, skills and resources to ooze into spaces of decision and power canonically forbidden to them.

Book Review

Book reviewed in this article: Designing Camelot: The Kennedy White House Restoration: James A. Abbott & Elaine M. Rice Shaping Space: The Dynamics of Three–Dimensional Design, Second Edition: Paul Zelanski & Mary Pat Fisher

SHORT TAKES

Too many American executives are clueless when it comes to business etiquette, and in today's global marketplace they pay a high price for their ignorance, maintains Letitia Baldrige, doyen of good manners. The former head of protocol in the Kennedy White House is acknowledged as a national authority on proper behavior. She now consults on business etiquette to major corporations, and is editor‐in‐chief of the Washington D.C.‐based monthly publication, Executive Advantage.

On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace

From the councils of the Athenian generals to the staff room of the German high command to meetings in the Kennedy White House, Donald Kagan shows the world's great leaders making the critical decisions of peace and war.

Connections with Toughness: the Novels of Eugene Burdick

As the principal materials for a study of values, The Ugly American (1958) and Fail-Safe (1962) fit well together. Though each was written by two authors, they have one author in common, the late Eugene Burdick. Both were best-selling novels and made into movies. Both were political cautionary tales, seeking to present dire realities in fictional form. The Ugly American, making the case for a more adept social and economic war on communism in South-east Asia, prompted a Congressional investigation of foreign aid and formed part of the climate which later produced the “ low-technology ” Peace Corps and the Kennedy interest in sophisticated-seeming counter-insurgency. Fail-Safe, attacking the beautiful but dangerous, “ high-technology ” nuclear weapons systems of the Cold War, was written in part as a deliberate campaign for arms control and caused a secret Pentagon review of safeguards against accidental war. Both books attracted attention at the Kennedy White House, and in keeping with New Frontier images, both featured the tough but humane professional, socially sensitive but highly controlled. Self-reliant and resourceful individualists, the heroes of these books are, nevertheless, geared to draw on highly-tuned supporting organizations as well as intensive training or experience.