Kant's Problem Research Articles

The Kantian origins of Sergei Rubinstein's theory of moral improvement

The early and late texts of the Russian psychologist and philosopher Sergei Rubinstein focus on ethical issues. The unfinished and fragmentary nature of these texts has contributed to the limited exploration of the ideas they contain. Rubinstein's main concern was the possibility of human moral improvement, a concern that originated in the young Rubinstein's study of the philosophies of Kant and Hegel, and somewhat later, the early manuscripts of Marx. In this paper, I show the pivotal importance of Kantian ethics for Rubinstein's theory of moral improvement. By criticising Kant's doctrine of the intelligible character of the human being, Rubinstein revises the relation between subjects and their deeds and shows that, in this relation, subjects not only express but also determine themselves. On the same basis, Rubinstein formulates the principle of creative self-activity, which he proposes to place at the foundation of a renewed ‘Socratic–Platonist pedagogy’ that can reveal the intersubjective nature of self-consciousness and will. In his critique of Kant, Rubinstein relies, to a large extent, on interpretations offered by Cohen, Natorp and Rickert. Rubinstein also attempts to solve Kant's problem of the dual nature of the human being, and in justifying the need to reconcile duty and inclination, he follows the same critical path as Schiller. Adducing the categorical imperative in its ‘formula of humanity’, and the principle of human self-determination through action, Rubinstein places the concept of educating behaviour at the core of his theory of moral improvement.

Ernst Haeckel’s ‘Kant Problem’: metaphysics, science, and art

Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919) has become famous, and perhaps infamous, for many reasons. Presently, he is probably most widely-known for his paintings of plants and animals in his very popular book, Art Forms in Nature, originally collected and published in 1904. However, in addition to Haeckel’s art, he is also well-known for his advocacy of Darwinism and Social Darwinism, for first coining the term ‘ecology,’ for having his work utilized by Nazi pseudo-scientists (Dombrowksi in Tech Commun Q 12:303–319, 2003), and for famously (perhaps fraudulently) producing drawings of animal and human embryos so as to confirm his biogenetic law (Gould in Nat Hist 109:44–45, 2000). Something Haeckel is not as well-known for today is the fact that he seemed to be both a strenuous critic of the metaphysical and moral philosophies of Immanuel Kant and yet also something of an adherent to Kant’s aesthetic views. In terms of metaphysics and morality, Haeckel sought to exorcise Kant’s ideas as much as possible from twentieth century views on science, humanity, and nature; however, in terms of aesthetic theory, Haeckel seemed to embrace a distinctly Kantian approach to art and artworks. This essay proposes to: (1) carefully examine Haeckel’s refutations of some of Kant’s central metaphysical concepts, (2) explore some of the, arguably Kantian, assumptions underlying Haeckel’s approach to aesthetics and his artistic practice, and (3) combine these two lines of inquiry into a portrait of Haeckel’s mind as one that is conflicted about the role Kantian philosophy, and more specifically Kantian noumena, should play in twentieth century science and art. This unresolved tension in Haeckel’s mind regarding Kant’s noumenal realm is what I propose to call his ‘Kant Problem’.

Response to Karen Lebacqz and Stephen Palmquist

AbstractI respond here to the essays by Karen Lebacqz and Stephen Palmquist, beginning with my debt of gratitude to Lebacqz for her understanding of the methodological depth I try to bring to the analysis of bioethical issues. I further illustrate that observation here by reviewing the logic of my approach to the issue of wrongful life. At the same time, in connection with human genetic enhancement, I acknowledge that I may have not properly appreciated the seriousness of the problem of sin. To Palmquist's assertion that my criticisms of Kant's treatments of grace miss the way Kant has confined himself to being a philosophical (as opposed to biblical) theologian, I argue that Kant's problem lies instead in his poor application of his own compelling insights about the depths of human sinning. I close with an appreciation of Palmquist's observation of some important points of contact between Kant's understanding of sin and that of Kierkegaard.

Международно-правовая аксиоматика И. Канта: история и современность

The article discusses the problems of international legal philosophy of Kant in its historical and methodological significance for modern analysis of international relations. The author pays attention to the formulation of Kant problems of war and peace as a central issue of international law. International legal concept Kant considered by the author in terms of the basic principles of solution to the problem of war and peace. Particular attention is paid to reflect this perspective in the marxist and liberal traditions.

Objects of Representation

I distinguish four questions within Kant's problem of reality: (1) What constitutes propositional content? (2) What constitutes truth? (3) What constitutes referential content? (4) What constitutes successful singular reference? I argue that Kant's transcendental idealism applies primarily to (3) - understood as: What makes some mental or linguistic items would-be referential representations - and secondly to (1). But with regard to (4) and (2), we do not create the objects and states of affairs in the world (there are human artifacts, of course, but most of them continue to exist quite independently of our representing activities). However the contents of our representations in (3) and (1) do depend crucially on our conventions and rules, which are almost always socially learned.

Apperzeption und Erfahrung: Kants Transzendentale Deduktion im Spannungsfeld der frühen Rezeption und Kritik (review)

Reviewed by: Apperzeption und Erfahrung: Kants Transzendentale Deduktion im Spannungsfeld der frühen Rezeption und Kritik Rolf Ahlers Martin Bondeli . Apperzeption und Erfahrung: Kants Transzendentale Deduktion im Spannungsfeld der frühen Rezeption und Kritik. Schwabe Philosophica, 10. Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2006. Pp. 361. Cloth, €52.50. This book deals with the epicenter of modern philosophy, Kant's transcendental thinking self. It lives and breathes not only in the unity of reason in Kant himself, but also spells out how the problems that emerge in that conception were dealt with in the intellectual world of early German idealism. Bondeli shows how Kant's unity of reason is variously conceived by Kant as the "I think," the "highest point" of the "unity of apperception," as well as the more traditional concept of "soul," which is freighted with heavy metaphysical baggage. According to Bondeli, Kant had the greatest difficulty providing adequate reasons for that unity of apperception. Those difficulties are laid bare in part A of the first part of the book, "Kant's Problem of an Adequate Founding of the Original-Synthetic Unity of Apperception." The problem Bondeli lays bare provided ample fodder for Kant's critics, first and foremost the very early pre-Kantian Carl Leonhard Reinhold, soon, however, to emerge as the "Kantian of the first hour" in his Kantian Letters, but then also for Maimon, Schulze, Beck, and Fichte. Bondeli deals with the criticisms of those important thinkers in part B, "Reactions to Kant's Problem." The author points to the excellent arguments Kant himself provided against his contemporary critics. Those arguments also address the old metaphysical assumptions about God, humanity's soul, and the (real) world. They gain ground not only in Kant's practical philosophy, but also in his theoretical assumptions about substance and with substance the whole empirical world. But despite the "grave problems" in his thought, Bondeli says that Kant is "all in all convincing" with his arguments (92). As for how old metaphysical assumptions reappear in Kant, just consider what he said of the "eternal life of the soul" (85–87) and of the empirical, temporal, and psychological self (75–84) being of necessary relevance to the transcendentally reflecting subject. Of course, the center of Kant's thought, the relation of reality and ideality, needs to be identified as both "old" and "new" metaphysics. [End Page 475] Bondeli's book deals with ambiguities and contradictions mainly in the Critique of Pure Reason in its two editions of 1781 and 1787, which are at the center of the aforementioned "grave problems" in Kant's thought. These are what drove the post-Kantian reception and critique of the transcendental deduction. One grave problem is Kant's conception of the "original apperception" (26), though an array of other issues are also in need of clarification, such as the "relationship of logical and real, intelligible and empirical status of the original apperception" (27). That theme is worked through Bondeli's entire volume, practically on every page. In ferreting it out, many ambiguities come to light, such as in Kant's conception of the "I think": in opposition to Descartes's substantial definition of the "I think" as a res cogitans or thinking thing, Kant understands it as having (mere) intelligible status. On the other hand, Kant also understands the "I think" with Descartes as an "empirical proposition" (B 428) or as a substantive "I am" (B 138), and Kant provides reasons for both propositions. This a vexing situation and Bondeli—and the whole post-Kantian discussion—finds it troublesome, first because Kant is critical of Descartes's cogito conceived as thinking substance. In no way, Kant insists in the "Paralogisms of Pure Reason," is the transcendentally-thinking self to be associated with the concept of substance. That it is devoid of empirical elements is of paramount importance for its critical transcendental capacity of providing the conditions of knowledge. Second, Kant stresses, in the second edition, that "the proposition 'I think', or 'I exist thinking', is an empirical proposition" (B 428). The need to clarify the relationship of the logical and the real, the intelligible and the empirical status of the original apperception in Kant's thought implied a...

The Synthetic A Priori in Kant and German Idealism

In twentieth-century Kant scholarship, few have provided an account of the analytic-synthetic distinction and of the problem of the synthetic a priori that takes into consideration the views of Kant's idealist successors such as Maimon, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. I first explain how Kant formulates the analytic-synthetic distinction in terms of the determinate-indeterminate distinction, which, in turn, is based on the distinction between general and transcendental logic. Kant's problem of the synthetic a priori, then, is the problem of showing how the logical forms of judgment can be employed determinately (and not merely indeterminately). I then show that Maimon also formulates the distinction and the problem in the same way, and that his interpretation will shape how Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel each construe and address Kant's question, How are synthetic judgments possible a priori?

Specters of the Humean Self

The significance of Hume's skeptical arguments for the development of Kant's critical philosophy is well-known to those familiar with the history of philosophy. In fact, it would not be imprecise to say that the whole of Kant's philosophy may be viewed as a reply to Hume. What is less clear is the degree of success Kant had in answering Hume. While it is beyond the scope of this essay to evaluate the whole of Kant's corpus, I will argue that despite his transcendental turn, the ghosts of Hume still haunt Kant's philosophy. In particular, I will draw attention to an aspect of Kant's thought that paradoxically is often overlooked yet is of great importance to contemporary Kant scholars, namely his account of virtue. Kant's account of virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals and Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason leads to a fracturing of the self and a failure to account for virtue as an abiding state of character. Furthermore, I will locate Kant's problem in his understanding of subjectivity and argue that Husserl's description of embodied transcendental subjectivity can provide a more adequate account of subjectivity and virtue while retaining the spirit of Kant's ethics. I will first discuss Kant's theory of virtue as it is presented in the above works and indicate how it leads to a re-emergence of the Humean self in Kant's moral philosophy. Second, I will argue that these difficulties are founded upon Kant's conception of subjectivity as bifurcated between rational and sensible nature. Third, I will argue that a new conception of moral subjectivity is needed in order to overcome this difficulty and that Husserl's notion of embodied transcendental subjectivity meets this need. Finally, I will end with some indications of how a Husserlian ethics can retain the spirit of Kant's moral philosophy by discussing Husserl's notion of the "truly ethical human being." Kant's Account of Virtue and the Re-emergence of the Humean Self Let me begin my discussion of Kant's theory of virtue by indicating the importance of this problem for Kantian ethics. Contemporary Kantian apologists have devoted a considerable amount of attention to the role of the emotions within Kant's moral philosophy. In general, they have argued against a traditional reading of Kant that accuses him of having an inadequate moral psychology. Because we have become increasingly aware of the extent of Kant's writings on ethics, these scholars have been able to cogently argue that Kant's moral philosophy does not reject the emotions (or inclinations) from playing a positive role in our ethical lives.1 While I do not have the time to engage in a discussion of these arguments, it is clear that these efforts on the part of Kant scholars are also an attempt to answer the criticism from neo-Aristotelean and virtue ethicists that Kant's ethics has a "thin" moral psychology.2 However, articulating a coherent theory of virtue is a task internal to Kantian ethics, and insofar as this is the case, this essay will not directly address neo-Aristotelian critiques. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant indicates the importance of a doctrine of virtue for his ethics. He states that ethics "provides a matter (an object of free choice). . . an end that, as far as human beings are concerned, it is a duty to have."3 In other words, ethics provides the content or ends that human beings must pursue if they are to act morally, and Kant's "Doctrine of Virtue" seeks to identify these ends. This description of the "Doctrine of Virtue" may strike some as odd, for it does not make reference to traditional theories of virtue that focus on the cultivation of certain habitual dispositions. Kant is aware of these approaches and explicitly rejects them. He does not want to define virtue in terms of a habit or attribute, for "unless this aptitude results from considered, firm, and continually purified principles, then, like any other mechanism of technically practical reason, it is neither armed for all situations nor adequately secured against the changes that new temptations could bring about. …

The Embodied Self: Friedrich Schleiermacher's Solution to Kant's Problem of the Empirical Self. Thandeka

<i>The Embodied Self: Friedrich Schleiermacher's Solution to Kant's Problem of the Empirical Self</i>. Thandeka

Kant's Problem of Causality and the Ding-An-Sich

Kant's Copernican Revolution in philosophy was mainly a response to the thought of the British Empiricists. He wanted to ground certain con cepts and precepts that the British Empiricists had nearly destroyed. We can say that the Copernican Revolution in philosophy addressed probems with the ego, justice and the Good, and so on. The aspect of the Coperni can Revolution with which I am concerned in this essay is Kant's view of the necessityof cause and effect relationships. My concern in this essay is to show that Kant is not committed to the problem of transcendental cau sality. In short, some philosophers have claimed that Kant must be com mitted to holding the following contradiction: There is no causal agency known outside of the realm of categorial judgment, yet appearances must becausedby thingsin themselves, whicharenotcategorially judged. Kant, in one breath, states that judgements of cause and effect hold only of ap pearances, while stating at other times that things in themselves must be the cause of our appearances. I will argue that Kant can escape this difficulty. In order to remove the apparent contradiction, I will show that Kant can claim that things in them selves need not be the cause of our appearances. Rather, they provide the ground for appearances. Even though Kantdoes indeedsometimes speak as though things in themselves should be the cause of appearances, it will be shown that, ultimately,he is not committed to this language. Therefore, Kant will not be committed to the contradiction. First,I shouldlike to exposethe problem as it is in the Critique ofPure Reason. Kant states in the Transcendental Deduction section of the Cri tique ofPureReason: All attempts to derive these pure concepts of the understanding ['cause and effect' is a pure concept of the understanding] from experience, and so to ascribe to them a merely empirical origin, are entirely vain and useless.1 From where are thepureconcepts of the un derstanding derived? Kant states, ...I maintain that the categories...are

Reconstruction from recollection and the refutation of idealism: A Kantian theme in theAufbau

We know from Carnap's autobiography that he was strongly influenced in his early writings by Kant's transcendental idealism of space and time, especially in the former's dissertation on space. By the time he wrote the Au?au, however, Carnap tells us that his use of "the neutral language of symbolic logic" had helped him realize that various sides of traditional philosophical controversies, such as realism and idealism, "were merely modes of speech, not formulations of positions".1 Upon reformulation of a symbolic definition of a philosophical idea as a rule of operation for a constructive procedure, says Carnap, it became "applicable by anybody, be it Kant's transcendental subject or a com puting machine".2 This does not mean, however, that Kant's problems no longer had a place in the Au?au, or even that Kant's own solutions to them cannot be fruitfully compared with his more constructive ap proach to them. On the contrary, Carnap himself provided interesting leads for such a comparison, most notably in Section 83 on interpreting "the basic relations as categories", though he says it may be omitted. But the bulk of the literature on the Kantian background of Carnap's early work up through the Au?au has focused rather on the neo Kantian influence exerted on him by his own contemporaries.3 The purpose of this paper is to lay out a direct comparison of the respective approaches and solutions of the Critique and the Au?au to problems centered on what Kant called the refutation of idealism, which involve in both cases underlying problems about time.4 My claim is that one cannot only recognize a treatment of these problems in the Au?au, but one can also see in it clear signs of philosophical progress when measured against Kant's treatment. I also argue that the significance of some of the Au?au's claims for Kant's problem was obscured by the fact that Carnap had not yet clearly distinguished implicit from explicit definitions.

Discussion: Thomson's Problems With Kant: A Comment on "Kant's Problems With Ugliness"

Discussion: Thomson's Problems With Kant: A Comment on "Kant's Problems With Ugliness"

Kant's Problems With Ugliness

Kant's Problems With Ugliness

Kant's Problems with Ugliness

Kant's Problems with Ugliness

Thomson's Problems with Kant: A Comment on "Kant's Problems with Ugliness"

Thomson's Problems with Kant: A Comment on "Kant's Problems with Ugliness"

Wittgenstein's Debt to Mach's Popular Scientific Lectures

In the Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung Wittgenstein says so little about physics that commentators have had the greatest trouble to comment on it. (See, for example, Black (I964).) It even happened that a misprint in the first edition of this elliptic treatise went unnoticed for sixty years. The explanation seems to be that it did not occur to anyone that Wittgenstein in his philosophy of physics did little more than summarize parts of a few articles Mach wrote in his Popular-wissenschaftliche Vorlesungen. (Ryle (195 I) even said of Wittgenstein: 'He was influenced by Frege and Russell, not by Mach.') In order to show that Wittgenstein was directly influenced by Mach, I will confine myself to the following subjects on which Wittgenstein commented: (i) chronometry, geometry and problems of space and time (6.36I I, 6.36I I I), and (2) physical principles 6.32-6.34). Mach wrote on the first of these subjects in the last essay that appeared in the fourth edition of the aforementioned book, 'Eine Betrachtung fiber Zeit und Raum'. The second he treated in his articles 'Ueber das Princip der Erhaltung der Energie' and 'Werden Vorstellungen, Gedanken vererbt?' (Mach (I91o).) I am not concerned here with the influence of Part VI of Russell's Principles of mathematics on Wittgenstein's Abhandlung, nor with the influence of Hertz's Prinzipien der Mechanik on both works, I only want to point out that the similarity of Wittgenstein's remarks with some of Mach's popular-scientific agruments is so striking that one cannot but conclude that Wittgenstein had read at least some of the articles of Mach's Popular-wissenschaftliche Vorlesungen. First, there are Wittgenstein's comments on Kant's problem of the right and left hand which cannot be made to cover one another: (i) this problem occurs already in the plane, and even in one-dimensional space; (2) the right and left hand are in fact completely congruent; (3) a right-hand giove could be put on a left hand if it could be turned in four-dimensional space (cf. 6.36III). Mach made similar remarks, but he at least did not omit his source: according to Mach, M6bius remarked about I827 'that a linear figure abc, that can be seen as the symmetrical counterpart of a'b'c'mirrored in SS on the same straight line, can never be made to cover the latter on this line; for this purpose one has to take the figure out of the straight line and turn it; in order to do that at least two dimensions are needed, so a plane' (ibid., pp. 502-503). In addition Mach mentioned M6bius' generalisation, not only for triangles in a plane, but also for congruent three-dimensional bodies, that cannot be made to cover each other in any way in space: 'But one could

Johann Georg Hamann: Metacritic of Kant

Hamann's criticisms of Immanuel Kant (as the critical philosopher after 1781) are contained in letters to Hamann's friends and in two short articles on the Critique of Pure Reason. The first article, a book review, was completed by the time of the appearance of the Critique of Pure Reason in July 1781. Hamann had received the first pages of Kant's book in proof from Hartknoch, both his publisher and Kant's, as early as April. The second article Hamann called the Metacritique of the Purism of the Reason (1784). Playing on the term metaphysics, which was the name given to the book in Aristotle which followed the Physics, Hamann intends to be the critic who follows the Critique. This criticism of Kant was born of the most serious respect on Hamann's part. At the time of the appearance of the Critique of Pure Reason Hamann was working on a translation of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion to which he planned to append his own critique of Hume. When Kant's book appeared it was evident to Hamann that the opponent was no longer Hume, and the project was never resumed. Although the underground influence of Hamann's criticism may be considerable, an evaluation of Hamann's critique of Kant has not yet been satisfactorily carried through-largely because such an undertaking would depend upon a grasp of Hamann's thought as a whole which only recent Hamann-research promises to provide. Kant's problem was one of escaping certain conclusions of Hume, while observing the principle inaugurated by the empirical tradition, that genuine additions to human knowledge (i.e. those embodied in synthetic judgments) 1 depend upon intuitions (Anschauungen) of sensibility (Sinnlichkeit).2 Yet reason is not to be dissolved into momentary sense impressions (Empfindungen) and thus saved from complete fragmentation only by nature or habit. The ideal before Kant is the Cartesian ideal of certainty.3 The way to accomplish this ideal is to show how synthetic, but a priori (i.e. necessary and universal) knowledge is possible.4 Philosophical reason must show that it stands on a sure foundation. This can be done by restricting its claims. A body of synthetic a priori

The Aim of the Critique of Pure Reason

My topic is historical rather than philosophical. I want to consider what Kant aimed to achieve in the Critique of Pure Reason. In 1909 Prichard wrote, “Kant's problem is similar to Locke's. Locke states that his purpose is to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge.” Many have maintained that Kant's purpose was to mediate between rationalism and empiricism in epistemology. Hermann Cohen held that the aim of the Critique is to provide a theory of experience, an account of empirical knowledge. Ernst Cassirer and other neo-Kantians have held that its aim is to furnish a philosophy of science.