Kant's Transcendental Idealism Research Articles

Introduction to the Special Issue ‘Umwelt Theory and Phenomenology’

This introduction to the special issue “Umwelt Theory and Phenomenology” is composed of a brief theoretical introduction to phenomenology seen as a key attitude of philosophical research, an investigation of the possibilities offered by a combined application of phenomenology and biosemiotics, and an overview of the articles that are included in the special issue. The theoretical introduction stresses the possibility of distinguishing, within phenomenology, between approaches centred on the object (in other terms, the phenomenon), and subject-centred approaches which have emerged in the wake of Kantian transcendental idealism. The connection with biosemiotics is explored for both kinds of approaches, showing how Uexküll, and many other scholars after him, have used phenomenological tools and perspectives in the study of biological meaning and meaning-making processes. For each article in the collection, the overview of the articles indicates one or two points that we believe are of the greatest interest for the reader.

Понятие трансцендентального в системе трансцендентального монизма В. Д. Кудрявцева-Платонова

The aim of the article is to clarify the meaning of the concept of "transcendental" in the epistemology of the most prominent representative of Russian ecclesiastic-academic philosophy of the second half of the 19th century, Christian philosopher V. D. Kudryavtsev-Platonov, as well as the relationship of this concept in the interpretation of the Russian religious philosopher to the philosophical tradition of transcendentalism established by I. Kant. The core of Kudryavtsev's entire epistemology is the concept of transcendental monism presented in his work "Metaphysical Analysis of Empirical Cognition". In the process of reconstruction of the mentioned concept it is shown that it has two planes: ontological and epistemological. Transcendental monism as an epistemological concept is the subject of conceptual and comparative analysis in the article, by means of which similarities and differences between Kudryavtsev's and Kant's epistemology are established. On the basis of this comparison it is concluded that Kudryavtsev, denying only the subjective character of cognitive forms, overcame Kant's transcendental idealism. Then the epistemological views of V. T. Krug and F. A. Trendelenburg are analysed as basic positions for Kudryavtsev's transcendental monism in order to identify its links with the tradition of Kantian transcendentalism. According to the results of the analysis, the ideas of Krug, Trendelenburg and Kudryavtsev are compared, which shows the points of convergence between the philosophers, namely, the transcendental for them appears in connection with the a priori, that is, with that which has an inexperienced origin, but lies at the basis of possible experience. It is established that Krug, Trendelenburg and Kudryavtsev endeavoured to overcome the gap between thinking and the external world in the process of cognition, which had arisen in Kantian transcendental idealism. Hence, it is concluded that the concept of "transcendental" in Kudryavtsev's theory of cognition is linked to the tradition of Kantian transcendentalism through the concept of apriorism. Finally, it is concluded that Kudryavtsev's epistemology is an example of Christian philosophy incorporating the concept of the transcendental in its connection with Kantian transcendentalism, and may become a model for new attempts to construct a Christian epistemology.

The World According to Kant: Appearances and Things in Themselves in Critical Idealism

Anja Jauernig here addresses with great scholarship and philosophical insight a central issue in the interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason: ‘The project of this book is to develop a comprehensive account of Kant's theoretical views in his theoretical critical philosophy or, perhaps more accurately, of the ontological implications of his theoretical critical philosophy. More specifically, my aim will be to sort out Kant's views on the nature of appearances, the nature of things in themselves, and the relation between them as presented and hinted in the Critique of Pure Reason…and associated writings’ (p. 1). This project, she thinks, is of more than historical interest, as Kant's ontological position, ‘critical idealism’, has great philosophical merit and may very well be in its main lines true (a thesis she does not claim to demonstrate in this book, though a sequel to it is planned). In taking this stance, she sharply dissents from the view, most closely associated in Anglo-American analytic philosophy with Peter Strawson, that Kant's transcendental idealism must either be rendered innocuous or disregarded altogether. ‘…Strawson's two-world reading of transcendental idealism, and his claim that Kant's more valuable philosophical insights can, fortunately, be “disentangled” from the doctrine of transcendental idealism, inspired legions of Kant scholars to either follow him in setting transcendental idealism to one side—or engage in the business of saving Kant from his bad reputation by devising readings that do not present him as a two-world theorist after all…’ (p. 24).

Legislative sovereignty: moving from jurisprudence towards metaphysics

ABSTRACT Legislative sovereignty is often discussed with one eye on the past and one eye on the procedural functions of law-making in the present. This limits the scope for a conceptual understanding of legislative sovereignty and hinders its theoretical progress. This article argues that legislative sovereignty contains within it the concept of an idol and that understanding the scope and impact of the idol of sovereignty is necessary for future development in this field. Theories from Kant, Nietzsche, von Mises and Derrida are used to offer a divergent critique of legislative sovereignty while the author calls for a move towards a nuanced view of legislative and Parliamentary Sovereignty to account for its idolism. The key factor preventing the development of a truly nuanced and reflective theory of sovereignty is the devotion to former idols which are inoperable and inconsistent with modern geopolitical, inter-state relationships. The author also argues that our knowledge of sovereignty is synthetic a priori and that development in this area can only be by reason, as knowledge derived experientially is subject to the Kantian Transcendental Idealism.

The Epistemological Stance of Psychoanalysis: Revisiting the Kantian Legacy

Psychoanalysis, as conceived by Freud, originates from an epistemological position that is often at odds with related disciplines such as psychology and psychiatry. We argue that psychoanalysis is wedded to a Kantian epistemology that is rigorously committed to modesty. The aim of the article is to illustrate how Freud’s thinking was embedded within a Kantian epistemology. Even if he was not explicit, a prevailing Kantian philosophical discussion influenced Freud. Hence, the article shall not argue for Freud as working with Kant as a philosopher, but more narrowly address his epistemological stance as influenced by Kant. Drawing on recent philosophical work, we clarify the difference between a Kantian transcendental idealism and the more modern critical realism, and show why the former is best suited for the psychoanalytic enterprise. This leads to a discussion of how we may understand transcendental idealism as a crucial if tacit premise in modern object-relations theory. We touch upon the implicit epistemological position in Klein and Winnicott, and the more explicit one advanced by Bion. Finally, we explore the psychoanalytic attitude towards the possibility of knowledge.

Andric and Austrian philosophy

Philosophy occupied an important place in Ivo Andric?s higher education. In Vienna 1913, Andric took undergraduate courses in philosophy that were taught by Wilhelm Jerusalem, Oscar Ewald and Josef Clemens Kreibig, while on his PhD studies he passed the exam in philosophy with Hugo Spitzer, one of the rare neo-Kantians in Austria-Hungary at that time. Austrian philosophy (this phrase covers Austro-Hungarian philosophers who worked outside the boundaries of our-day Austria) is an interesting phenomenon because, among other things, Austria is relatively young philosophical nation that gave, within less than one century (from 1840s to 1930s), many famous philosophers of whom some were also famous scientists. There are some attempts of finding out what all Austrian philosophers have in common, and, according to the so-called the Neurath-Haller thesis, the hallmark of Austrian philosophy is accepting the scientific world-view, using language analysis in addressing philosophical issues, appraising psychology and endorsing empiricism that presupposes rejecting speculative metaphysics. It is worth stressing that although they wrote in the same language, many prominent Austrian philosophers explicitly wanted to distance themselves from classical German idealism (and very often from Kantian transcendental idealism) both with regards to form (the style of writing) and content (the ideas they defended). The author examines to what extent the philosophical education gained in Vienna and Graz influenced Andric?s work and argues that his thought contains elements characteristic for the main features of Austrian philosophy mentioned above.

Algunos aspectos de la dialéctica del Parménides desde la óptica hegeliana

The purpose of this paper is to offer a general view of the philosophical affinities between Plato and Hegel through the analysis of the Hegelian interpretation of the Parmenides. We will show how the Hegelian approach to Plato, and his understanding of idealism and dialectics, is determined by Hegel’s debate with the philosophy of Kant. A brief expose of the differences between Kantian transcendental idealism and Hegelian absolute idealism will be needed. Then, we will show some traits of the Hegelian hermeneutics of Plato in order to understand how the first part of the Parmenides admits parallelisms with certain excerpts of Hegel’s work, both regarding its philosophical purpose as well as stylistically. Finally, the Author expounds the Hegelian evaluation of the dialectical exercise from the second part of the Parmenides. There, Platonic Dialectic fails and does not accomplish its philosophical purpose, and becomes a valuable skepticism consubstantial to philosophical thought.

Is There a Need for Transcendental Arguments in Discourse Ethics?

AbstractIn this essay, James Scott Johnston examines Jürgen Habermas's transcendental justification of his discourse theory of morality. According to Johnston, the application of Habermas's theory to educational issues often assumes that this justification is a cogent one. However, if the theory is to provide reasoned and appropriate guidance for educators, the justification of discourse ethics requires closer examination. Johnston argues that Habermas's so‐called “weak” transcendental approach is in fact unsustainable because it fails to reconcile two conflicting schools of philosophical thought: Kant's transcendental idealism and George Herbert Mead's social pragmatism. Johnston concludes that a more plausible justification of the discourse ethical project can be achieved by rejecting Habermas's Kantianism and appealing solely to Mead's social pragmatic conception of rationality.

THE RECEPTION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION AS A WAY OF FORMING AMERICAN PERSONALISM: THE POST-SECULAR VIEW

The aim of the article is to define the way of expounding the authenticity of the experience of self-cognition opened by the personalist philosophy of the USA on the horizon of receiving the philosophical tradition established by B. P. Bowne to lay the epistemological foundations for overcoming the impersonalist modes of thought in the philosophical-humanitarian space of North America. At the emergent stage of the historical-philosophical process defined as its post-secular period the topicality of studying American personalism in the indicated aspect of its genesis is predetermined by developing the personalistic inspiration of post-non-classical philosophy into renewing the interaction of philosophical and theological discourses initial for the personalist thought and intended to reunite rationality with its spiritual sources in the course of reflecting the personal mode of being realized on the ground of theism. The further reflection of the meta-ontology of the personhood uncovered by the Scripture and expounded by patristic trinitology presupposes the retrospection of the trajectory of moving towards the Supernatural Revelation paved in the late nineteenth and the first half of twentieth centuries by the attempts of personalizing the ontology, in particular by the “personalized” ontological constructions made in the USA. The methodology of the research is based upon realizing the meta-ontological character of the problem of the personality revealed in the midst of the twentieth century by the prominent Orthodox theologian and philosopher-personalist V. N. Lossky. Taking into consideration the Biblical background of American personalism and its genetic connections with the denominations of Protestantism developed on the North American continent and the branching Protestant theology, the author focuses on both proper philosophical and theological reference points of this personalistic current of philosophizing in the historical-philosophical reconstruction of its genesis oriented towards the meta-ontological dimension of the personality. The scientific novelty of the study consists in initiating the reflection of the way of defining the inner experience of the self as the all-sufficient criterion of cognition which was paved by the personalist thought of the USA in the course of revising the classical rationalist models of the subjectivity and broke the ground for constructing “the personal world” in the space of rational consciousness formed in North America. On the base of analyzing Bowne's revision of Kant's transcendental idealism aimed at the explication of the immediacy of self-experience the author reveals that such argumentation for its cognitive primacy transforms into affirming the mediation of the inner appeal of the human personality to living God by the outer interpersonal experience of rational cognition. The revealed regression to the rationally mediated relationship of the created person with Creator is connected with the restriction of the research for “personal beginning of all speculation” which resulted in the personal metaphysics of B. P. Bowne by the rationalistic tools of the personal self-reflection. The study proves that it was predetermined by the philosopher's confessional belonging to the Methodist Church detached from patristic Trinitology and Christology forming the arsenal of trinitarian meta-logic intended to expound the personhood as the ultimate principle of being. Conclusions define the resource of Bowne's idea of the “personal interpretation of experience” which inspired the subsequent “personalized” ontological constructions in the personalistic domain established on the North American continent. They form the dialogic space of the personalist philosophy of the USA predetermining the accumulation of its potential in the interaction with other philosophical currents. Manifesting itself as the personalistic inspiration of the emerging trends of thought this tendency predicts the focus of the further historical-philosophical research of American personalism.

Эренфрид Вальтер фон Чирнгаус: «Medicina mentis» как первая философия и всеобщая наука

The treatise of E.W. von Tschirnhaus «Medicina mentis»… is discussed in this article in the context of formation of Kant’s transcendental criticism. The study of theoretical sources of Tschirnhaus’s epistemology shows that, despite the strong influence of Spinoza and Leibniz, Tschirnhaus is closer to the Cartesian tradition. Trying to eliminate the metaphysical backgrounds from philosophy, he brings together empirical and rationalist traditions as close as possible. Such «critical convergence» results in the «subjective turn» that (partly through Ch. Wolff, but mainly through I.N. Tetens) leads to Kant's transcendental idealism.

El idealismo trascendental kantiano: origen del debate

In this article we analyze the starting point of the debate motivated by Kant’s embracement of the doctrine of Idealism. This debate, as we propose here, can be considered as the original point in the discussion that structures the further development of German Idealism, that is, the discussion about what should be the true idealist system that preserves the virtues of Kant's Transcendental Idealism but is able to overcome its shortcomings. In order to accomplish this, we study: first, the way in which Kant presents his idealistic position in the Critique of Pure Reason of 1781; second, the objections raised by Garve and Feder in the famous review published in 1782, where they accuse Kant of defending a higher idealism, comparable to Berkeley’s position; third, the reaction of Kant against this objection, reflected in certain passages of the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics and of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason; fourth, the famous objection posed by Jacobi, who expresses the need to abandon Kantian notion of things in themselves and accept solipsism if the kantian philosopher wishes to avoid falling into contradiction; finally, referring to the impact of this last objection and the importance of this debate in the origins of German Idealism, we refer to Fichte’s assessment of the Kantian transcendental idealism and his known pronouncement of his own Doctrine of science as Kant’s position well understood.

Husserls Kritik an Kants transzendentalem Idealismus: Erörterung des phänomenologischen Idealismus

Husserls Kritik an Kants transzendentalem Idealismus: Erörterung des phänomenologischen Idealismus

Od transcendentalnog idealizma do transcendentalnog empirizma i šire - Kant, Delez i ravna ontologija umetnosti

In this paper I will show that the movement from Kant's transcendental idealism to Gilles Deleuze's transcendental empiricism and then to new materialisms and speculative realisms is what enables us to talk about the direct and non-mediated access to the thing in itself (or its dissolution). In other words, it's the change from the conditions of possible experience to the conditions of real experience that made possible current philosophical and theoretical discourses of materialisms and realisms. What is of particular interest for the purposes of this paper is how the change from conditions of possible to real experience relates to the current conceptualizations of art practices. More precisely, I will show how the ontology of art changed, or at least that there perhaps appears paradigm-shifting possibility of different aesthetics and ontologies of art, flat ontology being one of them, with the appearance of new materialisms and speculative realisms that were made possible by the change to the conditions of real experience.

Is the Semiosphere Post-Modernist?

This paper provides arguments for and against M.Lotman’s (2002) contention that Y.Lotman’s seminal concept of semiosphere is of post-modernist (post-structuralist; Posner 2011) orientation. A comparative reading of the definitional components of the semiosphere, their hierarchical relationship and their interactions is undertaken against the two principal axes of space and subjectivity in the light of Kantian transcendental idealism, as inaugural and authoritative figure of modernity, the Foucauldian discursive turn and the Deleuzian (post) radical empiricism (sic), as representative authors of the highly versatile post-modern vernacular. This comparative reading aims at highlighting not only similarities and differences between the Lotmanian conceptualization of the semiosphere and the concerned modernist and post-modernist authors, but the construct’s operational relevance in a post-metanarratives cultural predicament that has

The Non‐Identity of Appearances and Things in Themselves

AbstractAccording to the ‘One Object’ reading of Kant's transcendental idealism, the distinction between the appearance and the thing in itself is not a distinction between two objects, but between two ways of considering one and the same object. On the ‘Metaphysical’ version of the One Object reading, it is a distinction between two kinds of properties possessed by one and the same object. Consequently, the Metaphysical One Object view holds that a given appearance, an empirical object, is numerically identical to the thing in itself that appears as that object. I raise various indiscernibility arguments against that view; because an appearance has different spatiotemporal and modal properties than a thing in itself, no appearance can be identical to a thing in itself. I point out that these arguments are similar to arguments against Monism, the view that material objects are numerically identical to the matter of which they are made. I outline some strategies Monists have developed to respond to these indiscernibility arguments and then develop parallel responses on behalf of the Metaphysical One Object view. However, I then raise another indiscernibility argument, to which, I argue, the Metaphysical One Object view cannot respond, even using the resources I have developed thus far. I develop a modified version of the Metaphysical One Object view that can respond to this new indiscernibility argument, but, I argue, this modified version of the One Object view is only a terminological variant of the Two Object view. When the Metaphysical One Object view is fully thought through it becomes the Two Object view. I conclude that Kantian appearances are not numerically identical to the things in themselves that appear to us.

Bodies inProlegomena§13: Noumena or Phenomena?

This article discusses Kant's transcendental idealism in relation to his perplexing use of ‘body’ and related terms inProlegomena§13. Here Kant admits the existence of bodies external to us, although unknown as what they might be in themselves. It is argued that we need to distinguish between a phenomenal and a noumenal use of ‘body’ to make sense of Kant's argument. The most important recent discussions of this passage, i.e., Prauss (1977), Langton (1998) and Bird (2006), are presented and shown to suffer from both systematic and exegetical shortcomings. The article is a contribution to understanding the nature of Kant's transcendental idealism, defending the view, especially against Prauss and Bird, that Kant is committed to the existence of things in themselves.

Transcendental Philosophy and the Challenge of the Human Body: Merleau-Ponty and Kant

This essay discusses Merleau-Ponty's assessment of Kant's philosophy looking first at his critique of Kant's transcendental idealism in the preface to the 1945 Phenomenology of Perception, and second at his account of the duality of the concepts of nature in the 1956-57 lecture notes on Nature at the Collčge de France. In both cases, Merleau-Ponty points to the encounter with the issue of the living/lived body as the stumbling block that halts the transcendental inquiry leading to his transcendental phenomenology. Along this itinerary, countering Merleau-Ponty's reading a different interpretation of Kant is offered. The claim is made that Kant did not evade the problem of the human body but made it functional to his own transcendental inquiry. Task of this essay is to measure the distance that separates the two accounts of Kant's view of sensibility, namely, the critical account that inspires Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the lived body leading him beyond the alleged impasse of Kant's transcendental idealism, and what the author claims to be Kant's own transcendental view of sensibility.

Kant's transcendental idealism and McDowell

Kant's transcendental idealism and McDowell

Intellectualism, Relational Properties and the Divine Mind in Kant's Pre-Critical Philosophy

AbstractI demonstrate that the pre-Critical Kant is essentialist and intellectualist about the relational properties of substances. That is to say, God can choose whether or not to create a substance, and whether or not to connect this substance with other substances, so as to create a world: but God cannot choose what the nature of the relational properties is, once the substance is created and connected. The divine will is constrained by the essences of substances. Nonetheless, Kant considers that essences depend upon God, in that they depend upon the divine intellect. I conclude by gesturing towards some possible implications of this interpretation, when considering the role that might be played by God – both historically and conceptually – in relation to the notion of ‘laws of nature’, and when understanding Kant's transcendental idealism and his Critical conception of freedom.

Allais on Transcendental Idealism

AbstractLucy Allais argues that we can better understand Kant's transcendental idealism by taking seriously the analogy of appearances to secondary qualities that Kant offers in theProlegomena. A proper appreciation of this analogy, Allais claims, yields a reading of transcendental idealism according to which all properties that can appear to us in experience are mind-dependent relational properties that inhere in mind-independent objects. In section 1 of my paper, I articulate Allais's position and its benefits, not least of which is its elegant explanation of how the features of objects that appear to us are transcendentally ideal while still being ‘empirically’ real. In section 2, I contend that there are elements of Allais's account that are problematic, yet also inessential, to what I view to be the core contribution of her analysis. These elements are the views that the properties that appear to human beings are not really distinct from properties that things have ‘in themselves’ and that Kant embraced a relational account of perception. In section 3, I return to the core of Allais's reading and argue that, despite its multiple virtues, it cannot make sense of key features of Kant's idealism.