Kantian Grounds Research Articles

Expressing and receiving negative emotions: Comments on Myisha Cherry's The Case for Rage

AbstractResponding to Myisha Cherry's The Case for Rage, I discuss how the book touches on the difficulties of disentangling emotions and their expressions. Then I suggest two ways in which destructive rage might be good, one on Kantian grounds and another via extension from experience. Finally, I raise the issue of whether there might be other Lordean emotions.

Dignity, Dementia and Death

AbstractAccording to Kant’s ethics, at least on one common interpretation, persons have a special worth or dignity that demands respect. But personhood is not coextensive with human life; for example, individuals can live in severe dementia after losing the capacities constitutive of personhood. Some philosophers, including David Velleman and Dennis Cooley, have suggested that individuals living after the loss of their personhood might offend against the Kantian dignity the individuals once possessed. Cooley has even argued that it is morally required on Kantian grounds for those who realize that they will lose their personhood as a result of dementia (e.g. Alzheimer’s) to hasten their deaths (e.g. commit suicide). This article specifies circumstances in which post-personhood living might indeed involve an affront to the Kantian dignity of a person who once was. However, the article contends, Kant implies that it is neither morally required nor even morally permissible for someone in an early stage of Alzheimer’s to hasten their death to avoid such an affront, even if they have autonomously chosen to do so. The article adds an ethical perspective to debate on physician-assisted dying, in particular on the moral permissibility of the soon-to-be-demented ending their lives.

Manipulation as theft

ABSTRACT Should there be a right not to be manipulated? On Kantian grounds, manipulation, lies and paternalistic coercion are moral wrongs, and for similar reasons; they deprive people of agency, insult their dignity, and fail to respect personal autonomy. On welfarist grounds, manipulation, lies and paternalistic coercion share a different characteristic; they displace the choices of those whose lives are directly at stake, and who are likely to have epistemic advantages, with the choices of outsiders, who lack critical information. Kantians and welfarists should be prepared to endorse a (moral) right not to be manipulated, though on very different grounds. At the same time, the creation of a legal right not to be manipulated raises hard questions, in part because of definitional challenges. With welfarist considerations in mind, it is best to start by prohibiting the most egregious instances of manipulation, while emphasizing that they may not count as fraud or deception. The basic goal should be to build on the claim that in certain cases, manipulation is a form of theft; the law should forbid theft, whether it occurs through force, lies, or manipulation.

Manipulation As Theft

Should there be a right not to be manipulated? What kind of right? On Kantian grounds, manipulation, lies, and paternalistic coercion are moral wrongs, and for similar reasons; they deprive people of agency, insult their dignity, and fail to respect personal autonomy. On welfarist grounds, manipulation, lies, and paternalistic coercion share a different characteristic; they displace the choices of those whose lives are directly at stake, and who are likely to have epistemic advantages, with the choices of outsiders, who are likely to lack critical information. Kantians and welfarists should be prepared to endorse a (moral) right not to be manipulated, though on very different grounds. The moral prohibition on manipulation, like the moral prohibition on lies, should run against officials and regulators, not only against private institutions. At the same time, the creation of a legal right not to be manipulated raises hard questions, in part because of definitional challenges; there is a serious risk of vagueness and a serious risk of overbreadth. (Lies, as such, are not against the law, and the same is true of unkindness, inconsiderateness, and even cruelty.) With welfarist considerations in mind, it is probably best to start by prohibiting particular practices, while emphasizing that they are forms of manipulation and may not count as fraud. The basic goal should be to build on the claim that in certain cases, manipulation is a form of theft; the law should forbid theft, whether it occurs through force, lies, or manipulation. Some manipulators are thieves.

Kant on Welfare: Five Unsuccessful Defences

AbstractThis article discusses five attempts at justifying the provision of welfare on Kantian grounds. I argue that none of the five proposals is satisfactory. Each faces a serious challenge on textual or systematic grounds. The conclusion to draw from this is not that a Kantian cannot defend the provision of welfare. Rather, the conclusion to draw is that the task of defending the provision of welfare on Kantian grounds is a difficult one whose success we should not take for granted.

Getting away with murder: why virtual murder in MMORPGs can be wrong on Kantian grounds

Ali (Ethics and Information Technology 17:267–274, 2015) and McCormick (Ethics and Information Technology 3:277–287, 2001) claim that virtual murders are objectionable when they show inappropriate engagement with the game or bad sportsmanship. McCormick argues that such virtual murders cannot be wrong on Kantian grounds because virtual murders only violate indirect moral duties, and bad sportsmanship is shown across competitive sports in the same way. To condemn virtual murder on grounds of bad sportsmanship, we would need to also condemn other competitive games. I argue, contra McCormick, that virtual murders performed within massively multiplayer online roleplaying games can be wrong on Kantian grounds when they are exploitative. Exploitation occurs when virtual murder treats the player controlling the victim in a way that they have no opportunity to consent to (i.e. as a mere means in Kantian terminology). I argue that some virtual murders involving inappropriate engagement (Ali, Ethics and Information Technology 17:267–274, 2015) and bad sportsmanship (McCormick, Ethics and Information Technology 3:277–287, 2001) are exploitative in this way and therefore also wrong on Kantian grounds.

Between Leibniz and Kant: The Political Thought of Wilhelm von Humboldt

In his early text, The Limits of State Action, Wilhelm von Humboldt raises the Kantian question of the permissibility and legitimate extent of political and juridical coercion, as his contribution to a debate amongst Kantians launched by the publication in 1785 of Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In arguing for a minimal state, concerned exclusively with internal and external security of its members but not at all with their felicity, Humboldt inflects Kantian political thought in the direction of a liberal laissez-faire state, in marked contrast to the strong interventionism that his fellow-Kantian Fichte derived from similar Kantian grounds. The article argues that the underlying conception of the individual retained by Humboldt has markedly Leibnizian traits, namely the notion of freedom as the spontaneous unfolding of a highly personal, monadic developmental trajectory toward perfection, which ought not to be impeded or homogenized by unnecessary state intervention. Humboldt thus represents not only a ‘rightist’ libertarian reading of Kant, but a particular appropriation of significant Leibnizian themes. His combination of these sources is compared with that of other contemporary theorists like Hufeland and Fichte.

The Cost of Conscience.

The spread of demands by physicians and allied health professionals for accommodation of their private ethical, usually religiously based, objections to providing care of a particular type, or to a particular class of persons, suggests the need for a re-evaluation of conscientious objection in healthcare and how it should be regulated. I argue on Kantian grounds that respect for conscience and protection of freedom of conscience is consistent with fairly stringent limitations and regulations governing refusal of service in healthcare settings. Respect for conscience does not entail that refusal of service should be cost free to the objector. I suggest that conscientious objection in medicine should be conceptualized and treated analogously to civil disobedience.

Reconsidering Kantian arguments against organ selling.

Referring to Kant's arguments addressing the moral relationship between our bodies and ourselves is quite common in contemporary debate about organ selling, although he does not provide us with any specific arguments related to this debate. It is widely argued that the most promising way to show the moral impermissibility of organ selling is to mount an argument on Kantian grounds. This paper asks whether it is possible to argue coherently against organ selling in a Kantian framework. It will be shown that by mounting the argument on Kantian grounds no compelling argument can be given against sale of organs, either because the arguments apply to donation of organs, too, or the arguments are not convincing for other independent reasons. In the first section, it will be argued that donation and selling are not distinguishable in a Kantian framework, since the concern about commodification of the body and its parts shall be raised by both actions. In the second section, some contemporary accounts inspired by Kant will be presented and discussed separately. It will be argued that the reasons for promoting organ donation while arguing against selling clash with each other in an unconvincing way.

Death, happiness and the meaning of life: The view from sociology

This article recovers the understated engagement with the question of mortality and the relationship to death in life through a reading of the classics of sociology – Durkheim, Marx, Simmel and Weber–in order to dramatize the relationship of such a concern to the imaginary of perpetual happiness idealized by the bourgeoisie of each generation and exemplified by Lacan as the ‘problem’ of the city. If engaging mortality is conceived as an example of the thinking of limits, I suggest that this ban parallels disavowing the question of meaning that the bourgeoisie have cultivated and perfected in the name of practical thinking. In this way, the bourgeoisie can be said to have mastered the secret of life and the connection between mental hygiene and intellectual parsimony celebrated by Kant as the advance of enlightenment. This adjustment is located at least as far back as the Stoics and replayed in much thought and in popular culture as a symptom of the self-destructiveness of the fixation on ‘ultimate meaning’ and its realistic pursuit in life. In this sense, the conditions of citizenship in the city are said to require a systemic disregard of such ‘deep’ concerns on Kantian grounds that their inaccessibility and irresolute character can only distract circumspection from its limited goals. Georg Simmel is maintained as the classical figure who both engaged death (and so the risk of thinking limit) and suffered marginalization for this, making his resolution of this tension not tragic, as his idiom suggests, but an exemplification of sociological artistry and of the playful relationship to life that it promises when unencumbered by the fear of the bourgeoisie.

Lacan’s Three Registers

I am grateful to Darian Leader for his interesting remarks, which serve as a useful reminder of some of the complexities of the thought of Jacques Lacan, particularly regarding the three registers of imaginary, symbolic, and real. Because I understand Leader’s remarks as essentially congruent with my own views, I respond briefly here, mainly to underscore some of the features of Lacan’s perspective that Leader rightly emphasizes. In my essay, I argue that each of Lacan’s three registers can be understood as constituting something like a Heideggerian mode of being. I go on to say, however, that this is not the only way the registers could or should be understood; and that, although Lacan can be read as contributing to phenomenology, he is certainly not ‘entirely or solely a phenomenologist.’ In line with this, I can certainly agree that, as Leader puts it, the imaginary and symbolic can be understood as something like Kantian grounds of experience. To my mind, however, this does not prevent us from recognizing the sense in which the registers are also associated with characteristic modes of experience and, especially, with encompassing or ontological modes of being in the Heideggerian sense. Another important point that Leader underscores concerns the complex nature of the relationship between the registers. The registers are indeed, as Leader remarks, in a kind of ‘diacritical’ relationship with each other, in the sense of being mutually defining and thus mutually interdependent precisely through their relationships of mutual opposition. Elsewhere, in a longer treatment of Lacan (Sass, in press), I discuss these features in some detail, associating them with the emphasis on paradoxical relationships that I see as one of the two crucial features of Lacan’s essentially modernist position (using ‘modernist’ in the esthetic sense, pertaining primarily to early twentieth century artistic and intellectual movements). Leader is, in my view, perfectly correct to remind us, for instance, of the fact (perhaps not sufficiently emphasized in my contribution to this special issue) that the experience of a more authentic and vital realm, sometimes associated with the Real, is not sui generis, but largely generated by its presumed opposition to the realm of the Symbolic.

The Pleasures of Contra-purposiveness: Kant, the Sublime, and Being Human

Serious doubts have been raised about the coherence of theories of the sublime and the usefulness of the concept. By contrast, the sublime is increasingly studied as a key function in Kant's moral psychology and in his ethics. This article combines methodological conservatism, approaching the topic from within Kant's discussion of aesthetic judgment, with reconstruction of a conception of human agency that is tenable on Kantian grounds. I argue that a coherent theory of the sublime is possible and useful, and the experience of the sublime is significant for our self-conception as agents. However, the chief interest in the sublime is not moral.

Varieties of Moral Beliefs in the "Sociology of Religion"

The article analyses the distinction in Weber's writings between conviction ethics and other types of ethics. Schluchter has situated this distinction in a sociological manner rather than religious meanings, as that between heroic (elite) ethics and mass religiosity. I argue that an ethic of conviction, in the Sociology of Religion, belongs to Weber's analysis of both ethical and exemplary prophecy; his analysis of priests and laity tends to obscure this point. Evil is overcome by an effort of inner conviction not priestly ritual. Contra Schluchter, ethical norms are not internalized and routinized into the convention of duty. Instead ethics are demonstrated by exemplary action of heroic individuals as religious virtuosi. The second half of the article pursues the difference between ethical sanctification through institutional grace, on one hand, and a virtuoso conviction ethic, on the other. The former is attained by duty, the latter through the will of the individual and the belief that salvation is attained through faith alone. One important conclusion is that conviction ethic, prominently displayed in Politik als Beruf, is an outcome of a religious conviction ethics. Faith is pursued through will and exemplary deeds and action. This places the argument on Nietzschean rather than Kantian grounds. In choosing to act in an exemplary way out of conviction, the consequences of actions and one's responsibility for them do not come into consideration. This renders conviction ethics consequential in their own right. Nietzschean moral autonomy puts the individual at moral risk. Weber demanded of these heroic moments intellectual honesty in place of self-deception. In rising to these moments, conviction ethics offer dignity to the modern individual.

A Kantian Moral Duty for the Soon-to-be Demented to Commit Suicide

It has been argued that, on Kantian grounds, pedophiles, rapists and murderers are morally obligated to take their own lives prior to committing a violent action that will end their moral agency. That is, to avoid destroying the agent's moral life by performing a morally suicidal action, the agent, while he still is a moral agent, should end his body's life. Although the cases of dementia and the morally reprehensible are vastly different, this Kantian interpretation might be useful in the debate on the permissibility of suicide for those facing dementia's effects. If moral agents have a duty to act as moral agents, then those who will lose their moral identity as moral agents have an obligation to themselves to end their physical lives prior to losing their dignity as persons.

Respect for Workers in Global Supply Chains: Advancing the Debate Over Sweatshops

ABSTRACT:In “Sweatshops and Respect for Persons” we argued on Kantian grounds that managers of multinational enterprises (MNEs) have the following duties: to adhere to local labor laws, to refrain from coercion, to meet minimum health and safety standards, and to pay workers a living wage. In their commentary on our paper Sollars and Englander challenge some of our conclusions. We argue here that several of their criticisms are based on an inaccurate reading of our paper, and that none of the remaining criticisms successfully challenge our main arguments. By highlighting the shortcomings of their arguments we hope to advance discussion of the ethical treatment of workers in global supply chains.

Filosofiniai žurnalistikos pagrindai : subjektyviosios objektyvumo šaknys

Journalism, like science, takes for granted certain fundamental assumptions, including (1) that reality exists; (2) that truths exist; and (3) that reality can be shown by expressing truths about it. These assumptions have been challenged by relativists and postmodernists of various stripes. This paper attempts to overcome the challenge by showing that these assumptions can be vigorously de¬fended (and some kinds of relativism and postmodernism refuted) not only on Aristotelian-Tho-mistic but also on Berkleian (subjective idealist) and Kantian (transcendental idealist, humankind-relativist) grounds. If the latter two approaches can be sustained, then objectivity and subjectivity need not be considered mutually exclusive. This paper is part of a larger project of exploring the foundations of journalistic objectivity.

From Opposition to Reciprocity

This article deals with the relationship between philosophy and science in the writings of Karl Jaspers and with its reception in the wider scholarly literature. The problem is how to characterize the relationship that exists between science -defined on pure Kantian grounds as a universally valid knowledge of phenomenal objects- and philosophy -conceived by Jaspers as the transcending mode of thinking of personal Existenz rising towards the totality and unity of Being. Two solutions to that problem arise from Jaspers s writings. The oppositionist view is based in his earlier philosophy of Existenz . It describes the discrepancy between determinateness, bestowed by science to its objects, and freedom of self-determination, which is both a synonym and a condition of possibility for Existenz . The reciprocal view is based in Jaspers s later works, where he focuses on exploration of his concept of Being ( das Umgreifende ). By contrast with most of Jaspers s commentators, the present interpretation is anchored in a developmental and contextual understanding of Jaspers s thought. Showing the transcendental background of this topic, the proposed interpretation allows us to abstain from viewing the two solutions as incoherent or contradictory and instead to see them as constitutive of a single philosophical course.

Electronic Monitoring and Privacy Issues in Business-Marketing: The Ethics of the DoubleClick Experience

The paper examines the ethics of electronic monitoring for advertising purposes and the implications for Internet user privacy using as a backdrop DoubleClick Inc’s recent controversy over matching previously anonymous user profiles with personally identifiable information. It explores various ethical theories that are applicable to understand privacy issues in electronic monitoring. It is argued that, despite the fact that electronic monitoring always constitutes an invasion of privacy, it can still be ethically justified on both Utilitarian and Kantian grounds. From a Utilitarian perspective the emphasis must be on minimizing potential harms. From a Kantian perspective the emphasis must be on giving users complete information so that they can make informed decisions as to whether they are willing to be monitored. Considering the Internet advertising industry’s current actions, computer users and government regulators would be well advised, both practically and ethically, to move to a user control model in electronic monitoring.

How children can be respected as 'ends' yet still be used as subjects in non-therapeutic research.

The question of whether or not children may be used as subjects in non-therapeutic research projects has generated a great deal of debate and received answers varying from 'no, never' to 'yes, if societal interests are served'. It has been claimed that a Kantian, deontological ethics would necessarily rule out such research, since valid consent would be impossible. The present paper gives a deontological argument for allowing children to be subjects in certain types of research.