Kantian Foundations Research Articles

A Reply to Clark Wolf, Elizabeth Edenberg, and Helga Varden

AbstractIn this article, I respond to symposium articles by Clark Wolf, Elizabeth Edenberg, and Helga Varden. With shared sympathies for anti-oppression liberalism and social contract theory, they urge me to develop the theory of liberal dependency care (LDC) in new directions — respectively, as a form of subject-centered justice, with a political liberal justification, and with a Kantian foundation for ‘private right.’ I respond by explicating the inclusivity that is built into the arrow of care map and the variety of contract theory I advance. Furthermore, I insist that anti-oppression liberalism need not formulate its claims in political liberal terms.

Two Metaphysics of Freedom: Kant and Hegel on Violence and Law in the Era of the Fall of Liberal Democracy

The article attempts to rethink the legacy of Kant and Hegel in light of the problematic of law, violence and universality. It is also an explication of this legacy in the context of two contemporary insights into historical fate of our Eurocentric civilization—of Achille Mbembe and of Susan Buck-Morss. First, I consider the Kantian foundation of Rechtstaat in the light of Benjamin’s classic Critique of Violence and Mbembe’s contemporary critique of colonial power. Then I propose a new account of the central concept of Hegel’s Logic—i.e. the transition from necessity to freedom— from the same perspective, supplemented with Derrida’s interpretation of Benjamin, and Žižek’s reading of Hegel. The dialectic of modality from Hegel’s Science of Logic seems to be an underappreciated thread in this respect, insofar as Hegel’s idea of universality or freedom is founded on his ontology and critique of law.

Las raíces kantianas de la autonomía personal en el pensamiento de Rawls

Rawls acknowledges the analogy between his conception of the moral personality and the thought of Kant. However, many philosophers have discussed that similarity. This article aims to evaluate the Kantian foundation of Rawlsian liberty. Specifically, it assesses the idea of personal autonomy. The conclusion is that certain interpretation of Kant, which incorporates both his thinkings on the moral law and on happiness as an intrinsic purpose of the human being, allows the acknowledgement of the aforementioned analogy, and thus enables a better understanding of the Rawlsian idea of freedom.

A Kantian foundation for welfare rights

ABSTRACT In this article, I offer a foundation for the prima facie idea of a right to welfare based on a neglected aspect of Kant’s legal theory: his account of equity rights (aequitas, Billigkeit). I argue that these rights are not the same as the ‘moral rights’ of current literature, and that they arise as a consequence of systemic injustice. The contribution of this article is twofold: firstly, it provides an analysis and application of Kant’s underanalysed and little understood discussion of equity; secondly, it offers an alternative to contemporary accounts of welfare rights as moral rights which can better account for their juridical nature as rights.

The Legitimacy of Civil Freedom

Force and Freedom by Arthur Ripstein provides a comprehensive account of the modern legal system on a Kantian basis, reaching from private law to public international law. The legal system is presented as a coherent whole, solely based on the idea of equal freedom. Ripstein’s fundamental claim is twofold: first, the Kantian foundation is hermeneutically superior to alternative approaches to understanding the normative structure of the legal system; second, the modern legal system, due to its foundation in equal freedom, resides in reason and is thus normatively superior to alternative ideas of social ordering. Such a great work is typically subject to a wide range of objections. Some of them are raised in contributions to Freedom and Force, edited by Sari Kisilevsky and Martin Stone. This review essay attempts to explain Ripstein’s basic line of thought in Force and Freedom and to defend his account against some mistaken, but nevertheless illuminating, arguments from his critics in Freedom and Force. It then raises two further concerns, one internal, regarding the idea of justice in contractual exchange, and one external, regarding the cogency of a Kantian legitimation for the modern welfare state.

Business\u2019 Environmental Obligations and Reasoned Public Discourse: A Kantian Foundation for Analysis

The Kantian categorical imperative process of rational reflection and reasoned social discourse is theoretically capable of forming the moral environmental maxims applicable to business. This article argues that rational environmental discourse demands that business has an imperfect duty to develop relevant unbiased information, and perhaps to disseminate this information through participation in business-public coalitions. For the environmental problem, this “rationality” particularly concerns (i) our obligations toward future generations and distant people while recognizing that they cannot participate in current discourse, and (ii) the rules for gathering and assessing the evidence that should govern our environmental preservations and enhancements. Both these concerns demand certain scientific information requirements, as well as logical decision criteria that are perceived as stable across both overlapping generations, and affected peoples (as argued by Rawls in a different context). The criteria for Rawls’ “considered moral judgments” are shown to apply to resolutions of these business-related ethical conundrums. In a way similar to Kant’s anthropological examinations of humanity’s antisocial behaviors, this article also examines various biases that inhibit this social reasoning.

From the Critique of Reason to a Critique of Culture

This paper argues that Cassirer’s development of ‘the critique of reason into a critique of culture’ was prompted by two motives that ultimately seem to collide. On the one hand, Cassirer attempts to overcome the Kantian dichotomy between the faculties of sensibility and the understanding. To this end, he turns to the schemata of the Critique of Judgment. On the other hand, Cassirer expands the scope of transcendental philosophy to include cultural domains such as myth, language, and the human sciences. His desire to maintain both the differences between these domains and the unity of reason however leads to a new dualism between the material modalities of the symbols and their ideal, recurring, forms. Yet, by adopting both a constitutive and a regulative conception of objectivity, Cassirer renders this duality legitimate, and his motives for a philosophy of culture on a Kantian foundation compatible.

“Der Faule Fleck des Kantischen Kriticismus”: Erscheinung und Ding an sich bei Nietzsche

“Der Faule Fleck des Kantischen Kriticismus”: Erscheinung und Ding an sich bei Nietzsche

Deception in Sports

Herein I address and extend the sparse literature on deception in sports, specifically, Kathleen Pearson’s Deception, Sportsmanship, and Ethics and Mark J. Hamilton’s There’s No Lying in Baseball (Wink, Wink). On a Kantian foundation, I argue that attempts to deceive officials, such as framing pitches in baseball, are morally unacceptable because they necessarily regard others (e.g., the umpire) as incompetent and as a mere means to one’s own self-interested ends. More dramatically I argue, contrary to Pearson and Hamilton, that some forms of competitor-to-competitor deception (which Pearson labels ‘strategic deception’) are similarly unacceptable. Specifically, I offer a ‘principle of caustic deceit’ according to which any strategic deception that divorces a game from its constitutive skills is morally untoward and ought to be met with negative social pressure at least, and/or legislated out of existence. The problem with these forms of strategic deception is that they treat one’s opponents, again in the Kantian sense, as a mere means to one’s own self-interested ends.

Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness. By Robert S. Taylor. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011. 360p. $74.95.

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Robert S. Taylor. Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011. Pp. xxiii+336. $74.95.

Robert S. Taylor. <i>Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness</i>. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011. Pp. xxiii+336. $74.95.

Taylor, Robert S. Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2011. Pp. 60. $74.95 (cloth).

Taylor, Robert S. <i>Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness</i>. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2011. Pp. 60. $74.95 (cloth).

Robert S. Taylor, Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness

Robert S. Taylor, Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness

Reconstructing Rawls: the Kantian foundations of justice as fairness

Reconstructing Rawls: the Kantian foundations of justice as fairness

A ética kantiana E a possibilidade do altruísmo (thomas nagel)

The present article discusses the relation of Th. Nagel’s ethics of altruism with kantian ethics. According to Nagel himself, his position resembles that of Kant in two respects: it defends the thesis of the autonomy of moral motivation, and it bases moral on a determinate self-conception of persons. However, differently from Kant, the principle of Nagel’s ethics is just the modest presupposition that persons essentially understand themselves as being one among a plurality of other persons. Starting from the nagelian argument in The Possibility of Altruism (1970), but contemplating also Nagel’s more recent position in The Last Word (1999), it is argued that in order to defend his conception of a rational ethics in a convincing way, Nagel has to approximate himself more to the kantian foundation of ethics than he wants to admit.

Democratic Jurisprudence and Judicial Review: Waldron's Contribution to Political Positivism

This article engages legal positivism conceived of as a political project rather than as a descriptive account of law. Jeremy Waldron’s ‘democratic jurisprudence’ represents such a politicized legal positivism—a normative argument for legal positivism rather than a non-normative claim that legal positivism is true. Unsurprisingly, the essential institutional elements of this democratic jurisprudence turn out to be the familiar features of classical legal positivism, and the case Waldron makes against judicial review grows out of his overarching political position. But, consequently, if there are reasons to doubt the strength of Waldron’s case against judicial review, there are surely reasons to doubt the normative bases of his case for positivism, and in turn, descriptive or conceptual positivism more generally. This article investigates this claim, noting that Waldron’s political case for positivism is based on Kantian notions about moral autonomy given circumstances of moral disagreement, but that Waldron’s conclusions about the role of judges undermine both these Kantian foundations and the aims of democratic jurisprudence. While Waldron’s arguments revive a tradition of political positivism that goes back to Bentham, engagement with those arguments suggests that legal positivism ultimately must embrace a radical democratic form of anti-constitutionalism.

Autonomia podmiotu politycznego w ujęciu Johna Rawlsa

Rawls’s philosophy in general and his conception of the person in particular has undenia- bly Kantian foundations. Kant, in his attempt to find a basis for his ethic, came to a conclusion that it can be found only in the autonomy of the will which has to be independent of any em- pirical determination. Any influence of our social and psychological inclinations leads us to the refusal of freedom and makes our will heteronomous. Therefore we are able to be moral only as participants in a transcendental subject.Rawls preserves Kant’s teaching by detaching it from transcendental idealism and recast- ing in the new context. His social and political theory is founded on a specific anthropology. The metaphysical essence of a person is not determined by any form of the good, ie by the ends we choose, but consists in our capacity to choose them. The reason for that is very clear: If a conception of the good were a part of my identity, I would try to impose it on others in a society we plan to build behind the veil of ignorance. That is why only the persons who are individuated prior to their ends can construct a just society. So in Rawls’s view the autonomy turns out to be our essence.However his anthropology and his political thought as well induce us to raise some objec- tions to his proposals. Rawls sees a human being in a very abstract and artificial way and such characteristic does not show the truth about ourselves but is used by him to justify liberal prin- ciples. Rawls simply constructs a certain notion of the person, which is liberal in its content to convince us that we have to choose to live in a liberal society. If we do not recognise ourselves in his theory of the person and therefore we are reluctant to accept the liberal vision of society, then what?

Nietzsche's Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of His Thought, by R. Kevin Hill and Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor, by Gregory Moore

European Journal of PhilosophyVolume 14, Issue 3 p. 438-448 Nietzsche's Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of His Thought, by R. Kevin Hill and Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor, by Gregory Moore Mathias Risse, Mathias Risse John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USAmathias_risse@ksg.harvard.eduSearch for more papers by this author Mathias Risse, Mathias Risse John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USAmathias_risse@ksg.harvard.eduSearch for more papers by this author First published: 09 November 2006 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2006.00236.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume14, Issue3December 2006Pages 438-448 RelatedInformation

Кант і «філософія діалогу»: парадокси спадкоємності

The article is devoted to the problem of the Kantian foundations of the "philosophy of dialogue" as one of the original trends in the philosophy of the twentieth century. In the author's opinion, Kant's understanding of man as a dialogical being addressed to the Other appears. The author aims at reconstructing the essential features of the "philosophy of dialogue" as a trend in non-classical philosophy, analysing two key ideas of Kant that determined the innovativeness of his philosophy, and proving the fact of continuity and substantive connection of these phenomena in the history of philosophy. Besides there is shown an essential correlation and the order of Kant’s ideas “the criticism of free mind” and “the things in person” in one sight and the key conceptions: the philosophy of the dialogue” in another one. The latter is analysed as a specific way of implementing the Kantian paradigm of rethinking the foundations of human existence and cognition.

Nietzsche's Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of His Thought

Book Review| April 01 2005 Nietzsche's Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of His Thought Nietzsche's Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of His ThoughtHill, R. Kevin Keith Ansell Pearson Keith Ansell Pearson Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Journal of Nietzsche Studies (2005) 29 (1): 54–71. https://doi.org/10.2307/20717852 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Keith Ansell Pearson; Nietzsche's Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of His Thought. The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 1 April 2005; 29 (1): 54–71. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/20717852 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All Scholarly Publishing CollectivePenn State University PressThe Journal of Nietzsche Studies Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright © 2005 The Friedrich Nietzsche Society2005The Friedrich Nietzsche Society Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.