Justificatory Work Research Articles

Responsible Citizens, Irresponsible States: Should Citizens Pay for Their State’s Wrongdoings?

<i>Responsible Citizens, Irresponsible States: Should Citizens Pay for Their State’s Wrongdoings?</i>

“A Previous Instance”—Yamamoto and the Uses of Precedent

When questions have been raised about targeted killing—that is, about our practice of hunting down and killing terrorist suspects identified by name— defenders of the practice often bring up the case of the 1943 killing of Japanese Admiral Yamamoto, the architect of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and they cite it as a “precedent.” Now the first meaning given to the word “precedent” in the Oxford English Dictionary is “a previous instance taken as an example or rule by which to be guided in similar cases or circumstances; an example by which a comparable subsequent act may be justified.” Can this apply to the Yamamoto killing? In what way can a single instance like this from almost 80 years ago contribute anything to the permissibility of a highly controversial practice today? If the Yamamoto attack is a precedent, it is a non-judicial precedent and its invocation invites us to consider how precedent operates outside the framework of judicial decision. Beyond that, we must also ask what kind of justificatory work a single instance can do in normative argument? Does it justify by being a shining example of the rightfulness of actions of this sort? Or does it justify by beginning a line of analogical conduct that increases in its justifiability the longer it goes on?

Punishment the Easy Way

Some argue against coercive preventive measures on the grounds that they amount to cloaked forms of punishment. Others offer a qualified defence of such measures on the grounds that such measures have substantively different goals and purposes from punishment. Focusing on the case of civil preventive injunctions, I clear the ground and provide reasons for a third logical possibility: that coercive preventive measures are relevantly similar to punishment, but this does not itself give us a reason to oppose them. ‘Punishment’ has a great deal of rhetorical force, and it thereby distracts us from the justificatory work that we need to do to specify proper restrictions on the state’s coercive powers. Whereas many commentators have proposed that legal theory provides grounds for challenging civil preventive orders, I argue for the opposite view. If we understand properly the function of civil preventive orders, we will endorse them at least in principle, and will come to rethink some central ideas in the grounding of the criminal justice processes.

Set-theoretic justification and the theoretical virtues

Recent discussions of how axioms are extrinsically justified have appealed to abductive considerations: on such accounts, axioms are adopted on the basis that they constitute the best explanation of some mathematical data, or phenomena. In the first part of this paper, I set out a potential problem caused by the appeal made to the notion of mathematical explanation and suggest that it can be remedied once it is noted that all the justificatory work is done by appeal to the theoretical virtues. In the second part of the paper, I appeal to the theoretical virtues account of axiom justification to provide an argument that judgements of theoretical virtuousness, and therefore of extrinsic justification, are subjective in a substantive sense. This tells against a recent claim by Penelope Maddy that such justification is “wholly objective”.

Hypatia's silence

AbstractHartry Field distinguished two concepts of type‐free truth: scientific truth and disquotational truth. We argue that scientific type‐free truth cannot do justificatory work in the foundations of mathematics. We also present an argument, based on Crispin Wright's theory of cognitive projects and entitlement, that disquotational truth can do justificatory work in the foundations of mathematics. The price to pay for this is that the concept of disquotational truth requires non‐classical logical treatment.

Reproductive justice in context: South African and Zimbabwean women’s narratives of their abortion decision

The abortion decision-making process is embedded within overlapping power relations. Using a post-colonial feminist framework, we analyse South African and Zimbabwean women’s narratives regarding their abortion decision. As neighbouring countries, South Africa and Zimbabwe provide a useful counterpoint as they have common and differing social histories and very different abortion legislation. In our analysis, we unpick transversal commonalities and divergences in the discursive resources deployed by the women in their narratives in the two sites. Commonalities included the women feeling compelled to justify their abortion decision in the interactive interview space, an absence of a reproductive rights discourse, and the deployment of relationship embedded discourses in the justificatory work performed by the women. The “conjugalisation of reproduction”, “imperative of good mothering”, and “unstable partner relationships” discourses featured across both sites but the manner in which these were deployed differed. These discursive resources allowed the women to position themselves as making responsible decisions. The Zimbabwean women spoke of shame and hiding, a discursive resource that was explicitly absent in the South African women’s accounts. We conclude by arguing that our post-colonial feminist approach allows for a contextualised reproductive justice stance to abortion decision-making that identifies both transnational and context-specific power relations.

Health Without Care? Vulnerability, Medical Brain Drain, and Health Worker Responsibilities in Underserved Contexts

There is a consensus that the effects of medical brain drain, especially in the Sub-Saharan African countries, ought to be perceived as more than a simple misfortune. Temporary restrictions on the emigration of health workers from the region is one of the already existing policy measures to tackle the issue—while such a restrictive measure brings about the need for quite a justificatory work. A recent normative contribution to the debate by Gillian Brock provides a fruitful starting point. In the first step of her defence of emigration restrictions, Brock provides three reasons why skilled workers themselves would hold responsibilities to assist with respect to vital needs of their compatriots. These are fair reciprocity, duty to support vital institutions, and attending to the unintended harmful consequences of one’s actions. While the first two are explained and also largely discussed in the literature, the third requires an explication on how and on which basis skilled workers would have a responsibility as such. In this article, I offer a vulnerability approach with its dependency aspect that may account for why the health workers in underserved contexts would have a responsibility to attend to the unintended side effects of their actions that may lead to a vital risk of harm for the population. I discuss HIV/AIDS care in Zimbabwe as a case in point in order to show that local health workers may have responsibilities to assist the population who are vulnerable to their mobility.

Human Rights and Human Dignity: A Reply to Doris Schroeder

According to Doris Schroeder, the view that human rights derive from human dignity should be rejected. She thinks that this is the case for three different reasons: the first has to do with the fact that the dominant concept of dignity is based on religious beliefs which will do no justificatory work in a secular society; the second is that the dominant secular view of dignity, which is the Kantian view, does not provide us with a justification of human rights, i.e. rights all humans have; and the third reason has to do with the fact that dignity is understood in too many different ways to provide us with a justification of human rights. It is argued in this paper that none of these reasons for separating human rights from human dignity is convincing. It is true, it will be argued, that some accounts of dignity will not be successful in justifying human rights. But there is no reason to assume that no account of human dignity is capable of doing this. In the final part of the paper a concept of human dignity is presented that could indeed provide us with a justificatory basis for human rights.

The value and limits of rights: a reply

I reply to each of the contributions in this issue. I agree with much that Hillel Steiner argues, especially his insistence that the associated ideas of impartiality and discontinuity are crucial to dealing satisfactorily with a diversity of competing claims. I am, however, less willing to conceive provision for that diversity as the role, rather than a role, that we should ascribe to rights. I question the success of David Miller’s endeavour to provide a unified justification of human rights grounded in the concept of need. It is the notion of a minimally decent human life, rather than need itself, that does most of the justificatory work in Miller’s argument and, arguably, that notion does not deliver a genuinely unitary account of human rights. I concede the case for state funding of opera and the arts more generally to John Horton’s argument, but defend neutralism, and its associated distinction between the right and the good, as a strategy for dealing with diversity, including cultural diversity. I resist Richard Bellamy’s attempt to ground all basic rights in democracy and suggest that his argument relies upon idealized assumptions about the functioning of democracy. I share much of his objection to substituting judicial for political decision-making but argue that a strong moral commitment to rights need not imply a shift in power from democratic processes to courts. I endorse Albert Weale’s argument for favouring a beneficial design approach over a rights approach to healthcare and to many other social goods. Rights should not monopolize our moral and political thinking.

The Circumstances of Justice

The aim of this paper is, first, to address three recent criticisms of Hume’s account of the circumstances of justice, and secondly, to consider how an account of the circumstances of justice may be deployed in philosophical argument when detached from Hume’s own narrow concern with rules of property. Against the criticisms lodged by Brian Barry and Martha Nussbaum, I argue that Hume does not build a conception of justice as mutual advantage into the circumstances of justice. Against the criticism lodged against modern invocations of the circumstances of justice by Gerry Cohen, I argue that any plausible account of deliberative reflection must be at once action-guiding and world-guided. This allows an account of the circumstances of justice—those features of the world no plausible theory of justice can idealize away—to do some justificatory work.

Entangled exchange: Reconceptualising the characterisation and practice of bodily commodification

Richard Titmuss’ classical 1970 study of blood donation has provided a powerful conceptual model for characterising transactions involving human bodily materials. This now paradigmatic model suggests that such transactions are typically organised in accordance with one or other of two dichotomous, and mutually exclusive, modes of exchange: gifting or commodification. In this paper I utilise findings from my own and others’ empirical research to illustrate the range of complex, multiply constituted, and contested modes of commodification that now typically attend the exchange of human body parts and tissues of which Titmuss’ model can take no effective account. Drawing on work by Radin, Callon, and Miller I illustrate the complex justificatory work that those involved must perform to fit their lived experiences of tissue exchange into this now outmoded paradigm. I then consider how the protagonists themselves ontologise their practices and with what effects. In the second part of the paper I consider how neo-liberal ideologies and instruments are being employed to suborn a variety of highly differentiated and geographically distinct practices of bodily commodification to the ‘logic of the market’. I explore here what the operative effects of defining the global circulation of body parts and tissues as a new ‘economy’ might be. I then consider how, if at all, a market logic could ‘Value’ all those ‘calculations of interest’ and ‘values’ that underpin exchanges of human body parts and tissues in specific national, communal or institutional settings. I conclude by reflecting on the desirability or possibility of performing normative assessments of the ethicacy of highly geographically and culturally differentiated practices of bodily commodification.

Fate and the Fortune of the Categories: Kant on the Usurpation and Schematization of Concepts

In the early steps of the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant briefly addresses the threat posed by usurpatory concepts such as ‘fate’ and ‘fortune’. Commentators have largely passed over these remarks, but in this paper I argue that a careful analysis of the reasons why ‘fate’ and ‘fortune’ are usurpatory reveals an important point about the relation between the Deduction and the Principles chapters of the Critique. In particular, I argue that ‘fate’ and ‘fortune’ are usurpatory because they are unable to discriminate between the particular contents of experience, and that this requires that Kant provide an account of how the categories are able to accomplish this task. And this in turn shows that the justificatory work begun in the Deduction can be completed only in the Schematism and Principles.