Justification Logic Research Articles

Justification Logic and the Epistemic Contribution of Deduction

Justification Logic and the Epistemic Contribution of Deduction

Reasoning with reasons: Lewis on common knowledge

Abstract David Lewis is widely regarded as the philosopher who introduced the concept of common knowledge. His account of common knowledge differs greatly from most later accounts in philosophy and economy, with the central notion of his theory being ‘having reason to believe’ rather than ‘knowledge’. Unfortunately, Lewis’s account is rather informal, and the argument has a few gaps. This paper assesses two major attempts to formalise Lewis’s account and argues that these formalisations are missing a crucial aspect of this account. Therefore, a new reconstruction is proposed, which explicitly discusses ‘reasons’ and uses a logic inspired by justification logic.

Getting some (non-classical) closure with justification logic

Getting some (non-classical) closure with justification logic

Justification of Discrimination against People with Mental Illness in Republic of Korea.

This study aimed to analyze the process in which individual values and beliefs affected social distance against people with mental illness by mediating cognition, based on applying the justification-suppression model to the stigma of mental illness. An online survey was conducted with 491 adults aged 20 to 64 years. Their sociodemographic characteristics, personal values, and beliefs, justification for discrimination, and social distance were measured to assess their perceptions of, and behaviors towards, persons with mental illness. Path analysis was performed to examine the magnitude and significance of the hypothetical relationship between variables. Protestant ethic values and morality significantly affected the justification of inability and dangerousness and attribute responsibility. Excluding attribute responsibility, the justification of inability and dangerousness significantly predicted social distance. In other words, the higher the Protestant ethic values, the higher the morality of binding, and the lower the morality of individualizing, the higher the level of justification based on inability and dangerousness. Such justification has been found to increase social distance from persons with mental illness. In addition, mediating effects were the largest in the path of the morality of binding → justification of dangerousness → social distance. The study proposes various strategies to deal with individual values, beliefs, and justification logic to reduce social distance against those with mental illness. These strategies include a cognitive approach and empathy, both of which inhibit prejudice.

A logic of interactive proofs

Abstract We introduce the probabilistic two-agent justification logic $\textsf {IPJ}$, a logic in which we can reason about agents that perform interactive proofs. In order to study the growth rate of the probabilities in $\textsf {IPJ}$, we present a new method of parametrizing $\textsf {IPJ}$ over certain negligible functions. Further, our approach leads to a new notion of zero-knowledge proofs.

Justification logic and type theory as formalizations of intuitionistic propositional logic

Abstract We explore two ways of formalizing Kreisel’s addendum to the Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov interpretation. To do this, we compare Artemov’s justification logic with simply typed $\lambda $ calculus. First, we provide a completeness result for Kripke style semantics of the implicational fragment of the intuitionistic logic of proofs. Then we introduce a map from justification terms into $\lambda $ terms, which can be viewed as a method of extracting the computational content of the justification terms. Then we examine the interpretation of Kreisel’s addendum in justification logic along with the image of the resulting justification terms under our map.

Weak relevant justification logics

Abstract This paper will develop ideas from [44]. We will generalize their work in two directions. First, we provide axioms for justification logics over the base logic B and show that the logic permits a proof of the internalization theorem. Second, we provide alternative frames that more closely resemble the standard versions of the ternary relational frames, as well as a more general approach to the completeness proof. We prove that soundness and completeness hold for justification logics over a wide variety of base logics. Finally, we will strengthen Belnap’s variable sharing for the justification logic context, demonstrating that the justifications are properly relevant justifications.

Consistency and permission in deontic justification logic

Abstract Different notions of the consistency of obligations collapse in standard deontic logic. In justification logics, which feature explicit reasons for obligations, the situation is different. Their strength depends on a constant specification and on the available set of operations for combining different reasons. We present different consistency principles in justification logic and compare their logical strength. We propose a novel semantics for which justification logics with the explicit version of axiom D, $\textbf {jd}$, are complete for arbitrary constant specifications. Consistency is sometimes formulated in terms of permission. We therefore study permission in the context of justification logic, introducing a notion of free-choice permission for the first time. We then discuss the philosophical implications with regard to some deontic paradoxes.

On intermediate justification logics

Abstract We study arbitrary intermediate propositional logics extended with a collection of axioms from (classical) justification logics. For these, we introduce various semantics by combining either Heyting algebras or Kripke frames with the usual semantic machinery used by Mkrtychev’s, Fitting’s or Lehmann and Studer’s models for classical justification logics. We prove unified completeness theorems for all intermediate justification logics and their corresponding semantics using a respective propositional completeness theorem of the underlying intermediate logic. Further, by a modification of a method of Fitting, we prove unified realization theorems for a large class of intermediate justification logics and accompanying intermediate modal logics.

Relating Semantics for Epistemic Logic

The aim of this paper is to explore the advantages deriving from the application of relating semantics in epistemic logic. As a first step, I will discuss two versions of relating semantics and how they can be differently exploited for studying modal and epistemic operators. Next, I consider several standard frameworks which are suitable for modelling knowledge and related notions, in both their implicit and their explicit form and present a simple strategy by virtue of which they can be associated with intuitive systems of relating logic. As a final step, I will focus on the logic of knowledge based on justification logic and show how relating semantics helps us to provide an elegant solution to some problems related to the standard interpretation of the explicit epistemic operators.

Towards a Formalisation of Justification and Justifiability

We introduce the logic QKSD which is a normal multi-modal logic over finitely many modalities that additionally supports bounded quantification of modalities. An important feature of this logic is that it allows to quantify over the information components of systems and, hence, can be used to derive justifications. We compare the proposed logic with Artemov's justification logic and also report on a prototypical implementation of a satisfiability solver of this logic and show some examples.

Linear temporal justification logics with past and future time modalities

AbstractTemporal justification logic is a new family of temporal logics of knowledge in which the knowledge of agents is modelled using a justification logic. In this paper, we present various temporal justification logics involving both past and future time modalities. We combine Artemov’s logic of proofs with linear temporal logic with past, and we also investigate several principles describing the interaction of justification and time. We present two kinds of semantics for our temporal justification logics, one based on interpreted systems and Fitting models and the other based on Mkrtychev models, and further, we establish soundness and completeness. We show that the internalization property holds in some of the temporal justification logics. We further investigate the two well-known epistemic-temporal notions of no forgetting and no learning in the framework of justification logics. Finally, we present temporal justification logics that avoid the logical omniscience problem.

Structured argumentation dynamics

This paper develops a logical theory that unifies all three standard types of argumentative attack in AI, namely rebutting, undercutting and undermining attacks. We build on default justification logic that already represents undercutting and rebutting attacks, and we add undermining attacks. Intuitively, undermining does not target default inference, as undercutting, or default conclusion, as rebutting, but rather attacks an argument’s premise as a starting point for default reasoning. In default justification logic, reasoning starts from a set of premises, which is then extended by conclusions that hold by default. We argue that modeling undermining defeaters in the view of default theories requires changing the set of premises upon receiving new information. To model changes to premises, we give a dynamic aspect to default justification logic by using the techniques from the logic of belief revision. More specifically, undermining is modeled with belief revision operations that include contracting a set of premises, that is, removing some information from it. The novel combination of default reasoning and belief revision in justification logic enriches both approaches to reasoning under uncertainty. By the end of the paper, we show some important aspects of defeasible argumentation in which our logic compares favorably to structured argumentation frameworks.

A Conflict Tolerant Logic of Explicit Evidence

Standard epistemic modal logic is unable to adequately deal with the FrauchigerRenner paradox in quantum physics. We introduce a novel justification logic CTJ, in which the paradox can be formalized without leading to an inconsistency. Still CTJ is strong enough to model traditional epistemic reasoning. Our logic tolerates two different pieces of evidence such that one piece justifies a proposition and the other piece justifies the negation of that proposition. However, our logic disallows one piece of evidence to justify both a proposition and its negation. We present syntax and semantics for CTJ and discuss its basic properties. Then we give an example of epistemic reasoning in CTJ that illustrates how the different principles of CTJ interact. We continue with the formalization of the Frauchiger–Renner thought experiment and discuss it in detail. Further, we add a trust axiom to CTJ and again discuss epistemic reasoning and the paradox in this extended setting.

Semirings of Evidence

AbstractIn traditional justification logic, evidence terms have the syntactic form of polynomials, but they are not equipped with the corresponding algebraic structure. We present a novel semantic approach to justification logic that models evidence by a semiring. Hence justification terms can be interpreted as polynomial functions on that semiring. This provides an adequate semantics for evidence terms and clarifies the role of variables in justification logic. Moreover, the algebraic structure makes it possible to compute with evidence. Depending on the chosen semiring this can be used to model trust, probabilities, cost, etc. Last but not least the semiring approach seems promising for obtaining a realization procedure for modal fixed point logics.

Gödel justification logics and realization

Abstract We study the topic of realization from classical justification logics in the context of the recently introduced Gödel justification logics. We show that the standard Gödel modal logics of Caicedo and Rodriguez are not realized by the Gödel justification logics and moreover, we study possible extensions of the Gödel justification logics, which are strong enough to realize the standard Gödel modal logics. On the other hand, we study the fragments of the standard Gödel modal logics, which are realized by the usual Gödel justification logics. We prove the corresponding realization theorem by using Fitting’s merging of realizations as well as appropriate hypersequent calculi on the modal side, adapting the work by Metcalfe and Olivetti. For these hypersequent calculi, we also show a cut-elimination theorem. We provide natural semantical characterizations for all of these newly introduced logics.

A logic of defeasible argumentation: Constructing arguments in justification logic

In the 1980s, Pollock’s work on default reasons started the quest in the AI community for a formal system of defeasible argumentation. The main goal of this paper is to provide a logic of structured defeasible arguments using the language of justification logic. In this logic, we introduce defeasible justification assertions of the type t : F that read as “t is a defeasible reason that justifies F”. Such formulas are then interpreted as arguments and their acceptance semantics is given in analogy to Dung’s abstract argumentation framework semantics. We show that a large subclass of Dung’s frameworks that we call “warranted” frameworks is a special case of our logic in the sense that (1) Dung’s frameworks can be obtained from justification logic-based theories by focusing on a single aspect of attacks among justification logic arguments and (2) Dung’s warranted frameworks always have multiple justification logic instantiations called “realizations”. We first define a new justification logic that relies on operational semantics for default logic. One of the key features that is absent in standard justification logics is the possibility to weigh different epistemic reasons or pieces of evidence that might conflict with one another. To amend this, we develop a semantics for “defeaters”: conflicting reasons forming a basis to doubt the original conclusion or to believe an opposite statement. This enables us to formalize non-monotonic justifications that prompt extension revision already for normal default theories. Then we present our logic as a system for abstract argumentation with structured arguments. The format of conflicting reasons overlaps with the idea of attacks between arguments to the extent that it is possible to define all the standard notions of argumentation framework extensions. Using the definitions of extensions, we establish formal correspondence between Dung’s original argumentation semantics and our operational semantics for default theories. One of the results shows that the notorious attack cycles from abstract argumentation cannot always be realized as justification logic default theories.

On sharp and single-conclusion justification models

Abstract Justification awareness models (JAMs) were proposed by S. Artemov as a tool for modelling epistemic scenarios such as Russell’s prime minister example. It was demonstrated that the sharpness and the single-conclusion property of a model play an essential role in the epistemic usage of JAMs. The problem to axiomatize these properties using the propositional justification language was left opened. We propose the solution and define a decidable justification logic $\textsf{J}_{\textit{ref}}$ that is sound and complete with respect to the class of all sharp single-conclusion justification models. We also provide the complete axiomatizations for the classes of all single-conclusion justification models and all sharp justification models.

Explicit analyses of proof/refutation interaction for constructible falsity and Heyting–Brouwer logic

Abstract Nelson’s logic of constructible falsity $\textsf{N}$ and Rauszer’s Heyting–Brouwer logic $\textsf{HB}$ are well-known cases of extensions of intuitionistic logic $\textsf{Int}$ enriched with novel connectives. Wansing has suggested that Gödel’s provability interpretation of $\textsf{Int}$ can be extended to these systems by pairing the category of formal proofs with a distinct category of formal refutations. In this paper, we extend the framework of Artemov’s justification logic to provide explicit analyses of $\textsf{N}$ and $\textsf{HB}$ (and the dual-intuitionistic logic $\textsf{DualInt}$) that respect a distinction between proofs and refutations. The application distinguishes the categories by reinterpreting the agents of multiple-agent justification logic as devices that operate exclusively on one or the other category. The analyses reveal that differences between $\textsf{N}$ and $\textsf{HB}$ can be reduced to competing interaction principles characterizing the coordination between proofs and refutations. We conclude by reappraising some of the unusual features of $\textsf{HB}$ in light of the explicit analysis of $\textsf{HB}$.

Natural deduction and semantic models of justification logic in the proof assistant Coq

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to present a formalization of the language, semantics and axiomatization of justification logic in Coq. We present proofs in a natural deduction style derived from the axiomatic approach of justification logic. Additionally, we present possible world semantics in Coq based on Fitting models to formalize the semantic satisfaction of formulas. As an important result, with this implementation, it is possible to give a proof of soundness for $\mathsf{L}\mathsf{P}$ with respect to Fitting models.