IntroductionThe word conjures up diverse images, whether it is a team of doctors crowded around an operating table during an organ transplant, or rows of small tomato plants recently inserted into newly tilled earth. For comparative law scholars, term signals something completely different. Decades ago, Scotsman Alan Watson (1974) generated concept of a legal transplant, which continues to be a major focus of comparative law scholarship (Graziadei 2006; Riles 2006). According to Watson, a legal is common phenomenon of one country adopting, in whole or in part, another country's established law, legal procedure, legal institution, or legal system. Some see this as single most important phenomenon in development of law, for example: the growth of law is principally to be explained by transplantation of legal rules (Ewald 1995:489). The notion has been employed to explain dissemination of legal procedures (Brake and Katzenstein 2013), plea bargaining (Langer 2004), and a host of other legal phenomena across globe. This essay employs concept of legal as a vehicle to describe global spread of trial by jury.The concept of a legal has been ubiquitous in field of comparative law, but also contentious. Scholars differ in their views of extent to which culture and society affect transfer of laws and legal procedures (for a review of debate, see Goldbach 2015:92-95). Even transplant terminology is contested (Graziadei 2006:443). Some scholars of comparative law maintain that word is at very least misleading because it suggests that an organ, plant, or legal procedure might function exactly same in its new body, garden, or country as it did in previous one (Legrand 1997; Merryman et al. 1994). From this perspective, idea of legal more correctly captures ways in which legal systems import, borrow, or export their laws, procedures, constitutions, or institutions to other legal systems (Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard 2003; Langer 2004). These scholars believe translation is a more apt metaphor because it allows one to distinguish between two countries' laws that may be textually identical but function in completely different manners.I am an outsider to field of comparative law. I am trained as a social psychologist, running experiments, analyzing surveys, and interviewing participants. But like many others in interdisciplinary Law and Society Association, my research focus on juries and lay participation has lured me into fields well beyond my initial training, in this case, domain of comparative law. From my outsider's perspective, I find concepts of transplanting and translating to be thought-provoking metaphors for movement of jury in global legal systems: its introduction and its flourishing, as well as its abolition and its decline, around world.My essay about jury as a legal presumes importance of society on legal movements, and has two emphases. First, I try to understand societal, political, and legal circumstances and actions that have led to adoption, expansion, and decline of lay citizen participation in law (Hans 2007, 2008; Thaman 2007; Thomas 2016). Trial by jury is a frequent topic in popular culture. It is regularly featured in movies, television shows, books, and other popular media, particularly in United States (Abramson 2000:498-500; Hans 2013:392-94; Marder 2007; Papke et al. 2007). Further, research on how jury functions as a decision making body is voluminous (Baldwin and McConville 1979; Devine 2012; Diamond and Rose 2005; Goodman-Delahunty and Tait 2006; Kovera 2017; Vidmar and Hans 2007). Much jury research is focused on how a jury or another lay fact-finding body functions within a single country at a particular point in time. There is a relatively modest amount of work that engages generally in historical and international comparisons and that specifically contrasts different forms of lay participation (Hans et al. …
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