Judicial Efficacy Research Articles

Institutions and Credit Ratings

This experiment investigates the relationship between these two traits in order to broaden the view and depict the influence of institutions on not just economic development as conventionally defined but also on country credit ratings. In this work, I demonstrate how we can determine the link between a country's credit ratings and the performance of its institutions. I utilized a data collection of nations and indicators of their performance on institutional indicators, including property rights, judicial efficacy, and so on, in my analysis. Finally, I come to the conclusion that there is a substantial link between an effective institution and a better rating in credit reports conducted by prominent corporations in this field. In terms of trustworthiness, I also note the experiment's limitations.

Drafting “better regulation”: The economic cost of regulatory complexity

Different public agencies are seeking to draft “better regulation”. Complex or poorly drafted norms are more difficult for economic agents to implement, tending to erode economic efficiency. The literature has so far concentrated on the analysis of regulatory complexity as a phenomenon related to the “quantity” of norms. This article guides the process of adopting new regulations, taking into account that norms can also be complex due to new “qualitative” reasons such as linguistic ambiguity or relational structure (references between legal documents). To perform the analysis, we develop new indicators for legibility and regulatory interconnectedness. Specifically, we construct a new database (RECOS – REgulation COmplexity in Spain) by extracting information from 8171 norms (61 million words) which comprise the regulations of all the Spanish Autonomous regions. Our analysis reveals the relationship between measures of “qualitative” complexity and relevant economic (productivity) and institutional (judicial efficacy) variables. This research shows that the new dimensions of regulatory complexity matter, yield significant results and should be taken into account in governments’ “better regulation” policies.

New Dimensions of Regulatory Complexity and Their Economic Cost. An Analysis Using Text Mining

Complex or poorly drafted regulations are more difficult for economic agents to implement, eroding economic efficiency. The literature has so far concentrated on the analysis of regulatory complexity as a phenomenon related to the “quantity” of norms. Regulation can also be complex because of “qualitative” reasons such as its linguistic ambiguity or its relational structure (references between legal documents). This article innovates by analyzing these new dimensions of complexity: we develop new indicators for legibility and regulatory interconnectedness. To do so, we constructed a new database (RECOS - Regulatory Complexity in Spain) extracting information from 8,171 norms (61 million words) covering the regulation set of all the Spanish autonomous regions. We analyze the relationship between these new indicators and productivity (as a relevant economic variable) and judicial efficacy (as a relevant institutional-structural variable). While each of these areas should be analyzed in separate articles, this research shows that the new dimensions of regulation complexity matter and also have significant results.

Integrated Justice in Pakistan: From Legal Pluralism to Normative Convergence

Legal pluralism, throughout most of developing countries, has been extant since the onset of colonial era. Manifested in a variety of forms, legal pluralism is inherently characterized by both promises as well as limitations. In Pakistan, legal pluralism is epitomized by the prevalence and functioning of parallel systems of justice such as formal courts and Alternate Dispute Resolution Mechanism (ADRM), such as “Jirga. Poor coordination and tenuous enforcement mechanisms, however, render the formal justice system in Pakistan one of poorest performers in terms of judicial efficacy world-wide. This article seeks to explore the possibility of a convergence between traditional and modern models of dispute resolution, i.e. Jirga and court system and the resultant efficacy thereof through devising a conceptual framework. The framework reveals that both formal courts and Jirga demonstrate marked discrepancies concerning their efficacy with respect to the provision of justice and dispute resolution. Findings from the field, however, evince that Jirga stand out to be a relatively more effective mechanism of dispute resolution than formal courts. The conceptual framework, however, implies that by converging both systems it is possible to cope with the limitations of each of the two systems such that while courts could provide legal legitimacy to the Jirga by improving its decency and accountability through regulations, Jirga could enhance the legitimacy of courts by improving its accessibility and transparency through feedback mechanisms. The article concludes by way of arguing that instead of parting ways with each other, both courts and jirga shall seek to go hand in hand in order avoid delays in the provision of justice.

Industry vs Services: Do Enforcement Institutions Matter for Specialization Patterns? Disaggregated Evidence from Spain

We exploit historical differences in foral law to consistently estimate the contribution of the quality of enforcement institutions to economic specialization across Spanish provinces in the period 1999-2014. The distribution of economic activity in Spain as of today shows a strong pattern of geographical specialization. Regions less specialized in manufacturing (industry) and oriented to services sectors (Andalusia, Extremadura) in the south are compared with industrialized/manufacturing regions in the north such as the Basque Country, Navarre or Aragon. We construct province-level congestion rates across three different jurisdictions (civil, labor and administrative) from real judicial data measuring the performance of the Spanish judicial system over time, and estimate the effect of judicial efficacy on the share of manufacturing and services in the total output. Using a variety of estimation techniques, the evidence unveils strong and persistent effects of judicial efficacy on province-level economic specialization with notable distributional differences. The provinces with a historical experience of foral law are significantly more likely to have more efficient enforcement institutions at the present day. In turn, greater judicial efficacy facilitates specialization in high-productivity manufacturing while greater judicial inefficacy encourages service-intensive specialization. The effect of judicial efficacy on economic specialization does not depend on confounders, holds across a number of specification checks and appears to be causal. Lastly, the three jurisdictions seem relevant to explain specialization, although the administrative jurisdiction appears to have a more pronounced impact than the labor or civil jurisdictions.

Justice Delayed is Assimilation Denied: Rightwing Terror, Fear and Social Assimilation of Turkish Immigrants in Germany

In 2011, German police accidentally stumbled upon a previously unknown right-wing extremist group called the National Socialist Underground (NSU). Further investigations implicated the group in previously unexplained murders of mostly ethnically Turkish individuals and in other crimes targeting Islamic immigrants in Germany. Using German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) data, this paper offers the first evidence that the 2011 revelations of the NSU crimes resulted in an increase in perceived fears of xenophobic hostility among NSU’s targeted groups. This serves as an indication of the minority’s perceived maltreatment by German institutions while investigating the NSU crimes. The results further show that the revelations significantly reinforced a feeling of estrangement among Turks, who were now less likely to self-identify as Germans and more likely to see themselves as foreigners; they, therefore, tended to bond more strongly with the ethos of their country of origin. The results also demonstrate that Turks reported a substantial decrease in their health satisfaction and subjective wellbeing. In conclusion, the paper underlines the pertinence of judicial efficacy over rightwing crimes for assimilation and welfare of immigrants.

Constitutionalism Outside the Courts

This essay is a chapter to be included in the forthcoming Oxford Handbook on the U.S. Constitution. Using the actions of Arkansas Governor Orville Faubus during the Little Rock crisis of 1957 and the U.S. Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Cooper v. Aaron as a lens, it explores constitutional interpretation and enforcement by extrajudicial institutions. I explore the critique of Cooper’s notion of judicial supremacy by departmentalists like Walter Murphy, empirical scholars skeptical of judicial efficacy like Gerald Rosenberg, and popular constitutionalists like Larry Kramer and Mark Tushnet. I also consider four distinct institutional forms of extrajudicial constitutional interpretation and enforcement: protection of constitutional values through political processes and checks and balances; the role of social movements in shaping constitutional meaning; resolution of particular constitutional controversies in the political branches through processes of “constitutional construction”; and the role of “administrative constitutionalism.” The critique of judicial supremacy and the analysis of extrajudicial interpretation and enforcement have had a salutary impact in broadening the horizons of constitutional law. To the extent that theories of constitutionalism outside the courts are used to go further and attack judicial review, however, I find them less persuasive. One need not believe in judicial supremacy to value the courts’ ultimate settlement function in litigated constitutional controversies. If the Constitution is to continue to act as an external constraint on political action, then constitutionalism outside the courts can never be wholly autonomous of constitutionalism inside.

Reservation in Higher Judiciary: An Unwarranted Narrative

Judiciary as guardian of rights has been trapped into controversy that demands a reservation in the higher judicial services and therefore the current paper in a very perceptible and noticeable manner denies the contention supporting providing caste-based reservation in higher judicial services. Several authors have earlier denied and stood against the idea of reservation as a tool for the affirmative action but the legislative desire going oppositely formulated a policy of caste-based reservation system in various organs of government. Judiciary even being one organ of government bears dissimilar attribute and nature that justified the shift to a non-reservation regime in higher judicial services. In the present paper, author emphasises on the reservation policy that itself attested as a controversial move in the apex court linking to which an arena of judgments are present screening several views of the judges affirming disregard toward the reservation policy of government. The policy of reservation proved to be so atrocious and terrible in the name of social justice that the Supreme Court of country acquired stringent stand to criticise and condoning the same furthermore suggesting to shift reservation criteria. The systematic reform in the appointment of higher judicial services remained heatedly flown on the floor of India democracy and needed a much debate for present but introduction for reservation footed on caste must not be the reformative measure crafting damage to judicial efficacy in place. Reservation reserves a negative impact on judicial efficiency as judiciary promotions are solely based on efficiency of a judicial officer in addition to keeping good character record, etc., and therefore reservation is not possible for an institution whose basic instinct lies in the need of efficiency of position. The paper scrutinises reservation in the judicial realm and provides some suggestive measures to keep warranted judicial efficacy on track forming balance among organs of government.

Does (average) size matter? Court enforcement, business demography and firm growth

Previous literature finds that the quality of judicial enforcement has a positive impact on average firm size, but it has not disentangled its effect on the growth of incumbent firms from that on business demography. This distinction is crucial, as entrants are generally smaller than incumbents, but both high entry rates and high firm growth are associated with better economic performance. This paper fills this gap, finding that judicial efficacy fosters the growth of incumbents and promotes entry in Spain. The paper also shows for the first time that the specific type of judicial procedure that companies face in case of a conflict, rather than the overall functioning of courts, is the relevant matter. Specifically, judicial efficacy at the declaratory stage (when a debt is verified by a judge) has a positive impact on both firm growth and entry, while it has no impact at the execution stage (when the judge requires its payment).

Entrepreneurship and Enforcement Institutions: Disaggregated Evidence for Spain

Entry of new firms, both in the form of entrepreneurs or corporations, fosters competition and productivity. Both the entry of firms and productivity have been low in the Spanish economy over the recent years. This paper analyzes the determinants of entry focusing on the role of the design and efficacy of enforcement institutions (the judicial system), a traditionally overlooked aspect. In order to do so, we examine disaggregated data at the local level in Spain. We find that higher judicial efficacy increases the entry rate of firms, while it has no effect on the exit rate. Crucially, that impact only occurs in the case of the entry rates of entrepreneurs, defined as self-employed, but not in the case of limited liability corporations. This finding may be explained by the fact that judicial (in)efficacy can be regarded as a fixed cost to be paid by agents that litigate. Hence, the economic activity of entrepreneurs -and specifically, their entry into the market- is expected to be more affected than that of larger firms.

Entrepreneurship and enforcement institutions: disaggregated evidence for Spain

Entry of new firms, both in the form of entrepreneurs or corporations, fosters competition and productivity. Both the entry of firms and productivity have been low in the Spanish economy over the recent years. This paper analyzes the determinants of entry focusing on the role of the design and efficacy of enforcement institutions (the judicial system), a traditionally overlooked aspect. In order to do so, we examine disaggregated data at the local level in Spain. We find that higher judicial efficacy increases the entry rate of firms, while it has no effect on the exit rate. Crucially, that impact only occurs in the case of the entry rates of entrepreneurs, defined as self-employed, but not in the case of limited liability corporations. This finding may be explained by the fact that judicial (in)efficacy can be regarded as a fixed cost to be paid by agents that litigate. Hence, the economic activity of entrepreneurs -and specifically, their entry into the market- is expected to be more affected than that of larger firms.

Firm Size and Judicial Efficacy: Evidence for the New Civil Procedures in Spain

The literature has found that the size of firms matters for innovation and productivity and, thus, for economic performance. It is therefore worth explaining why enterprises in Spain are small in international terms. Our findings indicate that the quality of the institutional environment plays a role. Specifically, this paper analyses the different channels through which the efficacy of Spanish courts may affect the size of the companies at the provincial level. Regarding the existing literature, this paper is innovative in several important respects. First, we disentangle the impact of judicial efficacy on average firm size by differentiating between the effect on the growth of incumbent firms (intensive margin) and the effect on entry and exit rates (extensive margin), finding clear evidence of the former but not of the latter. We do so by using a firm-level database of more than half a million companies and real data (not estimates) on judicial efficacy at the local level. Second, this paper is the first to analyse the relationship between firm size and the effectiveness of justice after the reform of the civil procedures in 2000. Finally, and most significantly, it is the first paper in the literature to analyse the specific impact of the various civil procedures, both at the declaratory and the executory stage. In general, we find that judicial efficacy has a positive effect on firm size, but it critically depends on the type of the procedure, something that the previous literature has overlooked. More specifically, judicial efficacy matters at the declaratory stage (e.g. when a debt is declared and recognised by a judge), while it does not have a significant impact on size at the executory stage.

Is judicial inefficacy increasing the weight of the house property market in Spain? Evidence at the local level

The weight of the housing tenancy market in Spain is very low. It is frequently argued that an ineffective judicial system, implying a cumbersome procedure to evict a non-paying tenant or simply requiring a long period to execute a decision, may be an important determinant of the tenancy market’s weakness, as it constrains the effective supply by reducing the profitability of landlords. This research studies this effect econometrically using a panel data approach and exploring differences in judicial efficacy among the Spanish provinces. After controlling for several other factors, this study concludes that the degree of inefficacy of the judicial system has a positive impact on the property share among provinces in Spain.

When Crime Pays: Measuring Judicial Efficacy Against Corruption in Brazil

There is a widespread perception in Brazil that civil servants caught in corrupt practices are not punished. Yet, until now, there was no hard evidence that would support such claim and some argued that this was just a mislead perception due to the recent increase in anti-corruption measures. One of the main reasons for this notably absence is that it is very difficult to identify actual cases of corruption to, then, measure whether or not they are actually punished by the judicial system. This paper proposes a method of measuring judicial system efficacy against corruption by comparing proven corruption cases punished by administrative committees with criminal and civil judicial performance for the same cases. Ours results show that in fact the Brazilian judicial system is highly ineffective in fighting corruption.

Testing Alternative Theories of Bureaucratic Corruption in Less Developed Countries*

Objective. Recent studies offer myriad explanations for why bureaucratic corruption is more pervasive in certain countries than others. However, relatively little empirical work has been done comparing competing explanations of bureaucratic corruption. In this article, I test informal, formal, and cultural control explanations against one another in an effort to understand cross‐national variation in bureaucratic corruption.Methods. Using cross‐sectional and longitudinal data, this article tests the hypotheses with ordinary least squares (OLS), tobit, ordered probit, and fixed‐ and random‐effects models.Results. Democracy, strong judiciaries, and parliamentary democracy in particular reduce the prevalence of bureaucratic corruption.Conclusions. This study proposes that electoral accountability and judicial efficacy produce “good” politicians, and “good” politicians monitor bureaucrats well enough to reduce bureaucratic corruption. Future research should attempt to create a direct measure of the quality of politicians variable.

Twenty-Five Years after Rodriguez: School Finance Litigation and the Impact of the New Judicial Federalism

This article examines the impact of state-level school finance litigation conducted in the wake of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. State supreme courts have handed down decisions in 36 states since the Rodriguez decision in 1973. The article looks at how these decisions have affected the distribution of educational resources in eight states—five states in which school finance activists have won and three in which they lost. The author shows that state supreme courts can have a significant impact on both the equity of school finance systems and their adequacy. This finding rebuts scholars who have recently argued that courts, acting alone, cannot achieve significant social or political change in the face of public opposition. The article also explores why some state supreme courts are more successful than others, putting forward a policy-centered model of judicial efficacy that takes into account the peculiarities of school finance as a policy issue.