Journal Of Strategic Security Research Articles

Social Media: Insight on the Internal Dynamics of Mexican DTOs

Recent literature analyzes the use of social media by terrorist organizations, gangs, and other criminal groups. Despite the valuable insight that this approach provides on these actors, the use of social media by Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) remains largely understudied. This study provides information on the scope and nature of Mexican DTOs’ online presence, a demographic snapshot of their users, and insight into the internal dynamics of these organizations through the systematic study of primary-source data collected from 150 Facebook accounts likely to belong to members of Mexican DTOs. This information gleaned from social media has the potential to enrich our knowledge and understanding of these organizations and to serve as a guide for more effective and assertive anti-narcotics policies and strategies in Mexico and Latin America. Finally, this study raises new questions and provides avenues for future research on specific issues and trends related to DTOs observed throughout the analysis. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss3/5

Drugs & Thugs: Funding Terrorism through Narcotics Trafficking

To date, much of the literature on the financing of terrorism and insurgency has focused at the macro-level on groups involved in financing their organizations through involvement in the drug trade. This paper discusses some of those implications, but argues that to better understand the threat faced by the new generation of jihadists in the West, security forces and intelligence services must also look at the micro-level of how lower level trafficking, drug dealing and petty criminal activity, combined with prison radicalization and ties to the black market and illicit underworld, combine to present a new spin on a longstanding threat. To be sure, the micro-level is even more difficult to counter, given already poor community-police cooperation and relations in the marginalized communities throughout the West. Further, the threat from drug trafficking at the micro-level can be equally as nefarious, as smaller cells are given greater autonomy to finance plots, recruit new members and ultimately conduct attacks in developed democracies. The paper concludes with some policy recommendations geared toward helping host-nations build capacity in critical areas, including law enforcement and intelligence, from the local to the state to the federal level. Disclaimer The analysis and opinions contained in this article are those of the author solely and do not represent the analysis and opinions of The RAND Corporation or any of the other institutions or organizations he is affiliated with. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss3/2

Secular States in a “Security Community”: The Migration-Terrorism Nexus?

This article discusses the disintegration paradox as set against the backdrop of the Brexit referendum and the migration crisis in Europe. In face of an apparent inability effectively to address the challenge of migration, and tested by disintegrative dynamics of which Brexit is just one example, religion has been brought back to narratives employed by societies perceived as secular. The instrumental use of religion and, as a consequence, the emergence of a migrationterrorism nexus, obscure our ability to understand and address the migration crisis as well as the subsequent disintegrative dynamics in the European Union. In this context, this article makes a case that, while the concepts of migration and the migrant have to be revisited, it is fundamental that the agency (individual and plural) of the migrant be brought into the analysis. In this way, migration can be viewed as a complex phenomenon that is a function of the postmodern and post-Westphalian reality, whereby the EU becomes a nomadic hub defined by “fluid frontiers” rather than binary divides. The migrant’s agency serves as the key to decode a complex matrix of strategies that could be employed to address the disintegrative dynamics that the current migration crisis exacerbates. Acknowledgements The authors express their appreciation to the Faculty Resource Network (FRN) for the opportunity given to Professor Anna Visvizi to conduct this research at NYU New York as well as to Belen Presas Mata, Bongha Lee, Ossama Ayesh, Melissa Salyk-Virk, and Negin Njn for their editorial comments and research assistance. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss3/3

Approaches to Detect Online Radicalization: A Survey

Approaches to Detect Online Radicalization: A Survey

Political Violence and the Mediating Role of Violent Extremist Propensities

Research into violent extremism is lacking integrated theoretical frameworks explaining individual involvement in politically or religiously motivated violence, resulting in a poor understanding of causal mechanisms. Building on situational action theory, the current study moves beyond the dominant risk factor approach and proposes an integrated model for the explanation of political/religious violence, distinguishing between direct mechanisms and “causes of the causes.” The model integrates mechanisms from different but complementary traditions. Following previous work, this study focusses on the causes of the causes influencing direct key mechanisms, violent extremist propensity, and exposure to violent extremist moral settings that explain political/religious violence. The theoretical model is tested using structural equation modelling. The analyses are based on a web survey (N = 6,020) among adolescents and young adults in Belgium. Results show that violent extremist propensity and exposure to violent extremist moral settings have direct effects on the likelihood of political/religious violence. These direct mechanisms are in turn determined by a series of exogenous factors: perceived injustice and poor social integration. The relationship between perceived injustice and poor social integration and political/religious violence is further mediated by perceived alienation, perceived procedural justice, and religious authoritarianism. The implications of these findings are discussed. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss2/5

The Influence of Charismatic Authority on Operational Strategies and Attack Outcomes of Terrorist Groups

Despite the historical and contemporary prevalence of charismatic terrorist leaders, there has been very little empirical examination of the relationship between charismatic forms of authority and the strategic operation of terrorist groups. In response to this gap in knowledge, this study seeks to investigate if charismatic authority has a real-world impact on strategic choices and attack outcomes of terrorist groups. Using a theoretical framework meant to help measure charisma in terrorist organizations, this study quantitatively examines how differing levels of the presence of charismatic authority contributes to the choice in operational tactics (e.g., weapon and target choices) and the results of attack outcomes (e.g., success rates, lethality) within a sample of thirty international terrorist groups. In the concluding section, relevant findings, policy recommendations, study limitations, and areas for future research are discussed. Acknowledgements This manuscript is an adapted version of a chapter from the author’s Ph.D. dissertation. This research was conducted with financial support from a Public Safety Canada Research Affiliate Grant (2013-2014). This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss2/3

Is the Hybrid Threat a True Threat?

Does the “hybrid threat” discussed in General Marty Dempsey’s 2015 United States National Military Strategy make logical sense? In this paper I define the national security threat risk assessment process, examine the most significant US security threats, and study the hybrid threat. I conclude that the hybrid threat is the one that could most exploit our nation’s critical vulnerabilitiesboth from a security and foreign policy perspective. I conclude with a study of security and economic methods to reduce this threat. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss2/2

“Designing Danger”: Complex Engineering by Violent Non-State Actors: Introduction to the Special Issue

This Special Issue of the Journal of Strategic Security (JSS) presents the results of a series of case studies of prior efforts by VNSAs to engage in complex engineering tasks, in the hope of informing strategic assessments of the threat of VNSA exploitation of emerging technologies. One particular concern in international security lies at the nexus of violent non-state actors (VNSAs) and sophisticated technologies. When it comes to the assessment of such threats, much of the analysis hinges upon being able to accurately judge the desire and capability of adversaries to successfully carry out complex engineering operations. Yet, the actual process of how and why VNSAs engage in these efforts and the determinants of their success or failure are understudied aspects, at least in terms of systematic comparison across actors, technologies and time periods. This special issue presents the results of a series of case studies of prior efforts by VNSAs to engage in complex engineering tasks, in the hope of informing strategic assessments of the threat of VNSA exploitation of emerging technologies. The introductory article defines a complex engineering effort, summarizes the existing literature on the topic and sets out the methodology and framing questions used in the case studies. Disclaimer Editor’s Note: This article forms part of a series of related case studies collected in this Special Issue and should be viewed in the context of the broader phenomenon of complex engineering by violent non-state actors. Readers are advised to consult the introductory and concluding papers for a full explanation and comparative analysis of the cases. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/3 Acknowledgements This work was supported by Sandia National Laboratories, Contract #1525332. Any opinions, findings, conclusions and recommendations in this issue are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views of Sandia National Laboratories or the U.S. Department of Energy. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/3

Aum Shinrikyo’s Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Development Efforts

This article details the terrorist activities of the Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, from the perspective of its complex engineering efforts aimed at producing nuclear and chemical weapons. The experience of this millenarian organization illustrates that even violent non-state actors with considerable wealth and resources at their disposal face numerous obstacles to realizing their destructive aspirations. Specifically, Aum’s attempts at complex engineering were stymied by a combination of unchecked fantastical thinking, self-imposed ideological constraints, and a capricious leadership. The chapter highlights each of these mechanisms, as well as the specific ways in which they constrained the decision-making process and the implementation of the complex engineering tasks associated with their unconventional weapons development. Disclaimer Editor’s Note: This article forms part of a series of related case studies collected in this Special Issue and should be viewed in the context of the broader phenomenon of complex engineering by violent non-state actors. Readers are advised to consult the introductory and concluding papers for a full explanation and comparative analysis of the cases. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/5 Acknowledgements This work was supported by Sandia National Laboratories, Contract #1525332. Any opinions, findings, conclusions and recommendations in this issue are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views of Sandia National Laboratories or the U.S. Department of Energy. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/5

The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Development of Mortars

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) repeatedly showed itself to be one of the most inventive and adaptive of all the violent non-state actors who operated in the latter part of the twentieth century. Among its most innovative exploits was the PIRA’s successful development and fielding – spanning almost its entire operational lifetime – of improvised mortar systems. This chapter will trace the sustained development of mortars, including the underlying motivations for pursuing mortars as a complex engineering effort, the process by which the development took place and the underpinnings of its success. The discussion will show that the PIRA’s mortar development program was born out of tactical necessity but enabled by good organizational practices and the organization’s access to materials, expertise and places in which to leverage these. Disclaimer Editor’s Note: This article forms part of a series of related case studies collected in this Special Issue and should be viewed in the context of the broader phenomenon of complex engineering by violent non-state actors. Readers are advised to consult the introductory and concluding papers for a full explanation and comparative analysis of the cases. Acknowledgements This case study was excerpted and abridged from Gary Ackerman, More Bang for the Buck (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation: King’s College London, 2014). This work was supported by Sandia National Laboratories, Contract #1525332. Any opinions, findings, conclusions and recommendations in this issue are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views of Sandia National Laboratories or the U.S. Department of Energy. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/4 This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/4

Digging Into Israel: The Sophisticated Tunneling Network of Hamas

By the end of Operation Protective Edge in August 2014, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) claimed to have discovered and destroyed more than 30 tunnels spanning from beneath Gaza into Israeli territory. Hamas officials have praised these tunnels as an innovative approach to fighting an asymmetric war with a far more conventionally powerful Israel. The purpose of this case study is to examine the complexity of Hamas’ vast tunneling network by assessing the motivations behind the group’s decision to construct the network, to identify the factors that enabled Hamas to engage in such a complex engineering task, and to assess the level of effectiveness of the tunnel network both strategically and tactically against the IDF. Disclaimer Editor’s Note: This article forms part of a series of related case studies collected in this Special Issue and should be viewed in the context of the broader phenomenon of complex engineering by violent non-state actors. Readers are advised to consult the introductory and concluding papers for a full explanation and comparative analysis of the cases. Acknowledgements This work was supported by Sandia National Laboratories, Contract #1525332. Any opinions, findings, conclusions and recommendations in this issue are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views of Sandia National Laboratories or the U.S. Department of Energy. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/8

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Development of Narco-Submarines

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have been one of the world's most consistently formidable violent non-state actors over the last forty years. Unsurprisingly, the group has provided one of the most compelling and concerning examples of the level of technical sophistication attainable by sub-state organizations. Over the last two decades the group has carried out an iterative and innovative process that, in reaction to improved detection capabilities, has brought them from depending on disposable go-fast boats to transport drugs to possessing fully submersible and reusable covert vessels for transportation. The following case study will discuss the development of narco-submarines and the underlying motivations behind the pursuit of this complex engineering task. The case study will outline the different phases of the narco-submarine development and highlight FARC’s determination to overcome the challenges present in each design. This discussion will show how FARC’s systematized acquiring of information and expertise has resulted in the accomplishment of fully submersible vessels, capable of transporting more than 10 tons of illicit product. Disclaimer Editor’s Note: This article forms part of a series of related case studies collected in this Special Issue and should be viewed in the context of the broader phenomenon of complex engineering by violent non-state actors. Readers are advised to consult the introductory and concluding papers for a full explanation and comparative analysis of the cases. Acknowledgements This work was supported by Sandia National Laboratories, Contract #1525332. Any opinions, findings, conclusions and recommendations in this issue are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views of Sandia National Laboratories or the U.S. Department of Energy. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/6

Los Zetas and Proprietary Radio Network Development

The years from 2006 through 2011 were very active years for a number of Mexican drug trafficking organizations. However, the group that probably saw the most meteoric rise in this period, Los Zetas, had a unique and innovative tool at their disposal. It was during these years that the group constructed and utilized a proprietary encrypted radio network that grew to span from Texas to Guatemala through the Gulf States of Mexico and across much of the rest of the country. This network gave the group an operational edge. It also stood as a symbol of the latitude the group enjoyed across vast areas, as this extensive illicit infrastructure stood, in the face of the government and rival cartels, for six years. This investigation explicates the process by which Los Zetas constructed, concealed and utilized this network and attempts to draw conclusions about the motivations and organizational dynamics that brought the network to be, with attention paid to what this case says about the complex engineering capabilities of nonstate entities in general. Disclaimer Editor’s Note: This article forms part of a series of related case studies collected in this Special Issue and should be viewed in the context of the broader phenomenon of complex engineering by violent non-state actors. Readers are advised to consult the introductory and concluding papers for a full explanation and comparative analysis of the cases. Acknowledgements This work was supported by Sandia National Laboratories, Contract #1525332. Any opinions, findings, conclusions and recommendations in this issue are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views of Sandia National Laboratories or the U.S. Department of Energy. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/7

Comparative Analysis of VNSA Complex Engineering Efforts

The case studies undertaken in this special issue demonstrate unequivocally that, despite being forced to operate clandestinely and facing the pressures of security forces seeking to hunt them down and neutralize them, at least a subset of violent non-state actors (VNSAs) are capable of some genuinely impressive feats of engineering. At the same time, success in such endeavours is not guaranteed and VNSAs will undoubtedly face a number of obstacles along the way. A comparative analysis of the cases also reveals new insights about the factors influencing the decision to pursue complex engineering efforts, the implementation of such decisions and the determinants of the ultimate outcome. These result in a set of hypotheses and indicators that, if confirmed by future research, can contribute to both operational and strategic intelligence assessments. Overall, the current study enriches our understanding of how and why VNSAs might engage in complex engineering efforts. Disclaimer Editor’s Note: This article forms part of a series of related case studies collected in this Special Issue and should be viewed in the context of the broader phenomenon of complex engineering by violent non-state actors. Readers are advised to consult the introductory and concluding papers for a full explanation and comparative analysis of the cases. Acknowledgements This work was supported by Sandia National Laboratories, Contract #1525332. Any opinions, findings, conclusions and recommendations in this issue are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views of Sandia National Laboratories or the U.S. Department of Energy. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/10

Using the Oldest Military Force for the Newest National Defense

The National Guard is establishing Cyber Mission Teams (CMT) that will fulfill a federal role to backfill active duty defending Department of Defense networks, but are also exploring how they could effectively fulfill state missions. The President, Council of Governors, and USCYBERCOM Commander have expressed concerns about U.S. critical infrastructure cyber network vulnerabilities and the increasing magnitude of threat our adversaries pose to those networks’ security. This article explores using this emerging National Guard capability in a state role for protection of critical infrastructure cyber networks. Most of the critical infrastructure is privately owned. Although current executive orders and policy mandate government sharing of This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss4/1 cyber threat information, private providers’ reciprocation of sharing their vulnerabilities is voluntary. This article contends that effective cyber defense requires strong private-public partnerships. We developed a critical infrastructure cyber defense model based upon key characteristics from the literature on private-public partnerships and performed a case study of current cyber defense partnerships to validate the model. Our research shows this model to be a useful guide for emerging National Guard Cyber Mission Forces to consider when establishing partnerships for effective critical infrastructure cyber defense. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss4/1

How Power-Laws Re-Write The Rules Of Cyber Warfare

All warfare contains and element of randomness. This article will argue that, the kind uncertainty encountered in cyber warfare (Power-Law randomness) is fundamentally different from the uncertainty the military has evolved to deal with in the physical world (GaussianRandomness). The article will explain the difference between these two kinds of randomness, and how cyber weapons appear to operate under Power-Law randomness. It then will show how in cyberspace, key aspects of strategic thought are based on a flaws assumption of randomness. Finally, this article shall argue that if the American military is going to be effective in cyberspace, it must re-examine the way the military assumes risk, recruits is forces, plans for war and maintains the peace. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss4/3

Deterring and Dissuading Cyberterrorism

Cyberterrorism, while being written about since the early 2000s, is still not fully understood as a strategic concept and whether such actions can be deterred is hotly contested. Some strategists and policy makers believe that acts of cyberterrorism, especially by non-state actors, may prove to be undeterrable. Yet the leadership of both state and non-state actors tend to act rationally and function strategically, and therefore they can, in fact, be deterred to some degree. Helping to shape the legitimate options following a significant cyberattack, the Law of Armed Conflict has salient considerations for the deterrence of cyberterrorism, particularly the principles of military necessity and lawful targeting. Furthermore, when considered holistically and using all available means, deterrence combined with dissuasion activities can lessen the likelihood of cyberterrorism, while mitigating any consequences should such a cyberattack actually occur. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss4/2

Cyberspace's Dynamic Duo: Forging a Cybersecurity Public-Private Partnership

As of 2015, cyber threats have become more prevalent due to high-profile cases like the Target, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Home Depot, and Sony Entertainment breaches. In order to prevent what former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta characterized as a “Cyber Pearl Harbor,” the US government has to engage the private sector in order to build a solid public-private partnership (PPP) for cybersecurity. For there to be a successful cybersecurity PPP between the US government and the private sector, there must be a PPP founded on a model composed of four essential elements: a high level of trust between the public and private entities that corresponds to a mutual belief in the positive gains of both partners; clear baseline guidance imposed from legislation, which should be reinforced with government training and financial incentives; a bottom-up structural approach for efficient operations that allows for more autonomy at lower levels on local needs and resources; and, gaining influential community involvement in the formation of PPPs from all levels of the participating organizations, as well as civil leadership and the general public. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss5/9

All Propaganda is Dangerous, but Some are More Dangerous than Others: George Orwell and the Use of Literature as Propaganda

The true battles of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union were fought on the ideological front: pitting democracy and capitalism against totalitarianism and communism. The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was formed in the late 1940s to help combat the spread of Communism across Europe and in the United States. Part of the “psychological warfare” included the use of propaganda. Around the same time, British author George Orwell had recently published Animal Farm and Nineteen EightyFour. Both novels, due to the anti-Communist overtones, were adopted by the OPC as part of a larger anti-Soviet campaign. By examining the use by intelligence agencies of Orwell’s works during the Cold War and the potential use of those works in a post-9/11 global society, this paper aims to illustrate the fickle nature of literary works as propaganda. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss5/14

Choosing an SAT with SAnTA: A Recommender System for Informal Workplace Learning

Current intelligence community analytic standards encourage the use of structured analytic techniques; these are taught in training programs and supported by analytic tradecraft cells. Yet resources are scarce, timely personalized help is not available to all when it is most needed, and conditions for the improper selection and misapplication of these techniques prevail. The Structured Analytic Technique Advisor (SAnTA) is an electronic interactive job aid that recommends structured analytic techniques to analysts, based on the current state of their analysis and on the synthesized expertise of tradecraft staff. SAnTA is undergoing formative evaluation and iterative development. When released, SAnTA will provide individualized support to a large number of analysts every day. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss5/8