Jonathan Lear Research Articles

Surrendering Noble Lies Where We Buried the Bodies: Formative Civic Education for Embodied Citizenship

AbstractTo enact democracy, which is to live in communication with difference, requires a formative process that involves an education of the whole person for and through civic life. Drawing on Charles Mills's theory of Herrenvolk ethics and Jonathan Lear's analysis of psychosocial lapses that ail us, Sheron Fraser‐Burgess and Chris Higgins pursue a critical, historiographical, and psychosocial reading of our failures to live up to this aspiration, offering (1) a critique of our tendency to saddle ourselves with a false choice between a homogenizing unity and a differentiated but fractured republic; (2) a demonstration of why we must eschew a thin universalism of principles and confront difference as embodied; (3) an argument from the ethics of risk against the urge to reify and compartmentalize difference; and (4) an evocation of how deep pluralism itself might serve as a unifying creed. Civic education is not a matter of informing but of forming and cultivating vision and values. In pursuing the credal deep pluralism that is required to do justice to the prospects and perils of our democracy‐in‐the‐making, the task of the formative educator may be more difficult; but by embracing this creed, teachers may inspire their students to do the same.

Später: Objectless Eschatology and Radical Hope in the Poetry of Paul Celan

abstract: In this article, I examine Paul Celan's career-long preoccupation with the notion of a new beginning and the eschatological possibility of bringing about a hoped-for better future through the artistic act. Drawing on three major reference points in Celan's conceptualization of this struggle—Heideggerian eschatological thought, Jewish messianism, and the utopian tendencies of the early 20th century European avant-garde—I suggest another theoretical framework through which to understand Celan's divergence from these approaches: Jonathan Lear's theory of "radical hope." Although not a literary concept, I argue that Lear's "radical hope" offers a unique vantage point from which to consider what I call Celan's "objectless hope," shedding new light on its peculiarities and on the poetic techniques with which it is made manifest.

Relations, Ruptures, and Rituals

ABSTRACT This article explores relations, ruptures, and rituals in light of repetition. In turn, it considers repetition in light of Freud, Kierkegaard, and Dewey. The author’s engagement with Freud is however partly mediated by attention to how Jonathan Lear, especially in a recent book, Imagining the End: Mourning and Ethical Life (2022), criticizes the Freudian conception of repetition. While Freud valorizes remembrance over repetition, Kierkegaard does just the opposite: he elevates repetition above recollection, at least in the modern age (that is, in his own age as envisioned by Kierkegaard). The insights to be derived from Lear’s critique of Freud’s one-sided understanding of repetition (especially Freud’s failure to appreciate how “repetition” might be healthy) and from Kierkegaard’s treatment of this topic need to be extricated from the context in which they are articulated. Dewey’s formulation of a nuanced, variable, and multifaceted understanding of habit provides us with a framework in which these—and indeed other—insights might be more tightly integrated and sharply focused on some of the salient features of everyday experience. One of these features concerns the repeated forms of activity through which the fleeting moments of our quotidian lives are given meaning shape and worthwhile foci (that is, rituals).

Book Review: Imagining the End: Mourning and Ethical Life, by Jonathan Lear

Book Review: Imagining the End: Mourning and Ethical Life, by Jonathan Lear

Imagining the End: Mourning and Ethical Life, by Jonathan Lear

Imagining the End: Mourning and Ethical Life, by Jonathan Lear

Courage in the Anthropocene: Towards a philosophical anthropology of the present

AbstractIn the late 18th century, Immanuel Kant attracted attention for his criticisms of colonialism, that problematized the established boundaries between civilization and barbarism, and chastised English colonialism in particular. Some years later, however, in his lectures on Anthropology, he ventured some oddly racist views, concerning the specific differences between European and Indigenous peoples. Kant's racism is by now well‐documented. However, less attention has been paid to the peculiarities of that racism, and especially its foundations in a theory of virtue. His racism comes to light especially in his discussions of the virtues of patience and courage, and in passages which have rarely been subject to critical scrutiny still to this day. This article starts out from an analysis of the functions of Kant's concepts of courage and patience in his account of European versus Indigenous difference, with a view to interrogating the politics of virtue in the present, where this discussion is reoccurring in new guises. What Kant considered courage has now been devalorized, while what he considered patience is now valorized. This reversal of perspectives on what counts as virtuous has occurred in correlation with a reversal in western perspectives on Indigeneity. Such that contemporary accounts of courage are correlated with contemporary accounts of Indigeneity. These reversals of perspective must be understood in context of the transformation which philosophical anthropology has undergone under the duress of the Anthropocene. Contemporary works by Dipesh Chakrabarty and Jonathan Lear are of great relevance to this correlated transformation and will be discussed here. The article analyses what both Chakrabarty and Lear understand by courage today, its relevance to the Anthropocene, and points out the limitations of their theories. Ultimately the article argues for a rethinking of the definition of courage as a political virtue of the Anthropocenic present.

What the Experience of Transience Tells Us About the Afterlife

Sigmund Freud’s reflections on transience left him surprised that someone could revolt against the process of mourning. In Jonathan Lear’s interpretation of transience, the revolt is not simply a passing struggle of the mind, but a response to a difficulty of reality, that is, an existential struggle. Central to the experience of transience, according to Lear, is the disbelief in the existence of an afterlife. How might we understand the idea of an afterlife philosophically? I first consider three different philosophical conceptions of the afterlife that—in different ways—underline the relation between collective memory and the process of mourning. These reflections make it clearer which aspects of the afterlife play a role in the existential struggle that Lear describes. However, a further analysis of the temporality at stake in the denial of an afterlife is needed. I therefore look at two psychoanalytic interpretations of the refusal to mourn. The first considers the refusal to mourn as a way to deny change. The second interpretation sees the refusal as a realisation of meaninglessness that prevents the flow of time. I end the paper by arguing that the afterlife can be understood as a practice of articulation, which allows a shared time to flow. Such a practice will commit us anew to a shared world in which we survive with the wounding difficulties of reality.

Lear on Irony and Socratic Method

In “The Socratic Method and Psychoanalysis,” Jonathan Lear argues that Socrates' conversations seek to draw out an irony that exists within human virtue. In this commentary, I suggest that Lear should identify irony with aporia to align his interpretation with Plato’s texts and capture the epistemic dimension of Socrates' method. The Socratic dialogue is a form of inquiry that encourages the interlocutor to carry on the inquiry. The irony of aporia is that the interlocutor grasps his life’s principle by recognising that he does not know what it is.

Jonathan Lear, Imagining the End: Mourning and Ethical Life

Jonathan Lear, Imagining the End: Mourning and Ethical Life

Between Anger and Hope

Discussions around progress, that have always been at the core of critical social and political philosophy, have lately become particularly thorny, exposing a sort of double bind: arguments in favour of progress are unable to avoid positions that undermine progress itself, but rejection of progress risks giving in to reactionary, cynic or melancholic positions.In this paper, I formulate the hypothesis that the double bind depends on a sort of unhealthy “obsession” with normative criteria of progress. As a corrective, I propose to think of moral, social and political changes in the terms of what I call troubled normativity – a normative reflection, namely, that embraces conflicts, ambivalences, uncertainty. I discuss in this regard two recent perspectives on progress, Rahel Jaeggi’s pragmatist and Amy Allen’s genealogical-psychoanalytical ones. I further articulate their insights by taking into consideration the affective dimension of social transformations. I concentrate in particular on two emotional constellations, anger and hope, by drawing upon María Lugones’ and Jonathan Lear’s work.

“A good, successful life”: processing biographical breaks in group work with refugees

ABSTRACT This article explores social group work with Aramaic Syrian refugees who fled to Germany during and after the migration wave of 2015. Held in an intercultural center that is sponsored by the Diakonie, the welfare organization of the Protestant church, the group supports older adults as they process biographical breaks associated with disaster, war, and migration. The existential nature of the group’s purpose is theoretically framed by Pierre Bourdieu’s habit theory and Jonathan Lear’s concept of “a good, successful life.” In contrast to the goal of integration, which reflects the perspective of the host society, group work allows for cultural negotiation among newcomers, their families, and host populations.

Rethinking the Purposes of Schooling in a Global Pandemic: From Learning Loss to a Renewed Appreciation for Mourning and Human Excellence

A main goal of this paper is to complicate “learning loss” as the only, or even the main, thing schools should be concerned about as they respond to the Covid-19 pandemic. While schools have a responsibility to make sure students who are enrolled in school are learning, this cannot come at the cost of ignoring the other substantial losses students are also contending with. Following the work of Jonathan Lear, I make the case that schools should engage students in a process of learning how to mourn for their individual and our collective losses, while also considering ways that school can move beyond narrow conceptions of the purposes of school and to a deeper appreciation for the ways that an education can promote human excellence. As this pandemic wears on, it becomes harder and harder to do anything but endure. One goal of this paper is to serve as a reminder that schools can do more than endure: they can envision new possibilities for schooling that promote conceptions of wellbeing that go beyond fear of learning loss.

WITTGENSTEIN’S DISAPPEARING IDEALISM

The article examines some well-known attempts to consider Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations in the context of transcendental idealism. The main purpose of these attempts is to protect Wittgenstein’s later philosophy from the relativistic interpretation of such concepts a “language games” and “forms of life.” Thus, Bernard Williams, noting the ambiguity of the pronoun “we” in Philosophical Investigations, believes that such a “we” has a transcendental rather than empirical character. This approach allows Williams to argue that there is no meaningful alternative to the general perspective on the world that is embodied in this “we.” However, the main disadvantage of this approach is that Williams views such a “we” in much the same way as a conceptual schema. However, as many authors point out, this idea does not find its confirmation in the later works of Wittgenstein. Jonathan Lear, in turn, suggests that we should consider such a non-empirical “we” as a special kind of “mindedness.” Such a mindedness could be considered as analogous to a Kant’s analytical principle of apperception. Lear believes that it is this principle that gives meaningful unity to human behaviour and makes possible any communication with other people. Following Williams and trying to correct the shortcomings of his position, Lear proposes to consider the ambiguous status of “we” in Philosophical Investigations as an argument in favour of the “disappearance” of the transcendental “we,” and with it the disappearance of the threat of relativism. John McDowell, however, agreeing with the need to get rid Wittgenstein's philosophy of relativistic interpretations, critically assesses the idea of using transcendental idealism for this purpose. Instead, McDowell proposes to return to Hegel’s thesis about the unboundedness of the conceptual, which makes it unnecessary to appeal to the transcendental justification of harmony between reason and the world. The article, therefore, also examines McDowell’s arguments against attributing to Wittgenstein any versions of transcendental idealism.

PATRIOTISM, IDENTITY AND DEATH. REFLECTIONS ON THE EXISTENCE OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND A POLITICAL COMMUNITY

The article reflects on the existential foundations of patriotism, identity and death. The presented considerations take into account the individual and community aspects of the analyzed issues. The preservation of eidos (essence) and the adjournment of the end are the central categories of the presented analysis. The starting point for the considerations is the myth-creating aspect of the historiography of Mistrz Wincenty, which forms the foundations of self-understanding for the Polish people. Attention is paid to the renaissance of thinking referring to myths that characterizes contemporary Western culture, described by Chantal Delsol. The concept of patriotism is analyzed using the understanding of this phenomenon proposed by Alasdair MacIntyre, and there are reference to the literature as well. The considerations reveal the tension between patriotism understood as a special kind of loyalty shown towards one’s own political community and the requirements of universalist ethics, especially liberal ones. Liberal criticism of patriotism presents it as an anachronistic attitude. It is related to the modern concept of progress. The article refers to the typology of types of progress proposed by Robert Spaemann, but referring to the division of human activities created by Aristotle. The negative effects – also in the sphere of education – of treating the category of progress as an absolute, radicalized and totalized value were emphasized; not requiring justification and equated with good. The article highlights the immanent threat to the existence of individuals and communities. Jonathan Lear’s study of the decline and rebirth of a culture created by the Native American community, the Crow tribe, is analyzed.

Confounded Dwelling: Architectures of Association in W. G. Sebald’sAusterlitz

Confounded Dwelling: Architectures of Association in W. G. Sebald’s<i>Austerlitz</i>

A case for Lear

Wisdom Won from Illness (2017) is Jonathan Lear’s second book of essays, 15 papers written between 2002 and 2015. The title comes from a 1936 lecture by Thomas Mann written for Freud’s 80th birthda...

Open-mindedness in Three Dimensions

In this programmatic essay, I approach the question "What is open-mindedness?" through three more specific questions, each designed to foreground a distinct dimension along which the analysis of open-mindedness might proceed: When is open-mindedness? What is not open-mindedness? and, Where is open-mindedness? The first question refers to the temporal dimension of open-mindedness, which I analyze in terms of Dewey’s distinction between recognition and perception and the psychoanalytic concept of disavowal. The second question refers to the dialectical dimension of open-mindedness, to what the many aspects of closed-mindedness reveal about open-mindedness. Here I recall Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean. The third question refers to the dimension of scale, asking what open- and closed-mindedness look like on the interpersonal and social levels. To bring out this third dimension, I draw on Jonathan Lear's reading of the Republic and psychoanalytic group dynamics theory. Through these three related inquiries I show the range of this central intellectual virtue and bring out its connections to two central, related features of the moral life: the need for integration and the need for openness to newness and complexity.

Lessons in Self‐Betrayal: On the Pitfalls of Transformative Education

AbstractIn this essay Ryan Kemp makes an unlikely case for value stability, arguing that people should almost never aspire to become radically different and that, given this, some people should be reluctant to pursue educational experiences that wildly broaden their life possibilities. His account is developed and structured around two borrowed examples, one literary and the other historical. Wendell Berry, his novel Hannah Coulter in particular, is the source of the first example; Jonathan Lear, specifically the case of Native American resettlement developed in Radical Hope, provides the second. The essay contains three sections structured around three related ideas. The first section explores the rationality of wanting to be a different person. The second section explores the rationality of wanting to be the same person while doing entirely different things. And the third section explores the rationality of desiring an education that teaches you to be suspicious of being anything in particular.

Irony, Disruption and Moral Imperfection

Irony has a suspicious moral reputation, especially in popular media and internet culture. Jonathan Lear (2011) introduces a proposal which challenges this suspicion and identifies irony as a means to achieve human excellence. For Lear, irony is a disruptive uncanniness which arises from a gap between aspiration and actualisation in our practical identity. According to Lear, such a disruptive experience of ironic uncanniness reorients us toward excellence, because it passionately propels us to really live up to that practical identity. However, Lear’s understanding of irony is idiosyncratic and his proposal overlooks that disruption often results from value incompatibility between different practical identities. The disruption which follows from value incompatibility does not inherently reorient us toward excellence. The point is exactly that achieving excellence in one practical identity is sometimes incompatible with excellence in the other. Pace Lear, I do not identify this disruptive experience as a central example of irony. Instead, I consider irony a virtuous coping strategy for such disruption, because it introduces the necessary distance from our moral imperfection to sustain practical deliberation and maintain good mental health. Such virtuous irony negotiates a golden mean between too little disruption (complete insensitivity toward one’s imperfection) and too much disruption (a complete breakdown of practical deliberation and mental health). I argue that ironic media in popular culture provide a rich source of such virtuous irony, which I demonstrate through analysis of satirical examples.

Trump as Mirror for the Church: Death and Despair, Hope and Resurrection of the Church

The election of Donald Trump inaugurated a wave of anxiety-bordering-on-despair among various peoples hoping for another, better world. This paper considers whether Trump deserves such acclaim in the sense that Trump is at best a symptom or cipher that can be approached by heeding Martin Luther’s observation that our politicians reflect who we are. To make this argument first I draw upon the work of Andrew Bacevich to suggest a certain continuity rather than apocalyptic break in recent American politics. Then I ask what the production of such politicians and politics says about American Christianity, which is far more frightening than the fleeting ascendancy of a mere Trump. In particular, using the National Study of Youth and Religion I suggest that the church in America suffers from a widespread failure of formation in the faith. What are we to make of this failure? Whence cometh hope? Building on Ephraim Radner’s interrogation of the divided church and on Jonathan Lear’s exploration of radical hope in the wake of cultural devastation, I will suggest both a theologically appropriate despair and also a hope for emergent forms and practices of faith capable of resisting the darkness of these times.