Joint Forces Command Research Articles

The “Two Koreas” Problem in U.S. Policy, 1974–1980

In this article, the author charts the evolution of US Korea policy after the failed attempts to establish a unification dialogue between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the reduction of the US military presence on the peninsula in 1974–1980. In 1973, The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), which the Americans had supported for decades, ceased operations. The question of the fate of the United Nations Command loomed large. On the whole, in 1974–1980, the Americans did not reduce their military presence in Korea. At the same time, diplomatic support for negotiations on this topic and participation in maintaining the inter-Korean dialogue on the status of the ROK and DPRK in the UN and scenarios for possible unification of the country were quite effective. The Americans managed to prevent destabilisation in South Korea even in the face of a sudden change of power following the assassination of Park Chung-Hee. Simultaneously, the necessary international structures, such as the ROK/US Joint Forces Command, were put in place. Moreover, US diplomats managed to preserve even such a relic of the Korean War as the UN Command. At the same time, the issue of Korean unification had by this time become an instrument of political manipulation by all countries concerned. Under these circumstances, unification could not be achieved by diplomatic means alone.

Outflanked? NATO’s Southern Hub and the Struggle for its Middle East Strategy

ABSTRACTFollowing the rise of the Islamic State in 2014, the Atlantic Alliance engaged in an ambitious political revision of its policies towards the Middle East, which led to the creation of the NATO Strategic Direction South Hub. However, this new policy was only marginally the product of a threat-driven strategy; rather it was the result of two factors. Specifically, it responded to a political need in NATO Headquarters and the capitals of member states, particularly in Southern Europe countries, to acknowledge the latest security challenges in the Middle East and to offer a policy more balanced between NATO missions to the East, namely vis-à-vis Russia’s policies in its neighbourhood, and those in the South. The Hub also provided the Joint Forces Command – Naples with a strong mission within the NATO bureaucracy. Nevertheless, the limitations of the project with respect to the Alliance’s other political priorities indicate that this institutionalisation of a new organisation within NATO did not overcome the ambiguities of the Alliance’s posture towards the region, but rather reflected them.

Megacities and the US Army

ABSTRACT: The urban environment is a known vulnerability for US forces, and grows more acute as megacities increase around the world. This article describes past research and joint experimentation efforts concerning urban environments and identifies critical gaps for further research and experimentation. A more committed Joint Force constituency, led by the US Army, can lead to better readiness in this area. ********** The US Army is currently examining the topic of megacities and how to train, organize, and equip itself for successful operations in them. As a recent report from the Army Chief of Staff's Strategic Studies Group stressed, it is inevitable that at some point the United States Army will be asked to operate in a megacity and currently the Army is ill-prepared to do so. (1) As other authors have noted, Army researchers have determined megacities, urban concentrations exceeding 10 million people, will be the most complex environments for future land Global growth trends also suggest the importance of such complex environments is increasing, ... since the places where people live are getting increasingly crowded, urban, coastal and networked, the wars people fight will take on the same characteristics. (2) Given such trends, the Army is justified in asking whether current urban operating concepts and capabilities will suffice to accomplish future national security objectives. Numerous studies related to urban operations exist, all with different focus areas and outcomes, some of which are inconsistent or incomplete. In fact, as this article maintains, the current Department of Defense (DoD) urban strategy is on an uncertain trajectory and is in need of new leadership. Until its closure in 2011, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) supported other geographic combatant commands advocating for, and developing, future concepts for joint warfighting. However, the closure of JFCOM and its inability to obtain approval of a Joint Capabilities Document stalled urban concept development. Perhaps JFCOM was never the best choice for this endeavor but merely a pragmatic one, given the Army's preoccupation with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, DoD needs another organization to refresh its dated urban strategy and capitalize on JFCOM's prior work. What organization is best suited for addressing this projected challenge? Establishing yet another ad hoc joint task force is neither optimal or desirable. Giving responsibility to the Joint Staff seems misplaced because is not charged with organizing, training, and equipping the force. Creating a joint program office is an option, but only desirable if one of the military services is willing to lead as the Joint Executive Agent. The Title X statute prescribes that the three services organize, train, and equip their respective forces. It is unlikely the Air Force or Navy would give priority to this effort. The Marine Corps contributes greatly to urban concept development; however, the Marine Corps as an amphibious force does not view urban operations as a core competency. Among the services, the Army provides the largest share of the capability and capacity for operating in urban environments. As the nation's predominant land force, the task of reviving DoD's dormant urban strategy logically falls to the Army. Originating Directives The 2014 Army Operating Concept (AOC) builds a narrative of future warfare describing urban operating environments as likely to have significant impact on land force operations. (3) Clearly, land forces must prepare for all future operating environments and cannot organize, train, and equip exclusively for urban battle-spaces. Forces should be tailored to provide the maximum flexibility to deal with a wide range of operating environments, conflicts, and contingencies. The Army must transform current forces with new capabilities for urban operating environments. …

Report of the 2011 NATO Legal Conference (24 – 27 October 2011, Hosted by the Joint Force Command Lisbon at the Hotel Riviera, Carcavelos, Portugal)

Report of the 2011 NATO Legal Conference (24 – 27 October 2011, Hosted by the Joint Force Command Lisbon at the Hotel Riviera, Carcavelos, Portugal)

TARGETING NARCOINSURGENTS IN AFGHANISTAN: THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

AbstractIn October 2008, upon the request of the Afghan government, NATO Defence Ministers meeting in Budapest agreed that ‘ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] can act in concert with the Afghans against facilities and facilitators supporting the insurgency, in the context of counternarcotics, subject to the authorization of respective nations’. In explaining the scope of the contemplated actions, NATO officials noted that drug producers and traffickers who aided the ongoing insurgency could now be attacked. NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), US General Bantz Craddock, justified the policy on the ground that the Taliban reaped over $100 million annually from the drug trade. US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates likewise defended the decision as sound strategy.It soon became clear that other key figures were less enamoured with the new approach, or the subsequent guidance issued to effectuate it. On 5 January 2009, Craddock instructed General Egon Ramms, the German Commander of Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum, which overseas NATO operations in Afghanistan, ‘to attack directly drug producers and facilities throughout Afghanistan’. The threshold for engagement seemed to require little connection to the insurgency. According to SACEUR's guidance, it was ‘no longer necessary to produce intelligence or other evidence that each particular drug trafficker or narcotics facility in Afghanistan meets the criteria of being a military objective’ because the alliance ‘has decided that (drug traffickers and narcotics facilities) are inextricably linked to the Opposing Military Forces, and thus may be attacked’.

USJFCOM Commander’s Guidance for Effects-based Operations

Herein are my thoughts and commander's guidance regarding effects-based operations (EBO). This article is designed to provide the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) staff with clear guidance and a new direction on how EBO will be addressed in joint doctrine and used in joint training, concept development, and experimentation. I am convinced that the various interpretations of EBO have caused confusion throughout the joint force and among our multinational partners that we must correct. It is my view that EBO has been misapplied and overextended to the point that it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations. Therefore, we must return to time-honored principles and terminology that our forces have tested in the crucible of battle and that are well grounded in the theory and nature of war. At the same time, we must retain and adopt those aspects of effects-based thinking that are useful. We must stress the importance of mission type orders that contain clear commander's intent and unambiguous tasks and purposes and, most importantly, that link ways and means with achievable ends. To augment these tenets, we must leverage nonmilitary capabilities and strive to better understand the different operating variables that make up today's more complex operating environments. My assessment is shaped by my personal experiences and the experiences of others in a variety of operational situations. I am convinced that we must keep the following in mind. First, operations in the future will require a balance of regular and irregular competencies. Second, the enemy is smart and adaptive. Third, all operating environments are dynamic with an infinite number of variables; therefore, it is not scientifically possible to accurately predict the outcome of an action. To suggest otherwise runs contrary to historical experience and the nature of war. Fourth, we are in error when we think that what works (or does not work) in one theater is universally applicable to all theaters. Finally, to quote General Sherman, Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and disaster. History is replete with examples and further denies us any confidence that the acute predictability promised by EBO's long assessment cycle can strengthen our doctrine. The joint force must act in uncertainty and thrive in chaos, sensing opportunity therein and not retreating into a need for more information. USJFCOM's purpose is to ensure that joint doctrine smooths and simplifies joint operations while reducing friendly friction. My goal is to return clarity to our planning processes and operational concepts. Ultimately, my aim is to ensure leaders convey their intent in clearly understood terms and empower their subordinates to act decisively. While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and many partner nations have adopted the EBO nomenclature, NATO's policy focuses on the whole-of-government/Comprehensive Approach. In short, NATO's effects-based approach to operations (EBAO) does not fully mirror US EBO. Thus I have not addressed NATO's use of EBAO in this USJFCOM commander's guidance. This article explains my perspective and provides guidance on issues related to USJFCOM use of EBO, EBAO, operational net assessment (ONA), and system-of-systems analysis (SoSA) in future force development, training, and experimentation. Elements of these concepts have proven useful in addressing closed systems such as targeting, where their effects can be measured per the US Air Force's deliberate analysis and targeting methods. However, the concepts have been misapplied by others to operations beyond their original intent, resulting in overextension and confusion. Therefore, we will change course and provide the joint warfighter with a more balanced and understandable framework in which to plan, execute, and assess operations. My Perspective After a thorough evaluation, it is my assessment that the ideas reflected in EBO, ONA, and SoSA have not delivered on their advertised benefits and that a clear understanding of these concepts has proven problematic and elusive for US and multinational personnel. …

Effects-based Operations: More Important Than Ever

Abstract : Whether effects-based operations (EBO) and the effects-based approach to planning have led to negative warfighting results is a topic well worth our collective time and study. In fact, it is a healthy activity of any defense institution to question and evaluate its doctrine, policy, and procedures. The current debate on EBO brought about by General James N. Mattis's memorandum to US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) directing the elimination of the term from the command's vocabulary has not put the issue to rest.1 Quite to the contrary, the Mattis memo reinvigorated the debate, and this article aims at being part of that debate. Effects-based operations are not dead. No one individual can kill a concept, and this concept has staying power. When the underlying rationale for General Mattis's decision is analyzed, one can see that EBO as a concept for planning will be around for some time.

The Iraqi Perspectives Report: Saddam's Senior Leadership on Operation Iraqi Freedom from the Official U.S. Joint Forces Command Report, and: On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (review)

The Iraqi Perspectives Report: Saddam's Senior Leadership on Operation Iraqi Freedom from the Official U.S. Joint Forces Command Report, and: On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (review)

The National Centers for System of Systems Engineering: A Case Study on Shifting the Paradigm for System of Systems

Introduction Based on literature and interest encountered in practice, there is a clear and consistent increase in System of Systems Engineering (SOSE). SOSE is being used in organizations such as Lockheed Martin, Concurrent Technologies Corporation, and the Joint Forces Command, all providing a service or solution for complex, distributed problems. However, a quick scan of literature, publications, and websites show that the approaches being presented do not necessarily subscribe to a common theme or methodology for solving, or defi ning SOS type problems. For example:  Lockheed Martin (CIAD 2006) proposes a unifi ed discipline methodology that integrates the practitioners needed to provide SOS solutions.  Concurrent Technologies Corporation (www.sosece. org), that operates the System of Systems Center of Excellence, suggests that System of Systems Engineering is an emergent condition of Systems Engineering and builds on current techniques.  Joint Forces Command, Standing Joint Task Force (MECS report 2006) focus on System of System Analysis, which is used to defi ne service capabilities in the process of providing for a Joint Force capability.

Human Performance Modeling for Operational Command, Control and Communication

The challenges facing the military due to adversaries, new battlegrounds, and everchanging technology requires innovative, fast, and efficient means to conduct and support research. The Army Research Laboratory has developed a modeling environment, C3TRACE (Command, Control, and Communication — Techniques for Reliable Assessment of Concept Execution), that aids in the evaluation of different personnel architectures and information technology on system and human performance. This modeling environment, which was originally designed to address tactical command issues, has been applied to a higher level organizational command and control environment within the Joint Forces Command. Specifically, it was applied to an urban operations exercise to evaluate the effect of various personnel structures and communication means on awareness, flow of information, and decision-making.

Advanced Message Routing for Scalable Distributed Simulations

On large Linux clusters, scalability is the ability of the program to utilize additional processors in a way that provides a near-linear increase in computational capacity for each node employed. Without scalability, the cluster may cease to be useful after adding a very small number of nodes. The Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Experimentation Directorate (J9) has recently been engaged in Joint Urban Operations (JUO) experiments and counter mortar analyses. Both required scalable codes to simulate over 1 million SAF clutter entities, using hundreds of CPUs. The JSAF application suite, utilizing the redesigned RTI-s communications system, provides the ability to run distributed simulations with sites located across the United States, from Norfolk, Virginia, to Maui, Hawaii. Interest-aware routers are essential for scalable communications in the large, distributed environments, and the RTI-s framework, currently in use by JFCOM, provides such routers connected in a basic tree topology. This approach is successful for small to medium sized simulations, but faces a number of constraining limitations precluding very large simulations. To resolve these issues, the work described herein utilizes a new software router infrastructure to accommodate more sophisticated, general topologies, including both the existing tree framework and a new generalization of the fully connected mesh topologies. The latter were first used in the SF Express ModSAF simulations of 100,000 fully interacting vehicles. The new software router objects incorporate an augmented set of the scalable features of the SF Express design, while optionally using low-level RTI-s objects to perform actual site-to-site communications. The limitations of the original MeshRouter formalism have been eliminated, allowing fully dynamic operations. The mesh topology capabilities allow aggregate bandwidth and site-to-site latencies to match actual network performance. The heavy resource load at the root node now can be distributed across routers at the participating sites. Most significantly, realizable point-to-point bandwidths remain stable as the underlying problem size increases, sustaining scalability claims.

Special Issue: Simulation Methodologies For Complex Urban Environments

originally presented the Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference (I/ITSEC’04). The papers were rewritten in article form and reviewed for publication in JDMS in accordance with its normal review procedure for special issues. The resulting articles showcase the power of modeling and simulation in the training and education community. Even more importantly, the special issue accentuates the universality of challenges faced by modeling and simulation professionals across the defense M&S domains. The first paper, “Adapting to Urban Warfare,” by Ceranowicz and Torpey, discusses the Urban Resolve experiments being conducted by the U.S. Joint Forces Command J9 Directorate and the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program at IDA. The experiments are focused on evaluating whether future sensors will provide a significantly higher degree of situational awareness in urban operations. The authors explain how the dense environment characteristics of urban areas pose significant challenges for current combat simulations and provide a comprehensive look at the issues associated with adapting simulations for urban warfare. In the next paper, “Advanced Message Routing for Scalable Distributed Simulations,” Gottschalk, Amburn, and Davis describe the communications infrastructure used to run the large-scale entity simulations supporting the same set of Urban Resolve experiments. To achieve truly large-scale (over 1M) clutter entities, their work extends the RTI-s software route infrastructure to accommodate a more general router topology. The third paper, “The Future of Mixed Reality: Issues in Illumination and Shadows,” by Konttinen, Hughes, and Pattanaik, addresses technologies necessary to fully immerse dismounted soldiers in virtual environments. Augmented reality will provide significant enhancements in training effectiveness, practicality, and flexibility. This paper documents, in a rigorous manner, technical lessons derived from experiments and research in this area. The authors have captured many of the issues, proposed solutions, and demonstrated the efficacy of the proposed approach. Finally, in “A Validation Methodology for Human Behavior Representation Models,” Goerger, McGinnis, and Darken have taken up a challenge faced by modelers across M&S communities: validation. Further, they chose as the stage for this task the representation of human behavior itself, arguably the most difficult component of warfare to simulate. They measured performance bias on the part of the experts as it affects both the accuracy and consistency of their judgments. The M&S community has begun to consider improving the evaluation by subject matter experts by providing some common evaluation criteria. Goerger, et al, have provided measurements that suggest the type of criteria that could be used successfully. While applied to human performance, their results are applicable across a far broader area of M&S. Their work places a measurable milestone in the path to providing more robust validation for simulations. In closing, my sincerest thanks to Dr. Margaret Loper of GTRI, Dr. Sue Numrich of IDA, Dr. David Pratt of SAIC, and LTC. John “Buck” Surdu, Ph.D., of U.S. Army PEO STRI, all I/ITSEC reviewers, and all essential to the compilation and design of this special issue. Special Issue: Simulation Methodologies For Complex Urban Environments

PDU Bundling and Replication for Reduction of Distributed Simulation Communication Traffic

Communication bandwidth and latency reduction techniques are developed for Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS) protocols. DIS Protocol Data Unit (PDU) packets are bundled together prior to transmission based on PDU type, internal structure, and content over a sliding window of up to C adjacent transmission requests, for 1 < C < 64. At the receiving nodes, the packets are replicated as necessary to reconstruct the original packet stream. Bundling strategies including Always-Wait, Always-Send, Type-Only prediction, Type-Length prediction, and Type-Length-Time prediction are developed and then evaluated using both heuristic parameters and a gradient descent back-propagation neural network. Several communication case studies from the One Semi-Automated Forces (OneSAF) Testbed Baseline (OTB) are assessed for multiple-platoon, company, and battalion-scale force-on-force vignettes consistent with Future Combat Systems (FCS) Operations and Organizations (O&O) scenarios. Traffic is modeled using the OMNeT++ discrete-event simulator models and scripts developed for a hierarchical communication architecture consisting of eight en route C-17 aircraft, each carrying three Ethernet-connected M1A2 ground vehicles, a wireless flying LAN based on Joint Forces Command's Joint En route Mission Planning and Rehearsal System (JEMPRS) for Near-Term (JEMPRS-NT) and follow-on bandwidth capacities. The simulation traffic includes Opposing Force (OPFOR) control through a CONUS-based ground station via its corresponding satellite links. Different bandwidth capacities are simulated and analyzed for PDU travel time and slack time, router and satellite queue length, and number of packet collisions are assessed at 64 Kbps, 256 Kbps, 512 Kbps, and 1 Mbps capacities. Results indicate that a Type-Length prediction strategy is capable of improving travel time up to 85%, slack time up to 97%, and queue length up to 98% on bandwidth restricted channels of 64 Kbps.

Mapping the Route of Leadership Education: Caution Ahead

Educational experts from the systems analyst school seek to impose research-based techniques on teachers in the place of the knowledge of teaching derived from experience, apprenticeship, and study of educational purpose. Such context-stripped research-based knowledge cannot substitute for professional knowledge. Joe L. Kincheloe (1) One of the hardest things for a successful organization to do is question the assumptions on which its success is attributed. The US military reached its preeminence on the battlefield, in part, due to a highly systematic approach to training and leadership development. Much of the program planning and curriculum in our system of professional military training and education was developed through a systems analysis approach, best illustrated in the Army's use of detailed tasks, conditions, and standards. Systematic training models drive the design, resourcing, execution, and assessment phases of a variety of schools and courses in a multitude of settings and specialties. It is second nature for many in the military to default to these technically rational processes, not only for training in basic soldier skills, but for leader education as well. The personality types of our leaders combine with a planning culture that can result in approaches to leader development more applicable for the industrial age than the information age. At the center of defense transformation is the issue of what will make 21st-century military operations successful. Everything is on the table, from force management, weapons platforms, institutional processes, manning policies, and organizational culture, to educational philosophies and practices used in professional military education. It is in the spirit of engaging in and expanding the discourse on the important subject of leadership education that we wrote this article. One ongoing debate relates to a Competencies Leader Development Framework proposed by the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) J9 Joint Experimentation Directorate. (2) The initiative is a commendable effort to improve joint education toward the goal of improved joint operations. When J9 developed the proposal, a number of service entities were already in the process of devising leader competency lists, including the Air Force, Army Research Institute, and Army Command and General Staff College. Contractors at Fort Leavenworth also were instrumental in developing a competency map that guided the redesign of Army intermediate-level education. Accordingly, competency mapping had to appear promising to JFCOM. Competency-based program planning is attractive to a military community that holds concrete, rational processes in high esteem. Reviewing the J9 proposal required us to step back and review educational strategies for developing leaders, particularly strategic leaders who guide the course of the military profession. Senior service colleges are charged with educating many of the nation's future strategic leaders. The J9 initiative is an important one because it represents an effort to think seriously about elements of abstract knowledge that are characteristic of the warfighting profession and to ensure that such knowledge is passed to practicing members via an admittedly disparate system of schools and courses. This is no small task. The results of the proposal have implications for every school in the professional military education system involved in leadership development. At stake in this initiative is the process by which the joint community identifies areas for inclusion in the curricula of our service and joint schools and then holds them accountable via the program for the accreditation of joint education. At the heart of any profession is a body of expertise and abstract knowledge that its members are expected to apply within its granted jurisdiction. Those who learn and employ that knowledge in unique contexts are rightly described as professionals; in them lies the heart and soul of the profession. …

Douglas A. Sweeney. <italic>Nathaniel Taylor, New Haven Theology, and the Legacy of Jonathan Edwards</italic>. (Religion in America.) New York: Oxford University Press. 2003. Pp. xi, 255. $45.00

Journal Article Douglas A. Sweeney. Nathaniel Taylor, New Haven Theology, and the Legacy of Jonathan Edwards. (Religion in America.) New York: Oxford University Press. 2003. Pp. xi, 255. $45.00 Get access Sweeney Douglas A.. Nathaniel Taylor, New Haven Theology, and the Legacy of Jonathan Edwards. (Religion in America.) New York: Oxford University Press. 2003. Pp. xi, 255. $45.00. Leo Hirrel Leo Hirrel U.S. Joint Forces Command Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 109, Issue 1, February 2004, Page 178, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/109.1.178 Published: 01 February 2004

Conquering the Elements: Thoughts on Joint Force (Re)Organization

Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated, or should have demonstrated, that joint warfighting--that is, the synergistic application of the unique capabilities of each service so that the net result is capability that is greater than the sum of the parts--is not just the mantra of the Department of Defense, but is, in fact, reality. Nevertheless, as successful as Operation Iraqi Freedom was, the department might take the concept of joint operations to still another level. If Operation Iraqi Freedom provided the observer with glimpses of innovative, task-organized units such as the Army's elite Delta Force special missions unit working with platoon of M1 Abrams main battle tanks and close air support, we still see segmentation of the battlespace that creates unnatural seams, inhibiting the full potential of joint force. How does this square with future joint operational concepts? Can the current architecture of joint force command and control arrangements react responsively and effectively to the threat environment that exists today and will likely confront our forces in the future? Is there better way? In this article, we will explore those questions as we look at alternative joint force architectures that might better unleash the full capability of the Department of Defense. The Paths to Military Innovation In simple terms, states prepare their militaries for the future by reworking, reequipping, or redesigning their forces to better meet their security needs, to develop decisive means, or to ensure their competitive lead in military capabilities. is the pursuit of such an increase in military capability, and the DOD's Transformation Planning Guidance tells us that it is imperative for the US military to transform. The Transformation Planning Guidance defines transformation as a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position. (1) Each of the four components of transformation can be seen as path or axis along which one might proceed toward military innovation, either separately or in conjunction with journey down one or more of the other paths. In order to put our discussion within broader framework, each of the paths bears closer examination at the outset of this article. * Concepts. New operational concepts seek to create synergies between the aerospace, ground, and maritime forces. The development of the blitzkrieg doctrine of rapid mechanized warfare supported by close air support is the oft-cited prime example of new operational concept. * Capabilities. In limited sense, new capabilities derive from new technologies. Clearly, technology plays pivotal role in military transformation. The arrival of the tank and FM radio transformed the battlefield (which in turn enabled the development of the transformational blitzkrieg concept), and nuclear weapons completely changed the face of warfare. Today, advances in precision strike weapons and information technology have enabled the military to do things never before contemplated. Indeed, the destruction of regime no longer requires the destruction of society. Technology plays key role in many of the service transformation visions, from the Air Force's super-stealthy F-22 fighter to the Army's future combat system and the Navy's effort to transform ballistic-missile submarines into land-attack platforms. * People. One aspect of transformation is learning to use the complex technologies properly. It is not enough to present new technology and simply instruct service members in the technical operation of the new systems. Blending the skill and experience of high-quality people with functional technology is what produces gain in combat capability, and the continual process of assessing, recruiting, and retaining those people will require transformation in the way the Defense Department approaches personnel challenges. …

The Lotus Knowledge Discovery System: Tools and experiences

The Lotus Knowledge Discovery System™ from IBM uses several leading-edge technologies to systematically create associations between corporate expertise and information resources, personalize and organize knowledge for individuals and communities, and provide a place for teams to work, make decisions, and act. It also creates a searchable index, computes document values, and provides a search-and-browse user interface. This paper describes the technology behind the knowledge management components of the product and describes the experience of the United States Joint Forces Command, one of the product's earliest adopters. The Joint Forces Command combined a new knowledge management methodology with the software tools, and the Lotus team gained valuable deployment experience in the process.