Job Matching Model Research Articles

Analysis of Instruments for Implementing Intelligent Job Matching Models

Vocational high schools in Indonesia face challenges in producing graduates who meet the needs of the job market. The link and match policy along with the Job Matching system are proposed to enhance curriculum relevance to the workforce. The intelligent job matching model, which integrates machine learning technology, is expected to provide job recommendations aligned with graduates' competencies. Data analysis techniques used include qualitative and quantitative statistical analysis, encompassing Validity Analysis, Practicality Analysis, and Effectiveness Analysis. The intelligent job matching model has proven effective in assisting in matching vocational high school students' competencies with workforce demands in the industry. In the 2023 job fair, the success ratio of students invited for interviews until the employment process reached 53.13%, exceeding the Ministry of education and culture's target of 40%. This indicates that the model can provide job recommendations accurately enough, aiding in improving the direct employment rate of vocational high school students. Research indicates that the intelligent job matching model is effective in facilitating students' transition to the workforce. The model has been tested for validity, practicality, and effectiveness in enhancing students' employability and strengthening the relationship between education and industry.

Analysis of Job Recommendations in Vocational Education Using the Intelligent Job Matching Model

Vocational high schools are one of the educational stages impacted by Indonesia's low quality of education. Vocational High Schools play a crucial role in improving human resources. Graduates of Vocational High Schools can continue their education at universities or enter the workforce directly. Many students are found to have not yet considered their career path after graduation. At the same time, graduates are still expected to find mismatched employment with their expertise and skills. This research uses CRISP-DM, or Cross Industry Standard Process for Data Mining, to build machine learning models. The approach used is content-based filtering. This model recommends items similar to previously liked or selected items by the user. Item similarity can be calculated based on the features of the items being compared. After students receive job recommendations through intelligent job matching, they can use these recommendations as references when applying for jobs that align with their results. This process helps students direct their steps toward finding jobs that match their profiles, ultimately increasing their chances of success in the job market. These recommendations are crucial in guiding students toward career paths that align with their abilities and interests. The Intelligent Job Matching Model developed in this research provides recommendations for the job-matching process. This model benefits graduates by providing job recommendations aligned with their profiles and offers advantages to the job market. By implementing the Model of Intelligent Job Matching in the recruitment process, applicants with job qualifications can be matched effectively.

Consistency of the doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector in job-matching markets

In a many-to-many variation of Kelso and Crawford's (1982) and Kojima et al.'s (2019) job-matching model, we prove that the doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector satisfies a striking property termed consistency. It states that the price vector remains an equilibrium price vector in the market where an arbitrary doctor reduces her capacity by one. Combining consistency with Kojima et al.'s (2019) result, we delineate how the set of equilibrium price vectors moves when a doctor reduces her capacity by one: the set moves up but still contains the original doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector. We apply this result to establish comparative statics of welfare at equilibrium. As a byproduct, we also provide a simple and short proof of the claim that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is a pivotal mechanism under quasi-linear preferences.

Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets

We propose a senior level job matching model with multiple heterogeneous incumbents and entrants. An agent (firm or worker) can be committed or uncommitted (i.e., free). A committed agent is bound by her commitment and cannot unilaterally dissolve her partnership unless her partner agrees to do so. A free agent can make decisions independently. Every agent has preferences over multiple contracts and tries to find her best possible partner with a contract. We examine the problem of how to match workers and firms as well as possible and to set free as many committed agents as possible without violating any commitment. We show the existence of stable and (strict) core matchings through our designed market mechanism and obtain a lattice result for such outcomes and incentive compatibility results for the mechanism.

Wartime health shocks and the postwar socioeconomic status and mortality of union army veterans and their children

We investigate when and how health shocks reverberate across the life cycle and down to descendants in a manual labor economy by examining the association of war wounds with the socioeconomic status and older age mortality of US Civil War (1861–5) veterans and of their adult children. Younger veterans who had been severely wounded in the war left the farm sector, becoming laborers. Consistent with human capital and job matching models, older severely wounded men were unlikely to switch sectors and their wealth declined by 37–46%. War wounds were correlated with children's socioeconomic and mortality outcomes in ways dependent on sex and paternal age group.

Exploring the Optimal Safety Person–job Matching Method of Major Equipment Based on Human Reliability

Under the background of intelligent manufacturing, this paper aims to develop a model for person–job safe matching that optimizes safety with consideration of major equipment operator competency and task complexity. Safe matching cost is minimized in the developed model and is measured by the equipment downtime, production defect rate, and operator labor costs oriented by human factors. Human reliability is calculated with the goal of best value individual competency and best admit task complexity with a hierarchical structure. The 0-1 integer programming person–job matching model minimizes the human factor safety and wage costs and satisfies the requirements of the production order, budget and operator quantity requirement. An improved genetic algorithm is designed to solve the model. The computational results of the proposed model based on a case study for a large iron and steel company evidently demonstrated its effectiveness. A new integrated model provides more realistic matches for person–job assignment.

Group-Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Job Matching with Continuous Transfers

We show that several classical results (the existence of a worker-optimal stable allocation, the rural hospitals theorem, the group-strategy-proofness of the worker-optimal stable mechanism) extend from the discrete to the continuous case in a generalized job matching model.

Intermediary Organizations in Labor Markets

We propose a job matching model of intermediary labor markets by developing the seminal work of Kelso and Crawford. Using this model, we show that for an arbitrary fixed broker-fee rate, the salary-adjustment process converges to a core allocation in intermediary labor markets where high-skilled workers are matched to high-technology firms by the private middleman and low-skilled workers are matched to low-technology firms by the public middleman. This result means that the dual labor market is emerged as a stable outcome of job-matching promoted by the private and public middlemen. Finally, we discuss empirical relevance of our theoretical model by using the data of job placement services in Japan.

Youth Unemployment and Jobless Recoveries: A Risk-based Explanation

We quantitatively analyze an equilibrium job-matching model in the presence of time-varying discount rates and persistent aggregate shocks to labor productivity. In our model workers and firms learn about an unobservable, idiosyncratic component of match productivity. We obtain three results. First, the unemployment rate of young, inexperienced workers is more sensitive to economic conditions than older, experienced workers. Second, labor productivity shocks are amplified and propagated more strongly in states with higher discount rates. We find this effect to be quantitatively large. Third, our model features jobless recoveries which are more pronounced after recessions in which risk premia is higher. We provide empirical evidence for these findings.

Skills Diversity in Unity

At any point in time, skills gaps, mismatches, and shortages arise because of an imperfect correspondence between the singular sets of skills required by different open vacancies and the unique combinations of capabilities embodied in every job seeker - skills diversity in unity. This paper first constructs an abstract framework for defining and thinking about these phenomena in a unified, formal and objective way. The main building block is a discrete skills space in which the locations of vacancies and workers are determined by the vectors of skills characterizing them. We define skills gaps and mismatches as two different distance measures between them, and derive a condition for each vacancy that determines whether or not it experiences a skills shortage. We then develop a job matching model with imperfect information, in which skills mismatches influence the job application decisions of the workers, while skills gaps and shortages shape the competition for workers on the resulting bipartite job applications network. The tools proposed in this paper could in future work be employed as the main ingredients of an agent-based model used to investigate how skills gaps, mismatches and shortages affect equilibrium outcomes in the context of skills diversity in unity and imperfect information.

Commitment and Wage Bargaining in Job Matching Models with Costly Search

This paper provides a new strategic underpinning of the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution that is widely applied in search-matching models of the labor market. This 'intertemporal surplus sharing' (ISS) solution is usually defended as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of a strategic bargaining model in which the risk of breakdown grows infinitely large. We argue that such extreme assumptions on the risk of breakdown during disagreement are unattractive in the context of a search-matching model. We then show that ISS arises for arbitrary breakdown rates if agents can precommit to search during disagreement.

Outside options and wages: What can we learn from subjective assessments?

This paper studies the correlates of subjective assessments of how easy it would be for a worker to find another job as good as the present one and how easy it would be for an employer to replace a worker. First, I study the correlates of these two subjective assessments. Second, I study whether respondents who report better chances of reemployment receive higher wages and whether respondents who think they are easy to replace receive lower wages. The results are consistent with the standard job-matching model, which predicts that wages increase with better outside opportunity of the worker and fall with better outside opportunity of the employer.

Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard

We consider a job matching model where the relationships between firms and wealth-constrained workers suffer from moral hazard. Specifically, effort on the job is non-contractible so that parties that are matched negotiate a bonus contract. Higher unemployment benefits affect the workers' outside option. The latter is improved for low-skilled workers. Hence they receive a larger share of the surplus, which strengthens their effort incentives and increases productivity. Effects are reversed for high-skilled workers. Moreover, raising benefit payments affects the proportion of successful matches, which induces some firms to exit the economy and causes unemployment to increase.

Job Matching When Employment Contracts Suffer from Moral Hazard

We consider a job matching model where the relationships between firms and wealth-constrained workers suffer from moral hazard. Specifically, effort on the job is non-contractible so that parties that are matched negotiate a bonus contract. Higher unemployment benefits affect the workers’ outside option. The latter is improved for low skilled workers. Hence they receive a larger share of the surplus, which strengthens their effort incentives and increases productivity. Effects are reversed for high skilled labor. Moreover, raising benefit payments affects the proportion of successful matches which induces some firms to exit the economy and causes unemployment to increase.

Product market deregulation and the US employment miracle

We consider the dynamic relationship between product market entry regulation and equilibrium unemployment. The main theoretical contribution is combining a job matching model with monopolistic competition in the goods market and individual bargaining. We calibrate the model to US data and perform a policy experiment to assess whether the decrease in trend unemployment during the 1980s and 1990s could be directly attributed to product market deregulation. Under our baseline calibration, our results suggest that a decrease of less than two-tenths of a percentage point of unemployment rates can be attributed to product market deregulation, a surprisingly small amount.

Exogenous vs. Endogenous Separation

This paper assesses how various approaches to modeling the separation margin affect the ability of the Mortensen-Pissarides job matching model to explain key facts about the aggregate labor market. Allowing for realistic time variation in the separation rate, whether exogenous or endogenous, greatly increases the unemployment variability generated by the model. Specifications with exogenous separation rates, whether constant or time-varying, fail to produce realistic volatility and productivity responsiveness of the separation rate and worker flows. Specifications with endogenous separation rates, on the other hand, succeed along these dimensions. In addition, the endogenous separation model with on-the-job search yields a realistic Beveridge curve correlation and performs well in accounting for the productivity responsiveness of market tightness. While adopting the Hagedorn-Manovskii calibration approach improves the behavior of the job finding rate, the volume of job-to-job transitions in the on-the-job search specification becomes essentially zero.

Seniority and Job Stability: A Quantile Regression Approach Using Matched Employer-Employee Data

Job mobility and employment durations can be explained by different theoretical approaches, such as job matching or human capital theory or dual labor market approaches. These models may, however, apply to different degrees at different durations in the employment spell. Standard empirical techniques, such as hazard rate analysis, cannot deal with this problem. In this paper, we apply censored quantile regression techniques to estimate employment durations of male workers in Germany. Our results give some support to the job matching model: individuals with a high risk of being bad matches exhibit higher exit rates initially, but the effect fades out over time. By contrast, the influence of human capital variables such as education and further training decreases with employment duration, which is inconsistent with the notion of increasing match-specific rents due to human capital accumulation. The results also suggest that the effects of certain labor market institutions, such as works councils, differ markedly between short-term and long-term employment, supporting the view that institutions give rise to dual labor markets.

Job matching and propagation

In the U.S. labor market, the vacancy-unemployment ratio and employment react sluggishly to productivity shocks. We show that the job matching model in its standard form cannot reproduce these patterns due to excessively rapid vacancy responses. Extending the model to incorporate sunk costs for vacancy creation yields highly realistic dynamics. Creation costs induce entrant firms to smooth the adjustment of new openings following a shock, leading the stock of vacancies to react sluggishly.

Where Does Entrepreneurship Pay?

Empirical literature has found negative earnings differential between self-employed and paid workers, but much of the existing theory predicts the opposite, especially when entrepreneurship is defined as applying general technical knowledge to firm-specific purposes. We employ the NSF data on science and engineering workforce to identify occupations and jobs that require especially intensive use of technical knowledge acquired through formal education and we show that entrepreneurship generates considerable conditional mean and median pecuniary returns as compared to paid work in such jobs. In contrast, among scientists and engineers whose business ventures are not related to their education, the entrepreneurial earnings differential is negative, in line with findings in the previous literature. The positive earnings differential in education-intensive occupations increases with tenure in business, but declines with age. We offer a simple job-matching model where workers receive noisy signals about their ability, and higher-ability workers gradually sort themselves into self-employment in education-related jobs because of higher returns to ability in such jobs. The model is shown to be in line with evidence from panel data, suggesting that the premium to self-employment in education-intensive occupations and jobs might be due primarily to selection.

Job Matching and Propagation

In the U.S. labor market, the vacancy-unemployment ratio and employment react sluggishly to productivity shocks. The authors show that the job matching model in its standard form cannot reproduce these patterns due to excessively rapid vacancy responses. Extending the model to incorporate sunk costs for vacancy creation yields highly realistic dynamics. Creation costs induce entrant firms to smooth the adjustment of new openings following a shock, leading the stock of vacancies to react sluggishly