Japanese Peace Treaty Research Articles

Reconsidering the Ashida memorandum: the relations between the emergency stationing plan and police reform

Abstract This article explores the origins of Japan’s security policy after the Asia-Pacific War. During the occupation, the Japanese government decided on the maintenance of US forces in the country after the Japanese Peace Treaty. To explain the rationale behind this, existing studies emphasize the Japanese government’s external security calculations. Highlighting the interaction between Japanese foreign and domestic policies, this article challenges this conventional claim by arguing that internal security calculations strongly influenced the Japanese government’s decision. With the creation of the Ashida memorandum in September 1947 and the expectation that the General Headquarters (GHQ) would allow for stronger police forces, Japanese Foreign Minister Ashida Hitoshi and his staff sought to restrict the stationing of US forces in Japan only to national emergencies. As opposed to such expectation, however, GHQ’s police reform significantly weakened Japan’s internal security capabilities, forcing Tokyo to depend on US forces for dealing with internal communist threats.

The Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty and the Chinese residents in Japan—Legal status problem under the 1952 regime

ABSTRACT The Sino – Japanese Peace Treaty signed in April 1952 not only set the basic framework for diplomatic relations between China, Japan, and Taiwan until 1972, but was also significant in substantially determining the legal status of Chinese residents in Japan during the same period. Subsequently, this paper analyzes both the legislative process in Japan leading up to the Sino – Japanese Peace Treaty and the process of diplomatic negotiations between Japan and China and identifies the following points. In the process of legislating the Immigration Control Ordinance, the Japanese government, while recognizing that Chinese mainlanders in Japan were Chinese nationals, considered them to be outside the legal jurisdiction of the Republic of China (R.O.C.) government, and while recognizing the jurisdiction of the R.O.C. government over Formosans in Japan to a certain extent, interpreted “the ultimate nationality of Taiwanese people has not been determined” from the standpoint that the legal status of Taiwan was undetermined. The R.O.C. government was forced to accept the Japanese government’s treatment regarding the legal status of Chinese residents in Japan because it was unable to have its sovereignty over Taiwan and the Penghu Islands clearly stated in the articles of the Sino – Japanese Peace Treaty out of consideration for the United States, which acted as an intermediary in the negotiations of the treaty.

The Question of South Korean Participation in the Japanese Peace Treaty

This article examines why South Korea could not sign the Japanese peace treaty. Using American, British and Korean records, it shows that South Korea’s exclusion from the treaty owed to international and Korean domestic factors. While the US, the most important decision-maker in crafting the peace treaty, sought to invite South Korea as a signatory as part of the effort to build up the legitimacy of that government, Britain was adamantly against it. London reasoned that South Korea was neither a former belligerent that fought against Japan nor legally an independent country, and thus not entitled to sign the treaty. Furthermore, Britain worried that inviting the non-communist South Korea could dissuade neutralist Asian states from co-signing the treaty. Japan was equally against having its former colony (Korea) sign the peace treaty, arguing that Koreans might use this as a pretext to demand compensation, which would damage the US schemes to rebuild Japanese economy. But most notably, South Korea itself indicated willingness to forgo signing the treaty. When pressed for time, the US decided to exclude South Korea and proceed promptly with a Japanese peace settlement.

The Spratly Islands as a Single Unit Under International Law: A Commentary on the Final Award in Philippines/China Arbitration

ABSTRACTThis article addresses the question whether Spratly Islands is “in law a unit … [such] that the fate of the principal part may involve the rest” (Max Huber). The question was pivotal in the Philippines/China Arbitration. The Tribunal addressed it from the perspective of the archipelago provision in the Law of the Sea Convention. This article approaches the question from the perspective of the Japanese Peace Treaty.

Great Britain’s Postwar Insecurity and the Question of South Korean Participation in the Japanese Peace Treaty

Between 1945 and 1951, Japan and her former belligerents worked assiduously to develop a peace treaty in an effort to formally terminate the Pacific War. At the time, the provisional South Korean government (and later the Republic of Korea government) sought to become a signatory to this treaty. Unfortunately, South Korea was never able to sign the resulting Treaty of San Francisco in 1951. One reason for this was Great Britain’s steadfast opposition to the idea of South Korean involvement. Why was Britain opposed to South Korea signing a Japanese peace treaty? This paper argues that Britain’s attitude was largely motivated by its postwar insecurity. Britain at the time was financially devastated from fighting World War II even as it was confronting communist menace throughout the world that threatened Britain’s interests. Wishing to protect its commercial and security interests in China, Hong Kong, and Malaya, Britain was careful not to antagonize the newly established communist state in China. This extreme sensitivity towards the People’s Republic of China ultimately dissuaded Britain from supporting South Korea when the question arose over whether or not to include that state as a signatory to the Japanese peace treaty. Britain’s objection did not simply end at South Korean exclusion from the treaty, for it had far-reaching consequences that put South Korea in a disadvantageous position in its future relations with Japan, a situation that has been creating bitter controversies to this day.

The Debate over Korean Participation in the Japanese Peace Treaty

The Debate over Korean Participation in the Japanese Peace Treaty

Nehru, Henderson and the Japanese Peace Treaty

Nehru, Henderson and the Japanese Peace Treaty

San Francisco treaty making and its implications for New Zealand

The debate over the Japanese Peace treaty drew New Zealand into new relationships with the US and Australia – also challenging its traditional relationship with the United Kingdom. The Canberra Pact, signed in 1944, signalled acknowledgement by New Zealand and Australia of a mutual interest in the Pacific but they had different perceptions of the reality of a security threat there. While both countries favoured a harsh treaty with Japan after 1945, the Australian sense of the Japanese threat was greater. New Zealand regarded Europe as the most likely area of future conflict and was prepared to support the UK’s strategic interests there. As the US signalled a softer approach to a Japanese peace treaty, however, New Zealand joined Australia in seeking an American guarantee of their security. Australia was determined on a security treaty as the price for its support of a ‘soft’ Japanese peace treaty. New Zealand would have accepted a less formal guarantee but agreed to support the Australian line. They achieved their goal with the signature of the ANZUS treaty in San Francisco in September 1951 before the peace conference opened. New Zealand would have welcomed a restrictive Japanese peace treaty, but the ANZUS treaty provided security against a revival of Japanese power. New Zealand’s commitment to ANZUS was lukewarm. It continued to see its commitment to Commonwealth defence as its prime responsibility and failed to appreciate the significance of the new strategic arrangements in the Pacific.

Hong Kong and San Francisco: Anglo-American debate on East Asia and the Japanese peace settlements

Britain’s position over the Japanese peace treaty was conditioned by close attention to American regional policy. Although the British government disagreed with the Truman administration over Washington’s refusal to recognize the People’s Republic of China, its conduct of the Korean War and some aspects of the peace settlements with Japan, there remained considerable, if unequal, Anglo-American co-operation. Questions relating to the fate of Hong Kong also had to take into account US strategy in East Asia and, despite American attempts to isolate the PRC that caused severe disruption to Hong Kong’s long-established commercial and financial roles, the territory gained some compensation through American political and economic liberalism towards Tokyo. The presence of the US Seventh Fleet also served to ensure some sense of security to a beleaguered Hong Kong. By the early 1950s it was apparent that Britain and all other governments had to reckon with the predominance of American power in the Asia-Pacific. The San Francisco peace settlements saw the United States as the West’s sole remaining champion in a divided and tense region.

Look back in fear: Percy Spender, the Japanese Peace Treaty and the ANZUS Pact

This paper aims to explain why, after World War II, Australia – especially Percy Spender, its External Affairs Minister from 1949 to 1951 – pursued, unremittingly and against British wishes, a peace treaty that would prevent Japan from again becoming a military threat and an American alliance that would engage the United States in Australia’s defence. It is suggested that the answer is to be found in Australia’s long-held fears of Japan and its belief, borne out by the experience of World War II, that Britain was unable to provide for Australia’s security. Australian fears were, to some extent, racially based, a fact that contributed further to the problem of responding rationally to the new geo-politics of the post-war Pacific. From the mid-1930s, Spender had been obsessed by these anxieties about Australia’s vulnerability to an attack from the north and, as result of this, he was, more than most of his colleagues (including Prime Minster Menzies), determined to try both to impose a harsh peace on Japan and to obtain a defence alliance with the United States which would give Australia a say in America’s global strategy.

Containing the Cold War in East Asia: British policies towards Japan, China and Korea, 1948-53

Part 1 Japan: Britain, MacArthur and the occupation the road to a Japanese peace treaty Dulles visits London - the climax to Anglo-American negotiations the San Francisco conference and the end of the occupation. Part 2 China: the fall of the Kuomintang recognition of the communist government and the fate of Taiwan economic sanctions and trade Taiwan, aircraft and the future prospects. Part 3 Korea: Britain and the emergence of two, Koreas rollback the repercussions of Chinese intervention and the dismissal of MacArthur negotiations to end the Korean War.

Informally special? The Churchill–Truman talks of January 1952 and the state of Anglo-American relations

When Churchill became Prime Minister and Anthony Eden Foreign Secretary in 1951 they had to try to adjust Britain's world role to match her capabilities, while confronting a wide range of problems. Britain faced a balance-of-payments crisis and troublesome questions from the USA about both dollar aid and trade with Communists. In the Middle East the nationalization of the massive Anglo-Iranian Oil Company operations by the Iranian leader Mossadeq was another difficult issue: Britain emphasized the need to coerce the Iranians in order to safeguard her economic interests, whereas the Americans saw Cold War dangers in pressurizing Iran. They feared British policy would destabilize Iran and create opportunities for a Communist takeover. In Egypt also, nationalist forces caused a division between the two allies, with the USA evincing more caution for fear of being tainted with colonialism and thereby alienating Third World countries from the Western camp. In Europe, Britain dragged her feet on integration and the creation of a European Army, which made more difficult the agreed aim of rearming Germany. In NATO the British resented the appointment of an American as the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT); and they worried about America's strategic plans and general stance towards the Soviets, and about the atom bomb regarding both its possible use and the breakdown of wartime Anglo-US cooperation. There were American doubts about the integrity of Britain's security after the Klaus Fuchs spy case and her failure to make reforms suggested by the Americans, and there were relatively minor disagreements on such issues as the choice of a standard rifle for NATO and the location of NATO headquarters. The most immediate trouble-spot for Anglo-US relations, however, was the Far East where there were differences about the Korean War, the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Nationalist Chinese on Formosa, and the Japanese Peace Treaty.

Medical Television

VISITORS to the New York World's Fair in 1939 saw an intriguing display at the RCA pavilion. On a tiny black-and-white picture tube, the ghostlike image of David Sarnoff, then chairperson of RCA, spoke to the world, predicting a great future for the medium of television. A quick glance at the headlines of the day provides some indication of the wonder television generated. As Business Week proclaimed, Curtain Goes Up on Television, and Collier's promised, Before Your Very Eyes. More wary, Time deemed television Terrific Witchcraft, while Harper's questioned, Where Does Television Belong? Other magazines speculated about its role in education, in the library, in viewing surgical operations, and as a new aid to recreation. Although television's development was interrupted by World War II, in 1946 the boom began. By 1951, coast-to-coast viewers watched President Harry Truman open the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference in San Francisco, Calif. Natural color

The United States and the Reemergence of Independent Japan

JAPAN COMPRISES 85 million people-industrious, hardworking, inventive, Dwight Eisenhower declared in the summer of 1954. Actually, the power they [the Japanese] developed against us in World War II was such as to be frightening when we saw what they could do alone. Consequently, it becomes absolutely mandatory to us, to our safety, that the Japanese nation does not fall under the domination of the Iron Curtain countries, or specifically the Kremlin. Eisenhower went on to describe the consequences of a Communist takeover of its resources: If the Kremlin controls them, all of that great war-making capacity would be turned against the free world .... And the Pacific would become a Communist lake.' For two years after April 1952, when the Japanese peace treaty had formally ended the American occupation restored Japanese sovereignty, American leaders had been urging the Japanese to rearm-to rebuild their military forces as a defense against a possible Communist attack. In mid-1954, Eisenhower continued to affirm that rearmament was necessary, but now he also spoke on a different subject: the need for American support of the Japanese economy. At the time, the president was trying to persuade the American Congress to increase economic aid to Japan, to ease restrictions on Japanese imports to the United States, to drop regulations tying American assistance to a Japanese agreement not to trade with China. Eisenhower recognized that in the United States a narrow concern with budget-balancing, with protecting American industries from Japanese competition, with attempting a continued quarantine of China, might yield short-term benefits; but he also believed that such an approach would eventually prove counterproductive, creating precisely the situation that the United States was seeking to avoid. Japan cannot live, Eisenhower asserted, and cannot remain in the free world unless something is done to allow her to make a living. Now, if we will not give her any money, if we will not trade

The Shaping of U. S. Policy towards the Japanese Peace Treaty, 1949-50 U.S. Foreign Poicy in the Cold War Era : Re-examinations

The Shaping of U. S. Policy towards the Japanese Peace Treaty, 1949-50 U.S. Foreign Poicy in the Cold War Era : Re-examinations

Japan's Response to U.S. Policy on the Japanese Peace Treaty: The Dulles-Yoshida Talks of January-Febrary 1951

Japan's Response to U.S. Policy on the Japanese Peace Treaty: The Dulles-Yoshida Talks of January-Febrary 1951

Japanese Peace Treaty Negotiations with the Soviet Union and China, January to April, 1975

Japanese Peace Treaty Negotiations with the Soviet Union and China, January to April, 1975

The Attitude of the Philippines Towards the Japanese Peace Treaty

The Attitude of the Philippines Towards the Japanese Peace Treaty

Société Toho v. Société Les Films D'art and Others.

Warfare on land — Appropriation, utilization and destruction of enemy property — Peace Treaty with Japan, 1951 (Article 14) — Provision for appropriation by Allied Powers of Japanese property rights and interests under their control — Seizure of Japanese film by United States authorities — Subsequent production of American film containing scenes from Japanese film — Action for breach of copyright by owners of copyright in Japanese film against distribitors of American film in France — Whether rights acquired by United States under Japanese Peace Treaty confined to United States territory — Whether rights of Japanese owner of copyright deemed to have been renounced — Whether protection under French copyright law and Berne Convention subsisting — The law of France.

Political Movements in Japan

IN every country, the supreme task of politics is to guarantee the security and peace of that country. Japan is no exception. In its case, however, a fundamental difficulty is that the government and opposition parties are not able easily to find any point of agreement on how the guarantee is to be achieved. This has brought about a political situation peculiar to Japan. The present Liberal Democratic government follows a national policy based on Japan's international position as a member of the free world, centered around the United States. This policy has remained unchanged ever since the signature of the Japanese Peace Treaty at San Francisco in 1951. In contrast, the Socialist Party, which is the No. 1 opposition party, advocates neutralism. It holds that Japan should disengage from the free world. If the Socialist Party's policy is realized, Japan will without doubt lean toward the Communist camp. Such differences between the government and the opposition are the factors causing political disputes over the China prob lem, the talks between Japan and the Republic of Korea, the Viet Nam issue and the problem of revising the Constitution. The disturbances in i960 over the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty were, on the surface, the most radical development of this situation. Such confrontations can be expected to reach a climax in 1970 when the decision must be made on whether to extend the present Security Treaty. Foreigners may get the impression of such confusion in the pol itics of Japan that they conclude the country faces a crisis. I would like to say at once that such a view is mistaken. This is not to say that Japan has attained the ideal in politics. But, relatively speaking, I do believe that Japan has reached a certain political maturity. Of all the countries occupied by the Allied forces after the last war, or which became independent, Japan probably is the only one that has managed to achieve democracy, rationed out in our case by the United States. None the less, the course of Japanese politics causes dissatisfaction both within the country and elsewhere. In my opinion, there are three reasons for this. First, Japan is probably the most highly educated country in the world. There is practically no illiteracy. In every household,