Japan Partnership Research Articles

Epistemic Goals and Practices in Biology Curriculum—the Philippines and Japan

AbstractDespite cultural differences, the Philippines–Japan partnership is developing an intentional teaching curriculum with parallel standards. However, disparities among their respective educational systems have prompted inequalities. As education plays a critical role in collaboration, we explored the Epistemic Goals (EGs) and Epistemic Practices (EPs) in the biology curriculum, with the research question: How do the epistemic goals and practices of the biology curriculum transmit knowledge and skills in the Philippines and Japan? Using an ethnographic design, we conducted two iterative explorations of EGs and EPs. First, we examined the curriculum policy to determine its EGs. Using the A-B-C-D protocol, we employed discourse analysis to evaluate knowledge and skills in the biology grade-level standards. Second, we examined the articulation of goals in classroom teaching practices. We conducted classroom immersion and observed classes to determine EPs and supported our observations through interviews, synthesizing the data using inductive content analysis. Our findings revealed that the Philippines’ EGs were to transmit factual knowledge enhanced by basic science skills, and their EPs were audio-visual materials, gamified instructions, guided inquiry, posing questions, and learning-by-doing. In comparison, Japan’s EGs were to provide a solid foundation of theoretical and metacognitive knowledge, integrated science skills, and positive attitudes. Its EPs involved cultivating lasting learning, observation, investigation, experimentation, collaborative discussion, and reflective thinking. Our study makes a meaningful contribution by shedding light on crucial ideologies and cultural identities embedded in Biology curricula and teaching traditions.

The EU–Japan Partnership in the Post-pandemic Order: What Comes Next?

EU–Japan relations have been treated in the literature as a ‘normal relationship’ between two mature actors with a long history of promises, expectations and indifferences. However, since 2004, the EU has been considering its relations with Japan as a strategic partnership; that is, a powerful relationship that plays an increasingly central role in the international system. Recent changes in the EU and Japanese domestic and international environments show how both parties’ relations have shifted from a period of indifferences and low expectations to a new momentum of cooperation in facing common global challenges such as open trade, climate change, multilateralism or the recent pandemic. The main objective of this article is, first, to suggest a framework of analysis to better calibrate the EU–Japan relationship, and second, to understand recent trends in EU–Japan relations that have enabled the Economic Partnership Agreement that entered into force in 2019.

North–South development competition and the quality and sustainability of Chinese and Japanese trans‐national infrastructure initiatives

AbstractChina has become a recent rising power in global development cooperation in the past few years. This paper examines how the Global North, as represented by Japan, responds to the rising of the Global South, as represented by China, in infrastructure support. This paper positions itself in the context of Global‐North/South and triangular cooperation to compare Japan's Partnership for Quality Infrastructure with China's Belt and Road Initiative from the dimensions of policy rhetoric, finance mechanism, environmental sustainability and rule of law. This paper draws the conclusion on whether the North–South competition enhances the quality and sustainability of those initiatives.

Review. The Eu–Japan partnership in the shadow of China: Natural allies or untapped potential?

Review. The Eu–Japan partnership in the shadow of China: Natural allies or untapped potential?

Modi’s India and Japan: nested strategic partnerships

The three pillars of India’s foreign policy strategy under an overarching preference for ‘strategic autonomy’ are security, economic development, and status. Japan plays a significant part with respect to all three. We employ an analytical framework that assesses how Narendra Modi, in line with a trend set in motion by his predecessors, has attempted to build the India–Japan partnership through a set of nested strategic partnerships: bilateral (India–Japan), trilateral (India–Japan–United States) and quadrilateral (India–Japan–United States–Australia). We examine the extent to which Modi has contributed to the strengthening of each of these partnerships with respect to institutionalisation, security, economic interaction and status. Our findings show the degree of continuity or change wrought by Modi in each case and the reasons for this. We conclude that Modi’s transformative impact has been limited, though he has been able to take two of the three strategic partnerships forward to a significant extent.

The EU–Japan Partnership in the Shadow of China: The Crisis of Liberalism

The EU–Japan Partnership in the Shadow of China: The Crisis of Liberalism

India’s Readiness for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Through the India–Japan Partnership

India and Japan are engaged in a strategic and comprehensive economic partnership. However, some major powers have different interests that may delay the conclusion of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). India and Japan were among the 14 countries that initially joined the RCEP, but India has since opted to stay out, pending resolution of outstanding issues. This study aims to examine the India–Japan strategic partnership in the development of the RCEP and measure the saving potential of the India–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, employing an ex-ante analysis with scenarios based on zero tariffs. These political and economic partnerships play an essential role for both countries at the regional level. India and Japan have good economic and political relations that could enhance the feasibility of India rejoining the RCEP. The results of the saving potential analysis show that both countries have gained benefits from the economic partnership.

A comparative study to identify a suitable model of ownership for Iran football pro league clubs

Today the government ownership of the professional football clubs is absolutely illogical view point. Most of sports clubs are conducted by private sector using different models of ownership all over the world. In Iran, government credits benefit was main reason that the professional sport was firstly developed by government firms and organizations. Therefore, the sports team ownership is without the professionalization standards. The present comparative study was to examine the different football club ownership structures of the top leagues and the current condition of Iran football pro league ownership and then present a suitable ownership structure of Iran football clubs to leave behind the government club ownership. Among the initial 120 scientific texts, the thirty two cases including papers, books and reports were found relevant to this study. We studied the ownership prominence and several football club models of ownership focused on stock listing model of ownership, private investor model of ownership, supporter trust model of ownership and Japan partnership model of ownership; theoretical concepts, empirical studies, main findings, strengths and weaknesses were covered in analysis procedure. According to various models of ownership in leagues and the models’ productivity in football clubs, each model of ownership considering national environmental, economic, social conditions has strengths and weaknesses. So, we cannot present a definite model of ownership for Iran football pro league clubs due to different micro-environments of Iran clubs. We need a big planning to provide a supporter-investor mixed model of ownership to Iranian clubs. Considering strengths and weaknesses in the models of ownership as well as the micro and macro environment of Iran football clubs, German model and Japan partnership model are offered as suitable ones to probable new model of ownership in Iran pro league clubs. Consequently, more studies are required to find a suitable model of ownership based on environmental conditions in Iran.

India–Japan Relations

Prime Minister Mori’s visit to India in 2000 began a new era in the India–Japan partnership, resulting in a surge in Japanese aid and investment into India. Japanese aid facilitated infrastructure development, health, water and sanitation programmes of India. Japanese investment also predominantly flowed into the automobile and the electronic sectors. The relationship followed the standard practice that was witnessed in Japan’s relations with other countries in Asia. However, Koizumi’s visit in 2005 brought a ‘strategic’ component into the purview of the India–Japan partnership. From 2010 onwards, especially with Shinzo Abe’s ascendency as the premier of Japan in 2012, this relationship further strengthened the strategic trajectory. China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean and in the Asian region and the changing priorities of the US have drawn the two nations closer, strengthening economic cooperation between the two countries by diverting the Japanese investment to long-term infrastructure projects and many public–private partnerships which address the strategic concerns. The main focus of this article is to highlight how the relationship between India and Japan no longer rests only on ‘complementary economic needs’, but rather that this economic cooperation is being used as a tool to gain strategic strength in the larger canvas of the ‘Indo-Pacific region’.

Central Asia and Japan: Bilateral and Multilateral Relations

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1991s Central Asian nations and Japan established diplomatic relations and partnership began to increase steadily as manifested by the level of official contacts. In 1997 the “Silk Road” Diplomacy concept was formulated for Japan's policy toward Central Asia. In the beginning of 21st century we see activization of new actors including India, Korea and Japan in Central Asia, which were mainly welcomed in the region. Tokyo recognized the growing strategic importance of Central Asia in the context of international security and sought to play a more active role as an Asian nation in Eurasia. During two decades Central Asian nations and Japan partnership began to increase steadily. Japan is one of the largest assistants to Central Asia in structural reforms and Japanese investments to the different aspects of region economy and transport communication add up to several billions. There are several areas of special interest to Japan in its relations with Central Asia, including cooperation in education, economic development of the region, political reforms, as well as energy resources. Japan's effort in creating the “Central Asia plus Japan” dialog is part of its multilateral diplomacy. At the same time there are some challenges and problems in Central Asia–Japan relations. However, there are potentialities for future bilateral and multilateral relations. Japan like Korea, India and other countries has a strong positive image in Central Asia, which could be regarded as an additional factor for fostering partnership of Central and East Asia as well as interregional relation with the vast Asian continent and beyond.

‘Getting the biosecurity architecture right’ in the Asia-Pacific region

This paper offers insights to enhance biosecurity in the Asia-Pacific by asking three questions. What risks/threats are significant in the region? Which security measures should be prioritized? What kind of regional – institutionalized and ad-hoc – arrangements should be implemented? By doing so the paper specifically focuses on two important aspects of biosecurity. Firstly, the issue of immediate capacity-building in the context of disaster relief, public health preparedness and biodefence. Secondly, the long-term preventive aspect, namely education and awareness-raising activities to more broadly promote responsible conduct in life science research in terms of laboratory accidents as well as the intentional use of biological agents for hostile purposes. In order to promote both aspects of biosecurity within the policy process, the paper analyses the strategic value of the US–Japan partnership in its efforts to build a biosecurity architecture in the Asia-Pacific region.

Comparative Study Between Japan and the UK on Shifting the Third Sector–Government Relationships

The aim of this research is to examine and compare the shifting relationships between third sector organizations and local government under the current public service reforms in Japan and the UK. In both cases, institutional isomorphic tendency amongst third sector organizations can be found. However, in the case of UK, more formalized partnership frameworks set by central government as well as contractual relationships has an impact on this tendency. Contrastingly, Japan partnerships tend to be individualized. In this regard, the contracting framework seems to have more impact on behavior of the third sector organizations than partnership frameworks. In addition, the aspect of co-governance of the third sector organizations has been less developed than in the third sector in the UK. This affinity seems to be associated with the lack of sense of identity as a sector and also the lack of strong third sector organizations.

Japan's Peace-Building in Mindanao: Partnering Malaysia, the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front

Tokyo claims that peace-building has become a key pillar in its foreign policy. A litmus test of this rhetoric is Japan's peace-building efforts in conflict-ridden Mindanao. Japan's partnership with Malaysia, Libya and Brunei (all Organization of Islamic Conference members) to address the conflict between the government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front is significant because it is a diplomatic milestone beyond the frameworks of the US – Japan Alliance and the United Nations. If Japan were to succeed in Mindanao, peace-building might well be a promising ‘third path’ in its international relations—beyond an inward-looking ‘one-country’ pacifism or over-dependence on its US ally for its foreign policy direction. Interviews with serving diplomats and other key players are used to offer additional insight.

Thirty years of the Australia–Japan partnership in Asian regionalism: evolution and future directions

This article reviews the development of the Australia–Japan partnership in building regional institutions such as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council and the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation over the last three decades since the NARA Treaty was signed in 1976. In a unique partnership, academics, business people, politicians and officials in both countries were central to establishing these regional economic institutions. This article, however, argues that while both countries had shared understandings on regional issues during the first two decades after the treaty, the last decade has seen divergent regional understandings, especially over the rise of China. Japan sees the growing influence of China as a political obstacle due to growing bilateral tensions arising from historical and territorial issues, while Australia finds it a great economic opportunity to promote its trade with and attract investments from China. This differing understanding on China between both countries may act as a major hurdle to the effective and functional partnership in East Asian regionalism.

The Australia–Japan Partnership in the Asia‑Pacific: From Economic Diplomacy to Security Co‑operation?

Australia and Japan have been acclaimed as taking joint initiatives in establishing regional economic institutions such as the Pacific Economic Co-operation Council and the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum. This article seeks to establish why both countries have been able to forge a partnership in an Asia-Pacific economic community. The article identifies three elements of the partnership in institution-building: shared interests in building institutions of regional economic cooperation; power complementarity between the two countries compensating for their respective diplomatic shortcomings; and a corps of influential policy personnel working for regional economic co-operation. The article then looks at the partnership moving towards defence and security co-operation. Introduction Australia--Japan relations have developed to the extent that they have evolved into a partnership in the Asia-Pacific region based on shared interests and common identity, as Prime Minister John Howard declared during his visit to Japan in September 1996. Significant achievements of the partnership have been the joint initiatives in creating regional economic institutions, such as the Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (PECC) in 1980 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum in 1989. Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser said of such endeavours by the two countries: APEC[ldots]is a creation of a great deal of painstaking effort and diplomacy over about 20 years. The move for such an organization has been driven by politicians in Japan and Australia, by the business community in both countries and also by linkages between universities. [1] After resolving 'bilateral trade disputes over beef and sugar in the 1970s, Japan and Australia worked together in organizing the Pacific Community Seminar at the Australian National University (ANU) in Canberra in September 1980, an event which is now regarded as the first PECC meeting. This was the earliest example of the success of the Australia--Japan partnership in contributing to the Asia-Pacific region at the governmental level. Yuichiro Nagatomi, Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira's chief policy assistant, attributed the success of the seminar partly to three strong and long-established ties among Australian and Japanese leaders: Ohira and Foreign Minister Saburo Okita, Okita and seminar chairman John Crawford, and Crawford and Prime Minister Fraser. [2] The origins of the PECC can be traced to Ohira's Pacific Basin Co-operation Concept, and the idea of setting up a nongovernmental seminar stemmed from an agreement between Fraser and Ohira in Canberra, in January 1980. The Australian and Japanese sides p roceeded with frequent consultations and co-ordination at both governmental and academic levels, culminating in the ANU's successful organization of the seminar. Both countries were also co-operatively engaged in developing the APEC initiative which Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke announced in Seoul in January 1989. The actual creation and the circumstances of the announcement of the initiative were at the instigation of Hawke and his advisers in the Prime Minister's office, but the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) came to play a major role in developing and promoting the idea after the Hawke announcement. Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) had floated a proposal for economic ministers' regional meetings in mid-1988 and the DFAT expressed strong interest in the idea, which urged co-ordination between the two countries. A MITI delegation visited the regional countries to sound-out reactions for its proposal and Hawke's initiative in March 1989, which laid the groundwork for the Hawke proposal's relatively easy acceptance when an Australian delegation later visited the regional countries in April--May 1989. Although MITI's p roposal was eventually subsumed into the Hawke initiative, MITI took the position that the establishment of APEC amounted to success of its own proposal. …

The Australia–Japan Partnership in the Asia‑Pacific: From Economic Diplomacy to Security Co‑operation?

The Australia–Japan Partnership in the Asia‑Pacific: From Economic Diplomacy to Security Co‑operation?

Ensuring alliance in an unsure world: The strengthening of U.S.‐Japan partnership in the 1990s

Ensuring alliance in an unsure world: The strengthening of U.S.‐Japan partnership in the 1990s