China-Japan Relations Research Articles

Whither China–Japan Relations: A Recent Political and Security Perspective

Political-security relations are not only an essential part of China–Japan relations but also a key factor influencing and limiting the overall improvement and growth of China–Japan relations and their impact on the common security of Northeast Asia. This relationship has shown signs of improvement for a while. However, after President Joe Biden took office in January 2021 and Japan had a new Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in October 2021, the political-security relationship between the two Asian powers has reversed compared to the previous period. The paper aims to point out the factors affecting this relationship and analyzes the current political and security relations between China and Japan from 2021 to the present to forecast prospects for the bilateral relationship.

A Theoretical Review of Mediated Public Diplomacy in China–Japan Relations

A Theoretical Review of Mediated Public Diplomacy in China–Japan Relations

The Game between China-Japan Relations and the Dilemma of China's Diplomacy in the Light of the Ryukyu Issue (1871-1881)

The Game between China-Japan Relations and the Dilemma of China's Diplomacy in the Light of the Ryukyu Issue (1871-1881)

Analyzing the interaction of China-Japan economic, trade, and political relations in the 1990s

This paper takes the China-Japan relations in the 1990s as the object of study, and through analyzing the historical situation of the two countries in the 1990s, it explores the interplay between the economic factors and political relations between China and Japan. Based on the state of China-Japan economic and political relations in the 1990s, this study analyzes the differences between Japan and China in the 1990s based on data and historical facts, and from the perspective of the political and economic development of Japan and China in the 1990s. At the same time, this study analyzes specific instances of ODA loan freezes and extensions triggered by political frictions between China and Japan based on data and historical facts, etc., to clarify the link between the two countries’ economic and political aspects preliminarily. This study concludes that the economic and political relations between China and Japan are mutually influential and cannot be discussed only based on the influence of one side on the other, but should fully consider the combination of the two.

Based on Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy, explore the development path of China-Japan relations

Japan was the first country to propose the concept of “Indo-Pacific strategy” and was also a staunch supporter and active promoter of it. The formation of Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy has gone through four stages of evolution: initial appearance, initial formation, extension, and all-round development, and has continuously promoted the development of the Indo-Pacific strategy in a more institutionalized and mature direction from many fields, It has formed a strategic layout in many fields such as comprehensive value sharing, economic and trade competition, maritime security, and multilateral mechanisms. Under the influence of the increasingly fierce competition between China and the US and the policy of putting the United States first, Japan has changed from a proposer of the Indo-Pacific strategy to a promoter, and the Japanese government actively seeks Japan and the United States to jointly dominate the Indo-Pacific economic security order. The accession of the United States has made international relations in the Indo-Pacific region more complex and changeable, and it will have a significant impact on China’s national interests and strategic orientation in the Indo-Pacific area. Sorting out the Japanese Indo-Pacific strategy will help explain the mechanism, rationale, and implementation effect of Japan’s policy choices under the China-US competition, and can also provide a reference for China’s decision-making.

American and Chinese vectors of the japanese foreign policy under the premiership of Junichiro Koizumi (years 2001-2006)

Th e article defi nes the essence, peculiarities and results of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s foreign policy concept (2001–2006) in the context of Tokyo’s relations with Washington and Beijing at the beginning of the 21st century. Th e methodological bases of the study are the principles of historicism, objectivity and systematicity, as well as diff erent methods. Problem-chronological became the principal method. Th e methods of content analysis, expert assessments were also applied. Th e scientifi c novelty lies in the attempt to comprehensively study the main vectors of the Japanese (American and Chinese) government’s foreign policy activities at the beginning of the 21st century, to determine their content and specifi cs of implementation, and to establish their consequences. Conclusions. It has been established that as Prime Minister, Koizumi paid close attention to the American vector of foreign policy, and as a result, Japan’s relations with the United States improved considerably. Th e strengthening of Japan’s crisis-response mechanism, and its positive experience of participation in overseas operations, helped the country gradually achieve the status of an equal ally of the United States. Simultaneously, there has been a strain on Japan-China relations. It has been established that China’s dissatisfaction with Koizumi’s policies stemmed fi rstly from his focus on strengthening the Japanese-American alliance and secondly from the Prime Minister’s own behaviour, which was seen as disrespecting the national feelings of the Chinese (“war of nerves”). As a result, China’s offi cial policy was aimed at condemning Koizumi’s actions and limiting intergovernmental contacts. As a result, during his premiership, there was no fundamental convergence in the assessment of the historical past and relations between the two countries, which was damaging to both of them in the end.

Normalization of Diplomatic Relations and Private Trade between Japan and China

This article reviews Japan-China private trade from the 1950s to the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China in 1972. Under the Cold War in East Asia, private actors were responsible for trade and business exchanges on behalf of the government in Japan-China relations. Both Japan and China promoted private trade with different political agendas. Japan’s objective was to expand Japan-China exchanges with the concept of separation of politics and economics, while China used private trade as a strategic tool to attract Japanese public opinion toward China. This article will clarify how the intentions of the two countries affected private trade, and how private trade expanded as various trade groups competed with each other.

Analyze the Development of China and Japan Relations from An Economic Perspective

Since the 21st century, the relationship between China and Japan has been in a very delicate situation. People's attitudes and views towards Japan and the development of bilateral relations have always been different. Therefore, changes in China-Japan relations have always affected the hearts of the people of the two countries. Few countries in the world have such complex "love and hate" as China and Japan. Under the general trend of globalization, whether China Japan relations can develop smoothly not only affects the economic trend of East Asia, but also relates to the stability of the whole world situation. Therefore, China Japan relations have become one of the important issues in the strategic layout of China's international relations and a key link in build a community of shared future for mankind and achieve shared and win-win development. This paper analyzes the development of China and Japan from an economic perspective, which can better show the changing process of the relationship between the two countries. In the era of complex and volatile COVID-19, through economic cooperation and trade exchanges to promote the development of bilateral relations, and seize the opportunities of globalization, we can be prepared to meet future challenges.

War in Ukraine from China’s Perspective: Limited Options for State that Cannot Reject Existing Policies

As the war in Ukraine becomes protracted, there is discourse comparing China and Russia as tyrannical states versus states based on the principles of democracy. However, while China appears to support Russia’s opposition to NATO’s eastward expansion, it abstained from voting on the resolution condemning Russia in the UN General Assembly, and, at the same time, China has shown consideration for Ukraine by saying that it values sovereignty and that Ukraine is no exception. China’s response seems by no means simple. This article analyzes China’s views of the war in Ukraine with a focus on domestic policy options in 2022, a special year of personnel changes and political “special appointments,” while attempting to deal with an increase in Novel Coronavirus cases and reaching the government’s growth target. It then describes the main principles of Chinese diplomacy and its vision of the world. Internationally, China and Russia have maintained a strong relationship even during the war in Ukraine but it is difficult to agree that China and Russia are monolithic. Finally, the article discusses how Japan-China relations have been affected and some of the challenges facing the Indo-Pacific region that have been revealed by the war in Ukraine.

Reforming the BRI from the Inside: Japan’s Contribution via Soft Law Diplomacy

‘Deep-free trade agreements (FTA)-maker-multilateralist’ nations are obliged to find unconventional ways to co-exist with China in countries along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); and this obligation is becoming more obvious. There is a possibility for Japan’s involvement in enlisting soft law mechanisms in order to ensure China’s BRI projects conform to high standards; and this serves as a main argument of this article. In my view, with its unique geographic position, the existing fierce rivalry in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the country’s intertwining market with China, Japan’s capacity to reform the BRI from the inside should not be underestimated. On the contrary, by persisting with high Quality Infrastructure Investment (QII) principles promoted in the last three years, Japan has been successful in nudging China toward these principles. The country has also enabled China to endorse the notion of high-quality infrastructure at the second BRI forum. With Japan’s leadership, the G20 Osaka Summit has contributed considerably into bolstering of the QII principles. Moreover, despite being less institutionalized and having soft law nature, the Japan-China Memorandum on Business Cooperation in Third Countries is effective: The Memorandum utilizes and suppresses the harm caused by the economic activities of Chinese businesses in third-country markets. Presently, Sino-Japanese collaboration in Thailand’s East- West Economic Corridor Program is testing whether the Chinese government is capable of earnestly engaging in ‘Third Party Market Cooperation’, or whether this endeavour is futile. BRI, FOIP, quality infrastructure, third-party market cooperation forum, China-Japan Relations

Japan and U.S. in the Indo-Pacific region under the J. Biden administration

The article analyzes the approaches of the United States and Japan to the international political problems in the Indo-Pacific region at the beginning of the administration of the 46th President of the United States Joe Biden in 2021. It also aims to evaluate the perspectives of US-Japan cooperation in key areas. The article analyses the policies of the United States and Japan towards China. Japan supported J. Biden's approach to confront China on a wide range of issues. By actively involving in the US-China confrontation government in Tokyo aims to strengthen its position in rivalry with China. However, it will not be easy for Japan to preserve the achievements of the "warm" period in Japan-China relations in 2018-2020 in the economic and humanitarian spheres. The article also analyses the approaches of the US and Japan to the situation on the Korean Peninsula, including the prospects for cooperation between Tokyo, Washington and Seoul towards DPRK. Difficult-to-resolve contradictions between Tokyo and Seoul in a short-term perspective will hinder large-scale cooperation of the parties with Washington. The article also analyses the perspectives of the concept of "Free and open Indo-Pacific region". Tokyo which sees the concept of "Free and open Indo-Pacific region" as a response to the expansion of Beijing's influence in the region, is interested in developing economic cooperation with partners aimed at weakening dependence on China. The article also notes the increased importance of Japan in the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy in the eyes of a number of American politicians and experts.

The Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and the Politics of Memory in PRC

The article deals with the impact of the Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945) on the politics of memory in PRC. Some events of this war, for example, the Nanjing massacre as well as the problem of comfort women are still a vital part of collective memory of Chinese. In recent years studies on Sino-Japanese war and its impact on the politics of memory in China have been constantly growing in number. Less attention has been paid to the history of the issue and its impact on foreign relations in Asia, including China-Japan relations. While work has been done on the revealing of political motives for shaping of PRC’s politics of memory, the impact of Chinese cultural characteristics on this issue has been neglected. Therefore, the historical transformation of war memories in PRC’s memory politics and above all the influence of cultural characteristics and specific worldview of Chinese on memory politics in modern China need further research. This article focuses on (1) the historical transformation of collective memory related to the Sino-Japanese war in China’s historical politics, (2) the influence of Chinese cultural peculiarities, such as “ritual thinking”, on politics of memory in China and (3) the impact of PRC’s historical politics on relations between China and Japan nowadays.

The Japanese conservative camp's bridging method for China–Japan relations under the separation of politics and the economic policy: investigation of the case of the Kenzo Matsumura Group, 1959–1972

AbstractFrom the signing of the Treaty of San Francisco to the resumption of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, Japan has always adopted a political and economic separation policy that maintains diplomacy with Taiwan and economic and cultural relations with China. Within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, to break the existing deadlock, Kenzo Matsumura of the Japanese House of Representatives and others formed a foreign policy group in 1959. This group spoke highly of China's importance to Japan's development on the grounds of national interests rather than ideology and national sentiments, played a bridging role in the political communication between China and Japan, and created a precedent for the nontraditional improvement of international relations in Japan.

Strengthening crisis management, the most urgent task in current China–US and China–Japan security relations

With profound changes in the international situation, China’s security relations with the US and Japan are at a critical moment. These relations have bearing on peace, stability, and development in the Asia–Pacific region. At present, China–US and China–Japan security relations face very high and high security risks, respectively. Enhancing crisis management has become the most important strategic task in both sets of relations. With poor crisis management, security frictions may lead to a military crisis or even open conflict. This would push China–US relations towards inescapable confrontation or even a cold war and cost China–Japan relations another opportunity for improvement, possibly driving the two countries into tense relations. In contrast, effective crisis management will give China and the US a running-in and mutual adaptation period and allow China–Japan relations to continue moving forward. To strengthen crisis management, China, the US, and Japan must raise their crisis management awareness, develop crisis management mechanisms, and strive to resume and strengthen bilateral defense and security dialogues.

Japan-China Relations and Conflicting Identities in The Son of Earth by Toyoko Yamasaki ：Focusing on the Character of Yixin Lu

Japan-China Relations and Conflicting Identities in The Son of Earth by Toyoko Yamasaki ：Focusing on the Character of Yixin Lu

Japan-China Relations and Conflicting Identities in The Son of Earth by Toyoko Yamasaki ：Focusing on the Character of Yixin Lu

Japan-China Relations and Conflicting Identities in The Son of Earth by Toyoko Yamasaki ：Focusing on the Character of Yixin Lu

Japan’s strategy amid US–China confrontation

Japan’s strategy amid US–China confrontation has focused on securing national defense and economic prosperity by maintaining Japan’s alliance with the United States and promoting Asia’s socioeconomic integration. Japan is working toward an institutional order based on universal values. It realizes that such a long-term goal requires coexistence, including with countries in the midst of integrating into the political and economic world order, and prioritizes stability. This approach explains the historical development of Japan–China relations since the 1970s. During this period, Japan has expected to maneuver China into integration with global politics through economic statecraft while maintaining its alliance with the US. During the current US–China confrontation, Japan faces the challenge of maintaining this complex strategic position in the US–China–Japan triangle. Its reaction to this new reality is to enhance its alliance with the US (including cooperation for economic security) and strengthen international partnership to promote its preferred mode of institutional order, while maintaining diplomacy with China.

미ㆍ중 간 기술패권 경쟁과 시사점 (U.S.-China Technological Rivalry and Its Implications for Korea)

미ㆍ중 간 기술패권 경쟁과 시사점 (U.S.-China Technological Rivalry and Its Implications for Korea)

Cool, warm, soft and sharp: paradigms of cultural exchange in Japan–China relations

ABSTRACT In the post-war period, relations between Japan and China have veered between cold and warm. For most of this period, due to historical and ideological issues, there has been an underlying tension which has prevented genuinely friendly relations and open cultural exchange between the two states. However, there have been periods of time when more open cultural exchanges and free information flows have occurred, and when genuinely friendly and cooperative relations have seemed possible. This article first proposes a model of cultural exchange based on types of information flow between countries. It then reviews zero-sum and non-zero sum theoretical perspectives on cultural exchange. Using these ideas, the article then uses several paradigms to characterise cultural exchange in Japan–China relations, namely people to people, partnership, reciprocity, soft power and sharp power paradigms, from the post-war era up to current times.

The Four Principles that Formed the Basis of Friendly Relations between Japan and China: The China Policy of the Nakasone Yasuhiro Government

This article examines Nakasone Yasuhiro’s policy toward China as a politician, including his remarks in the Diet before appointment as prime minister as well as exchanges with Chinese leaders during his prime ministership. Nakasone raised Japan-China relations to a level called a “honeymoon” in the 1980s, at which time the four principles of Japan-China relations were shared and there was the prospect of continued friendly relations into the 21st century. Behind the emergence of this era was not only Japan’s support for China’s economic development through ODA, but also the closeness of the stances that both Japan and China held toward the Cambodia and Korean Peninsula issues at the end of the Cold War. This may have been because there was the possibility for both parties to share information and mutually support each other. Nakasone actively talked not only with Hu Yaobang but also leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang. However, as Nakasone’s partner Hu Yaobang was dismissed and the Cold War approached its end, the “honeymoon” between Japan and China came to an end, and the four principles by Nakasone and Hu gradually became just one frame of history.