Jamming Attacks In Wireless Networks Research Articles

An efficient trbl-cdrrp method to detect jamming attacks in multichannel multiradio wireless networks

Wireless network is a flexible and scalable data communications system, which uses electromagnetic waves or infrared waves to broadcast data and receive data from one end to another without use physical link. Limited processing speed, energy efficiency, limited memory power, and many more constraints are affecting wireless networks. In these constraints security is a main concern. Protecting wireless networks from different kinds of attack is not a simple task, as the security violates are varies. To recognize this difficulty, we have to discuss and evaluate different methods for jamming in multi channel multi-radio wireless networks. Jamming attacks in wireless networks is defined as by minimizing the noise ratio at receiver side by the way of transmission of interfering wireless signals. In this discussion Transmission Range Based Localization-Constant Deceptive Random Reactive Protocol (TRBL-CDRRP) is proposed for detecting the different types of jamming attacks in multichannel multi-radio wireless networks. Also the suggested technique is utilized to find location and transmission range for every node. The performance metrics like Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR), End-to-End delay, Security, and throughput are to be resolute and also related with the existing algorithms. The execution is done in a NS-2 simulator.

Several Jamming Attacks in Wireless Networks: A Game Theory Approach

Wireless jamming attacks have recently been a subject of several researches, due to the exposed nature of the wireless medium. This paper studies the anti-jamming resistance in the presence of several attackers. Two kind of jammers are considered, smart jammers which have the ability to sense the legitimate signal power and regular jammers which don’t have this ability. An Anti Multi-Jamming based Power Control problem modeled as a non-zero-sum Game is suggested to study how the transmitter can adjust its signal power against several jamming attacks. A closed-form expression of Nash Equilibrium is derived when players actions are taken simultaneously. In addition, a Stackelberg Equilibrium closed-form expression is derived when the hierarchical behavior between the transmitter and jammers is assumed. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme can enhance the anti-jamming-resistance against several attackers. Furthermore, this study proves that on the transmitter side, the most dangerous jammer is considered to have the highest ratio between channel gain and jamming cost. Finally, based on the Q-Learning technique, the transmitter can learn autonomously without knowing the patterns of attackers.

Adaptive topologies against jamming attacks in wireless networks: A game-theoretic approach

Towards securing wireless networks and ensuring their dependability under jamming attacks, this paper presents and analyzes game-theoretic formulations between an adversary and a defender. The adversary jams a subset of nodes to increase the level of interference in the network, while the defender makes judicious adjustments of the transmission power level of the nodes, thereby continuously adapting the underlying network topology to reduce the impact of the attack. The defender's strategy is based on playing Nash equilibria (NE) strategies securing a worst-case network utility. First, a discrete control set is considered in which the space of strategies of the defender grows exponentially with the network size. Scalable decomposition-based approaches are developed yielding a defense strategy whose performance closely approaches that of the non-decomposed game. Second, we develop a marginal strategy to assign the power levels while satisfying a coverage constraint thereby evading the combinatorial complexity associated with enumerating all pure actions. Third, we generalize the marginal-based strategy by considering a continuous action space for both players. For this setting, we prove the existence of a unique pure Nash equilibrium. The presented numerical results show the effectiveness of the proposed defense approach against various attack policies and demonstrate the assignment strategies on a real wireless network deployed in a three-story building.

Smart Jamming Attacks in Wireless Networks During a Transmission Cycle: Stackelberg Game with Hierarchical Learning Solution

Due to the broadcast nature of the shared medium, wireless communications become more vulnerable to malicious attacks. In this paper, we tackle the problem of jamming in wireless network when the transmission of the jammer and the transmitter occur with a non-zero cost. We focus on a jammer who keeps track of the re-transmission attempts of the packet until it is dropped. Firstly, we consider a power control problem following a Nash Game model, where all players take action simultaneously. Secondly, we consider a Stackelberg Game model, in which the transmitter is the leader and the jammer is the follower. As the jammer has the ability to sense the transmission power, the transmitter adjusts its transmission power accordingly, knowing that the jammer will do so. We provide the closed-form expressions of the equilibrium strategies where both the transmitter and the jammer have a complete information. Thereafter, we consider a worst case scenario where the transmitter has an incomplete information while the jammer has a complete information. We introduce a Reinforcement Learning method, thus, the transmitter can act autonomously in a dynamic environment without knowing the above Game model. It turns out that despite the jammer ability of sensing the active channel, the transmitter can enhance its efficiency by predicting the jammer reaction according to its own strategy.

Exploiting Subcarrier Agility to Alleviate Active Jamming Attacks in Wireless Networks

Malicious interference injection or jamming is one of the simplest ways to disrupt wireless communications. Prior approaches can alleviate jamming interference to a limited extent; they are especially vulnerable to a reactive jammer i.e., a jammer that injects noise upon sensing a legitimate transmission or wideband jamming. In this paper, we leverage the inherent features of OFDM (Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing) to cope with such attacks. Specifically, via extensive experiments, we observe that the jamming signal experiences differing levels of fading across the composite sub-carriers in its transmission bandwidth. Thus, if the legitimate transmitter were to somehow exploit the relatively unaffected sub-carriers to transmit data to the receiver, it could achieve reasonable throughputs, even in the presence of the active jammer. We design and implement JIMS , a Jamming Interference Mitigation Scheme that exploits the above characteristic by overcoming key practical challenges. Via extensive testbed experiments and simulations we show that JIMS achieves a throughput restoration of up to 75 percent in the presence of an active jammer.

Anomaly-based intrusion detection of jamming attacks, local versus collaborative detection

We present intrusion detection algorithms to detect physical layer jamming attacks in wireless networks. We compare the performance of local algorithms on the basis of the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio SINR executing independently at several monitors, with a collaborative detection algorithm that fuses the outputs provided by these algorithms. The local algorithms fall into two categories: simple threshold that raise an alarm if the output of the SINR-based metrics we consider deviates from a predefined detection threshold and cumulative sum cusum algorithms that raise an alarm if the aggregated output exceeds the predefined threshold. For collaborative detection, we use the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence algorithm. We collect SINR traces from a real IEEE 802.11 network, and with the use of a new evaluation method, we evaluate both the local and the Dempster-Shafer algorithms in terms of the detection probability, false alarm rate, and their robustness to different detection threshold values, under different attack intensities. The evaluation shows that the cusums achieve higher performance than the simple threshold algorithms under all attack intensities. The Dempster-Shafer algorithm when combined with the simple algorithms, it can increase their performance by more than 80%, but for the cusum algorithms it does not substantially improve their already high performance.Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Prevention of Selective Jamming Attacks by Using Packet Hiding Methods

The open nature of the wireless medium leaves it too weak to intentional interference attacks, typically defined as jamming. This intentional interference with wireless transmissions can be used as a launch pad for mounting Denial-of-Service attacks on wireless networks. Typically, jamming has been introduced under an external threat model. However, intruders with internal knowledge of protocol specifications and network secrets can launch low-effort jamming attacks that are difficult to detect and counter. In this work, we address the problem of selective jamming attacks in wireless networks. In these attacks, the hacker is active only for a short period of time, selectively targeting messages of high importance. We demonstrate the advantages of selective jamming in terms of network performance degradation and hacker effort by presenting two case studies; a selective attack on TCP and one on routing. We show that selective jamming attacks can be forwarded by performing real-time packet classification at the physical layer. To reduce these attacks, we develop three schemes that prevent real-time packet classification by combining cryptographic primitives with physical-layer attributes. We analyze the security of the proposed methods and evaluate their computational and communication overhead. Investigations-We investigate the feasibility of real time packet classification for launching selective jamming attacks, under an internal threat model. We show that such attacks are relatively easy to actualize by exploiting knowledge of network protocols and cryptographic primitives extracted from compromised nodes. We investigate the impact of selective jamming on critical network functions. Our findings indicate that selective jamming attacks lead to a DoS with very low effort on behalf of the jammer. To mitigate such attacks, we develop three schemes that prevent classification of transmitted packets in real time. Our schemes rely on the

MAC Design of Uncoordinated FH-Based Collaborative Broadcast

Uncoordinated Frequency Hopping (UFH) techniques are promising to address jamming attacks in wireless networks without requiring pre-shared secret keys, and its communication efficiency in the broadcast scenario can be significantly improved through node cooperation. In this letter, we take a first step to investigate efficient Media Access Control (MAC) strategies for the UFH-based collaborative broadcast, and derive closed-form expressions of the channel access probabilities for time-slotted systems to minimize the broadcast delay and to significantly reduce the energy cost. Numerical and simulation results are provided to verify our analysis and reveal some insights.

Packet-Hiding Methods for Preventing Selective Jamming Attacks

The open nature of the wireless medium leaves it vulnerable to intentional interference attacks, typically referred to as jamming. This intentional interference with wireless transmissions can be used as a launchpad for mounting Denial-of-Service attacks on wireless networks. Typically, jamming has been addressed under an external threat model. However, adversaries with internal knowledge of protocol specifications and network secrets can launch low-effort jamming attacks that are difficult to detect and counter. In this work, we address the problem of selective jamming attacks in wireless networks. In these attacks, the adversary is active only for a short period of time, selectively targeting messages of high importance. We illustrate the advantages of selective jamming in terms of network performance degradation and adversary effort by presenting two case studies; a selective attack on TCP and one on routing. We show that selective jamming attacks can be launched by performing real-time packet classification at the physical layer. To mitigate these attacks, we develop three schemes that prevent real-time packet classification by combining cryptographic primitives with physical-layer attributes. We analyze the security of our methods and evaluate their computational and communication overhead.