Jorge Luis Borges's affinities with pragmatism, while certainly no secret his critics, have rarely been studied before with intensity and seriousness they otherwise undoubtedly deserve. This fact in and of itself should not come as a surprise; rather, it is consistent with a widespread tendency speak only with a great deal of irony about this author's philosophical alliances. Did not Borges himself talk of his basic as a tendency to evaluate religious or philosophical ideas on basis of their aesthetic worth and even for what is singular and marvelous about them (Other Inquisitions 189)? Such an evaluation in terms of aesthetic worth would seem preclude interrogations of a strictly theoretical kind, as if sheer marvel of a philosopher's inventions could not but overshadow their truth content. Aside from occasional mentions of Arthur Schopenhauer and Fritz Mauthner as philosophers whose books he annotated most, Borges also only rarely pronounces his philosophical commitments other than in literary-aesthetic terms, for instance, when he refers metaphysics as a branch of fantastic literature. Quickly making this skeptical stance their own, many of Borges's critics in turn shy away from a sustained inquiry into coherence of his philosophical beliefs. In so doing, they all but completely loose sight of possibility that beneath surface of irony they might find a small but fairly systematic set of philosophical principles, genealogy of which is worth looking into as well. In case of pragmatism, especially version dear William James, this is all more unfortunate insofar as Borges's debts James warrant such a genealogical inquiry perhaps more so than his affinities with any other modern philosopher. Indeed, what should come as a surprise even skeptics is strong language with which Borges, in a few marginal texts, expresses his utmost admiration for James's philosophy. In most significant of these texts, preliminary note 1945 Argentine translation of Pragmatism, Borges even goes so far as abandon his commonly self-proclaimed skepticism for an outspoken ethical judgment in favor of James. Never included in Borges's complete works nor in any of collections of essays and prologues published during his lifetime, this text is now at last more widely accessible thanks materials gathered in Textos recobrados. an aesthetic appreciation, Borges writes, the universes of other philosophies might be superior (James himself, in fourth conference of this volume, speaks of 'the music of monism'); ethically, William James is superior. He is only one, perhaps, for whom human beings have something do (Nota preliminar 11). For a writer who only rarely invokes term of ethics, it must be said that these are unusually strong words indeed. How, then, should we understand this alleged superiority of James's philosophy? What exactly is this doing or this making that is allowed to, or demanded from, all human beings according view that Borges attributes James? The claim that I want defend in following pages holds that James's pragmatism is actually far more central Borges's work than is commonly accepted--not just in prologue Pragmatism or even in one written for translation of Varieties of Religious Experience as part of Borges's Biblioteca personal, but right from earliest beginnings of his career as a writer and essayist. Of course, we all know that as an adolescent Jorge Luis was fond of hearing his father lecture on philosophical topics with James's Principles of Psychology as his manual. Less well-known, if not completely speculative, is fact that another of Borges's teachers, Macedonio Fernandez, for a while kept a correspondence with William James--with a signed photograph from New England philosopher as only surviving proof now in possession of Macedonio's son and archiver Adolfo de Obieta (cf. …