Israeli Public Opinion Research Articles

'Close but no Cigar’: Hamas’s psychological warfare against Israel between 2014 and 2023

This essay represents the continuation of my research, on the Hamas Organization’s novel methods of psychological warfare against Israel. The previous article, which covered the period between 2007 and 2014, demonstrated the relative clumsiness of Hamas’s attempts to influence Israeli public opinion. In the current study, which covers the period from 2014-October 2023, we examine Hamas’s attempts to improve its methodology, inter alia through the appropriation of Israeli popular culture and its retooling toward purposes of psychological warfare. This attempt, while bearing some impressive fruit, has still not seen any real penetration of the organization’s messages into the consciousness of Israeli society. Hamas remains tied to a conception of Israeli culture that mirrors its own (Arab-Muslim-Palestinian) culture, whereas in truth, Israeli culture has long since 'moved on’ from the days in which such material informed its daily existence.

Interstate Conflict Can Reduce Support for Incumbents: Evidence from the Israeli Electorate and the Yom Kippur War

Does war affect support for incumbent leaders and parties? The literature is divided with studies reporting negative, positive, or null-effects. Many studies analyze the consequences of foreign intervention, and less is known about the political costs of wars fought close to home. Building on theories of retrospective voting, we theorize that wars inform voters about leader’s competence, and in turn affect mass attitudes and behaviors. Leveraging the unexpected onset of the 1973 Yom Kippur war which interrupted an ongoing Israeli public opinion poll, and voting records from four national elections linked with Israeli military fatality data, we demonstrate that despite the ultimate military victory, the war and its casualties reduced support for incumbent parties and leaders, and increased support for the opposition. By moving beyond foreign interventions, we provide strong evidence that wars over a country’s core territory can be politically costly for incumbent leaders and parties.

Israeli Public Opinion on the Use of Nuclear Weapons: Lessons From Terror Management Theory

AbstractWhen do people become more willing to endorse a nuclear strike against a foreign country? Utilizing interdisciplinary theoretical insights from international relations and social psychology as well as original experimental survey data from Israel, this work aims to answer this question. Influential strands of scholarship argue that both the public and the political elites have internalized antinuclear norms. Critics, however, assert that the moral nuclear taboo lacks robustness. The work joins this debate by offering a novel theoretical framework informed by terror management theory (TMT) and suggests that people are more likely to support extreme forms of warfare (e.g., nuclear strikes) when reminded of their own mortality. Thus, consequentialist factors, such as perceived utility, and psychological factors, such as moral foundations theory and TMT, can be causal mechanisms in the support for nuclear weapons. In an age of populism characterized by the rise of nationalist leaders with authoritarian tendencies, the main finding is a source of significant concern.

The ‘Gray Zone’ in Cinema: Representations of the Kapo in Israeli Cinema

ABSTRACTFollowing the liberation of the death camps and labor camps and the discovery of the murder of millions of Jews by the Nazis and their collaborators, it emerged that among the latter were Jews. Referred to as ‘kapos,’ from the German word Kameradenpolizei, these Jews were forced to cooperate with the Nazi authorities in the camps and ghettos. While the kapos (and members of the Jewish Police) were also persecuted by the Nazis, they also benefited from certain powers and privileges – unlike their fellow Jews. These circumstances place them in a morally complex category within Holocaust narratives, their representation wavering between being seen as victim and as perpetrator. This paper explores the representation of the kapo figure in Israeli feature and documentary films, particularly the kapo’s ethical and moral characteristics. The research conducted focuses on how the disclosure of kapos’ personal or scripted versions in these films, as mediated by the director, reflects a gradual shift in Israeli public opinion regarding kapos and the role they played in the Holocaust. This article explores three films: two documentaries, Kapo (2000) and The Kozalchik Affair (2015), and one feature film, Kapo in Jerusalem (2015), which is constructed as a documentary and is partially based on the life story of a notorious kapo Eliezer (Acha) Gruenbaum.

The Use of Force: Israeli Public Opinion on Military Options

This article analyzes Israeli attitudes toward the use of force over the period from 1988 to 1994. Based on nine public opinion polls of Israel's Jewish population, it explores public trends on three dimensions of force use-conventional war, Intifada, and terrorism-and contributes new data to the theoretical and empirical debate over the stability and rationality of public opinion. Following the presentation of an aggregate analysis of general public attitudes, party affiliation and socioeconomic variables are examined for their relationship to the viewpoints of the respondents. The profiles of those holding extreme views on military force are investigated as well. In general, Israeli attitudes toward the use of force were stable over time, and Israelis were cautious in their support of using force. Indeed, the findings strengthen the claim that public opinion can constrain belligerent leaders, although it can be manipulated to support limited uses of force.

Chameleon Wall. Inside Two Competing Coalitions of Pro-“Fence” Actors in Israel

ABSTRACTFourteen years after the start of the construction of the “security fence,” the idea of the West Bank Wall as a concrete separation from the Palestinians is a norm for the majority of the Israelis. The “security fence” represents a consensual security solution among the Israeli public opinion that is assumed to have stopped Palestinian attacks in Jewish-Israeli populated areas during the Second Intifada. This article explores the various meanings ascribed to the Wall by certain segments of Israeli society, specifically by pro-fence actors pressuring the Government between 2001 and 2005. Based on the identification of beliefs associated with the fence by such actors, the Wall appears to act as a Chameleon “solving” issues concerning security, identity, territory and separation. Beyond military and control purposes, the Wall also acts as a tool of reassurance on these issues to the Israeli public. The demonstration distinguishes between divergent and convergent meanings ascribed by pro-fence actors to the “security fence.” Nowadays, separation is favored over negotiations and territorial or political compromises. The Wall is thus a consensual public policy for most Israelis. It normalizes their daily life and perceptions of safety, and it moves them away from the Oslo period.

Is a Just and Lasting Peace Possible?

The right-wing drift in Israeli public opinion that brought Benjamin Netanyahu to power for the fourth time has deepened the existing political stalemate, sharpened internal Palestinian discontent with the Palestinian Authority (PA), and further undermined its legitimacy. After nearly a quarter of a century of negotiations, since the Madrid conference in late 1991, the PA appears to have reached the end of the line. Its attempt to “internationalize” the conflict by seeking recognition as a state by the UN Security Council and the General Assembly is meant in part to gain time and fill the political gap. Palestinian civil society groups perceive Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) as an alternative strategy to the failed “negotiated process” to end occupation even if it is a long term effort. A stable and just peace does not appear possible in the near future, and in the long run the nature of the solution need not be the one deemed at present as the only possible one.

Is Hamas Winning?

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. As quoted in Azzam Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within, (Olive Branch Press, 2007), pg. 189. 2. R. Kim Cragin, “Palestinian Resistance Through the Eyes of Hamas,” (Ph.D dissertation, Clare College, Cambridge, 2008), p. 114. For information on what Hamas claims is its first attack, see Robert Kook, “Israel Returns to Deportation Policy for Arabs,” United Press International, December 16, 1990, and Ghassan Charbel, “The Khaled Mishaal Interviews,” Dar al Hayat, December 5, 2003. 3. Sara Roy, “Changing Political Attitudes among Gaza Refugees,” Journal of Palestine Studies 19, no. 1 (1989): 77, http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2537246?uid=3739584&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=2110230823718. 4. Zaki Chehab, Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement, (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2007), 43. 5. Adam Shatz, “Why Israel Didn't Win,” London Review of Books 34, no. 23, (December 2012): pg. 3–5, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n23/adam-shatz/why-israel-didnt-win. 6. “Hamas: Gaza and U.N. Recognition Go Together,” Reuters, November 30, 2012, http://forward.com/articles/166995/hamas-gaza-and-un-recognition-go-together/. 7. International Crisis Group, “Light at the End of Their Tunnels? Hamas & the Arab Uprisings,” Middle East Report no. 129, August 14, 2012, p. 12, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/129-light-at-the-end-of-their-tunnels-hamas-and-the-arab-uprisings.pdf. 8. “Gazans Say ‘Thank You Iran’, for Missiles Used against Israel,” Haaretz, November 27, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/gazans-say-thank-you-iran-for-missiles-used-against-israel-1.480982. 9. Ethan Bronner, “Hamas Strengthens as Palestinian Authority Weakens,” New York Times, November 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/middleeast/hamas-strengthens-as-palestinian-authority-weakens.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 10. “Q&A with Hamas Leader Khaled Meshaal,” Reuters, January 10, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/01/10/us-palestinians-meshaal-text-idUSL1046412720070110. 11. Abeer Ayyoub and Harriet Sherwod, “Tens of Thousands Celebrate Hamas ‘Victory’ Rally as Exiled Leader Returns,” The Guardian, December 8, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/dec/08/hamas-gaza-palestine-khaled-meshaal-israel. 12. Jim Zanotti, “U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians,” Congressional Research Service, June 15, 2012, pg. 6 and 11, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22967.pdf. 13. “West Bank and Gaza—Economic Update,” International Monetary Fund, May 24, 2012, http://www.imf.org/external/country/WBG/RR/2012/052412.pdf. 14. Natasha Mozgovaya, “U.S. lawmakers slam Mahmoud Abbas for alleged corruption,” Haaretz, July 11, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/u-s-lawmakers-slam-mahmoud-abbas-for-alleged-corruption-1.450279. 15. “Middle East and North Africa,” Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/regions/middle-east-and-north-africa. 16. “Palestinian Centre for Human Rights Annual Report 2011,” Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, http://www.pchrgaza.org/files/2012/Annual2011E.pdf. 17. Roger Cohen, “Fayyad Steps Down, but Not Out,” May 3, 2013, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/04/opinion/global/Roger-Cohen-Fayyad-Steps-Down-Not-Out.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 18. Geoffrey Aronson, “Will Hamas Make Bid For PLO Leadership?” Al Monitor, December 10, 2012, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/01/hamas-khaled-meshaal-plo.html. 19. Shibley Telhami, “Israeli Public Opinion after the November 2012 Gaza War,” Brookings Institution, November 30, 2012, http://www.brookings.edu/research/presentations/2012/11/30-israel-public-opinion-telhami. 20. “Palestinian Attitudes on Peace Prospects,” Jewish Virtual Library, updated April 2012, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/palpopeace.html. 21. Yonatan Touval, “A Recognition Israel Doesn't Need,” The New York Times, May 12, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/13/opinion/13iht-edtouval.html?_r=0. 22. “Full text of Netanyahu's Foreign Policy Speech at Bar Ilan,” Haaretz, June 14, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/news/full-text-of-netanyahu-s-foreign-policy-speech-at-bar-ilan-1.277922. 23. Herb Keinon, “Netanyahu: Abbas must say he accepts ‘the Jewish State,” The Jerusalem Post, June 24, 2011, http://www.jpost.com/VideoArticles/Video/Article.aspx?id=226378. 24. “The Israeli Elections: What Do They Mean for the United States?” transcript of panel discussion, Brookings Institution, January 24, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2013/1/24%20israel%20elections/20130124_israel_elections_transcript. 25. Neil MacFarquhar, “Sunni Leaders Gaining Clout in Mideast,” The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/28/world/middleeast/sunni-leaders-gaining-clout-in-mideast.html?pagewanted=2&_r=0. 26. Amira Hass, “Palestinian Poll: Hamas' Haniyah Would Win PA Presidency Over Abbas,” Haaretz, December 17, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/palestinian-poll-hamas-haniyeh-would-win-pa-presidency-over-abbas.premium-1.485429. 27. “Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll,” press release, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, December 26, 2012, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2012/p46ejoint.html. Additional informationNotes on contributorsDaniel BymanDaniel Byman is a professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown's School of Foreign Service and the research director of the Saban Center at Brookings. He is also the author of A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011)

Jacob Shamir and Khalil Shikaki, Palestinian and Israeli Public Opinion: The Public Imperative in the Second Intifada (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2010). Pp. 224. $65.00 cloth, $21.20 e-book.

Jacob Shamir and Khalil Shikaki, Palestinian and Israeli Public Opinion: The Public Imperative in the Second Intifada (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2010). Pp. 224. 21.20 e-book. - Volume 44 Issue 4

The potential Impact of palestinian Nonviolent Struggle on Israel: preliminary Lessons and projections for the Future

This article assesses the potential impact that a massive, organized, and sustained nonviolent Palestinian resistance movement can have on Israeli society. Based on the recognition of the growing success of nonviolent strategies internationally, the subjective Israeli perceptions due to a Jewish collective memory of victimhood, and the perceived efficacy of violent and nonviolent actions through the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, we conclude that such an unprecedented strategy has a strong likelihood of yielding an independent Palestinian state alongside a state of Israel. The nonviolent revolts against the long-ruling dictators in North Africa and the Middle East have spread like wildfire early in the second decade of the 21st century. At this time, many Palestinians have been considering how best to translate the strategies of such a spontaneous movement to meet their own needs. Clearly, there are some differences between what is in most cases a regime change with the massive support of the population, and the particular case of an uprising against the formidable military control of an Israeli government that has a large majority conditioned to support the suppression of an enemy's revolt. A realistic analysis of Israeli reactions to potential sustained Palestinian leadership and massive nonviolent struggle could be shaped mostly by the impact of three variables: a) recognition of the growing success of nonviolent strategies in the international context; b) subjective Israeli perceptions based on collective memory of victimhood and persecution in Jewish history, and c) the perceived efficacy of violent and nonviolent actions throughout the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly from the experiences of the first and second Intifada. In this article we briefly discuss a) and b) but are mainly focusing on c), a variable whose effect the Palestinians can still determine. In analyzing the latter, three key elements will be emphasized. First, Jewish-Is- raeli perceptions and stereotypes of past Palestinian resistance will be briefly discussed. Second, based on the lessons learned and opinions gathered, we assess the potential impact that nonviolent resistance can have on official and societal Israeli behavior. In the concluding section, looking into the future, we assess the likelihood that a nonviolent strategy will create an environment for an eventual sustainable resolution with a Palestinian state alongside a Jewish State of Israel. Means and ends have an important correlation. Moderation in Arab aims has occurred since the 19th Palestinian National Council in 1988, which established the Declaration of Independence recognizing the State of Israel in its pre-1967 borders. This moderation became regionalized with the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. Additionally, amid Palestinian reconciliation efforts, if Hamas genuinely joins the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) - at least implicitly agreeing to the Oslo Accords - there would be a larger Palestinian mandate to uphold a potential peace agreement with Israel. If such steps can be accompanied by a massive, long-term struggle legitimated by nonviolent means, then growing support at the international level and dissonance with unchanged (Israeli) official policy are likely to indirectly impact Israeli public opinion and strengthen the peace camp in Israel. This article builds on previous research conducted with colleagues from the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace (Hebrew University, Jerusalem) and Palestinian Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy (MEND, Jerusalem) between 2002-2004.1 It draws on an analysis of the Israeli reactions to the first and second Intifadas, including public opinion polls; content analysis of the media and coverage of specific events; interviews with activists from nonviolent grassroot organizations; focus groups (academics, media, students); and the personal experience of one of the authors, having been actively involved with this issue since the mid-1980s. …

Public attitudes towards the welfare state and public policy: the Israeli experience

This article provides data and insights into Israeli public opinion about the welfare state and social policy. The study included 940 respondents who reported their attitudes towards various issues related to the welfare state. The study was conducted in spring 2008 prior to the current economic crisis. The findings show that, to a large extent, the Israeli public justifies state intervention in the supply of public services, supports public investment in services related to the welfare state, and recognizes the obligation to support those in need. As for various policy areas, the Israeli public regards education as a top priority, believing that investment in public education is likely to lead to achievements in other areas such as security and health. However, when asked about their willingness to pay more taxes for services related to the welfare state, respondents tended to be less enthusiastic. The research points to a significant gap between the social and economic policies in the past decade and the attitudes of large parts of Israeli society towards the welfare state. We provide possible explanations for that gap.

Shamir, J. & Shikaki, K. (2010). Palestinian and Israeli Public Opinion: The Public Imperative in the Second Intifada.

Shamir, J. & Shikaki, K. (2010). Palestinian and Israeli Public Opinion: The Public Imperative in the Second Intifada.

Digital Shahid – From Broadcast Media to Citizen Journalism in Palestine

In January 2007, a video a few minutes long sparked stark outrage in Israel. At first it circulated on the Internet and soon after was broadcast by several TV channels around the world. It showed a woman from the Jewish settlement of Tel Rumeida, in the Old City of Hebron, West Bank, cursing a young Palestinian girl. The woman, later identified as Yifat Alkobi, was one of the 500 radical settlers dwelling in the heart of one of the most volatile Palestinian cities, where, despite the presence of almost 2,000 Israeli soldiers, the constant friction between the Jewish and the Arab communities has created a highly explosive situation. The incident was filmed with a handy camera by the sixteen-year-old daughter of the Abu Eishe family from within the metallic grid that protects her house from the frequent attacks of neighboring settlers. The footage captured the woman shouting to the girl's sister the Arabic and Hebrew term for whore, sharmouta. The word become a label for the video and it was referred to as such in the debates that stirred up Israeli public opinion. Because of the ban on traveling to the Occupied Palestinian Territories, that footage gave many Israelis their first ever insight into an aspect of Palestinian daily life under occupation. For them, it was a shock. For B'tselem, a Jerusalem-based advocacy organization which relies on a network of activists campaigning for the respect of human rights in the Occupied Territories, and which produced and posted the video online, it was a success. Then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz spoke publicly about the sharmouta video, condemning the behavior of the settler and ordering an investigation. Moreover, a ministerial committee was established to address issues in Hebron, highlighting the so-called 'quiet transfer' of Palestinians from the Old City, which has turned the once vibrant area into a ghost town. Since then, this sort of grassroots reporting, otherwise called citizen journalism and made possible by the penetration of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the emergence of Web 2.0, has enabled and empowered many Palestinians, for the first time, to show their daily plight: to be the makers, and not only the protagonists, of the headlines.

Rainbow, Snow, and the Poplar’s Song: The ‘‘Annihilative Naming’’ of Israeli Military Practices

This article explores the phenomenon of military naming, that is, the act of giving a name to military practices such as military operations, weaponry, and military units. The basic theoretical supposition is that military naming is a simple and useful mechanism that might be employed to blur undesired aspects—such as the human and economical costs—associated with the respective practices. Inspired by John B. Thompson’s ‘‘strategies of operation of ideology,’’ the research uses the construct of strategies of annihilative naming to analyze a corpus of 239 Israeli names of military operations and weaponry. By using names coming from nature and the Bible, the Israeli military uses three strategies—naturalization, euphemization, and legitimation—that mediate Israeli public opinion toward controversial military operations as well as weaponry development. Future research of other military names will support the construction of generalizations about this important phenomenon.

The Influence of Presumed Media Influence on Democratic Legitimacy

In this article, we examine the notion that perceptions of strong influence of biased media coverage may indirectly lead to an increased willingness to resort to violent protest. We test this idea on a sample of Jewish settlers in the Gaza Strip (N = 413), in the dramatic context of a Likud party vote on Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's plan to pull out from the Gaza Strip, which includes a proposed evacuation of the settlers from their homes. Findings show that perceptions of influence of biased media coverage of the settlements on Israeli public opinion were associated with perceptions of the negative image of the settlements in Israeli public opinion, which in turn had an impact on the justification of violent resistance to the likely evacuation. The perceived image of the settlements, resulting from presumed media influence, also affected settlers' political inefficacy and their thoughts about residential mobility.

The Construction of Illusion: The Ambivalence of Israeli Public Opinion about Government

The Construction of Illusion: The Ambivalence of Israeli Public Opinion about Government

Foreign policy in the 1999 Israeli elections

In 1996, Benjamin Netanyahu was elected prime minister of Israel by the narrowest of margins, following a series of deadly terrorist attacks that had a profound impact on Israeli public opinion. The election results reflected a rejection of the Labour government's policies, and of Shimon Peres, in particular, rather than an endorsement of Netanyahu and his policies. Although the new government's first priority focused on combating terrorism, this could never be the only measure of success or failure, and in order to be re-elected, Netanyahu would have to deliver on his promise to balance security and 'peace'. A pragmatic policy demonstrating some progress in the negotiations with the Palestinians and perhaps also Syria, along with a strong stance in the face of terrorism and violence, would provide Netanyahu with the continued support of the floating voters. In 1992, Yitzhak Rabin led the Labour party to a narrow victory over Yitzhak Shamir and the Likud on a platform of 'peace with strength', and in 1996, those voters who had swung to Rabin four years earlier were disenchanted and voted for Netanyahu. These floating voters were not motivated by a right-wing nationalist ideology, and to keep the margin of victory, Netanyahu would have to maintain their support. However, in 1999, Netanyahu failed, for a number of reasons, to hold these floating voters, and both he and the Likud lost badly. The relatively lower levels of terrorism, for which Netanyahu took credit, and the emphasis on 'reciprocity' and 'lowering expectations' in negotiations with the Palestinians, were insufficient for re-election. With few accomplishments during his three years as prime minister, Netanyahu's re-election strategy was based on an attempt to return to the themes of 1996. He tried to create a strong link between Barak and Peres, but failed. Although Barak identified himself as Rabin's political

Israel's Supreme Court and International Human Rights Law: The Judgement on ‘Moderate Physical Pressure’

AbstractOn September 6, 1999, the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, handed down its latest judgement on the question of the use of ‘moderate physical pressure’. The lack of substantial references to international law in the Court's reasoning was notable. The present article examines the possible reasons for the reluctance to introduce international law and goes on to analyse the effects of this reluctance. The analysis finds that the reasons for leaving international human rights norms out are less than compelling and that keeping the necessity defence for interrogators using force against detainees leaves a substantial risk of abuse.The article goes on to place the judgement in the larger context of Israeli human rights practices. By applying the so-called ‘spiral model’, developed within international relations theory, it is possible to examine linkages between international norms and domestic change. The model allows for an evaluation of what progress has been achieved so far and for suggestions as to which measures are still needed. It is found that the judgement reasonably can be interpreted as a tactical concession and that further progress in efforts to eradicate the use of force against detainees is dependent upon a change in the attitude of the Israeli public. Future efforts should thus be aimed at influencing Israeli public opinion to ensure that torture is eliminated from Israeli interrogation practices.

Israel and the war in the Balkans

All Israeli governments since the beginning of the breakup of Yugoslavia have adopted a consistently pro‐Serbian stand. Israeli public opinion has failed to respond to Serb atrocities in a way comparable to the response in many other countries. An important part of the explanation of this remarkable state of affairs, which puts Israel at odds with most of the western world and the Jewish diaspora, is to be found in Israel's history. Israel was set up at the price of turning the larger part of the native Palestinian population into expellees or refugees. Its continued existence as an ethnic, Jewish state is predicated on not readmitting the exiled Palestinians. Collective repression and denial of these facts help explain the unwillingness or inability of Israeli society and its political establishment to condemn the Serbs’ war of expansion and ‘ethnic cleansing’.

Promoting Peace through the News Media:

This article attempts to examine the role of the news media in an ongoing peace process. The Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in the city of Oslo led, in August 1993, to one of the most important breakthroughs in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Rabin government saw the news media as a crucial tool for mobilizing Israeli public opinion in favor of the peace process. Yet a study of the ongoing transactions between antagonists and journalists has provided some troubling lessons about the ability of leaders to promote peace through the news media. There are at least three major ways in which the news media can serve as obstacles to peace: (1) by focusing on events rather than processes; (2) by focusing on the unusual, the dramatic, and the conflictual aspects of the process; and (3) by making it difficult to conduct successful negotiations. In-depth interviews with a variety of leaders, activists, and journalists reveal that all three of these problems made it more difficult for the Israeli government to promote the peace process to the Israeli media.