Israeli Government Research Articles

Can Massive Religious Festival Celebrations Encourage a Faster Spread of a Pandemic? The Case of COVID-19 in Israel.

This paper attempts to evaluate how massive religious festivalcelebrations can encourage the faster spread of any pandemic according to our problem statement, such as the case of COVID-19. For example, we evaluate Israel's three major religions, namely Judaism, Christianity, and the Islamic festival celebrations, respectively. Firstly, we have the traditional Jewish festivities such asHanukkah, Yom Kippur, Sukkot, and Rosh Hashanah. In the Christian's traditional festivities celebrations, we identified Christmas, Easter Day, and All Saints Day. Finally, the Muslim festivities ofMuharram and the Birthday of theHoly Prophet Mohamad. Thepurpose of thisstudy wasto evaluate if these nine massive religious festival celebrations are the main reasons for the large spread of COVID-19 in Israel directly or indirectly. In fact, we propose a new methodology to evaluate the impact of any massive religious festivalcelebration andthe fast spread of any pandemic everywhere and anytime. The new indicator is entitled "The National Spread Levels of Infectious Diseases Risk from Massive Religious Festivities Index" (National-SLIDRMRF-Index). Finally, the major finding in this research is that any massive religious events can generate an exponential number of COVID-19 cases constantly. Therefore, this research concluded that we urgentlyneed a standardized index to monitor and control the expansion of any pandemic such as COVID-19 among different religious groups in the same country. At the same time, we give different policy recommendations to the Israeli government to constantlykeep major controls and measures ofdifferent religious events inJerusalem.

Stigmatisation as settler colonialism: designating humanitarian and civic society organisations in Palestine as security threats

ABSTRACT Since Hamas’s 7th October attacks on southern Israel, the Palestinian population living in the Gaza Strip has been subjected to an unprecedented level of destruction that has decimated every aspect of Palestinian life. The ongoing Israeli military invasion has been considered a ‘plausible case of genocide’, and the humanitarian catastrophe has been compounded by major restrictions on access to humanitarian aid. Accusations of supporting ‘terror’ have been levied against UNRWA, the major provider of humanitarian services in Gaza, leading to an initial suspension of donor support to the organisation by many western governments. In this article, we consider the Israeli government’s tactics used to delegitimise those involved in providing humanitarian and lifesaving support for the Palestinian population, concluding that the construction and dissemination of narratives that depict them as being ‘terroristic’ or having ‘terrorist’ connections is a sophisticated additional layer of the settler colonial logic of elimination and erasure.

The shrinking space for civil society activism in Palestine

Counter-terrorism is increasingly being used to shrink the space for civil society. In October 2021, six Palestinian civil society organisations (CSOs) were proscribed by the Israeli Minister of Defense as ‘terrorist organisations’ based on the 2016 Counter-Terrorism Law. If fully implemented, in conjunction with the 1945 Defense (Emergency) Regulations, the CSOs’ offices would be closed and their staff arrested. However, the designation’s primary audience has reportedly been the donors of these organisations. This article explores whether the designation added another layer to the long-ongoing process of criminalising the CSOs, curtailing their capabilities to operate, and delegitimising them as partners for the donors and global civil society. The analysis draws on a combination of the shrinking space concept and securitisation theory. It broadens the latter to include the power of the referent subject, an aspect often neglected in the literature. Even though both audiences did not approve of the Israeli government’s securitising move and the CSOs were able to develop coping mechanisms, it deepened chilling effects. Continued attacks against the organisations contributed to further limiting their activism space. The case study builds upon a content analysis of legal documents, public statements, and data gathered through semi-structured interviews.

Identifying Regulatory Barriers in the Management of Ecological Corridors in an Increasingly Congested Space

Ecological corridors are essential in facilitating the movement and dispersal of flora and fauna between separate and often isolated habitat patches. In recent years, Israel has confronted significant challenges due to the rapid pace of construction, driven in part by exceptional population growth that sets it apart on the global demographic stage. This accelerated development creates an unprecedented long-term impact on ecosystems. A key obstacle to maintaining ecological corridors is the Israeli government’s decision to construct thousands of housing units using expedited plans that circumvent standard planning processes. Such projects significantly impact these corridors, given that approximately 16% of their designated areas overlap with ecological corridors. This raises two pressing questions: Can the existing ecological corridors endure these changes and remain functional, or does the role of ecological corridors need to be redefined due to increasing urban development? What are the necessary institutional frameworks required to effectively manage these corridors in an environment that is becoming progressively denser? The research focuses on two case studies in the densely populated Central District in Israel, encompassing both local and regional ecological corridors. The regulatory assessment will point out key stakeholders, identify potential threats to the corridors, and explore existing regulatory mechanisms for planning and managing these corridors.

The Face of Autism in Israel.

This article seeks to offer a comprehensive perspective on autism in Israel, aligning with global reports. It aims to serve as a foundational resource for policymakers in developing relevant support and point to unmet needs. The data was drawn from publications by Israeli government authorities and academic publications. In 2022, the prevalence of child and adolescent autism in Israel was approximately 1.13%, with a male-to-female ratio of 4:1, and an annual increase of 23%, particularly among young children. In Israel, the diagnosis of autism follows the DSM-5 guidelines and is conducted by a physician and a psychologist specializing in autism. Typically, diagnosis is at age 2. The autism intervention approaches prevalent in Israel are consistent with those that are globally accepted. Children with autism are entitled to special education services adapted to their needs and developmental levels. The legally established package of services for children with autism includes sessions with occupational therapists, speech-language pathologists (SLPs), physical therapists, psychologists, and social workers. Children and adults with autism are eligible for disability allowance along with support regarding residence, educational programs, and employment opportunities. Nonetheless, underdiagnosis and low accessibility to services are common in minority populations and rural areas. Furthermore, in recent years, services for autistic individuals have declined. This decline, particularly considering the ongoing rise in the prevalence of autism, pose significant challenges for Israeli government authorities in ensuring that autistic persons receive appropriate support.

Public Discourse on the Israel‐Hamas War 2023: A Comparative Analysis of Lithuania and the United Kingdom

AbstractThe conflict between the Israeli government and Hamas escalated on 7th October 2023, with the media playing an unprecedented role in shaping the perceptions and narratives surrounding the ongoing tensions. The portrayal by the media, often mirroring global viewpoints and biases, has significantly influenced public opinion and international stances, serving as a catalyst for political, diplomatic, and humanitarian interventions. The aim of the study is to analyze the formation of discourse on the Israel‐Hamas war (2023) within the media landscapes of Lithuania and the United Kingdom, emphasizing the role of national broadcasters and uncovering the primary disparities in the information provided by online news portals lrt.lt and bbc.com. Employing the qualitative content analysis method, the study provides comprehensive insights into the subject matter. Moreover, it highlights the approaches of the Lithuanian and UK governments towards security discourse in Europe and their concerns regarding humanitarian aid for the Gaza Strip. The study is relevant to shed light on how political decisions and public opinion influence the international community's support for various actors in the conflict, including the manifestation of Islamophobic and antisemitic sentiments.

Israel’s position a year after the Hamas-led attacks of 7 October

While the Israeli government has succeeded in hobbling Hamas and scattering its forces, it has not formulated a coherent strategy for a post-war Gaza. This will exacerbate tensions with the United States and other international partners.

The Israeli Social-Military Conflict – A “Boiling Democracy”

ABSTRACT The symbiosis between the Israeli army – the IDF – and Israeli society, that was forged with the establishment of the State of Israel, is based on a model of a “citizen-soldier” military and has always stood as a pillar of national strength. Yet there are some who claim that since the 1990s, carried on the currents of liberalism introduced into Israeli society, as well as the effects of social post-modernism, this bond has been worn thin. The Israeli government’s intention at the beginning of 2023 to enact laws that would change the balance between the Supreme Court and parliament sparked a sweeping protest on part of large swaths of Israeli society, a protest culminating when a group of IDF reservists declared that they would not report for their next call for reserve duty if the reform is enacted. This reality places in question the “citizen-soldier” model, and the importance of the connection between society and the army for the latter’s existence. The present study attempts to examine the effects of the deep currents of social protest on the relationship between society and the military. It included 1,200 participants who filled out an online questionnaire and interviews with 30 participants, who shared their opinions on the ultimatum presented by the reservist to the Israeli government. The findings show that a vast majority of Israelis do not support the use that the reservist made of the duty ultimatum; however, a considerable/non-negligible minority was in support of this act. An in-depth examination of social processes in Israel presents a growing conflict between its liberal and traditional-conservative camps, which impacts the resilience of Israeli society and might very well compromise the national security of the State of Israel.

Does the Buck Stop Somewhere? Blame Games and State Capture in the Legalization of the Israeli Land Grab

This article explores the intricate relationship between the Israeli state and Jewish settlers in the occupied Palestinian West Bank after the Oslo Accords (1993). It shows that, despite the accords, which prohibited the establishment of new settlements, such activities persisted. Instead, the accords triggered the seemingly spontaneous emergence of numerous illegal “hilltop settlements,” tolerated by higher echelons of government and actively supported by lower levels. These settlements subsequently underwent a gradual post hoc formalization process, ultimately leading to their full legalization. The article elucidates how a faction within Israeli society influenced segments of the government, employing blame games as a strategy to rationalize the legitimization of the Israeli land grab. Notably, it highlights the strategic and deceptive tactics employed by various Israeli governments in their dealings with the settler movement. The article concludes by reflecting on the political implications of the settler movement's success for the democratic character of the Israeli state.

The Weight of History After October 7 and the Gaza War: Shaping a New Future

Abstract The trauma of the October 7 massacre for Israelis and the catastrophe that Gazans have experienced in the subsequent war mark a new stage in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. While October 7 and indeed the Israeli response are exceptional, we cannot overcome their consequences without addressing the root of the conflict. Calls for an immediate ceasefire are understandable but fall into the trap of seeing the solution as being a military decision. This echoes to the attitude of the current Israeli government which poses the response to October 7 as a military one. A new international political initiative is required to change the atmosphere by setting the goal of resolving the conflict on the basis of self-determination for both Israelis and Palestinians. That needs to inform the approach we adopt to ending the current conflict by replacing Hamas and Israel in Gaza with an international security mechanism.

ISRAEL'S APPROACH TO LIMITATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS ON THE EXAMPLE OF COOPERATION WITH CHINA, JAPAN AND INDIA

The article focuses on the specifics of the Israeli mechanism of foreign investments control that was created primarily under the influence of the political will of Israel's main global partner, the United States, but not on the basis of the country’s economic interests. The author considers the course of negotiations between the government of B. Netanyahu and the administration of D. Trump on the formation of an advisory committee for foreign investment approval, its goals, objectives and directions of work, as well as the differences from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). The cases of China, Japan and India are consistently analyzed. The choice of these examples is motivated by both by the level of their business activity in Israel and the dynamics of contacts with the United States, which forces the White House to support or hinder their cooperation with its Middle Eastern partner. The author comes to conclusion that the Israeli government did not completely repeat the American experience of control over foreign investment, although it is moving towards tightening this practice. The study shows that that the main focus of the Israeli advisory committee since its creation in 2019 has been transactions with China, while relations with representatives of Japan and India have particularly no restrictions.

이스라엘의 하레디 유대인들은 누구인가

This paper analyzes the political characteristics of Haredi Jews and evaluates their impact on Israeli political development. This paper analyzes and utilizes information from Jewish organizations and Haredi Jewish organizations, papers published in Haredi professional journals and religious journals, books on Haredi Jews, materials from Israeli government and Knesset, and Israeli, British, and American newspapers. I re-wrote this below This paper analyzes the political characteristics of Haredi Jews and evaluates their impact on Israeli political development by utilizing information from Jewish organizations, the academic literature, materials from Israeli government, and Israeli, British, and American newspapers. Historically, most Haredi Jews have pursued the political and economic interests of their community while changing their positions on the state of Israel and Zionism. In recent years, Haredi political parties have emerged as important influential actors in Israeli politics. Haredi Jews are a key element of Israel's identity as a Jewish state. However, the active participation of Haredi Jews in politics can be a fatal weakness and a major obstacle to Israel's development into a modern democratic state.

The 7 October Hamas Attack

On 7 October 2023, Palestinian militants led by Hamas launched a complex coordinated attack on Israel from the Gaza Strip, triggering an Israeli ground invasion combined with an aerial bombing campaign. The Hamas fighters killed around 1,200 people and took more than 250 hostages, while the death toll from Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip exceeded 31,600 in mid-March 2024. The Hamas attack not only shocked the whole world but also caught most people by surprise. Probably only a few could have imagined that the Palestinian organisation that controls the Gaza Strip could carry out such an attack on Israel. Following 7 October, several questions arose. Why Israeli intelligence could not predict the attack, and why did security and defence forces not react in time? The Israeli Government promised a full investigation once the Gaza ground offensive launched in response to the attack was over. But even without knowing more details of the events, we might still be able to provide a preliminary assessment of the surrounding Israeli intelligence failures based on the reports and accounts made public in the international media. Three months after the attack, the publicly available information showed that the Israel Defense Forces were unprepared and there was no battle plan in place in case Hamas militants broke out of the Gaza Strip with large forces. Clarifying what happened will be crucial not only to learn from the mistakes, but also because other actors or adversaries can learn from Hamas and copy its tactics.

Migrating the state into corporate clouds

ABSTRACT This article examines the cloudification of the state by focusing on ‘Project Nimbus’ – a $1.2 billion tender offered by the Israeli government to move ‘the entire Israeli state’ into corporate clouds. As one of the biggest informational infrastructure projects Israel has known, Nimbus revolves around the construction or repurposing of six massive, resource-hungry corporate data centers and the ‘migration’ of the state into them. Accordingly, Nimbus potentially redraws the relationship between the state and big tech, as well as between the state and its citizens. Based on thematic analysis of various project-related sources, we highlight four main aspects of the ‘cloudification of the state.’ First, focusing on cloud ideology, we expose the neo-liberal logics behind the construction of the Nimbus data centers. Second, focusing on cloud epistemology, we show that the effort and organizational changes that come with the cloudification of the state translate into an acute dependence on the tech giants. Third, focusing on the DCaaSization of the state, we argue that with its reliance on DCaaS (‘data center as a service’), the state's ‘behind the scenes’ is fading into the tech giants’ backstage. Lastly, we argue that this cloudification translates into disseminating advanced AI-powered data processing tools alongside pronounced data-ist Silicon Valley ideologies. We conclude by arguing that the construction of the Nimbus data centers and the subsequent cloudification of the state enhance power and information asymmetries between the state and big tech and discuss the data-coloniality of this new cloudified power structure.

Palestine and Israel War Conflict During COVID-19

The purpose of this study is to determine how international law affects the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the COVID-19 pandemic. The approach used in this research is literature study, which entails gathering pertinent material from books and journals, evaluating it, and drawing conclusions. Concerns regarding the socio-economic circumstances of Palestinians have been highlighted by the fast-spreading COVID-19 epidemic. Overcoming two issues at once is becoming more and more difficult. Considering the harm done to infrastructure for sanitation, hygiene, and water, the Palestinians’ situation is getting better. The COVID-19 virus is being stopped by impeding the flow of essential supplies into the Palestinian state and causing environmental harm, both of which may affect public health. International humanitarian law is in place to prevent these kinds of tragedies, but the Israeli government and military disobey these laws. From an international law standpoint, this research helps understand how the state of Israel behaved toward Palestine during the COVID-19 epidemic. References to a wide range of national and international periodicals and books were used in the preparation of this research. In addition, it makes use of the most recent news about the subjects covered. The findings of this review of the literature indicate that despite an increase in attacks on Palestinian civilians, the situation between Israel and Palestine has not improved

The Israeli health system’s rapid responses during the COVID-19 pandemic

BackgroundThe COVID-19 pandemic posed numerous challenges to health systems around the world. In addressing many of those challenges, Israel responded quite rapidly. While quick action is not an end in it itself, it can be important in responding to disease outbreaks. Some of Israel's rapid responses to the pandemic contributed significantly to population health and provided important learning opportunities for other countries.Main bodySome of the most prominent Israeli rapid responses were related to vaccination. Israel led the world in the pace of its initial vaccine rollout, and it was also the first country to approve and administer booster vaccines to broad segments of the population. In addition, Israeli scholars published a series of timely reports analyzing vaccination impact, which informed policy in Israel and other countries. Israel was a rapid responder in additional areas of public health. These include the partial closure of its borders, the adoption of physical distancing measures, the use of digital surveillance technology for contact tracing, the use of wastewater surveillance to monitor viral spread, and the use of vaccine certificates ("green passes") to facilitate a return to routine in the face of the ongoing pandemic. Many factors contributed to Israel's capacity to repeatedly respond rapidly to a broad array of COVID-19 challenges. These include a national health insurance system that promotes public–private coordination, a system of universal electronic health records, a high level of emergency preparedness, a culture of focusing on goal attainment, a culture of innovation, and the presence of a strong scientific community which is highly connected internationally. In addition, some of the rapid responses (e.g., the rapid initial vaccination rollout) facilitated rapid responses in related areas (e.g., the analysis of vaccination impact, the administration of boosters, and the adoption of green passes). While rapid response can contribute to population health and economic resilience, it can also entail costs, risks, and limitations. These include making decisions and acting before all the relevant information is available; deciding without sufficient consideration of the full range of possible effects, costs, and benefits; not providing enough opportunities for the involvement of relevant groups in the decision-making process; and depleting non-renewable resources.ConclusionsBased on our findings, we encourage leaders in the Israeli government to ensure that its emergency response system will continue to have the capacity to respond rapidly to large-scale challenges, whether of a military or civilian nature. At the same time, the emergency response systems should develop mechanisms to include more stakeholders in the fast-paced decision-making process and should improve communication with the public. In addition, they should put into place mechanisms for timely reconsideration, adjustment, and—when warranted—reversal of decisions which, while reasonable when reached, turn out to have been ill-advised in the light of subsequent developments and evidence. These mechanisms could potentially involve any or all branches of government, as well as the public, the press, and professional organizations. Our findings also have implications for health system leaders in other countries. The Israeli experience can help them identify key capacities to develop during non-emergency periods, thus positioning themselves to respond more rapidly in an emergency. Finally, health system leaders in other countries could monitor Israel's rapid responses to future global health emergencies and adopt selected actions in their own countries.

Sovereignty in Hebrew and the Decline of Democracy

Abstract Since assuming office in December 2022, Israel's government has worked to weaken the state's democratic infrastructure. While this appears to break from a long-standing Israeli consensus on democracy, this article demonstrates that retiring democracy has long been the agenda of the faction of the Israeli right most empowered in Israel's current government, namely the settler movement. Following the discourse in Sovereignty: A Political Journal, it finds that by recasting ‘sovereignty’ as involving annexation and disenfranchizing Palestinians, the settler right has consistently portrayed democracy—and particularly the Supreme Court that serves as a check on governmental power and protects minorities—as an obstacle to ‘sovereignty.’ Considering the settler right's political vision, the article claims that defending democracy today will necessarily involve engaging contentious questions of occupation and annexation.

How Israel's Illiberal Democracy Became a Model for the Right

ABSTRACT: Amid the mass slaughter and starvation of Palestinians in Gaza, it is easy to forget the political drama that gripped Israel only one year ago. After assuming power in December 2022, a new far-right government led by Benjamin Netanyahu had proposed a slate of judicial and administrative reforms that prompted a wave of anti-government protests. Concerned journalists, former U.S. and Israeli government officials, and major American Jewish organizations issued ominous warnings about democratic backsliding. Israel, it seemed, was heading in the direction of illiberal Hungary.

The political economy of populists in power, between policy and polity: Evidence from the Israeli case

This paper explores the connection between the current wave of populism, economic policies and governance practices. We first review the different ways in which populist political economy has been conceptualised, focusing on the relationship between populism and neoliberalism in terms of both policy and polity. We then briefly discuss right-wing populist governments’ recent economic policies and institutional changes. We argue that, while representing a continuation of neoliberalism in some areas, right-wing populism may, when in power, undermine neoliberal economic policies and institutional power by subverting governance norms and reintroducing the state as a major actor in the economy. To demonstrate and support our argument, we analyse the Israeli case, in which the right-wing populist leader Benjamin Netanyahu led three governmental coalitions between 2009 and 2019. We focus on the Israeli government’s response to the cost-of-living crisis and the housing crisis. We show that the populist Israeli government went beyond clientelism and welfare chauvinism and moved towards a more redistributive and expansionist economic agenda. To finance and legislate this agenda, it used unorthodox, short-term governance practices to bypass or overcome institutional limitations.

Pediatric Trauma During COVID-19: What Have We Learned?

BackgroundIn December 2019, an outbreak of a novel pneumonia-like illness, COVID-19 (C-19), emerged in Wuhan, China. In March 2020, as the incidence of C-19 rose, the Israeli government, like that of other nations, declared a national state of emergency, and a full, general lockdown was announced. PurposeThe purpose of this study is to determine the incidence and characteristics of pediatric maxillofacial trauma presentation during the 2020 C-19 lockdown restrictions and compare them to periods outside lockdown between 2019 and 2020 (Pre-C-19). Study design, setting, sampleA retrospective cohort study was conducted and included all pediatric patients (0-18 years) referred to the emergency department (ED) at Tzafon Medical Center, Israel, and diagnosed with maxillofacial injuries. Patients with missing demographic data and patients who did not complete the medical examination were excluded. Predictor/exposure/independent variableThe exposure variable is the date of injury – 2020 C-19 lockdown period compared to the previous year (Pre-C-19). Main outcome variable(s)The main outcome variable was the number of pediatric maxillofacial trauma ED arrivals out of total pediatric ED arrivals and out of total maxillofacial ED arrival. CovariatesCovariates included patient demographics, etiology and place of injury. AnalysesThe association between categorical variables was tested using Fisher exact test or Chi-square test for binary variables with relative risk (RR) when appropriate, logistic regression model used to predict outcome variable. P-values were 2-tailed and statistical significance was defined as P < 0.05. ResultsThe study sample comprised 1174 patients. RR of presenting with oral and maxillofacial trauma out of all pediatric ED patients was 1.85 comparing C-19 period to Pre-C-19 period (CI [1.65 ; 2.073], p < 0.0001). Most of the injuries recorded during the C-19 restrictions occurred in the domestic environment (56.1% compared to 47.5% in Pre-C-19, p < 0.001). Incidences necessitating treatment increased from 45.8% to 55% during C-19 (p = 0.002). ConclusionsDuring C-19 there was a higher rate of pediatric injuries compared to Pre-C-19. The incidence of domestic oral and maxillofacial injuries increased despite the considered home safety.