Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research Articles

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Use of Diplomats in Its Intelligence and Terrorist Operations against Dissidents: The Case of Assadollah Assadi

The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has two main intelligence organizations: the Ministry of Intelligence (MOI) and the Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The two organizations are highly active on foreign soil with malign activities like assassinations. In 2018, the third secretary of the IRI embassy in Austria, Assadollah Assadi, was arrested and later convicted of involvement in terrorism. With the help of three of his assets, they had planned to bomb a gathering in Paris arranged by the Iranian opposition to the IRI. Assadi would later be identified as the principal intelligence officer of the MOI on the European continent. Analyzing the case of Assadi shows that the IRI has the will and resources to conduct significant terrorist operations and that the regime has a vast network of assets throughout Europe. Most significant in the failed Paris plot was that evidently the IRI Intelligence Community is likely compromised and that the regime has considerable problems in trusting its own intelligence officers.

Realization of semantic and lexical instances in online hard news representation: a study through attitude and graduation analysis

The study explores media discourse through the lexical and semantic realization of text. For that, online hard news on the disruption of tension due to targeting Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani as the Commander of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on 3rd January 2020 in Iraq was selected from “Tehran Times” and “USA Today.” The “Appraisal Analysis” of Martin and White under “Attitude” and “Graduation” resources were employed to analyze the lexical strategies. The dataset comprises 322 words from the “Tehran Times” and 1727 words from “USA Today.” The study reveals that both newspapers have presented their views via social actors (Irani President Rouhani & U.S. President Donald Trump) as an external voice. President Rouhani presented in negative invoked instances with determination to respond in “Tehran Times.” At the same time, “USA Today” portrayed Donald Trump on a positive with correct measures as the need of an hour. The findings suggest “USA Today” only had inscribed judgment and invoked stances. Both newspapers had represented “subjectivity” along with “objectivity” by presenting social actors’ positive image in their local newspapers through direct speech that showed the ideological orientation of newspapers.

The EU Terror List and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC): About the Law as an Alleged Obstacle to Political Action

This article examines the legal requirements for a listing on the so-called European Union (EU) terror list, an aspect that remains underdeveloped in both legal scholarship and policy debates on counter-terrorism measures. The analysis elucidates the substantive requirements governing listings on the EU terror list and applies them to the case of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It highlights the two-tiered nature of the EU terror listing process, in which an EU terror listing relies on a national authority’s decision regarding the potential target. Furthermore, an analysis of recent Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case-law outlines prospective developments in the Court of Justice’s scrutiny of restrictive measures. It will be shown that the CJEU exercises judicial deference in its examination of restrictive measures adopted by the Council, particularly in cases involving threats to the EU’s legal and democratic order or international security orchestrated by foreign state actors.

The EU Terror List and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC): About the Law as an Alleged Obstacle to Political Action

This article examines the legal requirements for a listing on the so-called European Union (EU) terror list, an aspect that remains underdeveloped in both legal scholarship and policy debates on counter-terrorism measures. The analysis elucidates the substantive requirements governing listings on the EU terror list and applies them to the case of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It highlights the two-tiered nature of the EU terror listing process, in which an EU terror listing relies on a national authority’s decision regarding the potential target. Furthermore, an analysis of recent Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case-law outlines prospective developments in the Court of Justice’s scrutiny of restrictive measures. It will be shown that the CJEU exercises judicial deference in its examination of restrictive measures adopted by the Council, particularly in cases involving threats to the EU’s legal and democratic order or international security orchestrated by foreign state actors.

Discord in the Diaspora: Agonism in the Woman, Life, Freedom Movement for Democracy

The death of the 22-year-old Kurdish Iranian woman Mahsa Jina Amini in September 2022 sparked a movement that immediately captivated the Iranian diaspora around the world. The morality police had detained Amini in Tehran for allegedly improper hijab. Protests began in Iranian Kurdistan, where Amini was from, and spread across the country to regions and sectors of society that have historically been less involved in political protests than major urban centers like Tehran. What began as a street protest became a full-throated rejection of the status quo. Merchants, teachers, and students organized coordinated labor strikes, while protesters and security services clashed in the streets. Additional economic sanctions were implemented against Iran's government by the United States and Europe; the United Nations Human Rights Commission initiated an independent investigation of the government's response to the protests; Iran was expelled from the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women; and the European Parliament cut diplomatic ties with Tehran. The United States has nearly abandoned the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) even as it was in the final stages of renegotiation, while calls by activists and the European Parliament to designate Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a terrorist group are ongoing.1 We also saw significant global solidarity protests in numerous major cities in the United States, Europe, and Australia.

Իսլամական հեղափոխության պահապանների կորպուսի դերն Իրանի քաղաքական համակարգում

The complex political situation created by the Islamic Revolution provided the basis for the creation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps supplements regular Armed Forces by performing functions outside the traditional role of the army, operating separately, and carrying out various operational tasks. The research into this organization indicates that the IRGC that mainly carried out the security of the Khomeini groups has become a powerful structure. It could be said that today the IRGC functions as a broad socio-political and economic institution whose influence extends to all aspects of Iran's political and social life. Today, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is also a corporate unit of Iran's military, intelligence, political, political, ideological, as well as financial and economic institutions. It can also be emphasized that this powerful structure is the backbone of the Islamic Republic of Iran today. According to Ayatollah Montazeri, one of Iran's most influential figures, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is the child of the revolution and is the only body in its kind that has broad religious, political, and military powers.

The Quds Force and drug trafficking in the world

The Quds Force is one of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps's five forces. It is impossible to separate the Quds force and the IRGC from each other. Since its establishment, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has supported terrorist groups in the region and Islamic countries.The "Quds Force," or the "Sepah," took its name from the title given to Jerusalem by the Islamic Republic and was formed based on Article Seven of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps' Statute regarding the support of Islamic movements outside Iran's borders. This duty was first handled by the "Liberation Movements Unit" under the responsibility of Mohammad Montazeri and then by Mehdi Hashemi until the Unit was dissolved by the end of 1981. This Unit was also considered a sub-group of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.The "Islamic liberation movements" was also taken over by the intelligence unit of the IRGC for a while.This force was established during the Iran-Iraq war, and its purpose was to operate on Iraq's soil. Some sources have estimated this force to have up to 50,000 members worldwide.As the head of the Quds Force, Ghassem Soleimani created several other groups, such as the Hosseinioun, the Fatemiyoun, the Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi, Badr Corps, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, "Hezbollah of Iraq, in Yemen, the Quds Force supported the "Ansar Allah" group, all of these groups are politically, financially and militarily supported by the Iranian regime. Considering this organization's vast area of activities in the region, this article seeks to answer the central question of what role the Quds Force of the IRGC of Iran has played in drug trafficking in the Middle East and worldwide.1

Military Ideology and Foreign Policy: A Constructivist Examination of the IRGC'S Ideological Influence

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) pervades most aspects of life in post-revolutionary Iran. Ostensibly the regime’s security organisation, the IRGC’s political clout and economic heft enable it to extend its influence beyond security and into foreign policy. This study employs a constructivist perspective, casting light on the key elements of the IRGC’s identity, notably its religious discourse. In doing so, it develops our understanding of how the organisation’s beliefs and values affect the foreign policy agenda of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This article draws on IRGC press statements, ideological training materials and its constitutive charter in conjunction with an analysis of the organisation's behaviour to delineate an image of an organisation staunchly loyal to the total imperium of the ‘House of Leader’, and which buttresses the regime with its militant, violent and religiously hardline outlook. Working to promote rather than define Ayatollah Khamenei’s system of Islamic governance, the IRGC’s role is closer to that of enforcer and implementer than of autonomous agent of foreign policy. This article contributes to the wider literature on constructivist idealism by highlighting the importance of ideas as relational and performative elements of foreign policy.

The Recruitment of Elitesto the Cabinets of Iran: a Biographical Analysis (1979–1989)

The article highlights the main patterns of recruiting ministers in the Iranian governments at 1979–1989. The work is based on the theoretical foundation of the study of the elites. Structural biographical analysis is the research method in the article. The paper analyzes the biographies of 183 ministers at the first 7 governments of Iran using aggregated form based on secondary data published by other researchers. The results of the work show that the first 3 years of the existence of the executive branch were the most conflicting: 5 governments existed consequently. 55–65% of all ministers had technical education. At the same time, the share of members of governments with humanitarian specialization decreased; the military and doctors had been replacing them. According to the place of education, the only balanced government was the Bazargan government, later the share of ministers with Iranian education increased, and with Western education decreased. The governments of Bazargan and the Council of the Islamic Revolution were balanced, where bureaucrats, scholars and professionals were relatively evenly represented. The main profession becomes bureaucratic. During this period, new elite groups emerged in governments: Shiite clergy and veterans of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The share of clergy from remains stable and fluctuates in the range of 9–14%. At the same time, the yield of veterans of the IRGC increases with each new government, reaching 21% in the second government of Mousavi. 60–70% of ministers came from regional capitals, and Tehran and Isfahan were the key provinces to recruit ministers.

Iran and the Gulf: The Era of Hassan Rouhani

The paper utilizes the theory of neoclassical realism as its theoretical foundation to understand the relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). An insight is provided into defining Rouhani’s foreign policy discourse and slogan, primarily towards the GCC, while addressing the significant shifts in the region, which implicated Iran’s Rouhani stance towards the GCC and its members. The paper concludes with how the recent developments of the Iranian elections and Ebrahim Raisi will impact the future of Iran-GCC relations. From an analytical standpoint, it was found that Rouhani had difficulty engaging with the GCC countries due to impediments by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Similarly, the article highlights Rouhani’s era in Iran’s foreign behavior towards the GCC while exploring whether he achieved his foreign ambitions and provided a vision for the significant challenges awaiting the Raisi presidency.

Stakeholders analysis of COVID-19 management and control: a case of Iran

BackgroundThe COVID-19 pandemic is a multi-faceted phenomenon with many political, economic and social consequences. Success in managing and controlling this pandemic depends on the coordinated efforts of many organizations and institutions. Therefore, this study aimed to identify and analyze the actors and stakeholders related to managing and controlling this pandemic in Iran.MethodsThis mix-method stakeholder analysis was conducted in 2021 nationwide as retrospectively. The purposive sampling method was applied when inviting eligible participants to participate in the study. Our study was conducted in two phases. In the qualitative phase, data were collected using a semi-structured interview. An interview guide was developed based on the WHO stakeholder analysis framework. In the quantitative phase, we used a questionnaire developed based on the study framework. Each question was scored on a 5-point Likert scale, with a score greater than 4 was considered as high, 3–4 was considered as moderate, and 1–3 was considered as low. Data were analyzed using framework analysis, WHO stakeholders’ analysis framework and MENDELOW matrix. MAXQDA qualitative data analysis software Version 11 and Policy Maker software (Version. 4) were used for data analysis.ResultsA total of 48 stakeholders were identified. Ministry of Health (MoH), National Headquarters for Coronavirus Control (NHCC) had the highest participation level, high supportive position, and knowledge of the subject. The Parliament of Iran (PoI), Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) had the highest power/influence during the Covid-19 epidemic. Only two stakeholders (6.06%) had high participation, and 18.18% had moderate participation. All stakeholders except for the NHCC and the MoH lacked appropriate knowledge of the subject. Furthermore, only three stakeholders (9.09%) had high power/influence.ConclusionGiven the multidimensional nature of Covid-19, most institutions and organizations were involved in managing this pandemic. Stakeholders with high power/authority and resources had a low/moderate participation level and a moderate supportive position. Moreover, organizations with a high supportive position and participation had low power/authority and resources to cope with COVID-19.

Hizballah: Between Iran and Lebanon

Hizballah: Between Iran and Lebanon

Shi'a principles and Iran's strategic culture towards ballistic missile deployment

Abstract Iran's January 2020 missile attacks on US military bases in Iraq following the assassination of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps General Qasem Soleimani correspond to a stark change of Iran's approach. Iran has namely abstained from using its ballistic missile program (BMP), which was only used twice after the 1980–88 Iran–Iraq War: in 2017 and 2018, in both instances in retaliation against ISIS attacks. The article explores the change in Iran's employment of its BMP from a strategic culture perspective while paying special attention to the principles of Shi'a Islam, which form a particular discursive habitat in which Iran's strategic actions are framed and rationalized. Iran's approach to the BMP is thus inseparable from qisas (retaliation), while obeying the overarching principle of maslahat; but also characterized by the varying importance of the the principles zarare aghall, ezterar and nafye sabil. We conclude that a perspective focusing on religious principles can contribute to our understanding of strategic cultural change, in what concerns its possible orientation, range and limits.

Visual propaganda at a crossroads: new techniques at Iran’s Vali Asr billboard

Located at one of Iran’s busiest intersections, the Vali Asr billboard has been a key venue for projecting and promoting the regime messaging of the Islamic Republic since 2015. With its unique ability to frequently change its images, unlike the more traditional painted murals populating Iran’s urban landscape, the Vali Asr billboard has the capacity to convey a wide-range of regime messages tailor-made for a variety of domestic and international events, whether foreseen or unforeseen, from national holidays to the outbreak of Covid-19. This article assesses how the Vali Asr billboard’s unique features and design style allow it to present a mix of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ propaganda and succeed in attracting public engagement with its images. Through a close analysis of the assassination of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Qassem Suleimani (d. 2020), a series of murals unveiled during the holy month of Muharram in 2020, and a controversy around the 2018 World Cup, the article argues that the Vali Asr billboard is a unique communicative medium and potent tool for regime cultural producers in Iran’s twenty-first century media landscape.

Iran Under Raisi’s Presidency

Following the Islamic Revolution, a number of leaders have served as the highest elected official of Iran, with the winner of the last presidential election being Ebrahim Raisi, who does not have much experience in the political area, but received the support of all influential groups in the country, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the ulama. The attitude of the Guardian Council, which has the primary responsibility for the survival of the system, in determining the presidential candidates affects the voter turnout and enables the forecast of election results to some degree, as in this election. In this context, the rejection of the candidacy of some names is essential in terms of showing the rivalry between the various power groups in the system and giving clues about the new era, which is characterized as the second phase of the Revolution. Raisi, who has been seen as the Supreme Leader’s possible successor, is expected to make an impression as an embracive leader. However, he also faces significant challenges in domestic policy such as the economy, aridification, power and water crises, and ethnic problems, to which there are no simple and short-term solutions. In foreign policy, although it is expected that Raisi would prioritize the relations with neighboring countries instead of the great powers, the relations of Tehran with these countries will, to a great extent, depend on its policies towards the U.S. in the new era.

The Assassination of Fakhrizadeh—A Major Iranian Counterintelligence Failure?

The assassination of Iranian top nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh is one of numerous assassinations in Iran conducted by foreign powers ever since 2007. In the past six months, assassins have in addition to Fakhrizadeh also been able to kill Al-Qaida’s no. 2 on Iranian soil. The three most important organizations in the Iranian intelligence community are the Ministry of Intelligence, as well as the Intelligence Organization and Intelligence Protection Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. There is no doubt that the assassination of Fakhrizadeh is a counterintelligence failure; however, there are indications that the Iranian intelligence community have been compromised. The assassins of Fakhrizadeh had accurate information about Fakhrizadeh and his security details. Because of this breach, Iran will conduct serious reforms in its intelligence community and may also eliminate individuals it suspects work on behalf of foreign powers and may have leaked information.

Iran's Reconstruction Jihad—Rural Development and Regime Consolidation after 1979

Iran's Reconstruction Jihad—Rural Development and Regime Consolidation after 1979

Iranian-American Tensions and the Energy Security of the Persian Gulf Countries

ABSTRACT At the end of April 2020, Iran and the United States again exchanged harsh statements regarding each other’s naval operations in the Persian Gulf and threatened to use force against each other. While there was nothing new in the exchange of threats, two aspects are cause for concern. First, the exchange of statements came after a pause that lasted several months following the assassination by the American military of Qosem. Soleimani, a high-ranking officer in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, in January 2020. The sharp escalation at the time forced Tehran to be more cautious in its statements and actions, and the subsequent outbreak of the COVID-19 epidemic completely distracted the two sides from continuing the conflict. Their return to aggressive rhetoric suggests that the United States and Iran have adjusted to the new conditions and are ready to continue their traditional game of “chicken.” Second, the Iranian–American tensions flared at a particularly unfavorable moment. This flare-up will inevitably heighten the apprehensions of consumers of oil from the Persian Gulf region regarding potential threats to the security of raw-material supplies. The escalation, however, will not primarily harm the interests of consumers, as was the case in previous decades (from the 1970s to the 2000s), when the very presence of a threat to oil exports from the region’s countries led to oil price increases. This time the main victims will be the regional producers, who could lose their traditional customers. This reflects both a result of the current evolution of the world oil market, in which the rules of the game are no longer set by the producers of oil but by its consumers, and a shift of emphasis in the safeguarding of the Gulf states’ energy security.

Strategic Depth Through Enclaves: Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah

AbstractThis article interrogates and extrapolates Iran's bilateral relationship with the Assad government and Hezbollah in the context of the so‐called Resistance Axis, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps's objective of enhancing its strategic depth in Syria after the onset of conflict in 2011. Utilizing a complex realist conceptual framework, and with reference to constructivism, it argues that Iran's strategic depth in Syria could have been addressed as part of a dialogue on regional security after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the Iran nuclear deal) in 2015. However, it has been reinforced by the legacy of past warfare, the Trump administration's “maximum pressure” policy, and a regional trend toward the creation of enclaves in conflict zones. This trend, including Turkey's forward‐defense strategy in Syria, could create further instabilities as state and nonstate actors vie for security and political influence and as long as enclaves remain untethered to broader interests and alliances. The case of Pakistan highlights enduring themes such as how shifting US diplomatic and military strategy and dependency could impact strategic depth.

Photoshopped missiles and fallen Iran’s ballistic missile program and its foreign and security policy towards the United States under the Trump Administration

Drawing on the Strategic Culture Theory, this article analyzes Iran’s evolving ballistic missile program (BMP), by focusing especially on the period of the Trump administration (January 2017-January 2021), including both Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) shooting down a US surveillance drone in the Strait of Hormuz in June 2019 and Iran’s attack on the US military bases following the assassination of IRGC General Qasem Soleimani, in January 2020. This work demonstrates the increasing reliance on the ‘revolutionary’, more offensive narrative, which has become additionally reinforced after the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani and Professor Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. This has consolidated the retaliatory aspects in Iran’s foreign and security policy, while it has also marginalized moderated actors willing to engage in negotiations with the US.