Iranian Leaders Research Articles

From resentment to hatred: the Islamist complex and Iran’s anger-charged foreign policy

ABSTRACT The expanding literature on status in International Relations argues that Eastern nations with grandiose history, who have faced decline after the West’s ascent, are susceptible to resentment from the established Western powers. This often results in recurrent tensions in their relations with the West, stemming from feelings of misrecognition and disrespect. While this framework seems apt for cases like Russia and Turkey, this paper cautions about its applicability to elucidate the bellicosity of all rising Eastern nations towards the West, highlighting Iran as a case where animosity goes beyond status anxiety and resulting resentment. It contributes to the academic discourse on status by differentiating responses of Russian, Turkish and Iranian leaders towards the West, utilizing literature on hate and anger. It delves into Iran’s Islamist complex, which fuels hate-driven anger towards the West, discerning between this type of anger and the more straightforward resentment-induced anger exhibited by nationalist leaders of Russia and Turkey. The central premise posits that the anger of the latter two states functions as a bargaining instrument for improved treatment, dissipating upon status reclamation, whereas Iranian Islamists’ anger remains steadfast, as the Iranian leadership perceives the entirety of the West, not just its behaviours, as detrimental.

Иран на пути к региональной интеграции: политические и экономические аспекты взаимоотношений с государствами-членами ШОС

The article examines Iran’s relationship with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), analyses the process of establishing cooperation with the member states of this organization, primarily Russia and China, in the field of regional security, as well as the political and economic spheres. The history of Iran’s inclusion in the SCO, the dynamics of cooperation, as well as the impact of this interaction on regional and world politics are explored. The focus is on joint projects, diplomatic, trade and economic relations, as well as potential challenges and prospects for cooperation between Iran and the SCO. The work notes that Iran’s desire for full membership in this organization was reinforced by the confrontation with the leading Western powers led by the United States and fit into the framework of Eastern policy with the prospect of an alliance with Russia and China. It is emphasized that due to opposition to Iran’s desire to strengthen its independence and sovereignty, Western powers prevented its inclusion in the regional or international security architecture. Under these conditions, Iran has intensified its efforts in search of its place in the international security system, relying on the idea of national identity and drawing closer to Russia and China. It is noted that the negative consequences of sanctions, threats of military intervention, cyber warfare and attempts to destabilize the Islamic regime were the main methods of Western policy towards Iran. Based on this, accession to the SCO was considered by the Iranian leadership as the most important task to neutralize Western sanctions and become one of the leaders in the regional security system.

Ahmed Adnan Saygun’s Opera “Őzsoy” — a Cultural-Political Project and an Artistic Event in 20th Century Turkish Music

In 1934 in Ankara the world premiere of Ahmed Adnan Saygun’s opera Őzsoy took place. The initiator of its creation was the first president of the Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatűrk. He came forward as a peculiar curator who accompanied the project at various stages of its preparation: from the choice of the poetical source (the Persian epos Shahnameh by Ferdowsi) and the definitions of the chief ideas in his interpretation to assigning the librettist (Münir Hayri Egeli) and the composer, whom 27-year-old Ahmed Adnan Saygun was chosen to be. The idea of the creation of national opera fit organically into the context of Atatűrk’s reformist endeavors, however the project of Őzsoy was tinged not only with cultural, but also with political tones: the premiere of the opera, timed to the official visit of Iranian leader Reza Shah Pahlavi, was called to be conducive to the strengthening of Turkish-Iranian contacts. In the opera’s plotline, the theme of the mutual relations of the Turkish and the Iranian peoples is played out. Saygun, an adherent of Atatűrk’s reformative ideas, at that time a scholarship recipient of the Turkish Republic and a recent graduate of the Schola cantorum in Paris, turns in Őzsoy to the experience of European opera, but interprets it individually. This is testified by the formal structure and the dramaturgy (a free, at times montage connection of the musical and the talking episodes, a through type of intonational development and a conditional “number” structure), and the style; at the same time, Turkish national features show themselves through the Western European foundation, which is especially perceptible in the rhythmic and the timbral aspects. Such an intercrossing of the traditions of the East and the West has become one of the characteristic tendencies in 20th century Turkish music.

Klyuchevye napravleniya blizhnevostochnoj politiki oficial'nogo Vashingtona v period prezidentstva B. Obamy (2009–2017 gg.)

During the presidency of Barack Obama (2009-2017), official Washington identified priority aspects of Middle East policy: preventing the development of nuclear energy by the Iranian leadership and achieving a final peaceful settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The response to the White House's readiness for diplomatic negotiations with the Iranian side without putting forward preliminary conditions was the unwillingness of the Iranian leaders to participate in the negotiation process on curtailing the development of the national nuclear program. As for the Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement, even here, despite a number of positive steps by the American administration, the parties failed to achieve tangible results at the negotiating table.

Capitalist Lineages of Early Modern Iran

Iran is hardly perceived as a normal country, whether it be by Western commentators and politicians critical of the government, Iranian leaders who impart special distinction to it, or ordinary Iranians protesting against it. This sense of anomaly has become so ingrained that some factions of the Iranian opposition take to social media to express their yearning for a “normal life.” Economic peculiarities form one aspect of Iran's supposed abnormality, and the solution to them is posited as the establishment of a free market economy. Without denying the specificities of contemporary Iran, in this contribution I seek to scrutinize the very norms against which it is compared. I challenge the pathologizing approach that identifies Iran outside of or at the margins of history as a failing or stagnating polity and economy. This approach presupposes that a singular pattern of capitalist modernity is capable of yielding progress and prosperity, and diagnoses developmental shortcomings as the automatic outcome of deviating from a normal path of development.

A Review of Iran's Developmental Challenges in the Contemporary International System: A Non-Iranian Perspective

This research looked at the hurdles to Iran's growth plans in the modern world political economy. The data for this study was gathered from secondary sources such as textbooks, magazine articles, and online sources, and the data was analysed using content analysis. According to this study, Iran has been plagued by violent strife for many years. Furthermore, the mistaken economic policies of earlier Iranian leaders, as well as a reluctance to open the economy to international investors, have contributed to the country's economic stagnation throughout the years. Finally, this study suggests, among other things, that a total shutdown of the Iranian economy in the current global economy will continue to deprive Iran of the myriad economic gains associated with globalisation.
 
 Received: 11 October 2022 / Accepted: 30 December 2022 / Published: 5 January 2023

МЯГКАЯ СИЛА ИРАНА В ИНДИИ

This article analyzes the most important component of the soft power of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Republic of India - the work of the Iranian leadership with the Shiite community of India. Tehran views the Indian Shiites as its allies, sharing not only religious and ideological values, but also capable of promoting its geopolitical priorities and, to a certain extent, influencing the internal political situation in India. The author notes the intensification of Iran’s efforts in this direction since the 2000s. Both New Delhi and Tehran view Iran’s relations with Indian Shiites in the broad context of Iranian-Indian relations. New Delhi, given its partnership with Tehran and seeing Shiites as a possible counterbalance to the Sunni majority associated with Islamabad, does not prevent Iran from developing relations with its co-religionists. Tehran, for its part, is positive about the fact that, in general, the religious rights of Shiites in India are not limited and they are not discriminated against. The author identifies All India Shia Personal Law Board, Anjuman-e Haideri and All India Shia Husaini Fund as the main Shiite organizations in India with which Iran works. The most important conductor of Iranian influence is the Imam Khomeini Memorial Trust, which combines educational and charitable activities with political propaganda. The author believes that in the broad context of the development of relations between Delhi and Tehran, it is in the interests of Delhi to maintain patriotic sentiments among Indian Shiites, while preventing the strengthening of radical sentiments in their communities. For its part, Tehran is interested in further strengthening ties with the Muslim community in India and, above all, with the Shiite minority, which allows Iranian political and business circles to strengthen ties with Shiite business structures and foreign policy institutions.

Iran, China and the Persian Gulf: An unfolding engagement

AbstractSince the ancient Persian empires, Iran has been the key local actor in the Persian Gulf. In the modern era in particular, it has been engaged in periodic struggles for power with the great powers in this region. Therefore, it would be crucial to ask how Iran would evaluate China's increasing engagement in the Persian Gulf, especially its close ties with Iran's archrivals. As history suggests, Iran's relations with great powers in the Persian Gulf, coupled with the dynamics of transition in the international system, may be the most critical factors shaping the Sino–Iranian relations in the Persian Gulf. These two factors shape the emerging Iranian perception of China's presence in the region in three areas. Geostrategically, Iran views China's increasing presence in the Persian Gulf as a new window of opportunity to alleviate its security dilemma. Although Iranian leaders have concerns about military cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia, they trust that China could be a new balancing force against the United States. In the geoeconomic sphere, Iran seeks cooperation with China in two areas to overcome its regional rivals, that is, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates: it wants to become China's number one trading partner in the region and participate as much as possible in China's energy security. Finally, in terms of connectivity and transit, Iranian leaders hope to define their zones of influence in Iraq and Syria as the main route for the Belt and Road Initiative.

Իրանի նկատմամբ Հայաստանի հասարակության վերաբերմունքի փոփոխության դինամիկան 1991-2021թթ․

This article refers to the upheavals in Armenia-Iran relations and their impact on Armenian citizens. The work was made possible thanks to the numerous surveys conducted by two organizations operating in Armenia: the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) and the International Republican Institute (IRI). These surveys and the analyzes in the article clearly show the expectations in Armenian society towards the southern neighbor, as well as the extent of the impact of the failure of these expectations on the people. It is obvious that the public is influenced mainly by information flows. In the 1990s the state media was the main source of the information, and the state used to shape the news according to its policy priorities. Nowadays, due to the development of information technologies, the mushrooming of news media and especially the expansion of social networks, the information is not only impossible to control, but also very often social platforms are used to spread disinformation and cause an incorrect understanding among the public, like it happened during the Armenian-Azerbaijani war. After the 2020 war, the confidence of the Armenian society that Iran would somehow, even out of its own interests, intervene in the existing problems gradually faded. There were few official statements from the high-ranking Iranian leadership in 2021-2022 stating that Iran will not allow any violation of the territorial integrity of Armenia and emphasizing the importance of the Armenia-Iran land border. This development caused some positive dynamics in the attitude of the Armenian public, at least on an emotional level.

America’s Foe on Twitter

This article examines English and Farsi political messages on Twitter from two Iranian leaders, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. During the summer of 2019, Iran’s relations with Western democracies were further strained by Iranian attacks on foreign commercial ships in the Gulf of Oman and on a US surveillance drone. Shortly thereafter, President Trump announced on Twitter that he had ordered an air strike against Iranian targets, only to rescind the order minutes before contact. We explore Iran’s response to Trump and the international crisis that emerged during the spring and summer of 2019. Our article utilizes a content analysis to descriptively account for the politics and political messages that Zarif and Khamenei sought to promote. We also pay particular attention to the content criticizing America and its leadership during this time as we seek to understand Iran’s interest in provoking the United States on social media.

Iranian proxies in the Syrian conflict: Tehran’s ‘forward-defence’ in action

ABSTRACT This article examines Iran’s ‘forward-defence’ strategy, in particular its deployment of proxy forces in the Syrian conflict. Iran’s expanded presence in regional conflicts is regarded by its adversaries as indication of hegemonic intent, while Tehran posits its regional posture as a defensive response to security threats. We argue that Iran’s ‘forward-defence’ strategy offers practical benefits, shaping strategic realities, and performative benefits, allowing Tehran to propagate a discourse of military fortitude. On balance, however, the strategy has fed suspicions of Iran’s intentions and increased hostility towards the Iranian leadership, thus is likely to be counterproductive.

President Biden and Iran: assessing the prospects for returning to the JCPOA

The article analyzes the positions of the United States and Iran in the negotiations on the renewal of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), assesses the most serious differences in the approaches of the parties, and suggests possible changes in the process of dialogue ongoing in Vienna with the participation of all countries that have signed a nuclear agreement with Tehran. Despite many controversial actions and statements coming from senior Iranian leaders, it seems that Tehran was ready for a quick return to the JCPOA, but Washington was unable to resume compliance with the terms of the original agreement. The scientific hypothesis of the author is that what is happening between Iran and the United States is a confrontation between two points of view. The United States ignores the norms of international law and tries to impose its policy in the interests of maintaining its hegemony in the world. Iran believes that the UN-approved JCPOA must be respected by all parties without exception. In the author's opinion, the Biden administration's hopes of reaching a better agreement, with amended provisions on Iran's regional policy and its missile programs, are currently unrealistic and that the window for continued dialogue will not be open for long. Domestic opposition to Biden's policies hinders JCPOA revival.

РЕАКЦИЯ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ СИЛ ИСЛАМСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ ИРАН НА СПЕЦОПЕРАЦИЮ РОССИИ НА УКРАИНЕ

In this paper the authors examine the stance of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the Russian special operaton in Ukraine, drawing on the analysis of the statements made by Ira‑ nian politcians and statesmen, media output and expert artcles. The Islamic Republic was concerned with the militarizaton of Ukraine, the possibility of its entry into NATO and furthering of this bloc towards Iran’s boarders. The country's leadership realized that the confict between Russia and Ukraine will impact the entre system of internatonal relatons. The launch of Russia’s special operaton induced varied reactons across the Iranian politcal and expert spectrum, revealing diferent foreign policy approaches among Iran’s major politcal factons. The official positon of the Iranian leadership could be described as «supportve neutrality». While the confict is blamed on the West, IRI’s top policymakers avoid open support towards Russia, and call for peaceful resoluton of the crisis. Only the members of ultra‑hardline establishment and those affiliated with the IRGC explicitly vindicate Russia’s strategy. The oppositon represented by reformists and centrists condemns Russia’s actons, critcizes Ira‑ nian authorites and calls for diversifcaton of the foreign policy line. In additon, the issue of IRI’s potental capacity to enter the European energy market is addressed. The analysis of the producton and export profle of the hydrocarbons indicates, that even in the event of early removal of the sanctons, Iran will not be able to take Russia’s share in the market.

Development of Syria-Iran Bilateral Relations in the 20-21st Centuries

The article analyzes the evolution of Iranian-Syrian relations and describes their features. Iran and Syria are historically, politically and geographically related states, diplomatic relations between which were established in 1946. However, after the Islamic Revolution, in 1979 and the leadership of A. Khomeini, relations between the countries strengthened and began to develop rapidly. Because Syria was the first Arab country to diplomatically recognize the Islamic Republic of Iran and actively support Iran during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988. It is worth to say that these two countries combine many factors, especially such as common interests and position on current regional issues and the presence of shared enemies. Оfficial Damascus and official Tehran consider themselves as part of the Middle East's "axis of resistance" of the defense alliance, thus responding to joint threats from Israel and the United States. The position and role of Iran in the civil war in Syria are highlighted. In fact, since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Iran has provided political, economic and military support to Assad, and has since become a major player in the Syrian conflict. In the current context, Iranian leaders have described Syrian President Al-Assad as his main ally and are working hard to keep him in power. According to a study published by the Office of the US Special Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura, financial, military and economic assistance to Iran in Syria is estimated at about $ 6 billion USA per year. It is also investigated that Syria fully shares and supports the foreign policy of official Tehran and the active development of nuclear and missile programs. Syria strongly condemns the decision of former US President D. Trump to withdraw from the JCPOA and is in full solidarity with the leadership, government and people of Iran.

Shifting Threats and Strategic Adjustment in Iran’s Foreign Policy: The case of Strait of Hormuz

ABSTRACT Iranian behavior in the Strait of Hormuz (Strat) and the Persian Gulf is Janus-faced, swinging between the embracement of confrontation through calls to close the Strat and a quest for cooperation, which has been exemplified by inviting Arab monarchies to talk. Why is Tehran’s policy in the Strait in such a constant state of flux? Is it just a policy inconsistency or does it signal aspects of the Islamic Republic’s strategic logic instead? Some explanations focus narrowly on ideological motives, hegemonic ambitions, or rogue elements in the IRGC. None of these explanations are satisfactory, however. This paper argues that the Islamic Republic is a reactive actor to threats with a penetrative foreign policy. The dominant role of its leadership’s threat perception has resulted in the use of the power resources in a constant strategic adjustment with shifting threats. These adjustments follow a trade-off between leadership’s confidence in capabilities and wariness of constraints. Such a dynamic explains important shifts in Iranian foreign policy. This article deconstructs Iran’s power strategies and constraints in the Strait as a case study. It shows that while the Islamic Republic’s principal policy in the Strait in a non-existential threat environment favors maintaining the security of the waterway, Iranian leaders leave behind constraint-driven conservatism when existential threats emerge by incorporating the Strait into their deterrence or loss-aversive brinkmanship strategy. Flexible adjustments are perceived in Tehran as an essential tool to guarantee the regime’s survival.

Have International Sanctions Impacted Iran’s Environment?

Economic sanctions have been actively used against Iran in the last four decades. In response to sanctions, Iran has adopted a range of survivalist policies with notable environmental implications. This study provides the first extensive overview of the unintended environmental impacts of international economic sanctions on Iran. It is argued that while sanctions are certainly not the root cause of Iran’s major environmental problems, they have had an undeniable impact on Iran’s environment by: (1) restricting its access to technology, service, and know-how; (2) blocking international environmental aid; and (3) increasing the natural resource-intensity of its economy. Sanctions have effectively limited Iran’s economic growth and its ability to decouple its economy from natural resources, thereby growing the role of natural resources in Iran’s political economy. Overall, sanctions have made economic production much costlier to its environment, which is not currently considered a priority in the policy agenda of the Iranian leaders who manage the country in survival mode while aggressively pursuing their ideology. The study calls for increased attention to the overlooked environmental impacts of sanctions on Iran with major health, justice, and human rights implications that could be transgenerational and transboundary.

IRAN-SYRIA: FACTORS OF COOPERATION AND RAPPROCHEMENT

The article is about Iran-Syria relations. Bilateral ties between these countries were not friendly under Shah Reza Pahlavi (1919-1980), despite a thaw in relations in the 1970s. Having lost the U.S. support, Iran needed allies immediately after the Islamic revolution (1978-1979), which led to a rapprochement with Syria. The Iranian leadership also shared the Syrian point of view regarding Israel. All these factors have encouraged the bilateral ties strengthening. Iran has supported Bashar al-Assad's regime, providing Syria with both financial and military assistance since the beginning of the Syrian crisis (2011).

The Iranian-American competition in Iraq: the political defeat of the United States

The article gives an assessment of Iran's policy in neighboring Iraq during the years of the American occupation. The author's scientific hypothesis is that after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran, and not America, became the real beneficiary of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. The Iranian leadership, interested in changing the Baathist regime in Baghdad, having received such a strategic gift, did everything to use the US military presence to its advantage. The purpose of this study is to analyze the strategy of expanding Iran's influence in Iraq and its impact on US policy. The article shows that the nature of Iran's influence in Iraq included all the elements of state power: diplomatic, informational, military and economic. It is concluded that Tehran managed to take advantage of the democratic reforms in Iraq, which were carried out under the control of Washington. Iran used its Shiite henchmen, which gave it a political advantage over the United States, which did not have such influential allied forces in Iraq. Despite the disparate balance of military forces with America, Iran managed to avoid the risk of war with the United States and move on to achieving its long-term goals in Iraq. In the future, Tehran plans to achieve the rejection of Baghdad from constructive relations with Washington.

ИРАН И ПАЛЕСТИНСКАЯ ПРОБЛЕМА

The authors describe the relations between Iran and the Palestinian movement since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Israel always accused Iran of funding Palestinian terror. But though Israel accused Iran of its support for Palestinian nationalist groups the iranian leaders themselves blamed Yasser Arafat for Oslo talks with Israel. After Oslo Tehran provided with money and weapons only HAMAS and Islamic Jihad.

Iran's Geopolitics and Revolutionary Export: The Promises and Limits of the Proxy Empire

From its inception in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has functioned as a traditional state and an exporter of the Islamist revolution, a formula promulgated by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Creating the revolutionary export narrative and calling on Shia Muslims to dominate the Middle East was one thing. Implementing this policy was another, as the regime—hobbled by a weak economy and a devastating war with Iraq—had few resources to spread its influence and take on its enemies. With traditional warfare out of the equation, Iranian leaders decided to mobilize the Shiite minorities to create the Axis of Resistance using tactics that later become known as fourth-generation warfare (4GW). Iran, still subject to overwhelming sanctions led by the United States and facing better armed opponents in Israel and Saudi Arabia, has intensified its proxy warfare in the twenty-first century.