The Goldilocks question in corporate governance is whether investors do too much, too little, or just the right amount. But which investors, and too much or too little of what? To date, the question has applied to investor stewardship, by investment managers. But the focus of scholars and policy makers should be elsewhere, on the activity of investors in the aggregate, and on what this Article terms "investor initiation of corporate change." The appropriate Goldilocks question for scholars and policymakers is thus, whether there is too little, too much, or just the right amount of initiation of corporate change, by all investors. The greater clarity of these concepts not only has important implications for the debate regarding investor stewardship, but also permits a refinement of the two central debates in corporate governance over the last thirty years, regarding the appropriate levels of shareholder power and shareholder activism. The Article puts forward a conceptual framework for answering the Goldilocks question. Investor initiation is a substitute for initiation by directors and executives, so the Goldilocks question depends on "managerial completeness"—whether directors and executives initiate all (and only) value-increasing corporate changes. The Goldilocks question also depends on investors’ incentives to initiate corporate changes. The Article develops an economic theory of these incentives, which it applies to show the premises on which each of the possible answers to the Goldilocks question depend, as well as the main positions in debates over shareholder power and shareholder activism. Assessing these premises allows for an evaluation of the validity or plausibility of each answer, and of the major positions in the debates regarding shareholder power and shareholder activism. It is possible that the current level of investor initiation is "just right." But if it is not then over-initiation or under-initiation by investors represent important problems for policymakers to address. The Article shows how the solutions to these problems follow closely from the Article’s analytical framework, and how those solutions improve on others that have been proposed.