I all came together on a Friday morning in midApril 1959. Just the two of us, in a conference room at Planning Research Corporation in Westwood, CA. The paper was a direct result of this meeting. At the time, we did not think much about what impact the paper would have on future work in this area, but we are pleased and honored that it has been selected as one of the influential papers published in the 50-year history of Management Science. I had been at Planning Research Corporation for just a short time after being in the Logistics Department at the RAND Corporation for five years. During my first couple of years at RAND, I helped in the design and implementation of inventory control procedures based on the Wilson lot size formula and a variable safety level concept to allow for demand uncertainty and differences in unit prices, factors not considered in the stock policies then current in the Air Force. However, I became generally disturbed that each facility (Air Force bases and a depot) was being considered independently, ignoring the fact that they were intimately connected in the real world. In particular, supply performance at the bases was being significantly degraded by lack of proper support from the depot. So, I decided to attack this multiechelon problem from an analytic point of view based on the classical AHM (Arrow-Harris-Marschak) model, particularly in order to accommodate time-dependent factors resulting from the phase-in and phase-out of weapon systems. Starting with the most simplifying assumptions and a single-user activity supported by one higher-level facility (depot), I was able to formulate a procedure by which levels at the user facility could be determined by the AHM model, results of which were then used as inputs to a similar calculation at the depot level. With this basic approach, I was able to then consider nonzero resupply time due to the work of Karlin and Scarf and fixed reorder costs at the depot due to the work of Scarf. Also, the approach was easily