Intuitive Responses Research Articles

Feeling we’re biased: Autonomic arousal and reasoning conflict

Human reasoning is often biased by intuitive beliefs. A key question is whether the bias results from a failure to detect that the intuitions conflict with logical considerations or from a failure to discard these tempting intuitions. The present study addressed this unresolved debate by focusing on conflict-related autonomic nervous system modulation during biased reasoning. Participants' skin conductance responses (SCRs) were monitored while they solved classic syllogisms in which a cued intuitive response could be inconsistent or consistent with the logical correct response. Results indicated that all reasoners showed increased SCRs when solving the inconsistent conflict problems. Experiment 2 validated that this autonomic arousal boost was absent when people were not engaged in an active reasoning task. The presence of a clear autonomic conflict response during reasoning lends credence to the idea that reasoners have a "gut" feeling that signals that their intuitive response is not logically warranted. Supplemental materials for this article may be downloaded from http://cabn.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.

Intuitions, emotions and gut reactions in decisions about risks: towards a different interpretation of ‘neuroethics’

Empirical research by Jonathan Haidt and Joshua Greene seems to support the idea that in moral decision‐making under uncertainty, people follow their initial intuitions and ‘gut feelings’. Rational judgements are at most rationalizations or afterthoughts in our judgements about risks. This paper will challenge the theoretical assumptions made by Greene and Haidt, by proposing a different theory of ethical intuitions and emotions. Ethical intuitions and emotions should not be conflated with spontaneous ‘gut reactions’. Rather, ethical intuitions and emotions can be the source and the result of ethical reflection and deliberation. This allows for different interpretations of the empirical findings of Haidt and Greene and of psychologists who study emotional responses to risks, such as Paul Slovic and George Loewenstein. Emotional and intuitive responses to risk should not be seen as heuristics that are prone to be biases; rather, they should be seen as invaluable sources of insight when it comes to judging the moral acceptability of risks.

Is there a Real Nexus Between Ethics and Aesthetics?

Aesthetics is a vexed topic in philosophy, with a long history. For my purposes, an aesthetic experience is a foundational affective response to an object, to which terms such as “ugly”, “beautiful”, “pretty” or “harmonious” are applied. These terms are derived from a Discourse of aesthetics; some remain constant, others change from generation to generation. Aesthetics and ethics have been linked in Western thought since the days of Plato and Aristotle. This essay examines what is happening to that link in contemporary experience. It emphasises the ways in which the popular media exploit aesthetic appeal to penetrate their market, and to exploit and frame intuitive responses to current and past events. Production values, the artfulness of editors and the financial interests of producers and directors thus do much to determine contemporary aesthetic and ethical judgements. That which is beautifully presented invites the ethical involvement of the audience. Events whose images are beautifully presented constitute “hyperevidence”, a pre-judged, reinforced and amplified illusion of reality and participation. Understanding how aesthetic excellence draws audiences into ethical relationship with what is presented becomes an important part of education in ethics, including bioethics.

Intuitive reasoning in science and mathematics education: from the classroom to cognitive neuroscience and back

Event Abstract Back to Event Intuitive reasoning in science and mathematics education: from the classroom to cognitive neuroscience and back Reuven Babai1* and Ruth Stavy1 1 Tel Aviv University, Department of Science Education, Constantiner School of Education, Israel Our goal is to unveil the reasoning processes associated with overcoming intuitive interference in science and mathematics education. For this purpose we employ cognitive neuroscience techniques. We show that this research direction results in better understanding of students' difficulties and to improved teaching strategies. We focused on the comparison-of-perimeters task known to elicit incorrect intuitive responses. We measured accuracy, reaction time, and neural correlates (by fMRI) while participants compared the perimeters of geometrical shapes in two conditions: 1) congruent, in which correct response is in line with the intuitive reasoning (larger area–larger perimeter) and 2) incongruent, in which the correct answer is counterintuitive. In the incongruent condition accuracy dropped and reaction time for correct responses was longer than in the congruent condition. The congruent condition activated bilateral parietal brain areas, known to be involved in comparison of quantities, while correctly answering the incongruent condition activated bilateral prefrontal areas known for their executive control over other brain regions. These findings suggested the importance of control mechanisms in overcoming the intuitive interference and served as a basis for designing a successful classroom intervention. Recently we applied the prime-probe paradigm to study the effect of preactivation of inhibitory control mechanisms. The findings showed that when congruent trials followed incongruent prime, an increase in response time was observed as compared with congruent trials that followed congruent ones, and vice versa. In addition, when congruent trials followed incongruent prime, not only did response time increase, but accuracy significantly dropped as well. These findings further support the importance of inhibitory control mechanisms in overcoming intuitive interference. Our work argues that applying cognitive neuroscience techniques in science and mathematics education research could lead to a deeper understanding of students’ reasoning processes and to the development and evaluation of teaching strategies that would improve education. Conference: EARLI SIG22 - Neuroscience and Education, Zurich, Switzerland, 3 Jun - 5 Jun, 2010. Presentation Type: Poster Presentation Topic: Arithmetic and higher-order mathematics Citation: Babai R and Stavy R (2010). Intuitive reasoning in science and mathematics education: from the classroom to cognitive neuroscience and back. Front. Neurosci. Conference Abstract: EARLI SIG22 - Neuroscience and Education. doi: 10.3389/conf.fnins.2010.11.00007 Copyright: The abstracts in this collection have not been subject to any Frontiers peer review or checks, and are not endorsed by Frontiers. They are made available through the Frontiers publishing platform as a service to conference organizers and presenters. The copyright in the individual abstracts is owned by the author of each abstract or his/her employer unless otherwise stated. Each abstract, as well as the collection of abstracts, are published under a Creative Commons CC-BY 4.0 (attribution) licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) and may thus be reproduced, translated, adapted and be the subject of derivative works provided the authors and Frontiers are attributed. For Frontiers’ terms and conditions please see https://www.frontiersin.org/legal/terms-and-conditions. Received: 26 May 2010; Published Online: 26 May 2010. * Correspondence: Reuven Babai, Tel Aviv University, Department of Science Education, Constantiner School of Education, Tel Aviv, Israel, reuvenb@post.tau.ac.il Login Required This action requires you to be registered with Frontiers and logged in. To register or login click here. Abstract Info Abstract The Authors in Frontiers Reuven Babai Ruth Stavy Google Reuven Babai Ruth Stavy Google Scholar Reuven Babai Ruth Stavy PubMed Reuven Babai Ruth Stavy Related Article in Frontiers Google Scholar PubMed Abstract Close Back to top Javascript is disabled. Please enable Javascript in your browser settings in order to see all the content on this page.

Solutions to the Asset Allocation Problem by Informed Respondents: The Significance of the Size‐of‐Bet and the 1/N Heuristic

AbstractAsset allocation is a classic topic in the theory of finance and a crucial issue for investment policy. Noted for its significance in driving pension fund performance, it is also an issue that individual investors consider when designing their investment portfolios. In theory, Markowitz and those following in his wake have an optimal solution. In practice, however, we show that when asked to allocate their own money to a set of asset classes (from relatively low risk to high risk) in an experimental situation, most of our informed respondents would vary their investment strategies according to the size‐of‐bet (the money value of assets to be invested). We also show that most participants in the study adopted one of three solutions to the posed problem only one of which could be thought consistent with Benartzi and Thaler's 1/n heuristic. Since respondent solutions do not seem to be explained by formal education, professional qualifications, or training, it is suggested that solutions to the asset allocation problem are a product of strategies that mix intuitive responses to the initial tranche of money with theoretical cum practical shared conventions. Solutions to the asset allocation puzzle suggest that the size‐of‐bet could be a significant consideration for many informed investors. In conclusion, suggestions are made about taking forward closer scrutiny of these experimental results.

WORLD RECESSION: WHAT WENT WRONG?

This paper starts by framing the issue of how seemingly intuitive responses to the distress suffered during recession can not only be ineffective but also can harm long‐term growth. It then goes on to discuss the most long‐lived of explanations of cyclical instability, the explanation based on swings in the psychology of financial markets. Such explanations offer no framework for thinking about the price system and the role of the interest rate. Based on a discussion of the role of the interest rate in smoothing cyclical fluctuations, the paper offers a critique of current policy.

Nurses' Decisions, Irreducible Uncertainty and Maximizing Nurses' Contribution to Patient Safety

Nurses, like all healthcare professionals, use reasoning and judgment to make decisions. In doing so, they must grapple with irreducible clinical uncertainty. But, in managing uncertainty, the modes of reasoning used should encourage more good than harm. However, the nursing profession considers intuitive reasoning as a mark of the expert. Consequently, nurses are predominantly taught to handle uncertainty intuitively. Information-seeking behaviour is rare. This is problematic for two reasons: (1) intuitive decision-making is prone to reasoning biases and (2) mechanisms to judge nurses' decision-making rarely use intuitive responses themselves as the basis for scrutiny. In addition, when we evaluate nurses' decision-making in the context of problems such as time pressure, a less-than-optimistic picture emerges. However, this type of examination is a necessary first step in maximizing the contribution of nurses to patient safety.

Perceptions of Fairness in Consumer Insurance Contracts

Insurance Contracts often contain provisions calling upon the insured to maintain a certain pattern of behavior or state of affairs failing which cover will cease automatically. When used responsibly these provisions (in English and New Zealand law referred to as “warranties”) have public policy benefits strongly advocated by economists for their use as a tool to classify risk and also as a means of encouraging risk decreasing behavior and the converse. But in some jurisdictions there are legal sanctions against the use of these tools in cases where the actual loss to the individual insured was not in the event caused by non-compliance with the provision. The justification for this intervention is that the legal results where there is no causal link are “wrong and unjust”, unfair, “Draconian” or contrary to the “reasonable expectations” of the policyholders. This survey seeks to test the intuitive response by the law reformers as there appears never to have been any empirical work done on the perceptions of consumers in this area. Findings indicate a need for further empirical research as this first pilot study suggests that, provided insured parties are made aware of the existence of the warranties and the results where they are not complied with, they do not perceive the legal consequences as unfair. This is especially true where they are given an option to have or not to have the warranty in their contract and their premium will be lower if they do.

THE FALLACY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PROCREATIVE BENEFICENCE

The claim that we have a moral obligation, where a choice can be made, to bring to birth the 'best' child possible, has been highly controversial for a number of decades. More recently Savulescu has labelled this claim the Principle of Procreative Beneficence. It has been argued that this Principle is problematic in both its reasoning and its implications, most notably in that it places lower moral value on the disabled. Relentless criticism of this proposed moral obligation, however, has been unable, thus far, to discredit this Principle convincingly and as a result its influence shows no sign of abating. I will argue that while criticisms of the implications and detail of the reasoning behind it are well founded, they are unlikely to produce an argument that will ultimately discredit the obligation that the Principle of Procreative Beneficence represents. I believe that what is needed finally and convincingly to reveal the fallacy of this Principle is a critique of its ultimate theoretical foundation, the notion of impersonal harm. In this paper I argue that while the notion of impersonal harm is intuitively very appealing, its plausibility is based entirely on this intuitive appeal and not on sound moral reasoning. I show that there is another plausible explanation for our intuitive response and I believe that this, in conjunction with the other theoretical criticisms that I and others have levelled at this Principle, shows that the Principle of Procreative Beneficence should be rejected.

Pure reactive behavior learning using Case Based Reasoning for a vision based 4-legged robot

A traditional problem in robotics is adaptation of developed algorithms to different platforms and sensors, as each of them has its specifics and associated errors. Hierarchical control architectures deal with the problem through division of the system into layers, where deliberative processing is performed at high level and low level layers are in charge of dealing with reactive behaviors and adaptation to platform and sensor hardware. Specifically, approaches based on the Emergent Behavior Theory rely on building high level behaviors by combining simpler ones that provide intuitive reactive responses to sensory instance. This combination is controlled by higher layers in order to obtain more complex behaviors. Unfortunately, low level behaviors might be difficult to develop, specially when dealing with legged robots and sensors like video cameras, where resulting motion is heavily influenced by the robot kinematics and dynamics and sensory input is affected by external conditions, transformations, distortions, noise and motion itself (e.g. the camera bouncing problem). In this paper, we propose a new learning based method to solve most of these problems. It basically consists of creating a reactive behavior by supervisedly driving a robot for a time. During that time, its visual input is reactively associated to commands sent to the robot through a Case Based Reasoning (CBR) behavior builder. Thus, the robot learns what the person would do in its situation to achieve a certain goal. This approach has two advantages. First, humans are particularly good at adapting and taking into account the specifics of a given mobile after some use. Thus, kinematics and dynamics are absorbed into the casebase along with how the person thinks they should be dealt with by that particular robot. Similarly, commands are associated to the input sensor as is, so systematic errors in sensors and motors are also implicitly learnt in the casebase (camera bouncing, distorsions, noise …). Also, different reactive strategies to reach a simple goal can be programmed into the robot by showing, rather than by coding. This is particularly useful because some reactive behaviors are ill-fitted to equations. Naturally, CBR allows online adaptation to potential changes after supervised training, so the system is able to learn by itself when working autonomously too. The proposed system has been successfully tested in a 4-legged Aibo robot in a controlled environment. To prove that it is adequate to create low level layers for hybrid architectures, two different CBR reactive behaviors have been tested and combined into an emergent one. A deliberative layer could be used to extent the system to more complex environments.

Natural ventilation in practice: linking facade design, thermal performance, occupant perception and control

The action of opening a window is the most intuitive and simple response to controlling overheating in a room. However, it relies on the vagaries of occupant interaction to exploit the passive design potential and achieve comfortable results. An understanding of occupant behaviour is thus of significance in the design and evaluation of naturally ventilated buildings. This paper demonstrates the link between facade design, thermal performance, occupant perception, and window use in naturally ventilated offices in summer, based on a pilot study monitoring offices in Cambridge, UK. Survey results indicate that facade design has a large impact on the occupants' perceived control over and satisfaction with their environments. The research reveals that there is a close connection between perceived control and actual control (with respect to window use), and that occupants with a high level of perceived control more frequently use their windows than others with a low level of perceived control. Positive feedback loops between occupant action and effect reinforce appropriate behaviour and the paper shows that it is possible to derive statistically significant behavioural models to predict window use for different facade conditions. L'action d'ouvrir une fenêtre est la réponse la plus intuitive et la plus simple au problème du contrôle de la surchauffe d'une pièce. Néanmoins, elle est soumise aux caprices des interactions des occupants pour que soit exploité le potentiel de la conception passive et qu'il en résulte une température agréable. Comprendre le comportement des occupants n'est donc pas sans importance pour la conception et l'évaluation des bâtiments à ventilation naturelle. Cet article démontre le lien existant entre la conception des façades, les performances thermiques, la perception des occupants et l'utilisation des fenêtres dans les bureaux à ventilation naturelle en été, sur la base d'une étude pilote de suivi de bureaux à Cambridge, au Royaume-Uni. Les résultats de cette enquête indiquent que la conception des façades a une incidence importante sur le contrôle perçu de leur environnement par les occupants et sur leur satisfaction à l'égard de ce dernier. L'étude révèle qu'il existe un lien étroit entre contrôle perçu et contrôle réel (par rapport à l'utilisation des fenêtres) et que les occupants qui ont un niveau élevé de contrôle perçu utilisent plus fréquemment leurs fenêtres que ceux qui ont un faible niveau de contrôle perçu. Les boucles de feedback positif entre les actions des occupants et leurs effets renforcent le comportement adapté et l'article montre qu'il est possible d'en retirer des modèles comportementaux statistiquement significatifs permettant de prédire l'utilisation des fenêtres en fonction de l'état des façades. Mots clés: comportement adaptatif, performances des bâtiments, conception des façades, ventilation naturelle, ventilation nocturne, comportement des occupants, perception des occupants, contrôle des fenêtres, Royaume-Uni

Evidence-Based Neonatal Bereavement Care

Neonatal intensive care encompasses not only the care of the acutely ill infant but also bereavement care for the parents and their families. Until now, bereavement care has been an intuitive response to a perceived need mainly based on Western cultural influences. Neonatal bereavement care encompasses the care given to infants and their parents from the time withdrawal of life support is considered until the parents have worked through their grief after the infant's death. This article explores research studies done in the past 10 years on neonatal bereavement care around the world. Only articles written in English were considered. Evidence-based care is supported by qualitative, descriptive studies of parents', physicians', and nurses' perceptions. The literature emphasizes the importance of communication, compassion, and trusting relationships, along with a good understanding of grief and bereavement issues. Follow-up care after the death is very important. Grief for multiple-birth losses is particularly complex. Little attention is given in the literature to the suitability of Euro-American bereavement practices for ethnic populations. More research is needed on the many aspects of neonatal bereavement care.

Embodied design: constructing means for constructing meaning

Design-based research studies are conducted as iterative implementation- analysis-modification cycles, in which emerging theoretical models and pedagogically plausible activities are reciprocally tuned toward each other as a means of investigating conjectures pertaining to mechanisms underlying content teaching and learning. Yet this approach, even when resulting in empirically effective educational products, remains under- conceptualized as long as researchers cannot be explicit about their craft and specifically how data analyses inform design decisions. Consequentially, design decisions may appear arbitrary, design methodology is insufficiently documented for broad dissemination, and design practice is inadequately conversant with learning-sciences perspectives. One reason for this apparent under-theorizing, I propose, is that designers do not have appropriate constructs to formulate and reflect on their own intuitive responses to students' observed interactions with the media under development. Recent socio-cultural explication of epistemic artifacts as semiotic means for mathematical learners to objectify presymbolic notions (e.g., Radford, Mathematical Thinking and Learning 5(1): 37-70, 2003) may offer design-based researchers intellectual perspectives and analytic tools for theorizing design improvements as responses to participants' compromised attempts to build and communi- cate meaning with available media. By explaining these media as potential semiotic means for students to objectify their emerging understandings of mathematical ideas, designers, reciprocally, create semiotic means to objectify their own intuitive design decisions, as they build and improve these media. Examining three case studies of undergraduate students reasoning about a simple probability situation (binomial), I demonstrate how the semiotic approach illuminates the process and content of student reasoning and, so doing, explicates and possibly enhances design-based research methodology.

The ethics of Google Earth: Crossing thresholds from spatial data to landscape visualisation

‘Virtual globe’ software systems such as Google Earth are growing rapidly in popularity as a way to visualise and share 3D environmental data. Scientists and environmental professionals, many of whom are new to 3D modeling and visual communications, are beginning routinely to use such techniques in their work. While the appeal of these techniques is evident, with unprecedented opportunities for public access to data and collaborative engagement over the web, are there nonetheless risks in their widespread usage when applied in areas of the public interest such as planning and policy-making? This paper argues that the Google Earth phenomenon, which features realistic imagery of places, cannot be dealt with only as a question of spatial data and geographic information science. The virtual globe type of visualisation crosses several key thresholds in communicating scientific and environmental information, taking it well beyond the realm of conventional spatial data and geographic information science, and engaging more complex dimensions of human perception and aesthetic preference. The realism, perspective views, and social meanings of the landscape visualisations embedded in virtual globes invoke not only cognition but also emotional and intuitive responses, with associated issues of uncertainty, credibility, and bias in interpreting the imagery. This paper considers the types of risks as well as benefits that may exist with participatory uses of virtual globes by experts and lay-people. It is illustrated with early examples from practice and relevant themes from the literature in landscape visualisation and related disciplines such as environmental psychology and landscape planning. Existing frameworks and principles for the appropriate use of environmental visualisation methods are applied to the special case of widely accessible, realistic 3D and 4D visualisation systems such as Google Earth, in the context of public awareness-building and agency decision-making on environmental issues. Relevant principles are suggested which lend themselves to much-needed evaluation of risks and benefits of virtual globe systems. Possible approaches for balancing these benefits and risks include codes of ethics, software design, and metadata templates.

Statistical Evidence and Individual Litigants

Humpty, an enthusiastic football fan, is sued for gate-crashing a local football match. He was seen by Alice sneaking through the fence. Alice's visual identification ability is tested and shown to be accurate in nine times out of ten. This case seems straightforward and finding Humpty liable seems intuitively right. In another football match, Hatter, another enthusiastic football fan, is also sued for gate-crashing. This time, the only evidence available is that just one hundred tickets had been sold whilst yet a thousand spectators were counted. Hatter being sued for gate-crashing is based on the fact that nine out of ten spectators gate-crashed. Surprisingly, this case is relatively straightforward too: finding Hatter liable based on this statistical evidence seems intuitively wrong. It is surprising because in both cases, at least prima facie, the risk of error is similar. In both cases, there is a one in ten chance that finding liability would be mistaken. A common intuitive response to the gate-crasher paradox is that the statistical evidence does not prove anything about the particular individual. Whilst this explanation may have an intuitive appeal, it merely serves as a starting point because it immediately begs the question as to why the statistical evidence fails. Fortunately, some writers have tried to develop this intuition into a more detailed and elucidated account. In particular, Zuckerman has argued that imposing liability based on such statistical evidence is a form of corporate liability, which contradicts the commitment of the legal system to an individualised justice. Wasserman, on the other hand, has suggested that using statistical evidence fails to respect the individuality and autonomy of the litigant because it treats the individual as a predetermined mechanism rather than an autonomous individual who is capable of determining his own conduct. Whilst each account suggests a slightly different answer, both put the individual at the centre of their explanations (either through the individualised justice or the individual's autonomy). This paper critically examines whether these individuality accounts could serve as an explanation for this paradox and a justification for restricting the usage of statistical evidence in some circumstances. I will argue that, whilst the individuality accounts have promising potential to provide such explanation and justification, they also suffer from several substantial deficiencies that need to be overcome before this potential is realised. This paper therefore lays the requirements and perhaps the foundations for a comprehensive answer.

Smarter Than We Think

Human reasoning is often biased by stereotypical intuitions. The nature of such bias is not clear. Some authors claim that people are mere heuristic thinkers and are not aware that cued stereotypes might be inappropriate. Other authors claim that people always detect the conflict between their stereotypical thinking and normative reasoning, but simply fail to inhibit stereotypical thinking. Hence, it is unclear whether heuristic bias should be attributed to a lack of conflict detection or a failure of inhibition. We introduce a neuroscientific approach that bears on this issue. Participants answered a classic decision-making problem (the "lawyer-engineer" problem) while the activation of brain regions believed to be involved in conflict detection (anterior cingulate) and response inhibition (lateral prefrontal cortex) was monitored. Results showed that although the inhibition area was specifically activated when stereotypical responses were avoided, the conflict-detection area was activated even when people reasoned stereotypically. The findings suggest that people detect their bias when they give intuitive responses.

Crossing habitat boundaries: coupling dynamics of ecosystems through complex life cycles

Ecosystems are often indirectly connected through consumers with complex life cycles (CLC), in which different life stages inhabit different ecosystems. Using a structured consumer resource model that accounts for the independent effects of two resources on consumer growth and reproductive rates, we show that such indirect connections between ecosystems can result in alternative stable states characterized by adult-dominated and juvenile-dominated consumer populations. As a consequence, gradual changes in ecosystem productivity or mortality rates of the consumer can lead to dramatic and abrupt regime shifts across different ecosystems, hysteresis and counterintuitive changes in the consumer abundances. Whether these counter intuitive or abrupt responses occur depend on the relative productivity of both habitats and which consumer life-stage inhabits the manipulated ecosystem. These results demonstrate the strong yet complex interactions between ecosystems coupled through consumers with CLC and the need to think across ecosystems to reliably predict the consequences of natural or anthropogenic changes.

Moral judgment purposivism: saving internalism from amoralism

Consider orthodox motivational judgment internalism: necessarily, A’s sincere moral judgment that he or she ought to φ motivates A to φ. Such principles fail because they cannot accommodate the amoralist, or one who renders moral judgments without any corresponding motivation. The orthodox alternative, externalism, posits only contingent relations between moral judgment and motivation. In response I first revive conceptual internalism by offering some modifications on the amoralist case to show that certain community-wide motivational failures are not conceptually possible. Second, I introduce a theory of moral motivation that supplements the intuitive responses to different amoralist cases. According to moral judgment purposivism (MJP), in rough approximation, a purpose of moral judgments is to motivate corresponding behaviors such that a mental state without this purpose is not a moral judgment. MJP is consistent with conceptual desiderata, provides an illuminating analysis of amoralist cases, and offers a step forward in the internalist-externalist debates.

Abstract of "Intuitive Responses and Reasoned Arguments: Regurgitating the Yuck Factor"

Abstract of "Intuitive Responses and Reasoned Arguments: Regurgitating the Yuck Factor"

An environmental weed risk assessment model for Australian forage improvement programs

Many plant species with agronomic potential have been introduced for livestock forage and have subsequently become weeds of natural ecosystems, or ‘environmental weeds’. Stringent border quarantine procedures introduced by Australia in 1997 ensure few high weed risk species are now imported into the country; however, there are no protocols for assessing and managing weed risk in use on a national scale ‘post-border’ (i.e. once a plant species is in the country). Environmental weed risk management in forage improvement programs aims to minimise the risk that new species and cultivar introductions will be invasive in natural ecosystems. We describe an environmental weed risk assessment (EWRA) model specifically aimed at assessing the weed potential of exotic and native forage species. The EWRA model predicts and ranks species for weed risk by assessing invasiveness, impacts and potential distribution. Assessments are based on published evidence, experimental observations and intuitive responses from experienced pasture researchers, in collaboration with weed experts. This model specifically addresses the need for environmental weed risk management in forage improvement programs.