Intuitionistic Formulas Research Articles

Fixed-point Elimination in the Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus

It follows from known results in the literature that least and greatest fixed-points of monotone polynomials on Heyting algebras—that is, the algebraic models of the Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus—always exist, even when these algebras are not complete as lattices. The reason is that these extremal fixed-points are definable by formulas of the IPC . Consequently, the μ-calculus based on intuitionistic logic is trivial, every μ-formula being equivalent to a fixed-point free formula. In the first part of this article, we give an axiomatization of least and greatest fixed-points of formulas, and an algorithm to compute a fixed-point free formula equivalent to a given μ-formula. The axiomatization of the greatest fixed-point is simple. The axiomatization of the least fixed-point is more complex, in particular every monotone formula converges to its least fixed-point by Kleene’s iteration in a finite number of steps, but there is no uniform upper bound on the number of iterations. The axiomatization yields a decision procedure for the μ-calculus based on propositional intuitionistic logic. The second part of the article deals with closure ordinals of monotone polynomials on Heyting algebras and of intuitionistic monotone formulas; these are the least numbers of iterations needed for a polynomial/formula to converge to its least fixed-point. Mirroring the elimination procedure, we show how to compute upper bounds for closure ordinals of arbitrary intuitionistic formulas. For some classes of formulas, we provide tighter upper bounds that, in some cases, we prove exact.

An intuitionistic formula hierarchy based on high‐school identities

AbstractWe revisit the notion of intuitionistic equivalence and formal proof representations by adopting the view of formulas as exponential polynomials. After observing that most of the invertible proof rules of intuitionistic (minimal) propositional sequent calculi are formula (i.e., sequent) isomorphisms corresponding to the high‐school identities, we show that one can obtain a more compact variant of a proof system, consisting of non‐invertible proof rules only, and where the invertible proof rules have been replaced by a formula normalization procedure. Moreover, for certain proof systems such as the G4ip sequent calculus of Vorob'ev, Hudelmaier, and Dyckhoff, it is even possible to see all of the non‐invertible proof rules as strict inequalities between exponential polynomials; a careful combinatorial treatment is given in order to establish this fact. Finally, we extend the exponential polynomial analogy to the first‐order quantifiers, showing that it gives rise to an intuitionistic hierarchy of formulas, resembling the classical arithmetical hierarchy, and the first one that classifies formulas while preserving isomorphism.

Syntactic Preservation Theorems for Intuitionistic Predicate Logic

We define notions of homomorphism, submodel, and sandwich of Kripke models, and we define two syntactic operators analogous to universal and existential closure. Then we prove an intuitionistic analogue of the generalized (dual of the) Lyndon-Łoś-Tarski Theorem, which characterizes the sentences preserved under inverse images of homomorphisms of Kripke models, an intuitionistic analogue of the generalized Łoś-Tarski Theorem, which characterizes the sentences preserved under submodels of Kripke models, and an intuitionistic analogue of the generalized Keisler Sandwich Theorem, which characterizes the sentences preserved under sandwiches of Kripke models. We also define several intuitionistic formula hierarchies analogous to the classical formula hierarchies ∀ n ( = Π n 0 ) and ∃ n ( = Σ n 0 ) , and we show how our generalized syntactic preservation theorems specialize to these hierarchies. Each of these theorems implies the corresponding classical theorem in the case where the Kripke models force classical logic.

A constructive semantics for non‐deducibility

AbstractThis paper provides a constructive topological semantics for non‐deducibility of a first order intuitionistic formula. Formal topology theory, in particular the recently introduced notion of a binary positivity predicate, and co‐induction are two needful tools. (© 2008 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim)

A polynomial translation of S4 into intuitionistic logic

It is known that both S4 and the Intuitionistic prepositional calculus Int are P-SPACE complete. This guarantees that there is a polynomial translation from each system into the other.However, no sound and faithful polynomial translation from S4 into Int is commonly known. The problem of finding one was suggested by Dana Scott during a very informal gathering of logicians in February 2005 at UCLA. Grigori Mints then brought it to my attention, and in this paper I present a solution. It is based on Kripke semantics and describes model-checking for S4 using formulas of Int.A simple translation from Int into S4, the Gödel-Tarski translation, is wellknown; given a formula φ of Int, one obtains by prefixing □ to every subformula. For example,.That the translation is sound and faithful can be seen by considering topological semantics, which assign open sets both to □-formulas of S4 and arbitrary formulas of Int; the interpretation of φ and turn out to be identical. See Tarski's paper [6] for details. Gödel's original paper can be found in [3].In [2], Friedman and Flagg present a kind of inverse to Gödel-Tarski. Given a formula φ of S4 and a finite set of formulas Γ of Int, for each ε ∈ Γ one gets an intuitionistic formula given recursively by

An undecidable problem in correspondence theory

In this paper we prove undecidability of first-order definability of propositional formulas. The main result is proved for intuitionistic formulas, but it remains valid for other kinds of propositional formulas by analogous arguments or with the help of various translations.For general background on correspondence theory the reader is referred to van Benthem [1], [2] (see [3] for a survey of recent results).The method for the proofs of undecidability in this paper will be to simulate calculations of a Minsky machine by intuitionistic formulas. §3 concerns this simulation. Effective procedures for the construction of simulating modal formulas can be found in the literature (cf. [4]).The principal results of the paper are in §4. §5 gives some further undecidability results, that will be proved in another paper by modification of the method of this paper.I am indebted to the referee for drawing my attention to some errors in an earlier version of this paper.