Introduction Of Avian Influenza Viruses Research Articles

Migratory connectivity of Blue-winged Teal: risk implications for avian influenza virus introduction to Cuba

Migratory connectivity of Blue-winged Teal: risk implications for avian influenza virus introduction to Cuba

Wild Bird Surveillance in the Gauteng Province of South Africa during the High-Risk Period for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Introduction.

Migratory birds carried clade 2.3.4.4B H5Nx highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses to South Africa in 2017, 2018 and 2021, where the Gauteng Province is a high-risk zone for virus introduction. Here, we combined environmental faecal sampling with sensitive rRT-PCR methods and direct Ion Torrent sequencing to survey wild populations between February and May 2022. An overall IAV incidence of 42.92% (100/231) in water bird faecal swab pools or swabs from moribund or dead European White Storks (Ciconia ciconia) was detected. In total, 7% of the IAV-positive pools tested H5-positive, with clade 2.3.4.4B H5N1 HPAI confirmed in the storks; 10% of the IAV-positive samples were identified as H9N2, and five complete H9N2 genomes were phylogenetically closely related to a local 2021 wild duck H9N2 virus, recent Eurasian LPAI viruses or those detected in commercial ostriches in the Western and Eastern Cape Provinces since 2018. H3N1, H4N2, H5N2 and H8Nx subtypes were also identified. Targeted surveillance of wild birds using environmental faecal sampling can thus be effectively applied under sub-Saharan African conditions, but region-specific studies should first be used to identify peak prevalence times which, in southern Africa, is linked to the peak rainfall period, when ducks are reproductively active.

Efficacy of an automated laser for reducing wild bird visits to the free range area of a poultry farm

In the Netherlands, free-range layer farms as opposed to indoor layer farms, are at greater risk with regard to the introduction of avian influenza viruses (AIVs). Wild waterfowl are the natural reservoir hosts of AIVs, and play a major role in their transmission to poultry by contaminating free-range layer areas. The laser as a wild bird repellent has been in use since the 1970s, in particular around airfields to reduce bird-strike. The efficacy of laser for reducing wild bird numbers in and around free-range poultry areas has however not been investigated. During the autumn–winter, wild bird visits to the free-range area of a layer farm was surveilled by video-camera for a month without laser, followed by a month with laser. The automated laser (Class-III B qualification) was operated in two separate areas (i) within the poultry free-range area that directly bordered the poultry barn between 5:00 p.m. and 10:00 a.m. when poultry were absent (free-range study area, size 1.5 ha), and (ii) in surrounding grass pastures between 10:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. The overall (all bird species combined) efficacy of the laser for reducing the rate of wild birds visiting the free-range study area was 98.2%, and for the Orders Anseriformes and Passeriformes, respectively, was 99.7% and 96.1%. With the laser in operation, the overall exposure time of the free-range area to wild bird visits, but specifically to the Order Anseriformes, was massively reduced. It can be concluded that the Class-III B laser is highly proficient at keeping wild birds, in particular waterfowl, away from the free-range area of layer farms situated along a winter migration flyway.

Wild bird trade at live poultry markets potentiates risks of avian influenza virus introduction in Iran

ABSTRACT Wild aquatic birds are the main natural host reservoir of avian influenza viruses (AIV). Migratory aquatic birds can translocate AI viruses over wide geographic distances. AIV may be transmitted reciprocally at the wild bird–poultry interface, increasing viral variability and potentially driving the zoonotic potential of these viruses. A cross-sectional study on AIV and several further avian viral pathogens conducted in 396 trapped migratory aquatic birds traded at live bird markets (LBM) in northern Iran identified 11 AIV-positive cases. The 10 identified H9N2 viral sequences fell into wild bird H9 lineage Y439; in addition, an H10N3 virus of Eurasian lineage was detected. Ten samples contained low viral loads of avian coronavirus but could not be further characterized. Although traditional trading of live-trapped wild birds provides income for hunters, particularly during fall migration periods, it increases the risk of introducing new AIV strains from the natural reservoir to poultry kept at LBMs and, potentially, to traders and customers. Banning these birds from poultry trading lines would lower such risks considerably.

H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus introduction risk routes in a high biosecurity floor reared poultry setting

The European H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) epizootic during 2016-2017 resulted in both wild bird and poultry deaths throughout the EU. This in vivo study investigated the potential for indirect infection of naïve birds through contaminated drinking water or feed, to assess potential disease incursion into a high biosecurity commercial floor housed setting. Three-week-old Ross 308 chickens were exposed to H5N8 A/wigeon/Wales/52833/2016 (H5N8-2016) virus at a high (1 x 106 EID50/ml) or low (1 x 104 EID50/ml) dose, in either drinking water or feed for a 24 hour period. Chickens directly-infected with a high dose of H5N8-2016 (intra-nasal) acted as positive controls. Viral shedding, environmental contamination and clinical signs were monitored for ten days post infection (dpi). All directly-infected birds shed virus and were humanely terminated at 3 dpi. Immunohistochemical analysis of nasal epithelium and caecal tonsil lymphoid tissue, obtained at post mortem from directly-infected chickens (2 dpi), showed the presence of influenza antigen in both tissues. Only birds exposed to high dose virus in drinking water, shed virus and showed clinical disease presentation (67% mortality). Interestingly low levels of antigen were detected in the nasal epithelium, whereas higher levels were detected in the caecal tonsil. All surviving chickens from each group, remained uninfected and did not seroconvert. Our findings suggest virus bio availability in different substrates is variable (feed and water) and possible routes of viral contamination leading to disease ingress at poultry premises may have different outcomes including disease presentation.

Quantification of visits of wild fauna to a commercial free-range layer farm in the Netherlands located in an avian influenza hot-spot area assessed by video-camera monitoring.

Free‐range poultry farms have a high risk of introduction of avian influenza viruses (AIV), and it is presumed that wild (water) birds are the source of introduction. There is very scarce quantitative data on wild fauna visiting free‐range poultry farms. We quantified visits of wild fauna to a free‐range area of a layer farm, situated in an AIV hot‐spot area, assessed by video‐camera monitoring. A total of 5,016 hr (209 days) of video recordings, covering all 12 months of a year, were analysed. A total of 16 families of wild birds and five families of mammals visited the free‐range area of the layer farm. Wild birds, except for the dabbling ducks, visited the free‐range area almost exclusively in the period between sunrise and the moment the chickens entered the free‐range area. Known carriers of AIV visited the outdoor facility regularly: species of gulls almost daily in the period January–August; dabbling ducks only in the night in the period November–May, with a distinct peak in the period December–February. Only a small fraction of visits of wild fauna had overlap with the presence of chickens at the same time in the free‐range area. No direct contact between chickens and wild birds was observed. It is hypothesized that AIV transmission to poultry on free‐range poultry farms will predominantly take place via indirect contact: taking up AIV by chickens via wild‐bird‐faeces‐contaminated water or soil in the free‐range area. The free‐range poultry farmer has several possibilities to potentially lower the attractiveness of the free‐range area for wild (bird) fauna: daily inspection of the free‐range area and removal of carcasses and eggs; prevention of forming of water pools in the free‐range facility. Furthermore, there are ways to scare‐off wild birds, for example use of laser equipment or trained dogs.

Surveillance system for avian influenza in wild birds and implications for the improvement with insights into highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks during 2004-2017 in Japan

Surveillance system for avian influenza in wild birds and implications for the improvement with insights into highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks during 2004-2017 in Japan

A method to identify the areas at risk for the introduction of avian influenza virus into poultry flocks through direct contact with wild ducks.

Wild dabbling ducks are the main reservoir for avian influenza (AI) viruses and pose an ongoing threat to commercial poultry flocks. Combining the (i) size of that population, (ii) their flight distances and (iii) their AI prevalence, the density of AI-infected dabbling ducks (DID) was calculated as a risk factor for the introduction of AI viruses into poultry holdings of Emilia-Romagna region, Northern Italy. Data on 747 poultry holdings and on 39 AI primary outbreaks notified in Emilia-Romagna between 2000 and 2017 were used to validate that risk factor. A multivariable Bayesian logistic regression was performed to assess whether DID could be associated with the occurrence of AI primary outbreaks. DID value, being an outdoor flock, hobby poultry trading, species reared, length of cycle and flock size were used as explanatory variables. Being an outdoor poultry flock was significantly associated with a higher risk of AI outbreak occurrence. The probability of DID to be a risk factor for AI virus introduction was estimated to be 90%. A DID cut-off of 0.23 was identified to define high-risk areas for AI virus introduction. Using this value, the high-risk area covers 43% of the region. Seventy-four per cent of the primary AI outbreaks have occurred in that area, containing 39% of the regional poultry holdings. Poultry holdings located in areas with a high DID value should be included in a risk-based surveillance programme aimed at AI early detection.

Discordant detection of avian influenza virus subtypes in time and space between poultry and wild birds; Towards improvement of surveillance programs.

Avian influenza viruses from wild birds can cause outbreaks in poultry, and occasionally infect humans upon exposure to infected poultry. Identification and characterization of viral reservoirs and transmission routes is important to develop strategies that prevent infection of poultry, and subsequently virus transmission between poultry holdings and to humans. Based on spatial, temporal and phylogenetic analyses of data generated as part of intense and large-scale influenza surveillance programs in wild birds and poultry in the Netherlands from 2006 to 2011, we demonstrate that LPAIV subtype distribution differed between wild birds and poultry, suggestive of host-range restrictions. LPAIV isolated from Dutch poultry were genetically most closely related to LPAIV isolated from wild birds in the Netherlands or occasionally elsewhere in Western Europe. However, a relatively long time interval was observed between the isolations of related viruses from wild birds and poultry. Spatial analyses provided evidence for mallards (Anas platyrhynchos) being more abundant near primary infected poultry farms. Detailed year-round investigation of virus prevalence and wild bird species distribution and behavior near poultry farms should be used to improve risk assessment in relation to avian influenza virus introduction and retarget avian influenza surveillance programs.

Characterizing the temporal patterns of avian influenza virus introduction into Japan by migratory birds.

The objectives of the present study were to observe the temporal pattern of avian influenza virus (AIV) introduction into Japan and to determine which migratory birds play an important role in introducing AIV. In total, 19,407 fecal samples from migratory birds were collected at 52 sites between October 2008 and May 2015. Total nucleic acids extracted from the fecal samples were subjected to reverse transcription loop–mediated isothermal amplification to detect viral RNA. Species identification of host migratory birds was conducted by DNA barcoding for positive fecal samples. The total number of positive samples was 352 (prevalence, 1.8%). The highest prevalence was observed in autumn migration, and a decrease in prevalence was observed. During autumn migration, central to southern Japan showed a prevalence higher than the overall prevalence. Thus, the main AIV entry routes may involve crossing the Sea of Japan and entry through the Korean Peninsula. Species identification was successful in 221 of the 352 positive samples. Two major species sequences were identified: the Mallard/Eastern Spot-billed duck group (115 samples; 52.0%) and the Northern pintail (61 samples; 27.6%). To gain a better understanding of the ecology of AIV in Japan and the introduction pattern of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses, information regarding AIV prevalence by species, the prevalence of hatch-year migratory birds, migration patterns and viral subtypes in fecal samples using egg inoculation and molecular-based methods in combination is required.

Risk Assessment of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus Introduction into Poland via Legal Importation of Live Poultry.

The risk of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus introduction via import of live poultry results from the probability that infected birds are exported from apparently HPAI-free areas during the silent phase of the epidemic, i.e., the period between an incursion of the virus into a susceptible population and a report on the outbreak by an exporting country. In our study we adapted a stochastic model, previously published in 2010 by Sánchez-Vizcaíno et al., with our own modifications in which the probability of HPAI introduction was assessed as the sum of the probabilities of entry of at least one infected bird from each susceptible species exported from each country into each Polish region (county). The mean annual probability of HPAI introduction into Poland via legal trade of live poultry was very low (3.07 × 10(-3), which corresponds to 1 outbreak every 326 yr). The highest risk was associated with the import of turkeys (62%) and chickens (33%). The exporting countries that contributed the most to the overall risk were Italy (31%), the Netherlands (24%), and the Czech Republic (17%). The risk was not evenly distributed across the country and it seemed higher in western, north-central, and eastern Poland while several counties of the north-west, central, or south-east parts of the country were at negligible risk. The applied model provides quantitative evidence that the risk of HPAI introduction through legal trade of poultry does not play a major role and that other paths, such as wild birds migrations or illegal trade, should be considered as the most-likely routes along which the virus can be introduced.

Epidemiology of avian influenza in wild aquatic birds in a biosecurity hotspot, North Queensland, Australia

Migratory birds may introduce highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza from Southeast Asia into Australia via North Queensland, a key stopover along the East Asian-Australasian Flyway, with severe consequences for trade and human health. A 3-year repeated cross sectional study on the epidemiology of avian influenza in Australian nomadic wild aquatic birds was conducted in this potential biosecurity hotspot using molecular and serological techniques. Avian influenza virus subtypes H6 and H9 were commonly present in the studied population. It is likely that one of the H6 viruses was newly introduced through migratory birds confirming the perceived biosecurity risk. The matrix gene of another H6 virus was similar to the Australian H7 subtypes, which suggests the reassortment of a previously introduced H6 and local viruses. Similarly, a H9 subtype had a matrix gene similar to that found in Asian H9 viruses suggesting reassortment of viruses originated from Australia and Asia. Whilst H5N1 was not found, the serological study demonstrated a constant circulation of the H5 subtype in the sampled birds. The odds of being reactive for avian influenza viral antibodies were 13.1(95% CI: 5.9–28.9) for Pacific Black Ducks over Plumed Whistling Ducks, highlighting that some species of waterfowl pose a greater biosecurity risk. Antibody titres were slightly higher during warm wet compared with warm dry weather. Routine surveillance programmes should be established to monitor the introduction of avian influenza viruses from Asia and the interactions of the introduced viruses with resident viruses in order to better detect emerging pathogens in aquatic birds of North Queensland. Surveillance should be targeted towards highly susceptible species such as the Pacific Black Duck and carried out during favourable environmental conditions for viral transmission such as the wet season in northern Australia.

Risk factors for the introduction of avian influenza virus in breeder duck flocks during the first 24 weeks of laying

A study was carried out in French breeder duck flocks in 2008 and 2009 to identify practices and events related to the introduction of avian influenza viruses (AIVs). The status of flocks was assessed using serological methods for all subtypes of AIV without typing. Flocks managed with both natural mating and artificial insemination were investigated every 4 weeks from the beginning of the laying period up to seroconversion or for a maximum of 6 months. A questionnaire was completed with the farmer during each visit and 20 female ducks were randomly sampled for blood testing. Only flocks that tested seronegative at the first visit were included in the study (n =151 flocks managed with natural mating or artificial insemination). Data were analysed using survival analysis to identify factors influencing the time to seroconversion. Three separate models were constructed: one for the whole sample, one for natural mating flocks, and one for artificial insemination flocks. Factors related to the time to introduction of AIV included the type of production system linked to artificial insemination practices, the neighbourhood, poor disinfection practices, liquid manure management, presence of wildlife, and vehicles entering the building. No clear relationship could be observed in the serological status of male and female ducks in farms keeping male ducks separately from female ducks for artificial insemination. By respecting carefully biosecurity measures, it should be possible to decrease AIV infection of breeder duck flocks.

Pandemic Influenza A Viruses Escape from Restriction by Human MxA through Adaptive Mutations in the Nucleoprotein

The interferon-induced dynamin-like MxA GTPase restricts the replication of influenza A viruses. We identified adaptive mutations in the nucleoprotein (NP) of pandemic strains A/Brevig Mission/1/1918 (1918) and A/Hamburg/4/2009 (pH1N1) that confer MxA resistance. These resistance-associated amino acids in NP differ between the two strains but form a similar discrete surface-exposed cluster in the body domain of NP, indicating that MxA resistance evolved independently. The 1918 cluster was conserved in all descendent strains of seasonal influenza viruses. Introduction of this cluster into the NP of the MxA-sensitive influenza virus A/Thailand/1(KAN-1)/04 (H5N1) resulted in a gain of MxA resistance coupled with a decrease in viral replication fitness. Conversely, introduction of MxA-sensitive amino acids into pH1N1 NP enhanced viral growth in Mx-negative cells. We conclude that human MxA represents a barrier against zoonotic introduction of avian influenza viruses and that adaptive mutations in the viral NP should be carefully monitored.

Avian Influenza A Virus in Wild Birds in Highly Urbanized Areas

Avian influenza virus (AIV) surveillance studies in wild birds are usually conducted in rural areas and nature reserves. Less is known of avian influenza virus prevalence in wild birds located in densely populated urban areas, while these birds are more likely to be in close contact with humans. Influenza virus prevalence was investigated in 6059 wild birds sampled in cities in the Netherlands between 2006 and 2009, and compared with parallel AIV surveillance data from low urbanized areas in the Netherlands. Viral prevalence varied with the level of urbanization, with highest prevalence in low urbanized areas. Within cities virus was detected in 0.5% of birds, while seroprevalence exceeded 50%. Ring recoveries of urban wild birds sampled for virus detection demonstrated that most birds were sighted within the same city, while few were sighted in other cities or migrated up to 2659 km away from the sample location in the Netherlands. Here we show that urban birds were infected with AIVs and that urban birds were not separated completely from populations of long-distance migrants. The latter suggests that wild birds in cities may play a role in the introduction of AIVs into cities. Thus, urban bird populations should not be excluded as a human-animal interface for influenza viruses.

Looking for avian influenza in remote areas. A case study in Northern Vietnam

Epidemiological surveys of avian influenza infections rarely focus on backyard poultry systems in remote locations because areas with low levels of poultry production are considered to have little influence on the emergence, re-emergence, persistence or spread of avian influenza viruses. In addition, routine disease investigations in remote areas often are neglected due to the lower availability and relatively high cost of veterinary services there. A bank of avian sera collected in 2005 from ethnic minority households in Ha Giang province (Northern Vietnam), located on the Chinese border, was analysed to estimate the seroprevalence of avian influenza virus (AIV) during a H5N1 epidemic and to identify potential risk factors for infection. The results suggest that the chicken population had been exposed to AIV with a seroprevalence rate of 7.2% [1.45; 10.5]. The H5 and H9 subtypes were identified with a seroprevalence of 3.25% [2.39; 4.11] and 1.12% [0.61; 1.63], respectively. The number of inhabitants in a village and the distance to the main national road were the most influential risk factors of AIV infection, and high-risk clusters were located along the road leading to China. These two results suggest a virus spread through commercial poultry exchanges and a possible introduction of AIV from southern China. Remote areas and small-scale farms may play an under-estimated role in the spread and persistence of AIV.

Risk Factors for the Introduction of Avian Influenza Virus into Commercial Layer Chicken Farms During the Outbreaks Caused by a Low‐Pathogenic H5N2 Virus in Japan in 2005

Avian influenza outbreaks caused by a low-pathogenic H5N2 virus occurred in Japan from June to December 2005. All 41 affected farms housed layer chickens. Therefore, we conducted a case-control study targeting all commercial layer chicken farms within the movement restriction areas in Ibaraki prefecture, where most outbreaks were detected, to investigate the risk factors for the introduction of avian influenza virus (AIV). Four variables were identified as risk factors associated with the introduction of AIV by multivariate logistic regression: 'introduction of end-of-lay chickens ' (odds ratio (OR) = 36.6), 'sharing of farm equipment among farms' (OR = 29.4), 'incomplete hygiene measures of farm visitors on shoes, clothes and hands' (OR = 7.0), and 'direct distance to the nearest case farm' (0-500 m, OR = 8.6; 500-1000 m, OR = 0.8; 1000-1500 m, OR = 20.1; referenced more than 1500 m). We fully believe that strict biosecurity measures should be applied against any incursion points so as not to introduce AIV into more farms.

Active surveillance for avian influenza viruses in wild birds and backyard flocks in Northern Italy during 2004 to 2006

Following the avian influenza epidemics that occurred in Italy between 1997 and 2003, the Italian Ministry of Health in collaboration with veterinary authorities promoted, funded and implemented a national surveillance programme. The main objectives of the surveillance effort were to identify avian influenza viruses circulating in wild birds and to investigate the role of backyard poultry flocks in the dynamics of infection in a densely populated poultry area. Over 2 years (2004 to 2006), 164 backyard flocks and 4083 wild birds (mainly migratory Anseriformes and Charadriiformes) were sampled in three regions in the North of Italy. Samples collected were screened by means of real-time reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction and the positive samples were processed for attempted virus isolation in embryonated fowl's specific pathogen free eggs. At the end of the study period, 27 low-pathogenic avian influenza viruses had been isolated from backyard flocks and 49 strains obtained from wild birds. Of these, 26 belonged to the H5 or H7 subtype and were closely related to contemporary low-pathogenic strains of Eurasian lineage. The findings confirm that backyard free-range farming is at high risk for avian influenza virus introduction, and confirm the role of wild waterfowl in the introduction and perpetuation of low-pathogenic avian influenza viruses during the winter season in Southern Europe.

The epizootiology of the highly pathogenic avian influenza prior to the anticipated pandemic of the early twenty first century

The importance of the highly pathogenic avian influenza (AI) as a devastating disease of poultry has markedly increased during the last decade. By April 2006, it has become clear that the highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses of the H5N1 subtype are circulating in Asia, Africa (including Nigeria), Europe and the Americas, with Asia recording several human case fatalities.The introduction of AI viruses of the subtypes H5 and H7 of low pathogenicity (LP) from a reservoir in wild water birds has been at the base of this process. The acquisition of novel traits including lethality to waterfowls, ferrets, felids and humans indicate an expanding host range. Transmission of highly pathogenic H5N1 from domestic fowls back to migratory waterfowl in western China has increased the geographic spread. This has grave consequences for the poultry industry on a transcontinental scale and increases the need for good veterinary vaccines. Since exposure risks for humans are directly linked to the increased presence of potentially zooanthroponotic viruses in domestic poultry, there is justifiably a worldwide public concern. Many questions however, still remain unanswered from the avian and veterinary side of the story. The complexity and the potential impact of the current, zooanthroponotic HPAI H5N1 virus semi-pandemic in birds, therefore demands concerted and prudent actions from scientists, politicians, and the public. Animal Production Research Advances Vol. 2(1) 2006: 50-56

Molecular Evidence for a Role of Domestic Ducks in the Introduction of Avian H3 Influenza Viruses to Pigs in Southern China, Where the A/Hong Kong/68 (H3N2) Strain Emerged

The haemagglutinins (HAs) of five H3 influenza A viruses isolated from domestic ducks and one from a goose in southern China were analysed antigenically and genetically. The patterns of reactivity of two of the duck viruses and the goose virus with a panel of monoclonal antibodies to 10 different epitopes on the H3 HA were similar to those of influenza viruses isolated from wild ducks and pigs, as well as those of the earliest human H3 viruses. The other three isolates from domestic ducks were different from each other and from these viruses antigenically. Sequence analysis revealed that the HA genes of the two duck viruses and the goose virus were closely related to those of isolates from wild ducks and pigs; the identities between the deduced amino acid sequence of the HA of one of the isolates from domestic ducks and those of isolates from a wild duck and a pig were 98.7% and 99.5%, respectively. The antigenic and genetic similarity between these H3 HAs suggests that in southern China, the hypothetical influenza epicentre, domestic ducks may have played a role in the introduction of avian influenza viruses to pigs from feral ducks. The findings also support the hypothesis that the pig was a 'mixing vessel', producing a new human pandemic strain, A/Hong Kong/68 (H3N2), by genetic reassortment.